Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond

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Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond

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Jacqueline Klooster
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Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond: Introduction*

Jacqueline Klooster and Baukje van den Berg

This book is the result of an international conference held at Ghent University in May 2015. It sets out to study the reception of Homer in the context of reflections on the good ruler in antiquity and beyond: how and why did later authors employ Homeric epic to reflect on various types and aspects of leadership? This also includes the reception of Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror.[1] In this introduction, we address some preliminary points in order to shed light on the scope and importance of the topic. The first question to be addressed is what exactly is a Princes' Mirror and, next, whether the Homeric epics qualify as such or have been read as such (and if so, why). In a broader sense, this entails the question of how the reception of the epics functioned in various generically diverse ancient discussions of leadership. The last section considers the position of this book in the field of Homeric reception studies and announces its approach to the topic.

The Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond: The Princes' Mirror

The term 'Princes' Mirror' (*speculum regis/um* or *principis/um*) is not antique; it first appears as the title of Godfrey of Viterbo's treatise *Speculum Regum* (ca. 1180 AD).[2] On the other hand, the concept of a guide of conduct for rulers, either explicitly didactic (in the form of a series of instructions) or implicitly so

* The editors would like to thank the anonymous Brill referee for providing many useful suggestions. The conference from which this volume results was organized at Ghent University, May 2015, in the framework of a Marie Curie Pegasus Incoming Fellowship (*A Portrait of the Ruler as an Artist. The Evaluation of Writing Rulers in Antiquity*). The conference was generously funded by FWO, Ghent University Research Fund, and OIKOS.

1 The volume addresses the reception of Homeric epic in discussions of leadership and the good ruler in a broad sense, thus considering kings, emperors, military commanders, aristocrats etc. The terminology used throughout this introduction and the volume in general reflects this diversity of 'good rulers'.

2 This text provides a historical overview of kings rather than advice about good rule.

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(through the narrative representation of fictional or legendary kings and princes), is already attested in Near Eastern and Egyptian texts of the second millennium BC,[3] and knows a long tradition throughout classical antiquity.[4] We do not find theorizing about such texts to the extent that speaking of an ancient 'genre' is warranted; it would rather seem that there is a kind of anthropological universal at work in the desire to reflect on and advise the good king. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the title '*peri basileias*', which is attested regularly throughout antiquity (e.g. for Dio Chrysostom's Orations 1–4), did conjure up a set of specific expectations in readers.

As regards the image of the *speculum* or *katoptron/esoptron*, it may be pointed out that the particular metaphor of a 'mirror (for rulers)' does actually appear in antiquity, for instance in Seneca's *De Clementia* when Seneca speaks to young Nero:

> *Scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam modo speculi vice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem perventurum ad voluptatem maximam omnium.*
>
> SEN. *Clem.* pro. 1.1

> I have determined to write a book upon clemency, Nero Caesar, in order that I may as it were serve as a mirror to you, and let you see yourself arriving at the greatest of all pleasures.
>
> trans. STEWART

To elaborate on the implications of this metaphor helps to pinpoint the *aim* of 'Princes' Mirrors'. As Schulte (2001: 9) points out, through 'reflection' mirrors help the one who looks in them to adjust or correct himself; this goes for bathroom mirrors as much as for literary ones. Yet, as Seneca's phrase makes clear, what is seen in the Princes' Mirror is not necessarily an actual reflection of reality, but generally rather something that hovers between what *is* and what *should be*. The image in the mirror oscillates between a laudatory depiction of reality and admonitory praise of the (future) ideal (*te tibi ostenderem* perventurum *ad voluptatem maximam omnium*). In other words, Princes' Mirrors usually have an encomiastic function as well as a protreptic and didactic one. Since such texts are aimed both at established rulers and at aspiring ones,

3 See Böhl (1937), Hadot (1972) 556–568.

4 See Hadot (1972) 555–631, esp. 597–600; Schulte (2001); Roberts in *Brill's New Pauly* s.v. 'Princes' Mirror'.

we may expect them to frame their advice accordingly, now focusing more on praise (for the established ruler, e.g. Plinius' *Panegyricus* for Trajan), now more on direct instruction and admonishments (for the young or prospective ruler, e.g. Seneca's *De Clementia* for young Nero).

Numerous texts throughout antiquity reflect on aspects of leadership in generically and historically diverse contexts—we will encounter many of them throughout this volume. As regards the Princes' Mirror more specifically, in the archaic and classical Greek world, selected passages from larger works or entire texts could be said to answer to some degree to this 'genre'. We can for instance think of Hesiod's *Works and Days* (e.g. 201–204), and the fragmentary *Chironis Hypothēkai* attributed to him, which are allegedly based on the commandments of the wise educator of princes Chiron (whose advice is also referred to in Pindar's *P.* 6.21–27). In addition, we have Theognis' admonishments to Cyrnus; passages from Xenophon's *Symposium* (e.g. 4.6), and more extensively his *Cyropaedia*, *Agesilaus*, and *Hiero*; Plato's *State, Laws, Statesman, Charmides, Gorgias*, and *Critias*; Isocrates' *Nicocles* and *Evagoras*.

From the Hellenistic era only fragments survive, but it is evident that there was a substantial literature on Kingship answering to the demand of the courts of the Diadochs. Besides the title of Stoic works 'On Kingship' from which unfortunately nothing remains, fragments of Neo-Pythagorean treatises by Diotogenes, Sthenidas, and Ekphantos survive,[5] as well as the so-called Aristeas letter (second century BC), which describes in panegyric terms Ptolemy Philadelphus' erudition and desire for knowledge of Jewish religion.

In the context of Roman rule we find Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer*, a fragmentarily preserved treatise written for Calpurnius Piso, Philodemus' patron. As mentioned above, Seneca wrote *De Clementia* for his royal pupil Nero. The four *Kingship Orations* of Dio Chrysostom are aimed at Trajan, as is Pliny the Younger's *Panegyric*. Plutarch addressed his *Praecepta reipublicae gerendae* to a young man from Sardis who considered running for public office. Some also consider Marcus Aurelius' *Meditationes* a form of Princes' Mirror, ostensibly aimed at the author himself, but through him also at others. From late antiquity the *Caesares* of emperor Julian survive, a satirical dialogue about various historical imperial predecessors and their characteristics, and his panegyrics for Constantius II and Eusebia. To the same period belong the works of Libanius and Themistius, and of various Christian authors like Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*). We might say that Synesius' *De Regno* forms the

5 See Delatte (1942) and Schulte (2001) 125–170.

bookend of the ancient tradition, although the genre has a flourishing afterlife in the Byzantine era and the Latin Middle Ages.[6]

Turning to a later age, we find that the *topics* regularly addressed in Princes' Mirrors are aptly summed up in the words of Niccolò Machiavelli, as Manuel Schulte also observes (2001: 2). In a letter to his friend Francesco Vettori about his treatise *Il Principe*, in 1513, Machiavelli writes that he has attempted to answer the questions 1) what a kingdom is, 2) what types of rule exist, 3) how one may obtain them, 4) how one may keep them, 5) and how one may lose them. It is between these five questions a Princes' Mirror plays itself out, also in antiquity. Some authors may be more interested in reflecting on the first two and produce theories and definitions of various types of rule and constitutions, others focus more on the latter three, i.e. the actual practice of (good or bad) rule and how it affects the state. These themes, of course, are also addressed in other ancient and later texts reflecting on the good ruler.

Besides these topics, a number of continuities in theme and form can be observed in the Princes' Mirrors. Most importantly, *mythical, legendary, or historical examples* illustrating specific virtues to be copied or vices to be abhorred occur frequently, to admonish established as well as prospective rulers (e.g. Alexander in Dio's second *Kingship Oration* for Trajan, or the many historical examples in Plutarch's *Praecepta reipublicae gerendae*, aimed at an aspiring young politician). This use of great examples from the past suggests that there is a similarity between Princes' Mirrors and ancient political biography, or even historiography more broadly.[7] Looking at Cornelius Nepos or Plutarch, it is easy to understand how their descriptions of series of great men from the past were meant to function as Princes' Mirrors for aspiring rulers and the political elite. Plutarch actually uses the metaphor of the mirror himself to point out how this works:

> Ἐμοὶ [μὲν] τῆς τῶν βίων ἅψασθαι μὲν γραφῆς συνέβη δι' ἑτέρους, ἐπιμένειν δὲ καὶ φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι' ἐμαυτόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἁμῶς γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀλλ' ἢ συνδιαιτήσει καὶ συμβιώσει τὸ γινόμενον ἔοικεν, ὅταν ὥσπερ

6 For the Princes' Mirror in Byzantium, see Blum (1981). Hadot (1972) col. 555–631, esp. 597–600, and Schulte (2001) provide overviews of the theme of the Princes' Mirror in antiquity. Schulte also includes Quintus Cicero's *Commentariolum Petitionis* and Augustus' *Res Gestae* in his discussion; we have here left them aside because, in our view, they do not strictly belong to the genre: the first is geared to the campaigner in the Roman elections specifically, the second is more conceived as a self-glorifying autobiography than as a didactic text.

7 Compare the *historia magistra vitae*-idea, cf. Cic. *De Oratore* 2.9.36.

> ἐπιξενούμενον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑποδεχόμενοι καὶ παραλαμβάνοντες ἀναθεωρῶμεν 'ὅσσος ἔην οἷός τε' [*Il.* 24.630], τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ κάλλιστα πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων λαμβάνοντες.
>
> PLU. *Aem. Paul.* 1

> I began the writing of my 'Lives' for the sake of others, but I find that I am continuing the work and delighting in it now for my own sake also, using history as a mirror and endeavouring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues therein depicted. For the result is like nothing else than daily living and associating together, when I receive and welcome each subject of my history in turn as my guest, so to speak, and observe carefully 'how large he was and of what mien' [*Il.* 24.630], and select from his career what is most important and most beautiful to know.
>
> trans. PERRIN

The Homeric quotation in this passage points to the pervasive influence of Homer in discussions of leadership. Indeed, Homeric heroes, too, could and often did function as exempla in such texts. Margalit Finkelberg in fact argues that throughout antiquity, there was a sense that the mythical past was continuous with Greek history and as a result,

> it became possible to mention Achilles and Brasidas, Nestor and Pericles in the same breath, as for example in Plato's *Symposium* [221], simply because they were seen as belonging to the same historical place.[8]

Because of his status in education, Homer was the text *par excellence* when it came to the selection of such mythical examples, as will be addressed more fully below.

So what were the *characteristics* offered for imitation, whether through such examples or through direct instruction? Paradoxically, we may turn to an Anti-Princes' Mirror to explore this question. According to Wilhelm Blum (1981: 2), such an *Anti-Fürstenspiegel* is first found in Homer's description of Thersites (*Il.* 2.211–269). Thersites' physical appearance, social position among the heroes, manner of speech, and general character all point in the direction of an extremely negative appraisal, which reverses the aristocratic norm or ideal:[9]

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8 Finkelberg (2003) 83. Cf. Scodel (1982) 35: 'in Homer, the continuity of history from the heroes to the poet's contemporaries is complete'.

9 Cf. e.g. schol. A bT *Il.* 2.212b, where it is argued that Homer deliberately ridicules Thersites to 'lighten the air'. On Thersites and Homeric heroic ideology, see e.g. Thalmann (1988).

Ἄλλοι μέν ῥ’ ἕζοντο, ἐρήτυθεν δὲ καθ’ ἕδρας·
Θερσίτης δ’ ἔτι μοῦνος ἀμετροεπὴς ἐκολῴα,
ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδη,
μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν,
ἀλλ’ ὅ τι οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοίϊον Ἀργείοισιν
ἔμμεναι· αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε·
φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ’ ἕτερον πόδα· τὼ δέ οἱ ὤμω
κυρτώ, ἐπὶ στῆθος συνοχωκότε· αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε
φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλήν, ψεδνὴ δ’ ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.
ἔχθιστος δ’ Ἀχιλῆϊ μάλιστ’ ἦν ἠδ’ Ὀδυσῆϊ·
τὼ γὰρ νεικείεσκε· τότ’ αὖτ’ Ἀγαμέμνονι δίῳ
ὀξέα κεκλήγων λέγ’ ὀνείδεα· τῷ δ’ ἄρ’ Ἀχαιοὶ
ἐκπάγλως κοτέοντο νεμέσσηθέν τ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ.
Il. 2.211–223

Now the others sat down and were restrained in their places, only Thersites still kept chattering on, of measureless speech, whose mind was full of a great store of disorderly words, with which to revile the kings, recklessly and in no due order, but whatever he thought would raise a laugh among the Argives. Ugly was he beyond all men who came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in one foot, and his shoulders were rounded, hunching together over his chest, and above them his head was pointed, and a scant stubble grew on it. Hateful was he to Achilles above all, and to Odysseus, for those two he was in the habit of reviling; but now with shrill cries he uttered abuse against noble Agamemnon. With him were the Achaeans exceedingly angry, and indignant in their hearts.[10]

Thersites is ugly and disabled, he speaks both too much (ἀμετροεπής) and not in an orderly way (ἄκοσμά, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον), he is only out for laughs, and he creates divisiveness. He is also hated by what are arguably the two best heroes of the *Iliad*, Achilles and Odysseus, and hates and reviles them in return. It follows, and can be amply illustrated by Homeric quotations, that a ‘Good Ruler’ according to Homer should in all ways be his opposite: he should be of sound body, perhaps even physically beautiful (as the Homeric heroes

10 Throughout the volume, translations of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are taken from the most recent Loeb editions, Murray & Dimock (1995) and Murray & Wyatt (1999).

frequently are),[11] he should be a wise and pleasant speaker, whose words are honey-sweet,[12] he should aim at reaching consensus among the group, or at least be concerned with what benefits the community, and justly praise the good acts of his peers with friendly words.[13] If this characterizes his behaviour, the people will revere him like a god,[14] and he will be like a herdsman of the people, protecting them.[15] In Thersites, reversals of these implicit norms and negative narratorial qualifications make abundantly clear what the audience's opinion regarding this 'hero' should be. Later texts, such as Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer*, indeed point to the use of Thersites as a negative example.[16]

Yet, interestingly enough, there are also a number of works praising Thersites to be found in antiquity. These appear, not surprisingly perhaps, in the context of *progymnasmata* of the Second Sophistic and beyond.[17] The fourth-century orator Libanius, for instance, in a full-blown encomium, ingeniously and counter-intuitively argues that Thersites is actually an excellent example of virtue: he is not of lowly birth, to begin with, but related to prince Diomedes. In his youth, he moreover participated in the heroic hunt for the Calydonian boar, like a true aristocrat. His deformity is the result of a disease that later befell him, and he should not be blamed on account of it. In fact, it is extremely praiseworthy in him that he should have come to Troy even so, instead of trying to escape his duties like the able-bodied Achilles and Odysseus had done. Odysseus' and Achilles' initial unwillingness to participate in the war also explains the mutual enmity between courageous Thersites and these 'heroes', according to Libanius. Thersites' tendency to speak truth to power (as in *Iliad* 2.225–242) was not aimed at drawing the laughs, then, but to point out the despicable and unbeneficial behaviour of the leaders, enthralled as they are by their desire for women and money. That Odysseus resorts to violence and Agamemnon offers no response to Thersites' attacks proves only how well-grounded his accusations are—and moreover, he is really repeating what Achilles had already

11 E.g. Agamemnon, resembling the gods Zeus, Poseidon, and Ares (*Il.* 2.477–483).

12 E.g. Nestor, whose words flow like honey (*Il.* 1.248–249).

13 E.g. Odysseus (*Il.* 2.180).

14 E.g. Odysseus' words to Alcinous (*Od.* 8.166–180).

15 E.g. Agamemnon, the 'herdsman of the people' (*Il.* 2.243, 10.3, 11.187, 11.202, 14.22, *Od.* 4.532), the bull among the cows (*Il.* 2.480–483).

16 See Dorandi (1982) 155, referring to col. 21 and 35.18; cf. also Ps.-Isocrates, *Ad Demon.* 15.

17 Favorinus wrote an encomium of Thersites (cf. Barigazzi [1966] 139) and so did Libanius (Gibson [2008] 228–237).

brought forward and which no one finds fault with. Thersites, in sum, is nothing less than a Demosthenes *avant la lettre*, Libanius triumphantly and no doubt playfully concludes.

As this Homeric passage and its reception demonstrate, even an ostensibly negative example can be used in several ways. The audience may extrapolate positive princely qualities from their negation, but one can also simply take any example as a starting point (*aphormē* is the word used by Philodemus in his treatise)[18] and proceed to twist it around ingeniously, as Libanius does. Of course, the more regular mode of extracting or constructing a canon of virtues from examples was by quoting the *positive* descriptions of Homeric and other historical or legendary rulers and their great deeds. As we have now seen, a kingly physique, and a righteous and wise and eloquent manner of speech that benefits the community belong to the core values of Homeric kingship. In particular the descriptions of Agamemnon as a herdsman of the people (*Il.* 2.243), or a strong bull among the cows (*Il.* 2.480–484), and Odysseus' description of the blissful state of the country where a pious and just king rules (*Od.* 19.107–114) proceeded to have great influence on Greco-Roman thinking about leadership. The values incorporated in these 'good rulers' would have a long legacy, and numerous other similar qualities like clemency, constancy, magnanimity, generosity, truthfulness, piety, wisdom, urbanity, education, and physical courage would be added by later political theorists, often basing themselves on Homeric examples.

Homer and the Good Ruler in Antiquity and Beyond: Homeric Epic as Princes' Mirror

This brings us to the question of whether the Homeric epics *qualify as Princes' Mirrors*. As Irene de Jong points out in this volume, the answer to this question depends to a large degree on whether or not one chooses to ascribe to Homer a didactic intention. Most modern scholars would probably hesitate to state that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have an outright didactic outlook, even if in the past this view has certainly, and not entirely unconvincingly, been voiced, for instance by Werner Jaeger and Eric Havelock.[19] The appraisal of Homer's didactic intentions necessarily also affects the question of whether Homeric

18 Col. 43.16 Dorandi.

19 Jaeger ([1933] 1946) 3–56 and Havelock (1963) 61–96.

epic qualifies as Princes' Mirror, a type of text that *qualitate qua* has a didactic aim. Scholars have held various opinions about this. Richard Martin recognizes in *Odyssey* 19.107–114 elements of a widespread archaic doctrine of sacred kingship. This is why he argues that Homer participates in an age-old tradition of kingship literature or Princes' Mirrors.[20] Manuel Schulte, who denies an overall didactic intent, sees Homer's epics mainly as *Vorläuferliteratur* (2001: 21–29) in which various passages do point towards this tradition. Michael Roberts goes further and holds that Homeric poetry both stands in an age-old tradition of literature providing guidelines for rulers and 'formed the basis for the tradition of the Princes' Mirror for a millennium'.[21] Finally, in this volume Irene de Jong focuses on 'the birth of the Princes' Mirror' in Homeric epic by pointing out various discrete passages that emphatically centre on the theme of the advice for the young or prospective ruler.

So whether or not we decide to label the whole of Homer's epics didactic, it is certainly true that in the *Iliad* advice for the ruler or education of a young prince is made central to the action in a number of important scenes. Thus, at 1.254–284 the wise counsellor Nestor advises Agamemnon and Achilles to stop quarrelling; at 9.434–605 Phoenix tries to convince Achilles to let go of his wrath by telling him exemplary tales; at 11.655–803 Nestor speaks at length to Patroclus to make him convince Achilles to return to battle—and the list could be made much longer.[22] Important passages in the *Odyssey* can also be read as disquisitions on good rule (Odysseus' reign as it was on Ithaca before he left, in particular the ideals he expresses regarding kingship, 8.166–181; 19.107–122), and again, its opposite (the suitors' squandering of Ithaca's wealth). Telemachus' '*Bildungsroman*' in Books 1–4 in particular reads like an instruction for young aristocrats.[23] Indeed, the figure of Athena, taking on the physical appearance of Odysseus' friend Mentes/Mentor and advising Telemachus on what steps to take, lives on even today in our word *mentor*.

Apart from these distinctly didactic passages, it is clear in any case that *political themes* like good governance, consensus and discord, the relation between individual and collective, or 'merit and responsibility', belong to the central concerns of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[24] As Osborne (2004: 212) notes:

20 Martin (1984) 29–48.

21 Roberts in *Brill's New Pauly* s.v. *Princes' Mirror*.

22 See De Jong in this volume.

23 See Martin (1984) 29–48.

24 See in particular Adkins (1960), Calhoun (1962), Raaflaub (1993) esp. 46–59, Hölkeskamp (2002), Hammer (2002), Elmer (2013).

> Homeric epic is highly political. The *Iliad* explores relations between paramount chiefs in the context of a rather exceptional form of inter-city warfare. The *Odyssey* examines issues of political succession in an extreme situation of political vacuum and uncertainty. The desirability of self-government, and the importance to individuals of status and power within the community, go without question.

These political themes made Homer, as David Elmer (2013: 12) notes with regard to the *Iliad*, 'good to think with' in political debate. Already in antiquity Aristotle and others used Homeric quotations to discuss issues such as the distribution of honour in proportion to the individual's contribution to the wellbeing of the community. Thus Aristotle (*Pol.* 1267a1) cites *Iliad* 9.318–319: 'Stay at home or work your hardest, your share will be the same, coward and hero are given equal honour.' And examples could—and will, in this volume—be multiplied.

This practice ran up against the objections of some ancient thinkers, most (in)famously Plato.[25] As Nietzsche ([1887] 1988: 154) remarked, 'Homer versus Plato, that is the complete, the genuine antagonism.' He was no doubt thinking among others of the following famous passage, the ultimate demonstration of the way Plato's Socrates tries to dethrone Homer as 'educator of the Greeks':

> οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πρὸς διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν, φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν: εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.
>
> ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
>
> PL. *R.* 10.606e–607a

25 On Plato and Homer, see e.g. Labarbe (1949), P. Murray (1996), Clay (2000), Destrée & Herrmann (2011), and Lake in this volume.

> 'Then, Glaucon', said I, 'when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas, and that for the conduct and education of human affairs he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love and salute them as doing the best they can, and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic of poets and the first of tragedians, but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men. For if you grant admission to the honeyed Muse in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best.' 'Most true', he said.
>
> trans. SHOREY

Plato's vehemence actually demonstrates how widely it was believed throughout antiquity that one could learn practically everything from Homer.[26] Not only were *Iliad* and *Odyssey* read in schools as 'classics', but many also believed the epics could and did illustrate ideas about the management of human affairs (διοίκησίν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων), and so about good rule. In other words, they also functioned as guidelines for rulers, which is precisely what is condemned and rejected in this passage.[27] As Socrates argues, philosophers should rule, not the 'honeyed Muse in lyric and epic'. The point of this passage is clearly that philosophers are capable of reasonable government, whereas the poets' depictions of government are uninformed, irrational and hence not trustworthy, and certainly not to be adopted as authoritative.

But as is well known, Plato is the exception: antiquity's readings of Homer were predominantly positive and normative. This positive appraisal is reflected in the tendency to read his epics as Princes' Mirrors. The practice may be illustrated, for instance, by a striking passage from Isocrates' *Panathenaicus*, which takes Agamemnon, often seen as a problematic ruler by modern scholars, as the ultimate example of good rule.[28]

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26 Cf. also Heraclit. *All.* 1.5–7, Isoc. *Panegyr.* 159, Ar. *Ran.* 1034. The absurd extremes of this idea are ridiculed in Plato's *Ion* and Xenophon's *Symposium* (4.6). For literature on Homer as a didactic text in antiquity and Homer in educational practice, see Verdenius (1970), Morgan (1998), Sluiter (1999), Horsley (2000), Cribiore (2001).

27 Cf. also Pl. *R.* 3.386a–392c, where the unbecoming conduct of heroes is rejected as an example for the guardian class of Socrates' ideal city.

28 On the positive ancient evaluation of Agamemnon, see Bouchard in this volume; on his reception as a problematic ruler by Graves, see McKenzie in this volume.

> στρατόπεδον γὰρ συνεληλυθὸς ἐξ ἁπασῶν τῶν πόλεων, τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος ὅσον εἰκός, ὃ πολλοὺς εἶχεν ⟨ἐν⟩ αὑτῷ τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ θεῶν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν γεγονότας, οὐχ ὁμοίως διακειμένους τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐδ' ἴσον φρονοῦντας τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ὀργῆς καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ φθόνου καὶ φιλοτιμίας μεστούς, ἀλλ'ὅμως τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔτη δέκα κατέσχεν οὐ μισθοφοραῖς μεγάλαις οὐδὲ χρημάτων δαπάναις, αἷς νῦν ἅπαντες δυναστεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ καὶ τῇ φρονήσει διαφέρειν καὶ δύνασθαι τροφὴν ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων τοῖς στρατιώταις πορίζειν, καὶ μάλιστα τῷ δοκεῖν ἐκεῖνον ἄμεινον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων βουλεύεσθαι σωτηρίας ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν.
>
> ISOC. *Panath.* 81–82

> He commanded an army which had come together from every city, a host whose size may be imagined since it contained many of the descendants of the gods and of the direct sons of gods—men who were not of the same temper as the majority of mankind nor on the same plane of thinking, but full of spirit and passion and envy and ambition—and yet he held that army together for ten years, not by great bribes nor by outlays of money, by which means all leaders nowadays maintain their power, but by the supremacy of his intelligence [*phronēsis*], by his ability to provide from the enemy subsistence for his soldiers, and most of all by his reputation of being better advised in the interest of others than others in their own interest.
>
> trans. NORLIN, adapted

This passage illustrates how far such a positive reading of Homer's kings could go, and how natural it apparently was to take the example of the legendary ruler Agamemnon to say something useful about contemporary politics. Indeed, as has already transpired a number of times in this introduction, a variety of ancient works are entirely dedicated to the theme of learning about good rule from Homer, such as the first century BC epicurean philosopher Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer*, Dio Chrysostom's *Kingship Orations*, and Porphyry's lost treatise *On the Utility of Homer for Kings*, whose title is transmitted in the *Suda*.[29]

Apart from these specialized treatises, the practice of reading Homeric epic as providing examples of good (and occasionally bad) rule and hence (implicit) instructions for rulers, or reflections on the practice of kingship, is extremely widespread in ancient literature, as this book aims to show. Since moreover

29 *Suda* π 2098.

discussion about the definition of good governance and the question what type of constitution was best are among the evergreen topics of Greek and Roman ethical and political philosophy, it is clear that the reception of Homeric epic as a reflection on politics and different styles of leadership is immense, as well as immensely important.

Aim and Scope of the Book

The pervasiveness and importance of the topic make it all the more remarkable that, to date, no scholarly attempts have been made to produce a sustained inquiry into the development of the reception of Homer's good ruler and the Homeric epics as Princes' Mirror in ancient Greek and Latin literature, let alone beyond. Some studies address specific aspects of the theme: the *Iliad* is discussed as a poem about 'politics' in a number of works.[30] The *reception* of Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror forms the theme of various monographs on specific texts, both in ancient and modern reception studies. Such analyses of, for example, Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer* and Dio Chrysostom's *Kingship Orations*, however, typically treat the theme solely in relation to their specific topic and text, not in the context of an overall and comparative treatment.[31] Plato's reaction to Homer's influence on Greek education is a subject of its own.[32] Bizer's 2011 study, *Homer and the Politics of Authority in Renaissance France*, again, only looks at the political reception and appropriation of Homer in Renaissance France. What is lacking, however, is a fuller treatment of this pervasive and important theme throughout European culture.

A number of reasons for this absence can be identified. In the first place, despite many historical, sociological, and cultural approaches, modern scholarship has long tended to focus on Homeric poetry as 'literature'; it has often approached Homeric epic mainly through a study of stylistic, structural or thematic issues, rather than focusing on the cultural or societal roles its reception may have played in the ancient world. Although general awareness that Homer was read as a compendium of values has certainly never been absent, the modern tendency has nevertheless been to consider the epics as 'literary products' rather than didactic texts. As Eric Havelock (1963: 61) phrased it:

30 See in particular Calhoun (1962), Raaflaub (1993) esp. 46–59, Hölkeskamp (2002), Hammer (2002), Elmer (2013).

31 On Philodemus, see e.g. O. Murray (1965), Dorandi (1982). On Dio, see Milazzo (1978) 73–107, Vagnone (2012).

32 See n. 25 above.

> To approach Homer in the first instance as a didactic author is asking a good deal from any reader and is not likely to win his early sympathy. The very overtones of the word 'epic' implying as they do the grandiose sweep of large conceptions, vivid action and lively portraiture, seem to preclude such an estimate of Greece's first poet. Surely for Homer the tale is the thing.

Whereas this focus on Homer as literature is no longer so predominant in Homeric studies, it does explain why studies of Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror and its reception have not been undertaken at an earlier stage.

As pointed out earlier, Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror can be considered a sub-topic of the theme of Homeric epic as a didactic, educative text, a compendium of societal values and ethical norms with quasi-encyclopaedic stature for the Greeks.[33] As such, it has been treated within the context of Homer's educative value in general, albeit mostly cursorily. For instance, the reception of Homeric epic as an instruction text for orators (who are often engaged in political rule) has been studied frequently.[34] It seems likely that this somewhat scattered approach has obscured the possibility of attempting a more general focus on this specific strain of advice for rulers in Homeric reception.

Finally, the topic of the reception of Homer as Princes' Mirror and Homeric ideas of rulership is enormously, perhaps even dauntingly, broad, since, as Aeschylus already saw, the whole of Greek literature could be seen as 'slices of Homer's banquet' (Ath. 8.347e).[35] This means that there are innumerable texts one could turn to for interpretations of the Homeric epics as Princes' Mirrors, and completeness becomes a near impossible aim—and let it be clear right away that this book does not strive for such completeness but merely wishes to undertake a first more sustained effort to look at this line of reception. It is hoped that this will inspire further research in this direction.

Of key importance in any study on (classical) reception is the idea that reception is a two-way process: studying the way in which Homer is received in, say, Silius Italicus' *Punica* elucidates the *Punica* as much as (Silius' reading

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33 This latter theme has often been treated in the past, in particular by Jaeger ([1933] 1946), Marrou (1948), Havelock (1963), Verdenius (1970), Finkelberg (2003) 75–97.

34 See e.g. Kennedy (1957), Hunter (2015), Van den Berg (2016), Pontani (2016).

35 Cf. Longin. *Subl.* 13.3, who sees Homer as the 'source' for all subsequent poetry. On this image, see Brink (1971) 553–556, Williams (1978) 98–99. Homer appears as the 'father' of all later literature in e.g. Nonn. *D.* 25.265.

of) Homeric epic.[36] The source text is re-interpreted, reshaped, and received under influence of what Jauss, building on Gadamer's thought, designates as 'the horizon of expectations' of any given period. In other words, the reception of Homer is influenced by both the historical, social, and cultural context of the receiver and the generic and rhetorical constraints of the receiving text. For the didactic reception of Homer specifically, this means that the receivers tend to read their own programme into the Homeric epics, a programme that reflects the needs and preconceptions of their own period and genre.[37] More concretely, this means that an ancient scholiast is likely to read into Homeric epic a different concept of the good ruler than Eustathios in twelfth-century Byzantium; Philodemus in the Imperial Period may use Homeric epic to propagate different qualities of the good ruler than Christophoros Kondoleon in sixteenth-century Italy. Similarly, we may expect to find a different reading of Homer in Plato's philosophical works, Polybius' *Histories*, or Plutarch's anecdotal *Table Talk*, depending on differences not so much of historical period but of genre. This volume, then, aims to explore a multiplicity of 'receptions' of Homer's Good Ruler over a large span of time and in diverging genres. In doing so, it hopes to shed light on the reception of Homer as political and educational text, which was appropriated according to the needs of a specific period, on the one hand, and to explore these needs and ideas of good rulership in specific periods, on the other hand.

To illustrate this multiplicity and diversity, the current collection of essays studies generically different texts which each incorporate readings of Homeric epic in order to reflect on rulership and forms of governance. It offers readings of Homeric epic as a Princes' Mirror in the works of certain authors within their own historical context, in order to provide, in the end, a diachronic overview of how Homeric epic functioned as such throughout antiquity and beyond, in Byzantium, the Early Modern Period, and the twentieth century. It thus aims to trace both change and continuity in the reception of Homer and in conceptions of good rule throughout the ages.

In order to trace the diachronic development, the papers in this collection are arranged chronologically, starting with Homer himself. As mentioned above, Irene de Jong opens the volume by exploring the 'birth of the Princes' Mirror' in Homeric poetry by discussing discrete examples of advice to young

36 On the reception of Homer in Silius Italicus' *Punica*, see Pyy in this volume.

37 Sluiter (1999: 173–174, 176–179) discusses this phenomenon for ancient commentators specifically. A similar idea is expressed in Sluiter (1998) 14–15.

or prospective rulers in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Next, Will Desmond highlights one aspect, viz. the piety of the Homeric ruler, who is godlike on the one hand and a representative of his people before the gods on the other. Desmond focuses on the important figures of Odysseus and Achilles in particular, tracing moreover the reception of the latter's piety as a model for Aeneas, Alexander, and Julian. The third paper, by Jacqueline Klooster, explores Phoenix' definition of the good ruler as a doer of deeds and a speaker of words (*Il.* 9.443), that is to say, as possessing both excellence in counsel and physical courage. The paper discusses both its implications within the *Iliad* and its reception in antiquity, addressing topics and texts to be further explored in other papers along the way. As such, these three papers shed light on Homer's conception of the good ruler in both a synchronic and diachronic perspective, in Homer and in Homeric reception, and thus provide a useful basis for the readings of individual authors to follow.

These readings, ironically one may say, start with Plato, Homer's most passionate opponent. Patrick Lake analyses the Homeric quotations in Book 3 of the *Republic* and argues that Plato in fact uses his interpretation of these passages to *support* his idea of good rule and obedience, thus making poetry an ally of, rather than an adversary to philosophy. Elsa Bouchard explores the largely positive reception of Agamemnon—a problematic ruler in modern eyes—in the Homeric scholia and *zētēmata* tradition. Maria Gerolemou focuses on Odysseus, demonstrating how Polybius uses this figure in his *Histories* as an example of his idea of a good ruler who has gained geographical knowledge and useful experience through his wanderings.

The next papers explore various generically diverse texts from the Imperial Age, from its beginnings to its later ages, from the Greek as well as the Roman world. Jeffrey Fish identifies the qualities of the good ruler that Philodemus reads in the Homeric epics, providing a fuller picture than ever before thanks to newly edited fragments. Casper de Jonge studies a Greek scholar in Rome and argues that Dionysius of Halicarnassus' ideas on good rule—exemplified to some extent by Homer's swineherd Eumaeus—were part of the same intellectual and socio-cultural world as Augustus' ideas on good rule—exemplified to some extent by Virgil's Arcadian king Evander. David Driscoll delves into Plutarch's *Table Talk* and specifically the anecdotes told by middle-class symposiasts in which the Homeric epics are quoted to rulers, in order to shed light on the socio-cultural role of *paideia* and of knowledge of Homer in the Imperial Age. Elina Pyy takes us to Flavian Rome and analyses the reception of Homer's ideal of heroism and rulership in the heroic code as set out by Silius Italicus in his *Punica*, showing that this is no longer appropriate to the situation in the Roman Empire after the civil wars.

The final papers move beyond antiquity to twelfth-century Byzantium, sixteenth-century Europe, and the Great War in the twentieth century. The paper by Baukje van den Berg analyses Eustathios of Thessalonike's praise of emperor Manuel I Komnenos as a good ruler *qua* orator. It points to similarities that Eustathios perceives between the excellent oratory of Manuel and of Homer as *summus orator* to shed light on twelfth-century ideas on oratory and the reception of Homer herein. Filippomaria Pontani provides an analysis of Kondoleon's *On the Good King According to Homer*, a text that has hardly been studied before. The document is a moralistic manifesto, providing rulers in sixteenth-century Italy with examples of qualities that good rulers should have and did have in the good old times. Finally, the *Iliad* is used as a negative Princes' Mirror in Robert Graves' translation *The Anger of Achilles*, as Laura McKenzie argues in the last contribution. Her paper explores how Graves attempts to come to terms with his traumatic experiences in the Great War through his translation of the *Iliad*, making the rulers in the *Iliad* 'mirror' the rulers in the War, i.e. the commanders of the army.

Taken together, all papers show how rich and versatile the history of reading the Homeric epics as Princes' Mirror is, and will probably always remain.

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The Birth of the Princes' Mirror in the Homeric Epics

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Introduction: Homer, Educator of the Greeks?

One of the topics of this volume is the reception of the Homeric epics as a Princes' Mirror, i.e. these texts having been read throughout the ages as a source of instruction for young elite readers. This educational reception can be compared to others, such as reading the *Iliad* as a poem about post-traumatic stress, or the *Odyssey* as a poem about nostalgia or as the first *Bildungsroman*. The Homeric epics share this long and colourful history of reception with other great works of world literature, and such multifarious receptions actually explain their status as classic or canonical texts.

When looking at different strands of reception it is always interesting to ask whether a particular later reading tallies with the intentions of the author himself. Thus Verdenius in his discussion of 'Homer the educator of the Greeks'[1] rightly suggests that we should distinguish between 'educational influence' and 'educational intention'.[2] Homer's educational influence is unmistakable, has been traced for both antiquity and modern times, and is tangible up until the present day in our word 'mentor'.[3] But how about his educational intention? This, of course, is more slippery terrain, but there are some famous defenders: Jaeger, Havelock, and Verdenius himself.

Jaeger in his classic study *Paideia* goes furthest of all. He declares Homer not only the educator of the Greeks but 'the teacher of all humanity' and considers both poems *in their entirety* as forms of education, both explicit and

1 Verdenius with his title of course refers to Plato *Republic* 10.606e2–3 (τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητής).

2 Cf. Griffith (2001) 33–34: 'Whether or not (as some have claimed) the original purpose of the *Iliad* was precisely to provide a comprehensive ethical reference work for the young, the poems certainly came to play such a role'. The *Homer Encyclopedia*, edited by Finkelberg (2011), distinguishes between 'Education in Homer' and 'Homer in Education'.

3 See e.g. Verdenius (1970) 5–19, Clarke (1981), Howie (1995) 142–146, Lamberton (1997), Den Boer (2004), and Finkelberg (2012). The origin of the concept of a mentor as derived from the figure of Mentor is to be found in Fénelon's *Les Aventures de Télémaque*.

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implicit.[4] Explicit education takes place in the conversation between Phoenix and Achilles in *Iliad* 9 or Telemachus' travels in *Odyssey* 1–4. Implicit education is inherent in the genre of epic poetry in general, whose 'educational aim and influence are far greater than that of all other types of poetry, because it gives an objective picture of life as a whole, and portrays men at hand-grips with destiny, struggling to win a noble prize' (43).

Havelock also sees both Homeric poems as in their entirety providing instruction in matters political, religious, and even technical. He notoriously speaks of 'Homer as a sort of tribal encyclopaedia', and contends that 'the tale is made subservient to the task of accommodating the weight of educational materials which lie within it'. If you want to know how to beach a ship, you only have to read *Iliad* 1.432–436.[5]

Verdenius, finally, argues that Jaeger and Havelock are going too far in seeing the Homeric epics as educational in their entirety but comes up with a list of stray didactic remarks, passages where information is given that is irrelevant within the context of the story but that the poet wishes to share with his addressees. One of his examples is 'Mentor'/Athena saying to Telemachus that 'few sons indeed are like their fathers; most are worse, and those better than their fathers are few' (*Odyssey* 2.276–277).[6]

It will be obvious that as a narratologist who has devoted much of her career to defending the art of Homeric storytelling I am not fond of an approach like that of Verdenius, which refuses to see the function of a passage within the context of the story itself, or that of Havelock, which sees the story as a mere vehicle for encyclopaedic information. At the same time, I do believe that Homer intended his own poems to be more than mere entertainment. His task is to keep alive the memory of the *klea andrōn*, and this endeavour arguably encompasses both a historiographical and an educational aspect.[7] This opens the way to connecting Homer with the later genre of the Princes' Mirror, which

4 Jaeger ([1933] 1946) 3–56, quotation from p. 39. His idealistic reading of Homer is, of course, influenced by the dark historical times in which he wrote. Cf. his remark in the preface to the German edition: 'The book is meant not only for scholars, but for all who seek to rediscover the approach to Greece during our present struggles to maintain our millennial civilization' (ix).

5 Havelock (1963) 61–96, quotations from 66 and 61.

6 Verdenius (1970) 20–27. More recent defenders of an educational intent on Homer's part are Howie (1995) and Classen (2008).

7 For the Homeric epics as proto-historiography, see De Jong (2001) ad *Od.* 8.487–491, with references to further bibliography.

I define as a (narrative or discursive[8]) text used for the instruction of a young person destined to be a ruler.[9]

The reason why I dare to speak of the birth of the Princes' Mirror in Homer is the presence of quite a few passages where we see young rulers being educated via tales about model rulers,[10] such tales being called 'the secret of Homeric pedagogy' by Marrou in his classic discussion of ancient education.[11] In what follows I will first select from the larger category of Homeric tales or embedded narratives those that can be considered proto-Princes' Mirrors and then discuss (a selection of) them.

Embedded Narratives as Proto-Princes' Mirrors

Homeric embedded narratives can be divided into two groups: those told by internal (secondary) narrators, i.e. characters telling about events from their own past, like Nestor, Phoenix, Eumaeus, Menelaus, Agamemnon, and Odysseus, and those told by external (secondary) narrators, i.e. characters telling about events in which they have not participated themselves and which often belong to a more distant past, like Phoenix telling the story of Meleager, Agamemnon recounting the story of Zeus' delusion at the moment of Heracles' birth, Achilles relating the story of Niobe, and Antinous the story of the Centaurs and Lapiths.[12]

8 By 'discursive' I mean a text that takes the form of a series of instructions, such as we find e.g. in Hesiod's *Works and Days* and Machiavelli's *The Prince*, but also in the Iliadic parting speeches of Peleus and Menoetius to be discussed below.

9 Cf. Schulte (2001) who calls the Homeric epics 'Vorläuferliteratur' and M. Roberts in the *Brill New Pauly*, s.v. Princes' Mirror: 'Homeric poetry formed the basis for the tradition of the PM for a millennium'.

10 Discussed briefly by Jaeger ([1933] 1946) 32–34 and 40–41, Verdenius (1970) 24–25, and Howie (1995) 150–154.

11 Marrou (1948) 38. He defines the tales as 'de grands exemples empruntés à la geste légendaire, exemples qui doivent éveiller en eux l' instinct agonistique, le désir de rivaliser'.

12 Lists of embedded narratives can be found in Gaisser (1969) 6–7 (she also includes narratives, or 'digressions' as she calls them, told by the primary narrator), De Jong (2004) 18–22, and Minchin (2007) 35–36. The 'para-narratives' of Alden (2000) is the broadest category since she includes the Shield of Achilles. Note that gods too can tell stories, e.g. *Il.* 1.590–594, 14.249–261, 15.18–30, 18.395–405, 21.441–457. Although having a paradigmatic function these never are a Princes' Mirror: the nature of the gods in Homer is set and they are not educated.

Most embedded narratives have an 'argument' function: they are told by one character to another character to make a point.[13] Even narratives that answer questions for factual information like 'who are you?' or 'what happened?' usually also bring across a message. That message or argument is often of a paradigmatic nature: the character tells a story in order to encourage or dissuade his addressee to act in a certain way. Yet not all paradigmatic stories are Princes' Mirrors and conversely non-paradigmatic stories too can serve as Princes' Mirrors. My main criterion for considering a Homeric tale a proto-Princes' Mirror is that it is told to a young person or to a person who is at least considerably younger than the speaker and who therefore can be expected to learn from the model held up to him. This means that the Niobe paradigm, told by Achilles to Priam, is not included. I have also excluded negative or dissuasive paradigms. Of course one can teach someone a lesson by telling him which model *not* to follow, as Phoenix famously does when telling Achilles about Meleager, and this embedded narrative is mentioned by both Verdenius and Marrou as an instance of an educational tale. But I think it belongs to the essence of the Princes' Mirror that the young ruler is given a positive model to follow. The 'mirror' he is given to look at is a person to be imitated rather than rejected. This leaves me with the four autobiographical tales told by Nestor about his own younger self (*Iliad* 1.267–273, 7.132–156, 11.671–761, 23.629–643), the Orestes story told to Telemachus (*Odyssey* 1.298–302, 3.193–200), and a series of tales told about fathers to their sons: the tale about Tydeus told to Diomedes (*Iliad* 4.372–399, 5.800–813), the tale about Peleus and Menoetius told to Achilles and Patroclus (*Iliad* 9.252–259, 438–443, 11.765–790), and the tales about Odysseus told to Telemachus (*Odyssey* 1.255–264, 3.120–129, 4.240–264, 266–289).

It need not come as a surprise that more than half of the Homeric 'Princes' Mirrors' involve fathers and sons. Lacking a public educational system, education in the archaic Greek world was in the hands of fathers. 'For most free, non-elite Greeks, the main occupation for which they had to be trained was that of their father', and the education of the elite likewise operated 'entirely through family networks'.[14] The Homeric epics amply illustrate such education by fathers or members of the family: we see old Phoenix instructing, or rather trying to instruct Achilles in Troy, continuing the work he started when Achilles was still a toddler (*Iliad* 9.432–605); Nestor advising his son Antilochus how to drive his chariot in the funeral games for Patroclus (*Iliad* 23.306–348); 'Men-

13 For the term 'argument', see Andersen (1987) 4–5.

14 Griffith (2001), quotations from pp. 29 and 35.

tor'/Athena, an old friend of Odysseus, accompanying Telemachus on his first trip abroad (*Odyssey* 3.13–30); and Odysseus coaching his son Telemachus during the run up to their revenge on the suitors (*Odyssey* 16.300–303, 476–477; 20.385–386; 21.129, 431–434).

In what follows I will discuss briefly the (well-known) tales about Nestor, Tydeus, Orestes, and Odysseus, and devote most of my attention to the tale about Peleus and Menoetius, which has been analysed less often.

Nestor as Model for Patroclus

Four times Nestor recounts stories about his younger self which function as paradigms. In Book 1 he tells Achilles and Agamemnon how he once gave advice to the Lapiths in their battle against the Centaurs (he does not specify on what matter) and how these heroes listened to him, the obvious message being that Achilles and Agamemnon should listen to him now (which they do not). In Book 7 he recalls how he once successfully fought a duel against the frightening Ereuthalion when all others were afraid, thus successfully encouraging the hesitating Greeks to accept Hector's challenge. And in Book 23 he recounts how in the funeral games for the Epeian king Amarynceus he was beaten in a chariot race, thus implicitly exhorting Menelaus not to quarrel over his second prize in the chariot race which forms part of the funeral games for Patroclus.[15] These three paradigmatic tales show Nestor as a quintessential 'doer of deeds', both martial and athletic, and 'speaker of words', in short as the embodiment of the heroic ideal (*Iliad* 9.443), and thus function clearly as an early form of a Princes' Mirror.[16]

The fourth and longest of Nestor's tales is more complex. In Book 11 he tells Patroclus about a skirmish between the Pylians and Epeians in his youth. The Eleans steal cattle from the Pylians, who are weakened because Heracles had killed many of their best men. The Pylians retaliate, attack and defeat the Epeians, but then the Epeians invade Pylian territory to seek vengeance.

15 This last interpretation derives from Alden (2000) 103–110. Nestor's tales are discussed in the general studies on paradigms in Homer (Austin [1966], Gaisser [1969], Alden [2000], and Minchin [2007]) and in specific studies (Pedrick [1983], Toohey [1994], Primavesi [2000], and Minchin [2005]).

16 Cf. Austin (1966) 303: 'Having already proved his worth in heroic encounters, he sets his life before the young heroes as paradigm. Now it is their turn to prove their character.' On the reception of the good ruler as a 'doer of deeds and a speaker of words', see esp. Klooster in this volume.

Nestor's father forbids his son to participate in the fight, but Nestor disobeys and plays a major role in defeating the invaders, among other things by killing their leader Moulos and chasing the enemy into their own territory until he is stopped by Athena. Upon his return he is looked upon as a god by the grateful citizens. Having told this autobiographical tale Nestor then goes on to remind Patroclus of what his father Menoetius had once said to him (a tale I will discuss in the last part of the chapter), and concludes by advising Patroclus to try and persuade Achilles to return to battle and, if Achilles will not listen, to put on the latter's armour himself and lead the Myrmidons into battle.

Nestor's story about his role in the fight with the Epeians provides Patroclus with a model, as ancient scholiasts already saw.[17] Nestor shows Patroclus how, just as he himself dared to oppose his father, he could come up with a line of action that goes against the will of Achilles, viz. to lead the Myrmidons into battle again.[18] In this way Patroclus could become the saviour of the Greeks, who like the Pylians in Nestor's story are weakened by the death or wounding of many of their best men, and chase the Trojans from the Greek ships. Patroclus lets himself be instructed by Nestor and follows his example but the result will not be the same: he does oppose Achilles' refusal to aid the Greeks and asks him to let him lead the Myrmidons into battle in his stead; like Nestor, he kills a champion of the enemy, Sarpedon, and many Trojans, chases them into their own territory, right until the walls of Troy, and is eventually stopped by a god; but instead of returning home he is killed by Hector.

This case shows that, just as in financial matters, 'past performance is no guarantee of future results'. What was successful behaviour for Nestor in the past is not successful behaviour for Patroclus in the present.[19] Behind Nestor

17 Schol. bT *Il.* 11.717–718: τεχνικῶς τῷ παραδείγματι τὸν Πάτροκλον διδάσκει, εἰ καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς αὐτὸν εἴργει, λαθόντα προελθεῖν εἰς τὴν μάχην, 'he artfully teaches Patroclus through the paradigm that, even if Achilles withholds him, he should go to battle secretly', and schol. A *Il.* 11.717–718: προτρέπει τὸν Πάτροκλον, δι' ὧν αὐτὸς καὶ νέος καὶ ὑπὸ πατρὸς κωλυόμενος ὅμως πεζὸς ἐξῆλθεν, 'he encourages Patroclus in that he himself, although young and restrained by his father, nevertheless went to battle on feet (i.e. lacking a chariot)'. In general for the discussion of paradigmatic stories in the Homeric scholia, see Nünlist (2009) 261–264.

18 Cf. Vetten (1990) 85–93, Hainsworth (1993) ad *Il.* 11.670–762, Alden (2000) 88–101, and Primavesi (2000) 57. Many scholars argue that Nestor's tale is actually meant *for Achilles*: Schadewaldt ([1938] 1966) 87, Austin (1966) 302–303, Pedrick (1983) 59–61, and Martin (1989) 80–81. This interpretation is impossible, however, in that Patroclus when facing Achilles in Book 16 does report Nestor's suggestion that he should fight in Achilles' armour but does *not* repeat, not even in abbreviated form, his autobiographical tale.

19 Nestor gives sensible advice but is overruled by the will of Zeus (cf. *Il.* 16.688–691), who

holding up himself as a mirror to Patroclus we may discern Homer showing his narratees, amongst whom will have been many a young aristocrat, how a positive and successful model may actually effect a tragic result.

Tydeus as Model for Diomedes

With the figure of Tydeus we encounter our first proto-Princes' Mirror involving a father-son relationship. Indeed, as Andersen notes, there is no other Homeric hero for whom the image of his father is so important.[20] Twice the martial and athletic valour of his father Tydeus is held up to Diomedes as a model to follow, by Agamemnon and by Athena, the two passages referring to the same event. When the army of the Seven against Thebes approached the city, they sent Tydeus as an ambassador. He beat all Thebans in athletic contests and then, upon being ambushed on his way back, killed nearly fifty Thebans. His exceptional courage is stressed by his fighting alone against many opponents (cf. πολέας: 4.385, μοῦνος … πολέσιν: 389, πολέας: 5.804).[21]

Both speakers hold up the example of Tydeus by way of contrast, claiming that Diomedes is lagging behind his father (4.370–371, 399–400; 5.800, 812–813). This claim is hardly to be taken at face value. Rather, it is (in the case of Agamemnon) part of the genre of the *neikos* and (in the case of Athena) of the *paraenesis*: both exhortatory types of speech tend to contain an element of (usually feigned) criticism which serves to stimulate the addressee.[22] Indeed, Diomedes accepts, first in silence (4.401–402), then with words (413–414), Agamemnon's *neikos* and follows the example of his father in performing a major *aristeia*.[23]

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already in 8.476 had decided that Patroclus would die. On Nestor as counsellor, see Roisman (2005).

20 Andersen (1978) 34.

21 As Andersen (1978) 34–35 notes, both speakers of course avoid mentioning the battle of the Seven itself, since on that occasion Tydeus lost his life and the Seven lost the war.

22 Cf. Andersen (1978) 39 and Alden (2000) 120.

23 Cf. Pratt (2009) 150. Differently Graziosi & Haubold (2010) 38, who contend that Tydeus is a problematic role model for Diomedes: 'Whether or not Diomedes has any direct memory of his father, other characters in the *Iliad* keep reminding him about Tydeus and telling him to be like him […] and the audience know what that means: in the *Iliad* Tydeus is remembered as a savage warrior. He marched against Thebes disregarding the will of the gods and thus played a leading role in one of the greatest disasters described in the poem: *Il.* 4.370–400 and 4.404–410. Diomedes wavers between emulating his father when he is on the attack (*Il.* 5.115–117, 10.283–294; cf. 5.252–256) and rejecting him as a model when

One detail demands our attention in the tale about Tydeus: both Agamemnon and later Diomedes himself stress that they only know about Tydeus' exploits from hearsay: 4.374–375, 6.222–223 (and cf. 14.125). Scholars have given different interpretations of this fact: Diomedes, by pretending or stressing that he had never seen his father, would distance himself from him[24] or would be characterized as a fatherless hero, who as a result of lacking a father has no empathy and is an 'utterly pitiless' warrior.[25] I would suggest a different reading: the references to hearsay acknowledge that Tydeus has already become a figure of legend or *kleos*. Even people who have never seen him know about him from the tales told about him. Thus Tydeus is more than just a model for a son learning from his father: his exploits are encoded in tales and he has already become a 'literary' model for many more young persons.

A similar and perhaps even clearer example of such a 'literary' proto-Princes' Mirror is the figure of Orestes.

Orestes as Model for Telemachus

The 'Oresteia' story is a well-known foil to the *Odyssey*, in which as a rule 'Agamemnon parallels Odysseus, Clytemnestra Penelope, and Orestes Telemachus'.[26] The part of the story in which Orestes kills the murderer of his father, Aegisthus, is twice explicitly held up as mirror to Telemachus, by 'Mentes'/Athena and by Nestor, partly in identical words. It is meant to encourage him to contemplate revenge on the suitors, if he should find out that his father has died and is unable himself to take revenge. If a young man like Orestes could do it, then he can, too. Moreover, Orestes won *kleos*, glory, with his revenge (*Odyssey* 1.299), an attractive prospect to Telemachus, who deplores his lack of *kleos* (1.237–241) and craves for it (3.201–209). Athena using the word *kleos* in connection with the tale of Orestes makes explicit that we are dealing here with a 'literary' Princes' Mirror: it is the *terminus technicus* for the fame which is enshrined in a poem (and hence, according to the epic singers' own conceit, is eternal or undying).

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he chooses to be less extreme, as here [in the meeting with Glaucus: *Il.* 6.119–236]'. This interpretation of T. as a negative role model is hardly convincing in view of the fact that the disaster of the Seven against Thebes is *not* 'described in the poem' (see above n. 21).

24 Graziosi & Haubold (2010) 38 (quoted in n. 23) and their note ad *Il.* 6.222–223.

25 Pratt (2009), quotation from p. 143.

26 De Jong (2001) ad *Od.* 1.32–43 with bibliography.

Apart from Orestes Telemachus is also, like Diomedes, given his own father as model.

Odysseus as Model for Telemachus

Telemachus is the prime example given by scholars who argue in favour of an educational intention on the part of Homer, and Porphyry was the first to speak of the *paideusis* of Telemachus.[27] As a result of his journey to Pylos and Sparta we see him change from a shy, inactive, uncertain youth into a man who takes initiatives, speaks out and assumes responsibility and who is hence mature enough to be introduced to the scheme of Odysseus' incognito return at an early stage and to take revenge on the suitors shoulder to shoulder with his father.[28] As always in Greek literature, the development of a character is not radical but rather entails the realization of inborn—and often inherited—qualities.[29] Thus already in Book 1 Telemachus instinctively adopts the cunning of his father when he does not reveal to the suitors what he has just discussed with 'the stranger'/Athena, let alone the stranger's true identity as a god, and from the beginning he is given the epithet πεπνυμένος, 'shrewd'.[30] But it is also clear that his first journey abroad and encounters with adults like Nestor, Helen, and Menelaus (who moreover tell him stories about his father Odysseus) have a 'decisive formative influence on the youth'.[31] In a way we could compare Telemachus' situation with that of Diomedes: he too has never seen his father, at least not consciously (he was a baby when Odysseus left), and rather than being educated directly by his own father must rely on tales about him. The difference is, however, that he hears about his father from named eyewitnesses

27 Schol. *Od.* 1.284. Cf. Jaeger ([1933] 1946) 31–32, d'Arms & Hulley (1946) 208, Clarke ([1967] 1989) 32, Austin (1969) 56, and the subtitle of Petropoulos (2011) 'The Homeric Education of a Little Prince'.

28 For discussions of the maturing of Telemachus, see Klingner ([1944] 1964), Millar & Carmichael (1954), Rose (1967), Clarke ([1967] 1989) 30–44, Austin (1969), Scheid-Tissinier (1993), Roisman (1994), Heath (2001), and Petropoulos (2011). According to Olson (1995) 65–90, he does not develop.

29 For the principle of the apple not falling far from the tree, see *Od.* 4.206–211 and 16.300–304. For characters saying that Telemachus resembles his father, see *Od.* 1.206–212; 2.270–280; 3.122–125; 4.141–146, 149–150, 611.

30 On this epithet see Roisman (1994) 7–9 and Heath (2001).

31 Cf. Austin (1969) 56: 'Through the stories which his hosts tell him he is introduced to the models of the heroic life. [...] Of all the paradigms held up before him, by far the most important, the one to which most attention is given, is that of his father.'

rather than from the anonymous collective voice of tradition ('they say'), as Diomedes did, which makes his education via the model of his father a more forceful one.

The model of his father that is presented to Telemachus is overwhelmingly that of a cunning man and this clearly is the 'pre-eminent characteristic of his father's which he should emulate'.[32] Nestor puts it summarily: in Troy 'no man ventured to vie with him in counsel, since noble Odysseus far excelled in all kind of wiles, your father' (*Odyssey* 3.121–122). And Helen and Menelaus flesh out Nestor's qualification by telling about Odysseus' visit to Troy disguised as a beggar and his leadership of the men inside the Wooden Horse, who forced them to keep silent when Helen addresses them. Telemachus is thus taught that *mētis* sometimes is more effective than *biē* and that in certain situations it is better not to speak out one's mind. In the revenge on the suitors he will show himself a model pupil who, now further coached directly by his own father, knows when to keep silent and how to keep a secret.[33]

The fact that the inculcation of cunning should form part of a Greek prince's education need not come as a surprise and it was also well understood by Machiavelli (e.g. in *The Prince*, Chapter 18). But it is interesting to see Jaeger struggling here with Homer's role as 'teacher of humanity'. His distaste of 'the cunning storm-tossed adventurer' Odysseus is unmistakable: his role in the fall of Troy 'made it necessary to glorify his character', but 'the Greeks themselves, especially those of the mainland, did not accept this ideal without some objections'.[34]

Peleus and Menoetius and the Instruction of Achilles and Patroclus

My last instance of a Homeric scene that can be interpreted as a forerunner of the Princes' Mirror concerns Peleus and Menoetius instructing their sons Achilles and Patroclus when they depart for Troy. This event forms part of the tale of the visit of Odysseus and Nestor to Phthia in order to recruit

32 Austin (1969) 56–57. ('Odysseus is presented as the heroic man, favoured by Athena, who fought bravely, but he is also presented as the supremely cunning strategist. Of the two aspects it is his cunning which receives greater recognition than his heroic conduct.')

33 Cf. Austin (1969) 57: 'Telemachos' journey had been the largely theoretical side of his education; in Ithaka comes the chance for practical education, in Telemachos' observation and imitation of *il maestro*, Odysseus himself.'

34 Jaeger ([1933] 1946) 22. Classen likewise is struggling: he wants to distil 'Wahrhaftigkeit' as a Homeric ideal (2008: 175–181), cannot pass over Odysseus' cunning, yet quickly adds 'Doch sonst wurden Täuschung und Betrug immer wieder verurteilt' (180).

Achilles. This recruiting visit is referred to on six occasions (*Iliad* 7.124–131; 9.252–259, 438–443; 11.765–790; 18.324–327; 23.144–149), which together yield the following picture. Odysseus and Nestor arrive in Phthia to seek participants in the expedition against Troy (11.769–770). Achilles and Patroclus are eager to participate (11.782), but Peleus is reluctant to let his only son go and asks Nestor who else is joining the expedition (7.127–128). When he hears the names of illustrious heroes he allows his son to go, realizing that it will be an opportunity for him to win *kleos*. But since Achilles is still young and inexperienced Peleus sends his tutor Phoenix with him. At the moment of his departure he gives his son instructions (9.252–258, 11.783–784), as does Menoetius with his son Patroclus (11.785–789). Achilles promises Menoetius to bring back Patroclus (18.324–327), while Peleus promises the river Spercheius that Achilles, upon his safe return home from the war, will sacrifice his hair and a hecatomb (23.144–149).[35]

This 'Princes' Mirror' is somewhat different from my previous examples in that it *tells about* fathers educating their sons in the form of a series of *instructions* and thus combines the narrative and the discursive. The parting scene actually is an instance of a recurrent theme in Homer. There are two other places where we hear about a father instructing his son upon his departure for war, and verbal echoes confirm the traditional nature of the theme:

Lycaon instructs Pandarus (*Iliad* 5.197–200):

> ἦ μέν *μοι μάλα πολλὰ* γέρων αἰχμητὰ Λυκάων
> ἐρχομένῳ *ἐπέτελλε* δόμοις ἔνι ποιητοῖσιν·
> ἵπποισίν μ' *ἐκέλευε καὶ* ἅρμασιν ἐμβεβαῶτα
> ἀρχεύειν Τρώεσσι *κατὰ κρατερὰς* ὑσμίνας·
>
> Truly the old spearman Lycaon instructed me many times in his strong-built house as I went here: he urged me to mount a chariot and lead the Trojans in the strong encounters.[36]

Hippolochus instructs Glaucus (*Iliad* 6.207–211):

> *πέμπε* δέ μ' ἐς Τροίην, *καί μοι μάλα πόλλ' ἐπέτελλεν*
> αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν *καὶ* ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,

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35 For a similar reconstruction, see Avery (1998). I agree with most of his interpretation but not with his central thesis that Agamemnon should be seen as Achilles' third father (after Peleus and Phoenix).

36 Since my concern is to show the resemblances in phrasing I give my own translations.

μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνέμεν, οἳ μέγ' ἄριστοι
ἔν τ' Ἐφύρῃ ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐν Λυκίῃ εὐρείῃ.

And he sent me to Troy and instructed me many times always to be bravest and to excel over others and not bring disgrace on the stock of my forefathers, who were by far the bravest in Ephyra and broad Lycia.

Peleus instructs Achilles (*Iliad* 9.252–259):

ἦ μὲν *σοί* γε πατὴρ *ἐπετέλλετο* Πηλεὺς
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε·
'τέκνον ἐμὸν, κάρτος μὲν Ἀθηναίη τε καὶ Ἥρη
δώσουσ' αἴ κ' ἐθέλωσι, σὺ δὲ μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν
ἴσχειν ἐν στήθεσσι· φιλοφροσύνη γὰρ ἀμείνων·
ληγέμεναι δ' ἔριδος κακομηχάνου, ὄφρά σε μᾶλλον
τίωσ' Ἀργείων ἠμὲν νέοι ἠδὲ γέροντες.'
ὣς *ἐπέτελλ'* ὁ γέρων, σὺ δὲ λήθεαι·

Truly your father Peleus instructed you on the day when he sent you from Phthia to Agamemnon: 'My dear child, strength Athena and Hera will give you, if such is their wish, but you must restrain your passionate *thumos* in your breast. For good will among friends is better. And you must stop evil-bringing quarrelling, in order for the Greeks, both young and old, to honour you all the more.' Thus the old man instructed, but you are forgetting his words.

Peleus instructs Phoenix to educate Achilles (*Iliad* 9.438–443):

σοὶ δέ μ' *ἔπεμπε* γέρων ἱππηλάτα *Πηλεὺς*
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε
νήπιον οὔ πω εἰδόθ' ὁμοιΐου πολέμοιο
οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι.
τοὔνεκά με προέηκε διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα,
μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.

The old horseman Peleus sent me to you on the day when he sent you from Phthia to Agamemnon, still a child and not yet experienced in war or debate, where men can become distinguished. That is why he sent me to teach you all these things, to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds.

Peleus instructs Achilles and Menoetius instructs Patroclus (*Iliad* 11.765–790):

> ὦ πέπον, ἦ μὲν *σοί* γε Μενοίτιος ὧδ' *ἐπέτελλεν*
> *ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε,*
> [...]
> τὼ δ' ἄμφω *πόλλ' ἐπέτελλον.*
> Πηλεὺς μὲν ᾧ παιδὶ γέρων *ἐπέτελλ'* Ἀχιλῆϊ
> αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων·
> σοὶ δ' αὖθ' ὧδ' *ἐπέτελλε* Μενοίτιος Ἄκτορος υἱός·
> 'τέκνον ἐμόν, γενεῇ μὲν ὑπέρτερός ἐστιν Ἀχιλλεύς,
> πρεσβύτερος δὲ σύ ἐσσι· βίῃ δ' ὅ γε πολλὸν ἀμείνων.
> ἀλλ' εὖ οἱ φάσθαι πυκινὸν ἔπος ἠδ' ὑποθέσθαι
> καί οἱ σημαίνειν· ὃ δὲ πείσεται εἰς ἀγαθόν περ.'
> ὣς *ἐπέτελλ'* ὁ γέρων, σὺ δὲ λήθεαι.

> My dear, truly Menoetius instructed you thus on the day when he sent you from Phthia to Agamemnon [...] They both instructed much. Old Peleus instructed his son Achilles always to be bravest and to excel over others. And you Menoetius the son of Actor instructed thus: 'My child, by birth Achilles is superior to you, but you are older. In force he is much stronger. But you must expertly speak sensible words to him, advise him, and guide him. And he will listen to you all for the best.' Thus the old man instructed, but you are forgetting his words.

We see that in all cases a father instructs his son (or has his son instructed) about how to show himself a true hero in the war to which he is about to depart.

Let us now take a closer look at the instruction by Peleus and Menoetius. In 9.252–259 it is Odysseus who, addressing Achilles, reminds him of the instructions of Peleus and even quotes the words spoken by his father in direct speech. The powerful effect, already noted by ancient scholiasts, is that Achilles seems to be hearing his father himself speaking to him.[37] At the same time, Peleus' words reveal some puzzling details: why would he, at the moment when Achilles departs, say '*stop* quarrelling'. Scholars have adopted different solu-

37 See schol. bT *Il.* 11.786–789: ἵνα μὴ δόξωσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες μήτε Ὀδυσσέα μήτε Νέστορα τοὺς λέγοντας, ἀλλὰ τὸν πατέρα, 'in order that those who are listening do not think that they hear Odysseus or Nestor speaking, but their fathers'. In narratological terms we are dealing with metalepsis, in that the levels of narration collapse and tertiary narrators address secondary narratees. In De Jong (2013) I discuss more examples of metaleptic speech in epic and especially lyric.

tions: Ameis-Hentze write 'Achills leidenschaftliche Natur hatte sich schon früh gezeigt',[38] which means that Peleus already at the moment of departure foresees that his son would end up quarrelling sooner or later. In the same spirit Hammond translates 'And if a quarrel begins its mischief, you should abandon it'.[39] A more radical solution is that adopted by Hainsworth (1993: ad 9.251–258), who assumes the conversation between father and son never to have taken place: Peleus' words 'are too apposite to be other than virtually an example of what later rhetoricians called prosopopoeia, the orator's assumption of a convenient personality in whose name he affects to speak. […] the direct quotation of Peleus' alleged words is emotively effective. The quotation is an oblique way of saying δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν (496), words that at this juncture would be unpolitic coming from Odysseus.'[40] I find this an implausible solution: if Odysseus wants to persuade Achilles it seems a bad idea to do so via a lying tale about his father, a lie that his interlocutor could easily detect since he himself was supposed to have been present. Rather, Odysseus freely quotes Peleus' words and adapts them to suit the present situation: Achilles should make an end to the 'evil-bringing' quarrel with Agamemnon; if he does so, the Greeks will honour him more, i.e. they will restore the *timē* that Agamemon, taking away Briseis, had diminished (cf. ἠτίμησεν: 1.507) and will increase it by bringing him the lavish compensation Odysseus has just listed.[41] Such adaptation of the details of a story to the situation at hand, including even the adaptation of *ipsissima verba*, is a phenomenon often observed in the Homeric epics. In a society without writing there is less fixation on exactitude when representing the past: what counts is the general idea of what happened or what was said.[42]

Shortly afterwards, in the course of the same embassy scene, Phoenix too recalls the parting scene: 9.438–443. The fact that we are dealing with the same scene is brought home to the narratees by the verbatim repetition ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε, 'on the day when he sent you from Phthia to Agamemnon'. Phoenix' reference to the parting scene ostensibly serves to make clear that if Achilles returns home he will join him, since his father had sent him to accompany him (wherever he would go). But his reminder, like that of Odysseus, actually is aimed at exhorting Achilles to stay and return to

38 Ameis & Hentze (1930) ad *Il.* 9.257.

39 M. Hammond. 1987. *Homer. The Iliad: A New Prose Translation.* London.

40 Willcock (1977) 45–46 and Martin (1989) 61–62 also speak of 'the conversation which *allegedly* took place' and '*alleged* instructions' (my italics).

41 This interpretation already in De Jong ([1987] 2004) 173–175.

42 See Andersen (1990).

battle. For days now Achilles has not been active in the assembly or on the battlefield (cf. 1.490–491), and reminding him, this time in indirect speech, that his father had asked him (Phoenix) to teach him (Achilles) 'to be a speaker of words and doer of deeds', he hopes to bring him back to action. Thus the tale forms part of Phoenix' sustained strategy, involving other tales too (his autobiography and the Meleager story), to appeal to Achilles to give up his anger and resume fighting. Indeed, his position as Achilles' tutor in the end allows him to say directly what Odysseus in 9.252–254 had only suggested obliquely via his reminiscence of Peleus' parting instructions: ἀλλ', Ἀχιλεῦ, δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν, 'come, Achilles, curb your great anger' (9.496).

The parting scene figures one last time in the context of Nestor's long speech to Patroclus (Book 11) in which he also tells the autobiographical tale that I discussed earlier. Since the addressee this time is Patroclus, Nestor only briefly refers to Peleus' instruction of Achilles.[43] Whereas Odysseus had quoted Peleus saying to Achilles not to quarrel, Nestor now recalls the part of his speech in which Peleus had said to his son 'always to be bravest and to excel over others'. Thus Nestor focuses on Achilles as a doer of deeds, which is understandable in view of Menoetius' instruction of Patroclus, which Nestor goes on to quote in direct speech, and which runs that since Achilles is the better fighter, Patroclus as his senior might give him sound advice. This reminder of his father's instruction should, of course, persuade Patroclus to dare to stand up to Achilles, advising him to let him, Patroclus, fight with the Myrmidons.[44] As in Nestor's earlier paradigmatic use of his own younger self, there is an element of dramatic irony in his words: Menoetius is quoted saying that listening to Patroclus will be 'all for the best' (εἰς ἀγαθόν περ) for Achilles, and Nestor himself adds that 'persuasion by a friend is good (ἀγαθή)', but actually the result will be good for the Greeks at large but *not* for Achilles and Patroclus themselves, who both pay with their lives for listening to Nestor.

The parting scene is a special case, in that it is a *mise en abyme* or minor replica of the main story. Both the main story and the embedded story recount the instruction of a young man by an older man: in the past Achilles and Patroclus were instructed by their fathers, in the present they are instructed by

43 Hainsworth (1993) ad 11.786–789: 'Here the pressure is on Patroklos and the important words are not those of Peleus (who are reduced to a formular verse in an indirect construction) but those of Menoitios'.

44 Nestor even urges Patroclus to remind Achilles of Menoetius' words (790–791), which he does not do, however. Cf. Achilles urging Thetis to remind Zeus of her earlier assistance (*Il.* 1.396–407), which she does not do.

Odysseus, Phoenix, and Nestor. Once again we see the instruction of younger men by older ones misfire in Homer: the reminder of his father's instruction does *not* persuade Achilles, while it does persuade Patroclus but with fatal results for himself (and eventually Achilles).

Conclusion

A strong case can be made for the birth of the Princes' Mirror in Homer, i.e. Homer already knowing the principle of narratives or discourses being used to educate young men, those represented in his own text and arguably those listening to his poems. The Greeks at large are lectured by the old man *par excellence* in their ranks (Nestor), an adolescent is given a famous figure from 'literature' as a source of inspiration (Orestes), and sons are told about their fathers (Tydeus, Odysseus) or reminded of their fathers instructing them in the past (Peleus, Menoetius). What is striking is that looking in the mirror so often has a fatal effect for the young prince concerned. This fact in itself fits the tragic outlook of the *Iliad*, in which human beings do not know what the future has in store for them and their good intentions may be overruled by the plans of the gods.[45] But it is interesting to observe that the negative aspect of many Homeric proto-Princes' Mirrors has not precluded the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* themselves and many of its heroes from becoming role models for later generations. Readers have picked out from the text those elements they needed and closed their eyes to the less pleasant bits. Looking in a literary mirror, thus, is just as subjective and selective an activity as looking at reality.

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45 This tragic outlook, also evident in many other respects, is of course well known and much discussed, see e.g. Griffin (1980), Rutherford (1982), and Rinon (2008).

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Between Gods and Mortals: The Piety of Homeric Kings

Will Desmond

In the drama series *House of Cards*, the hero Frank Underwood is a US senator and president-to-be who is sometimes depicted professing his faith, attending church services, and even preaching in church. Behind the scenes, we the audience see the real man and know that he does not believe in any God or ultimate power other than Frank Underwood. In this, the series accurately reflects the fact that no US president has been a declared atheist, and most have professed to be devout and God-fearing Christians. One should not be too cynical with regard to such public *personae*, but it is interesting to note how a character like Underwood does in effect follow the advice that Machiavelli gives his would-be prince, and that Aristotle gives his would-be tyrant. For both, the leader should cultivate the appropriate virtues of leadership—if not in reality, then at least in appearance. Nowhere are appearances more important than with the virtue of piety. So Aristotle writes that the tyrant

> … should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the gods; for if men think that a ruler is religious [*deisidaimōn*] and has a reverence for the gods [*phrontizein tōn theōn*], they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very gods fighting on his side.[1]
>
> ARIST. *Pol.* 5.11, 1314b38–1315a4; trans. JOWETT

Here Aristotle hones in on what might be called a dominant regal virtue in the long tradition of the *Fürstenspiegel*: piety.[2] In that genre, the mirror is held up to the prince to show him either his true or his ideal self. The image is typically flattering, and the catalogue of virtues that distinguish the real or perfect leader

1 On the importance of virtuous appearances, cf. *Pol.* 5.11, 1314b20–29 (appearing as a good soldier), 1314a30–1315b10 (appearing to serve common good). In his discussion of 'faith' (*la fede*) in *The Prince*, Chapter 18, Machiavelli asserts that 'there is nothing more necessary to *appear* to have than this last quality', religiosity (trans. Marriott, italics added).

2 One of the earliest such pieces, Xenophon's *Agesilaus*, treats piety (*eusebeia*) as the first of royal virtues (iii). For the association of virtue with kingship in the Greek Archaic period, see Mitchell (2013) 57–90.

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easily elevates him above the common crowd. His courage, temperance, justice, clemency, diligence, intelligence, wisdom and so forth make him a superior person, a higher specimen, who embodies the best of his people. His virtues are out of the ordinary: they inspire admiration, fear, gratitude, self-criticism—a complex mix that verges easily into the more properly religious category of awe. 'Such divinity doth hedge a king', and Shakespeare's phrase has purchase on the great majority of historical forms of monarchy, pervaded or tinged as they are by some aura of divinity.[3] To categorize these forms in broad strokes: the monarch may either *be* a god, or be descended from gods; or he may *represent* or somehow *reflect* the gods. In either case, he is somehow 'more' divine, a figure somehow sacred and numinous, as he mediates between his human society and the enigmatic powers that surround, threaten, and support it.

Homer is not an Aristotle or a Machiavelli, and his narrative poems are not semi-didactic letters or treatises about ideal or sacred kings. Yet various aspects of his narrative—formulaic language, characterization, religious outlook—do in fact make his kings numinous beings, intermediate figures who mediate between gods and mortals in various ways. This at least will be my argument: Homer's kings have what could be called their own distinctive 'piety'—the sum of virtues, excellences, powers that make them somehow closer to the gods, though not divine. This mediation between the two spaces works in two directions: kings represent the people to the gods, and the gods to the people. As 'the best' men, they represent their communities before the gods—notably as leaders of sacrifice, and more diffusely in the respect they do or should accord to omens, seers, priests, poets, and other conduits of the divine. If this aspect of regal 'piety' is more conventional, the second type of mediation lifts the king out of the human and ordinary altogether: when inspired or divinely favoured, the king absorbs and reflects the power of the gods, and 'godlike' himself, becomes an object of awe to mere mortals, who glimpse that other reality through their leaders. These two forms of mediation pervade the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but become most concentrated in the cases of Odysseus and Achilles. Here, Achilles may be the most exemplary of all, and in him Homer created a most 'godlike' king with a kind of 'piety' that ultimately inspired Alexander, Virgil, and Julian.

To begin, both Homer and his cast of aristocratic characters share the Mirror of Princes' preoccupation with the virtue or excellence (*aretē*) of the leader.

3 'That kings are sacred [is] … an anthropological and historical truism': expanding on Gilbert's assertion (1987: 287), Oakley (2006) offers comprehensive evidence that sacred kingship 'can lay strong claim to having been nothing less than the *political commonsense* of humankind' (4); cf. Hocart (1927) *passim* and esp. Chapter 2 ('The Divinity of Kings', 7–20).

'Always to be the best and to be superior to others' is often taken as the epitome of Homeric heroism, and Homer's characters are compared and ranked in every conceivable way.[4] War and council, battle and the *agora* are the most important arenas for gaining glory, and from one perspective, it would seem that 'piety' is conspicuous here by its absence. For all their rivalry, Homer's characters never try to outdo each other in pious devotion; no single word (like the later *eusebēs*) isolates this as a desirable trait; no character is as ostentatiously pious as, say, Augustus or Julian with their religious reforms, or Norman warrior-kings with their abbey- and church-building. Compared to the piety ostensibly required of the 'Lord's Anointed' among the Hebrews, or of the 'most Christian king' after Constantine, the obvious Homeric equivalents may seem formulaic to the point of vacuity. Thus, the epithet *dios* is typically translated as *noble*, *good*, *illustrious* or *bright*, depending on context—a necessary adjustment, but one that may lose some of the resonance of the Greek.[5] Other epithets offer a vocabulary replete with religious resonance, however indeterminate: kings are routinely called 'godlike' and described with epithets like *theoeikelos*, *diotrephēs*, *theoeidēs*, *theios*, *isotheos*, *antitheos*, *diiphilos*, *arēiphilos*, *philos athanatoisi*,[6] as well as phrases like *Arēi isos*, *daimoni isos*, *Dii ikelos*, *Dii atalantos*, *Enyalo atalantos*, *therapontes Arēos* and *ozos Arēos*. Such language, while formulaic, will not be vacuously so if it reproduces in miniature the larger themes of the poems. As we will see, they should not be deemed mere words of praise, as if *dios* or *theoeikelos* meant simply 'excellent', for they hint more specifically at how the superlative virtue of the kings is 'godlike', as it perches them above the nameless people, though not so high as the immortal gods. Perched here, their virtue is conspicuous from two directions: they are 'honoured by the people as gods' while they are also 'honoured by Zeus' and to them 'Zeus gives glory'.[7] The

4 'Always be best': *Il.* 11.784. Rankings: Nireus, most beautiful after Achilles (*Il.* 2.673–675); Philoctetes, best bowman (2.718); Lesser Ajax, best spear-thrower (2.530); Menestheus, best troop-marshaller (2.553–554); Eumelus has the best horses after Achilles (2.761–770); Ajax, best fighter after Achilles (2.761–770); Merops, best at prophesying (2.831–832), Calchas, best of bird-diviners (1.69).

5 Sheppard (1935: 113) suggests that the epithet *dios* is not a mere 'faded epithet': rather, 'linking as it does by sound and sense the glory of Achilles with that mystery [i.e. the will of Zeus], is more than a mere ornament of style. It is a first hint of the poet's deeper meaning.'

6 One notes that classical definitions of piety start from the notion of what is 'pleasing (*philos*) to the gods' (e.g. Pl. *Euthphr.* 6e10, 7a6). For a complementary discussion (especially on gods' love for kings), see Griffin (1980) 82–87.

7 'The people honour him as a god': e.g. *Il.* 9.154–155. Zeus honours the king: e.g. *Il.* 1.175. Zeus gives him glory (*kudos*): e.g. *Il.* 1.279.

bi-directionality, and double mediation, suggested by these formulae is often borne out in the narrative, as when Odysseus is honoured by Phaeacians and favoured by Athena, or when Achilles holds the place of pre-eminence in the Funeral Games or gains honour from Zeus.[8]

The King as Numinous Figure: Warrior, Legislator, Priest, Prophet, Bard

To further explore the notion of the Homeric king as a being 'between gods and mortals', it is helpful to focus on the three dominant functions commonly detected in Indo-European traditions of kingship: the martial, legal, and sacral. This tripartite division struck Aristotle also when he regarded the Homeric kings as at once warriors, judges, and priests, as they

> took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those which required a priest. They also decided causes either with or without an oath.
>
> ARIST. *Pol.* 3.9, 1285b9–11; trans. JOWETT

Most obviously religious here is the designation of Homeric kings as *kurioi thusiōn*, 'leaders of the sacrifice', to which we will return. But the other two can also have a real, if less determinate, religious intensity. First, Homer's kings are most obviously warriors and war-leaders who fight for victory, spoils, honour, and the 'undying glory' (*kleos aphthiton*) that gives a mortal some share of the unfading existence of the immortals. As the end of existence, glory has an aura of divinity,[9] and a warrior gains it most of all during the *aristeia*: charged by some deity with *menos*, the champion is filled with the ecstasy of power and stands out, momentarily, as 'the best' of his people. He is 'like Ares' or 'like a *daimōn*', formulae that may not be *merely* conventional for a martial

8 Most succinct regarding the latter is Thetis' request to Zeus: 'honour my son!' (*Il.* 1.505). Pivotal for readings like Whitman ([1958] 1965) and Arieti (1986) is *Il.* 9.608 where Achilles speaks of Zeus' honour as sufficient, over and above the honour of his mortal peers.

9 The epithet *aphthitos* is associated primarily with the divine—and with gold, which as a stainless, beautiful metal has associations with the divine in and beyond the Homeric poems: see *Il.* 5.724 (Hera's war chariot), 13.22 (Poseidon's palace), 14.238 (golden throne made by Hephaestus), 18.370 (Hephaestus' palace), 24.88 (Zeus' counsel); the only other Homeric instances of *aphthitos* are at *Il.* 2.46, 2.186 (Agamemnon's sceptre), 9.413 (Achilles' choice of *nostos* or *kleos aphthiton*), and somewhat differently, *Od.* 9.133 (never-failing vines).

culture that glorifies the rampant warrior as an awesome, sublime thing.[10] In his *aristeia*, the heroic king inspires a mixture of terror and fascination—terms that since Otto's *Das Heilige* (1917) have often been associated with the properly religious emotion of awe. At once *tremendum* and *fascinans*, the spectacle of the 'godlike' warrior is worthy of bardic memory, and even attracts the attention of the gods, who are otherwise often bored or disgusted by mortal squabbles and who ignore the common people entirely. Thus the enthused fighter stands forth as the representative of his people, not only to the enemy, but to the 'divine audience': a figure of awe, he is god-*like*—and yet *not* a god, for his *aristeia* will come to an end with wounds or death.

One need speculate less about the psychological reactions of Homer's intended audiences when one turns to a different aspect of his kings' 'piety': they more obviously mediate between gods and mortals in their role as judges and law-givers.[11] Again, the evidence here is somewhat indeterminate, yet in the aggregate it points firmly in one direction: the king's judicial authority *somehow* reflects that of Zeus himself. For as 'king (*anax*) of gods and men', Zeus adjudicates divine disputes, makes fateful decisions, and attends to the 'right' outcomes among gods and mortals, and so maintains *dikē*, rightly understood as a kind of cosmic order.[12] That kings too should uphold the cosmic order is suggested by a series of disparate phrases in which Zeus 'gives' them the sceptre, symbol of royal power. So Achilles generalizes that the sceptre-bearing 'sons of the Achaeans' are 'judges (*dikaspoloi*), who guard the ordinances (*themistes*) of Zeus'; and by passages where kings 'give signs' and 'give decrees', like Minos in the Underworld.[13] What these ordinances and signs are is never clarified, and Homer is less interested in constitutional niceties than in the evocation of the kings' 'divine' superiority to their people. Here the sceptre becomes the

10 For the numinous glory of the warrior, radiant in his energy, see e.g. *Il.* 5.1–5 (Diomedes' *aristeia*). Cf. Griffin (1980) 89–90; Desmond (2011) 6–7, 9, 54–55 (Alexander, with Griffin [1987]), 139–141 (Julian); Dodds (1951) 8–10.

11 This judicial function is, I suggest, most operative in the penultimate scenes of *Iliad* 23 (Achilles judging competitors and distributing prizes) and *Odyssey* 23 (Odysseus judging the Suitors and their followers). The *istōr* in the court scene of Achilles' Shield (*Il.* 18.497) has been interpreted as the judging king (e.g. Greenidge [1896] 16 n. 4).

12 For which see Allan (2006).

13 Achilles' statement: *Il.* 1.237–238. Give signs: e.g. *Il.* 1.289, 250–252. Minos: *Od.* 11.568–569 (*themisteuonta*). For kings to whom Zeus gives the sceptre and glory, see *Il.* 1.277–281 (Agamemnon), 2.204–206 (Odysseus' much-quoted assertion of the monarchical principle), 9.37–39 (Agamemnon), 9.97–99 (Agamemnon), and 6.159 (Proetus).

great symbol of royal powers of retributive and distributive justice, for though a sceptre is simply a stick (that may support the 'old beggar' Odysseus, for example) in the hands of such numinous figures as kings, prophets, priests, and heralds, it becomes (as in so many cultures) 'a symbol and instrument of unearthly power'.[14] The generalizing portrait of the royal *temenos* on the Shield of Achilles would seem to give *every* king a sceptre, visibly distinguishing him from his workers, while the most typical epithet of kings is that they are 'sceptre-bearing' (*skēptouchoi*). Equally typical and semantically similar is the epithet 'council-bearing' (*boulēphoroi*), and indeed the sceptre gives the right to speak in council.[15] Such formulae or the image on the Shield do not abstractly articulate the king's power to distribute rewards or punish laggards, but these judicial roles seem implicit in several scenes involving a royal sceptre. Most importantly, the 'quarrel' in *Iliad* 1 concerns the supreme right to distribute *gera*. On the one side, Agamemnon's sceptre is introduced in all its numinous sublimity, with a pedigree (tracing back to Zeus himself) that makes it a truly 'significant object', elevating its holder above the common people and even making him as superior to his royal peers as Zeus is to the other gods, for Agamemnon certainly claims such inimitable superiority (*Il.* 1.182–187). Achilles for his part most contemptuously rejects this claim when he flings Agamemnon's sceptre to earth—a dead stick, carried by a fraud. Who should wield the sceptre of Zeus is indeed a cause of quarrel, but the contest is limited to the tiny elite of the kings themselves. When Thersites repeats Achilles' exact grievances, he is beaten down by Odysseus—with Agamemnon's sceptre and with blows that the common soldiers praise as Odysseus' best ever.[16] The quick succession of deeds and speeches in *Iliad* 2 can convey only one overwhelming idea: retributive justice is in the hands of sceptre-wielding kings like

14 Burnell (1948) 158. A sceptre gives the right to speak (*Il.* 2.279, 3.218, 23.567–569) and perhaps therefore symbolizes the authority of priests (*Il.* 1.15, 28), heralds (7.277–278), and poets (Hes. *Th.* 30) as well as kings. Combellack (1948) remains a good discussion, while Kirk (1985) 128–129, ad 2.109 is helpful but problematic, with its anachronistic dichotomy of 'sacred' and 'secular', a modern distinction with Christian roots.

15 *Boulēphoros* used of kings: *Il.* 1.144 (*locus classicus* for the monarchical principle), 2.24, 2.61, 5.180, 13.463, 17.485, 20.83 (Aeneas), 5.633 (Sarpedon), 7.126 (Peleus), 10.414 (Trojans), 10.516 (Hippocoon), 12.414, 13.219, 255 (Idomeneus), 24.651 (unspecified Achaeans who advise Achilles), 13.12 (Phaeacian kings).

16 Shield of Achilles: 18.557. Agamemnon's sceptre: 2.100–108 (echoed in Ps.-Plato, *Minos* 320d). Achilles' oath: *Il.* 1.234–246. Odysseus' deed: *Il.* 2.265–277. The image of Odysseus playing Agamemnon's part is reinforced verbally by the statement that he was the *koiranos* in this crisis (*Il.* 2.203–207).

Odysseus, who constitute a class apart, and whose authority does not *derive* from the consent of the governed, even though the subjects, overawed, willingly consent to it.[17] Such powerful men are indeed 'shepherds of the people', as if they herded their subjects around with their royal staves. In all, the association of kings, sceptres, justice, and Zeus in epithets, images, and narrative may not be precise enough to satisfy a constitutional lawyer, yet the general constitutional situation seems clear: kings mediate between the gods and the people they rule, and though the formulaic phrase, 'all kings come from Zeus', would become proverbial only after Hesiod, one senses that the concept is not at all alien to Homer.[18]

The notion of the king as judge, upholding divine justice, surfaces in the passage that has been taken as a *locus classicus* for the ideology of sacred kingship. In *Odyssey* 19.107–114, when Penelope asks the disguised Odysseus about his identity, he deflects the question and answers in generalizing terms about the virtues that make a good king:

> Lady, no mortal upon the boundless earth could find fault with you, for your fame goes up to the broad heaven, as does the fame of some blameless king, who with the fear of the gods in his heart [*theoudēs*], is lord over many mighty men, upholding justice; and the black earth bears wheat and barley, and the trees are laden with fruit, the flocks bring forth young unceasingly, and the sea yields fish, all from his good leading; and the people prosper [*aretōsi*] under him.

Thus the wily Odysseus praises Penelope indirectly, as if she were *herself* this blameless, god-fearing king. At a different level, Homer's hearers may understand that this good king is Odysseus himself, who will exact justice on the thieving Suitors and restore the world of Ithaca to its former order. Taken out of its narrative context, Odysseus' association of justice, good governance, wealth, and pious fear of the gods would give the passage a long afterlife, from Hesiod to Plato's *Republic* to Hocart's Frazerian study of *Kingship*.[19] Frazer's work (e.g. 1905) influentially focuses on the archaic idea of a harmony between cos-

17 *Il.* 2.86 distinguishes sceptre-bearing kings and the people (*laoi*), as do Odysseus' different approaches to *basileis* and commoners (*Il.* 2.188 and 2.198 echo each other).

18 'All kings come from Zeus': Hes. *Th.* 96, *Homeric Hymn to the Muses and Apollo* 4, Call. *Jov.* 79.94–96, Theoc. 17.12, Stob. 4.6.7 (under the *topos hoti kalliston monarchia*).

19 Hes. *Op.* 224–237; Pl. *R.* 363a–c; Hocart (1927) 36, cf. 47–57 ('The King's Justice'). Martin (1984, esp. 147–148) uses West's Archaic 'Mirror of Princes' genre (1978: 3–30) to construe both characters' speech as regal.

mos and society: the king's personal vitality guarantees the vitality of land and folk—or in the specific terms of this passage, the *aretē* of nature and people depend upon the *aretē* and 'good-leadership' of the blameless, god-fearing king. The association is central to Frazer's thesis on archaic kingship, yet with the exception of this passage is never broached explicitly in the Homeric poems. Associations of the ruler's justice, or devotional piety, with the material fortunes of a people are fleeting or indirect: Ithaca under Odysseus, Pylos under Nestor, or Troy under Priam and Hector prosper and are blessed by the gods, who were well pleased with such kings who out of fear of the gods offer them due sacrifice;[20] the epithet *theoudēs* is an important marker of moral character, though Homeric religion does not quite make 'fear of the Lord' (or the later catch-all term, *deisidaimonia*) the beginning of wisdom. So too, Homer's sometime association of god-fearing kings with well-ordered societies hardly amounts to the emphatic ideology of sacred kingship that prevailed in Egyptian, Babylonian or Hittite societies—indeed in the majority of societies before the industrial revolution.[21] This does not, however, entail that Homer's societies are a secular exception to the hieratic systems that prevailed in the eastern Mediterranean in Bronze, Dark, and early Archaic periods: instead, what one may find in Homer's sceptre-bearing, Zeus-born kings is a specific refraction of that broader pattern of sacred monarchy.

Let us turn then to Aristotle's pithy designation of the Homeric kings as 'masters of sacrifices'. Throughout antiquity, the most important cultic act and expression of 'piety' was to offer sacrifice: to thank, petition or honour the gods with offerings, usually material. In Homeric society, sacred actions are not monopolized by a priestly class or by the nobles. Women sacrifice, the slave Eumaeus sacrifices, and in one passage, each common Achaean soldier sacrifices to one god or other, praying for his own safety. In the same pas-

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20 Odysseus: *Od.* 1.45–62. Ithaca and Pylos: *Od.* 3 implicitly contrasts the sacrifices and double weddings of well-ordered Pylos with chaotic Ithaca, where a marriage is suspended, a wedding with a Suitor postponed indefinitely, and the gods neglected—by the Suitors at least, who never begin their feasts with a sacrifice (e.g. *Od.* 2.55–58), do not welcome strangers like Mentes or the 'beggar', and violate the sacred laws of hospitality by 'consuming' Odysseus' household (e.g. *Od.* 1.248). Zeus loves Hector because of his pious sacrifices (*Il.* 24.66–70) and 'sacred Ilion' because under Priam his altars there always smoked with offerings (*Il.* 4.44–49), although ironically enough in the same passage he is prepared to have the city sacked and destroyed as a favour to Hera. Tlepolemus' people in Rhodes 'were loved by Zeus' and made wondrously wealthy (*Il.* 2.668–670).

21 See Oakley (2006), Chapter 1, esp. 14–19 for Near-Eastern material, drawing on work by L'Orange (see esp. ([1953] 1982) 103–109), Eliade (1959), and especially Frankfort, Wilson, Jacobsen ([1946] 1974) e.g. 77–96, 200–216.

sage, however, Homer describes at much greater length the ritual actions of Agamemnon: how he gathers the leaders, and in their company sacrifices a bull to Zeus, praying for victory for the army as a whole. In particular, Agamemnon 'hallows' (*hiera rezein*, *hiereuein*) the animal, and so even the semantic associations suggest that he has taken on an essentially priestly role, as representative of all the Achaeans before Zeus.[22]

Priest and king, Pope and Caesar, Patriarch and Emperor, Prophet and Caliph: from Caesaropapism to Erastianism to separation of powers, the possible relations of spiritual and material power are many, and of crucial importance.[23] To tease out how the Homeric poems offer their own variation on a perennial pairing, one can divide relevant passages into those in which the king *personally* performs the sacrifice—that most sacred of activities—and those in which he does not: that is, those passages where the king himself takes on the role of priest, and those where he merely presides. In both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the former often occur in moments of crisis or symbolic importance, but seem comparatively rare: Agamemnon and Priam hallowing the oaths before the duel of Paris and Menelaus and Odysseus sacrificing to the dead are the two salient examples. The latter scene depicts Perimedes and Eurylochus holding the sheep whose throats Odysseus himself cuts over the pit (*Od.* 11.23–36): to get the interview with Teiresias so necessary for his men's homecoming, the king does the sacred action himself, mediating between the living and the shades of the dead. More paradigmatic for 'ordinary' experience is the scene of Agamemnon's sacrifice in *Iliad* 3. Here after the Catalogue and *teichoskopia*, Agamemnon and Priam meet on the plain as high representatives of their followers to take oaths and strike a truce. For this moment, fraught with significance and anticipation, Homer slows the pace, forcing his audience to linger attentively on the details of the sacred acts, as if to ensure that each is done right. Crucial among these details may be that Agamemnon performs the ceremonies *himself*: his hands are purified, he cuts the dedicatory hairs, he prays to Zeus and Helios, and then comes the sacrifice itself, as he 'cuts the lambs' throats with the pitiless bronze and laid them down upon the ground gasping and failing of breath; for the bronze had robbed them of their strength' (3.292–293). Here Homer takes time to describe each step but at other times the sequence is compressed, as kings are simply said to sacrifice, or promise

22 Trojan women praying to Athena: *Il.* 6.297–312. Eumaeus may be a special case, given his royal parentage and the fact that he bears other marks and epithets of royalty (see *infra*, n. 24). Common soldiers' prayers, followed by Agamemnon's sacrifice and prayer on behalf of all: *Il.* 2.400–420.

23 Ehler & Morall (1954) treat this large topic in medieval and modern European contexts.

to sacrifice in the future; when the sacred killing is done, the king most typically yields to followers the ancillary tasks of cutting, cooking, and preparing the meat for the sacred feast.[24] On the other hand, there are many more passages in which the king seems to be only present at or to merely preside over the sacrifice, while priests, *hetairoi*, or unspecified others do the actual grisly work of killing, as well as lifting, cutting, folding the fat, cooking the meat. Most saliently, in *Iliad* 1, Odysseus presides over the hecatomb to Poseidon, but it is Chryses who says the prayer, and unnamed others who 'drew back the victims' heads and cut their throats' and all the other *ponos* of the ritual; in *Odyssey* 3, Telemachus sees nine black bulls being sacrificed by nine companies, but the aged Nestor is introduced as sitting with his sons, while his companions (*hetairoi*) prepare the feast; in *Iliad* 23, it is only said that animals were sacrificed to Patroclus' ghost, but not by whom. Finally, on the Shield of Achilles, it is the heralds on the royal *temenos* who prepare and sacrifice an ox, while the king stands by, holding his sceptre.[25]

Does the Shield give the generic situation? Or are Homeric kings ideally expected to perform the act of sacrifice themselves? I would suggest the latter as a possible way of reconciling the two sets of passages: circumstances or personal character may cause him to delegate, but in moments of crisis or general significance, it is essential that the king himself lead, hallowing the animal himself, and himself saying the prayers of mediation. Here the mixed scene at the end of *Odyssey* 3 may be instructive. In the celebrations honouring Telemachus' departure, the aged Nestor continues to do as much as he can: he gives gold to the smith to gild the victim's horns, initiates the sacrifice by washing his hands, sprinkling the barley grains, cutting the first hairs, casting them in the fire, and saying the prayer to Athena. He is clearly at the centre of

24 Kings sacrificing (*hiereuein, sphazein*): *Il.* 2.402–418 and 7.314 (Agamemnon), 6.174 (Lycian king), *Od.* 8.59, 13.24 (Alcinous). The case of Eumaeus may fall into this pattern, since he is the virtuous son of a 'godlike' king (*Od.* 15.413–414) and so a generous host and gift-giver: the swineherd—*dios* (14.48 and 12 more times) and a 'leader of men' (14.22, 14.121, 15.351, 15.389, 16.36, 17.184)—sacrifices 2 boars (14.47), and the best boar (14.413–425) which he kills himself (14.425), though the after-work of preparing the meat can be done by himself (14.74) or by attendants (14.430–432). The Suitors' unsuitability for kingship may be reflected in their banquets, where the sacrificial element is hardly emphasized and *hiereuein* seems synonymous with mere 'killing' (e.g. 14.28, 20.391, cf. 24.215). Kings promising to sacrifice: *Il.* 4.101–103, 4.119–121, 23.144–149; cf. *Il.* 6.94, 6.275, 6.309, 23.863–865 (Teucer punished for *not* vowing a hecatomb), *Od.* 10.521–525.

25 Odysseus and Chryses: *Il.* 1.458–467. Nestor and company: *Od.* 3.32–33. Patroclus' ghost: *Il.* 23.31, 23.167. Shield: *Il.* 18.554–560.

proceedings, but the heavy work of striking the blow and cutting the throat are handed over to two sons: Thrasymedes stuns the animal, and then Peisistratus cuts the throat. Only after the meat is prepared does Nestor step in again to pour a libation over it (3.436–460). Here one sees the sacred action split: Thrasymedes is the eldest son and presumably future king, but Homer focuses on Peisistratus, as the newly made friend of Telemachus, giving him the final blow, as well as the epithet 'leader of men' (*orchamos andrōn*, 3.454) as if he too were made of kingly stuff.

If this is not to over-read this and the other passages, it would seem that Homer does equivocate about the relation of kings and priests in a way that justifies Aristotle's somewhat indeterminate phrase, *kurioi thusiōn*. That is, Aristotle did not simply project onto the Homeric poems the hieratic 'kingly' offices of later-city states (e.g. Athenian *archōn basileus*), but captures a real function of the kings in the epics themselves. In fact, Aristotle and this analysis only highlight how Homer's societies give their own refraction of the close conjunction of kingly and priestly roles in contemporary and later ancient societies: Pharaohs, Mesopotamian kings, Spartan kings, Macedonian kings, Roman emperors, and others are expected to preside over, and even ideally to perform, sacrifices as part of their royal duties.[26] What may seem strange to some modern readers was overwhelmingly generic in antiquity: because the divine will was felt to affect the community's welfare in all ways, it was entirely fitting that the people be represented by their king and 'best' man in propitiatory offerings. In their priestly role as 'masters of sacrifice', Homeric kings are no exception to this type of 'pious' mediation.

At the same time, Homeric kings are never *identified* as priests. They may 'hallow' (*hiereuein*) sacrifices, they may pray, but they are clearly distinguished from *hiereis* and *arētēres*. Named priests like Chryses, Dares, Dolopion, Onetor, and Maron are dedicated to single deities, but the Homeric kings are not: Athena's favour for Odysseus, for instance, or Zeus' favour for Hector and Achilles are more erratic, and do not entail a relationship of special service.[27] The priests' special devotion may be what most underlies their authority and reverend status, to which even kings are expected to submit at appropriate

26 Spartan kings: X. *Lac.* 13. The Roman Emperor's central role as *Pontifex Maximus*: e.g. Gordon (1990).

27 Most elaborate is the description of Chryses as priest (*arētēr*) of Apollo (*Il.* 1.11–23; *hiereus* in 1.370). Dares is *hireus* of Hephaestus (*Il.* 5.9–10). Onetor is priest of Idaean Zeus, and 'honoured by the people like a god' (*Il.* 16.604–605). Dolopion is a Trojan priest of the river Scamander, also 'honoured by the people like a god' (*Il.* 5.76–78). Maron is *hireus* of Apollo, and reverenced (*hazesthai*) by Odysseus and his men (*Od.* 9.197–201).

times. Paradigmatic here surely is the way the *Iliad* opens, with a confrontation between a king and a priest. When Chryses appears bearing the golden sceptre and garlands of the god, beseeching the Achaeans to show reverence (*hazesthai*, 1.21) for Apollo, then the army, Achilles, and seemingly Homer himself all show proper *aidōs* for the priest—all except Agamemnon, though in the end he too is forced by Apollo's anger to respect the old man's request. Here is another, rather conventional dimension of the piety expected of the good king: reverence for the power of the gods, as mediated through their priests.

In the end, it may not be possible to fully reconcile the partial similarities and differences of Homer's kings and priests. An analogous pattern of difference and partial similarity may be traced in the relations between Homeric kings and two other numinous types: bards and prophets. Homeric bards (*aoidoi*) are blessed with an authoritative knowledge of divine history,[28] while prophets, i.e. seers, bird-diviners, and dream-readers (*manteis*, *theopropoi*, *oiōnopoloi*, *oneiropoloi*) have a more or less permanent insight into the divine will.[29] Both types are acknowledged specialists, *dēmioergoi* or 'public workers' whose skills were specialized enough to require the support of a whole community, or several.[30] Bards and prophets have a deeper, and broader mindfulness, encapsulated best perhaps in the phrase that they are said to know 'what was, what is,

28 That the poet is divinely inspired is obvious in the invocations of the Muses (*Il.* 2.484–486, 2.760–762, 16.112–113; cf. 11.218–222, 14.508–510), while the twin main subjects of Homeric poetry are heroic and divine deeds. Demodocus is a 'divine bard' (*theios aoidos*, 8.43–45), divinely taught (8.488), and divinely inspired (8.499)—as he sings a song about Ares and Aphrodite (as well of two Trojan tales), and is 'like a god in voice' (9.4); Phemius too is 'like to a god in voice' (1.371), a 'divine bard' (*theios aoidos*, 13.27, 16.252, 17.359), a 'wondrous bard' (*thespis aoidos*, 17.385), taught by a god and worthy to sing to Odysseus 'as to a god' (22.344–349). Note also how the Homeric narrator parades his (startling?) knowledge of the gods' language (e.g. *Il.* 1.403, 20.74). Hesiod juxtaposes bards and kings as equal recipients of divine inspiration (*Th.* 79–103), enabling them to sooth sorrow (97–101) and quarrels (81–84, 90), respectively.

29 Calchas knows Apollo's will while Polydamas' insights in *Il.* 12.219–250 are ignored by Hector. More minor prophets are the Trojans Merops ('above all men skilled in *mantosunē*', 2.831–832), and Helenus ('by far the best of the *oiōnopoloi*', 6.76; cf. 7.53). Bremmer (1993) provides an informative discussion of 'a phenomenon that has not yet received the attention it deserves: prophets, seers and power'.

30 Eumaeus' classification of bards as *dēmioergoi* (*Od.* 17.382–385) is not 'an anomaly' reflecting Eumaeus' lower-class perspective (*pace* Segal [1994] 151–152, 163) but rather a reflection of the economic law that finer specializations require larger markets and that many bards must wander for a living (cf. Finley ([1954] 1972) 42–43)—unless a great house like Agamemnon's or Odysseus' can keep one in its exclusive and permanent employ; Eumaeus may only meet the less fortunate, wandering type. The wandering musician is a fairly uni-

and what will be':[31] this mindfulness may be echoed in kings' need to 'look forward and backward'[32] when dealing with the present, and of course prophets like Calchas and Polydamas help them in this by giving advice. Bards, prophets, and kings all carry sceptres as symbols of authority,[33] and while prophets are always aristocrats and in some cases minor kings, the dominant narrative sharply *distinguishes* kings and seers:[34] a Calchas or Polydamas have abilities *not* possessed by an Agamemnon or Hector, yet their uncanny access to the divine mind does not automatically thrust them into the highest positions of leadership.[35]

The distinction between the three types suggests that Homer's kings are not 'pious' mediators in the sense that they enjoy bards' and prophets' more direct knowledge of the divine life. Yet Homer praises those kings who at least *respect* the autonomous knowledge of singers and seers. Agamemnon threatens Calchas, Hector and the Trojans scorn Polydamas, Odysseus' men ignore Teiresias' warning about the Cattle of Helios, and the Suitors ignore Halitherses and Theoclymenus, but in each case they suffer the consequences.

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versal phenomenon, and the 'mobility' of prophets too is a common theme in later Greek and Hebrew traditions (Bremmer [1993] 158, 163–164).

31 Knowing present, future and past: *Il.* 1.70 (Calchas), 18.250 (Polydamas); cf. Hes. *Th.* 29–39 (Muses know all time, and inspire the sceptre-bearing poet to sing of future, past, and of ever-living gods), *Il.* 2.485 (Muses 'know everything'), 13.732–735 (Zeus-given *noos* of Polydamas).

32 Kings should 'look forward and backward', transcending personal emotion for the people's good: *Il.* 1.342–343 (Agamemnon does not), 3.105–110 (Priam does, but his hot-headed sons may not—though in 3.146–160 the Trojan elders' wise advice is ignored by Priam). Seer-like Polydamas 'alone sees forward and backward', in contrast to Hector (18.249–250). See also the proverbial *Il.* 2.61 (a leader should not sleep the whole night).

33 Sceptre-bearing prophets: *Od.* 11.91 (Teiresias). Poets: Hes. *Th.* 30. Heralds also bear the sceptre, probably as representatives of kings.

34 Kingly status of seers: Merops of Percote (*Il.* 2.831–832, best *mantis*), Mysian Ennomus (2.858, 17.218), Eurydamus (5.149, reader of dreams), Phaeacian Nausithous (*Od.* 8.645–671, 13.172–173), and Melampus (*Od.* 11.281–297); cf. Calchas, who fights among the leaders (*Il.* 13.45, 70). Stories about such 'king-seers', Bremmer (1993: 155) speculates, 'would fit well in the efforts of the Homeric kings in monopolising the "mediatorship between gods and men"'. I suspect that the Homeric poets were not so compliant with royal ambitions: the *false* dream of Agamemnon, and his poor interpretation of it, dramatically undercut any claim to a kingly 'monopoly' on mediatorship.

35 It was through his superlative prophetic gifts that Calchas 'led the Achaeans' ships to Ilium' (1.69–72): his temporary leadership may have involved just navigating the ships successfully. Only in one instance does a bard replace a king—when an unnamed *aoidos* is put in charge of Agamemnon's house during his absence: *Od.* 3.265–272.

By contrast, Achilles and Odysseus respect the specialized knowledge of a Calchas, or a Teiresias, and it reflects on Telemachus' emergent greatness as a king that he attracts the prophet Theoclymenus as a retainer. In fact, in all such narrative incidents, Homer seems consistently to side with prophets against their sceptics.[36] Analogously, Aegisthus subjected Agamemnon's bard to a slow and ignominious death, but Odysseus shows his superior 'piety' when he honours Demodocus with the best cut, and spares Phemius' life.[37]

A final consideration at least suggests that Homer's kings exist in the middle region between gods and people. This is the curious fact that only kings share with the gods the privilege of having a *temenos*—a plot of ground set out for their exclusive use, enjoyment, and honour. The deity's *temenos* is his or her favourite haunt, while kings have or are awarded theirs both to honour their superiority and to support them in it economically.[38] The most extended passage here is Sarpedon's evocation of the heroic code, by which the community gives their fighting kings a 'cut' (*temenos*) of the best land, in exchange for which (and other honours) the kings have the duty of defending their people in war. The exact terms of this social contract are not clear but Finley argues plausibly that any communal grant of land must have been in perpetuity:[39] namely, the poem's aristocratic tenor precludes any reversion to the people of what they have once given up to a great man. On the other hand, it is never implied that the royal *temenos* is or should be used for communal, *sacred* purposes or that

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36 Most prominent are the scenes in which Agamemnon ignores Calchas, and Hector Polydamas, but there are others, as when Merops' prophecies are ignored by his sons (2.831–884).

37 The full scene sees Odysseus exercising judgment over an array of numinous figures: he spares the bard and herald (Medon), but kills Leiodes, who as prophet should have foreseen his return (*Od.* 22.310–374). For a more thorough sifting of categories of hero and bard in the *Odyssey*, see Segal (1994) 142–163: Achilles (153–154) and Odysseus are likened to bards, but *are* not bards (esp. 159). Segal argues that Homer aims to place the bard 'in an intermediate … relation between the hero and the beggar' (149): I suggest instead that Homer honours bards as autonomous, reverend figures, even if they appear as wanderers, beggars or servants in aristocratic houses.

38 Demeter has a *temenos* in Pyrasus (*Il.* 2.696), Zeus on Mt Ida (8.48), the river-god Spercheius in Phthia (24.148), and Aphrodite in Paphos (*Od.* 8.362). *Temenē* of kings: *Il.* 6.194 (Glaucus' ancestors), 9.578–580 (Meleager), 12.313–314 (Sarpedon), 18.391 (Iphition), *Od.* 6.293–294 (Alcinous), 18.2, 18.299 (Odysseus), and most elaborately and generically *Il.* 18.550–560—Achilles' shield where the king watches, the people work, and the heralds prepare the sacrificial meal. In a different passage, Achilles wonders whether the Trojans have allotted a *temenos* for Aeneas, as reward for killing him (*Il.* 20.184–186).

39 See Finley (1957) 149–152.

it should provide the resources to support specifically sacred mediation (i.e. animal sacrifice). Nor is it equated with the god's *temenos*, and differs from it in often comprising arable land and orchards, as opposed to the 'fragrant altar' of the latter: a reminder perhaps that mortal men 'eat bread', while the gods subsist on more ethereal ambrosia and *knisos*. In any case, though definitive conclusions are difficult, the very fact that kings and gods have *temenē* is a remarkable coincidence, and surely not entirely fortuitous: would the Homeric mind have accepted the royal *temenos*—rich, separate, perpetual—as the prime gift by which a people 'honour their kings like gods'?

Achilles and Odysseus as Numinous Figures

The difficulty of answering such questions underscores how little Homer is interested in economics, logistics, and legalities, relative to the more compellingly direct realities of personality. The heroes' personalities are not merely vivid and dominating, but are often sketched in tones of what could be described as quasi-religious intensity. Thus there are the many scenes in which a deity sheds strength, light or grace over a favoured hero, and the other mortals present look on in a wonder, dread, or both (*thambos*, *tarbos*): Athena pours marvellous grace (*thespesiēn kharin*) on Telemachus, or on Odysseus, and those present look on in astonishment.[40] In all this, one should not forget that wonder and dread are basic religious emotions[41] and that the Greek *thambos* and

40 *Od.* 2.12–13, 8.17–19, and most of all *Od.* 16.172–179 where Telemachus averts his eyes, for fear that the transformed beggar 'be a god' (16.179). Martin (1984: 45 n. 35) discusses such scenes under a 'looking on' motif—exemplified in Sarpedon's speech (*Il.* 12.312) and *Od.* 8.170–173 (with Hes. *Th.* 85, 91)—where the people look on the ideal king 'as a god'. To Martin's motif one might link the formula 'being honoured by the people as a god', of which the following are examples or variations: *Il.* 2.230–231 (Idomeneus); 10.33 (Agamemnon); 11.58 (Aeneas); 13.218 (Thoas); 9.302, 9.155, 9.297 (Achilles); 22.394, 22.434–435 (Hector prayed to 'like a god'); *Od.* 7.11, 7.71 (Alcinous); 5.36–40, 19.280, 23.339 (Odysseus); and 14.202–206 (Odysseus' Cretan tale in which people 'honoured me equally with the immortals' [*ison ithaigeneessin*]). The phrase *theos hos tieto dēmōi* is used of the priests Dolopion (*Il.* 5.77–78) and Onetor (*Il.* 16.605), as it is of the regal Nausicaa (*Od.* 8.467) and Helen (*Od.* 15.179).

41 This commonplace of religious experience is reflected in the *tarbos* of Hector before Apollo's voice (*Il.* 20.379), of Priam before Hermes (24.170), and Achilles' possible *tarbos* before Athena and Hera (21.288); the *thambos* of Achilles before Athena (*Il.* 1.199), of Helen before Aphrodite (3.398), of Telemachus before Athena (*Od.* 1.322–324), of Penelope before an inspired Telemachus (*Od.* 1.360, 21.354). Note especially the *tarbos* of heralds (*Il.* 1.331) or Priam before Achilles (24.152) or of Thersites before sceptre-wielding Odysseus

tarbos are related etymologically. Such scenes reflect the double mediation of Homer's kings, intermediate between gods who exalt them with a touch of their own power and beauty, and the people, who are then even more inspired to worship them as higher beings.

Many kings enjoy their moments of 'grace', Homeric-style, but Homer's overriding concern for *aretē* ensures that he is ultimately less interested in conventional figures like Diomedes or Hector, and far more in the extraordinary ones of Achilles and Odysseus. One dimension of these superior specimens is that they begin to take on aspects of the separate numinous types, and become alternately warrior, bard, prophet, and priest. Achilles, for one, is primarily a warrior-king and the quintessence of the heroic world. And yet his furious desire for *kleos aphthiton* may make him also a lover of music: when the Embassy arrives, he is singing about the *klea andrōn* with a beautiful lyre whose silver bridge and history Homer pauses to evoke. Something of Achilles' own character is objectified in the lingering description, but what? His longing (*pothos*) for glory, certainly, his fated tie to Hector—but also something of those terrifying infinite spaces where 'the divine' dwells.[42] It is more obvious how Odysseus partially unites the virtues of king and bard: in Phaeacia, when he essentially replaces Demodocus as a courtly singer of heroic tales and awes the company to silence, Alcinous openly compares him to a wandering bard.[43] Eumaeus revisits the comparison, and Odysseus will continue to regale swineherd, Suitors, and Penelope alike with 'Cretan' tales of adventure, blending truth and falsehood as skilfully as Hesiod's Muses.[44] Achilles is not so versatile as Odysseus, yet if anything his nature is even more profoundly poetic. He 'utters more similes than any other character', a fact that has been taken as a sign of distinct poetic talent, and his vocabulary and style of speech are so strikingly original, imagistic, and vivid that they seem to resemble Homer's own.[45]

(2.268); in the *thauma* of Laertes before Odysseus 'like to the immortals' (*Od.* 24.370–371) and most of all in the mutual *thambos*, emphatically repeated, between kings Priam and Achilles (*Il.* 24.482–484).

42 Dio Chrysostom plays on the notion that Alexander, like Achilles, had a music-inspired nature that could be satisfied only by regal, heroic poetry (*Or.* 1.1); cf. Julian, *Or.* 2.49c.

43 Awed silence: *Od.* 11.333–334. Alcinous: *Od.* 11.363–369; Odysseus himself anticipates the comparison in 9.2–10. On the theme, see e.g. Thalmann (1984) 113–133, 157–186, and Segal (1994).

44 Eumaeus' simile about Odysseus as a singer 'from the gods': *Od.* 17.518–521. Hesiod's Muses: *Th.* 27–28.

45 Martin (1989: 170) in fact argues that Achilles is unique in using 'expressions elsewhere used exclusively by gods in speeches, or by the narrator in diegesis'. Utters most similes:

Odysseus' skill with words is not merely bard-like: it allows him often to speak like a prophet also. In *Iliad* 2, in order to restore order to the army, he reminds the soldiers of Calchas' prophecy of victory, nine years before in Aulis: he even speaks in Calchas' voice, as if to assume the prophet's authority in this moment of crisis (*Il.* 2.299–322). In his home-coming, in his guise as beggar, he often speaks in a quasi-prophetic way about the imminent return of the king. Achilles too is *not* a prophet—though unlike Odysseus, he does *not* in Machiavellian style cultivate the appearance of being one. But around him there hangs far more the uncanny aura of a prophet. Almost uniquely he is the son of a goddess—and like Nereus, Proteus, and other sea-deities, Thetis was associated with special prophetic powers.[46] It is from her that Achilles knows what his fate will be, and this is the singular, uncanny knowledge that separates, even alienates him from all others at Troy. This aura is reinforced by the fact that Achilles is one of the few characters to whom gods appear *directly*, frequently, and even on terms of equality and intimacy. Deities can appear to whomever they will, of course, and do so through omens, prodigies, dreams, voices, and direct epiphanies. These manifestations tend to be short-lived, and there is a hierarchy from noticing a strange event to sensing, hearing, and actually *seeing*, let alone *recognizing* a deity. Such direct epiphanies are rare, lonely affairs. They elevate the hero far above the middling crowd, yet by nearer proximity to the divine also teach him the painful truth that he is mortal. Athena lifts the veil from Diomedes' mortal eyes, or more dramatically still, Athena yanks backwards Achilles' head and he turns in astonishment (*thambos*) towards the burning eyes of the goddess: the hero is alone in such visions (1.197–200). Achilles' closeness to the divine is unparalleled in any character, even Zeus-born Helen: Athena, Iris, Thetis all appear to and even converse with this demi-god, almost at times as an equal.[47]

Moulton (1977) 100. Poetic talent: Janko (1991) 316; cf. Reeve (1973), Friedrich & Redfield (1978), and Griffin (1986) 50–56.

46 See esp. Slatkin (1991).

47 On epiphanies, see Dietrich (1983) and Turkeltaub (2007) who argues that Achilles is gradually raised to near equality with the gods, citing *inter alia*, his 'unique ability' to recognize divinities outside the *aristeia* (68), his perceiving 'three times as many divine epiphanies as any other hero' (69), his freedom whether to obey their injunctions (70), Iris' deference to him 'as though he were a god himself' (71), and his mixed parentage and knowledge of his fates that place him permanently 'on the boundary between apotheosis and death' (74), that liminal zone skirted by other heroes only in their brief *aristeia*.

Even more impressive is Achilles' relative closeness to Zeus. A modern secular reader may tend to read Zeus as simply another definitely limned character. Yet aspects of Zeus consistently point to his *otherness*. He is the one god who does not intervene directly, he is clearly supreme over all the others, and often isolates himself on the farthest reaches of Olympus or Ida: physical separation becomes the objective correlative of his superior power and inscrutable mind. In the parallel world of mankind, Achilles physically separates himself from the Greeks and the war for two thirds of the epic: a separation which is correlated with his superior heroism and which after the Embassy baffles more conventional figures like Ajax and Diomedes. The inner affinity of isolated high god and isolated hero is apparent from the beginning, as Thetis visits both—Achilles by the ships, Zeus 'sitting apart from the others, on the highest peak of many-ridged Olympus' (*Il.* 1.488–489). Through Thetis, Achilles learns *something* of Zeus' will and this unique awareness sets him further above all others. It would be too much to speak of him as a 'priest' or 'prophet' of Zeus, dedicated exclusively to a god whose will he knows. The crucial speeches of *Iliad* 9 suggest that in the face of Agamemnon's insults and Hector's victories Achilles does not know with certainty that Zeus will give him glory: the openness of his fate (*Il.* 9.410–416) makes him waver between staying and returning home.

Yet his awareness of an inner affinity grows as the action proceeds. The critical juncture comes in *Iliad* 16.220–252. Patroclus has re-entered the battle and the Myrmidons have been roused. Achilles is wholly alone now. He enters his hut, takes out a special goblet of gold used only for libations to Zeus, purifies the goblet with sulphur, cleanses his hands, pours a libation, and utters a prayer that has been described as the 'most solemn in Homer', invoking Zeus as the Pelasgian god of distant Dodona, where his oracular interpreters (*hypophētai*), the Selloi, live in their holy simplicity.[48] Whoever these Selloi may be, it is clear that they have dedicated their lives to Zeus, and in invoking them, Achilles may seek to affirm his own inner resemblance to these priest-prophets of the high, distant god. With his special goblet and unique prayer, the utterly isolated Achilles identifies with the strange ascetics of far-off Dodona, and seeks to bind Zeus' high will. But he does not yet know the workings of that will: Zeus grants Patroclus victory, but not a safe return. Zeus' decision here foreshadows Achilles' own fate to win glory and lose his *nostos*, but to this mysterious duality of the divine mind, as it gives both good and evil together, Achilles will not be fully reconciled until the final juncture, when he can articulate his new-found wisdom to Priam (24.525–546). This is a tragic wisdom, a painful

48 Solemnity: Janko (1991) 348.

awareness of the precariousness of human power, and it is appropriate that it is articulated by Achilles specifically: the prayer in *Iliad* 16, and Zeus' response, shows Achilles' simultaneous closeness to and distance from Zeus, for Zeus will bring about his glory through the most harrowing mortality.

The prayer thus marks a critical stage in Achilles' understanding of his fate, and it vividly dramatizes how Achilles' relationship to Zeus defines him more than any other. When all others are gone, Zeus still hears him: yet the affinity with the high god is, as with all seers or prophets, a soul-shattering one, and Homer's Achilles is no exception, even though Homer develops the notion of Achilles' 'dark night' with his own epic style that seems so crisp, luminous, and lacking in shadows. This reticence should not deceive one, however, and one suspects that Virgil may have better penetrated the bright veil when he partially modelled his own Aeneas on Homer's Achilles. T.S. Eliot sums up Virgil's Aeneas as a 'man in fate': one defined by his loyalty (*pietas*) to a higher, 'divine' purpose.[49] The idea can be cast from Virgilian studies back to the *Iliad*, I suggest, for Achilles too is a 'man in fate', in Eliot's sense, since his actions are also shaped by the consciousness of a higher purpose and reality. As with Aeneas, however, it is a consciousness that flickers and grows. From his mother Achilles knew the prophecies and his choice of fates, but initially (as with Virgil's Aeneas) that knowledge was abstract. It is only through the course of the *Iliad*, through disappointment, isolation, alienation, doubt, loss, and his own choices at each stage that Achilles gradually enters into his destiny, accepts and realizes it through his own actions.[50] Before his prayer to Zeus, Achilles tells Patroclus that he does not 'fret about any oracle he knows', his mother has told him nothing of Zeus' design, and so his mind reverts to brooding on Agamemnon's insult (*Il.* 16.49–60). The death of Patroclus, his alter ego, changes all this. When he returns to battle, it will be with an intense certainty of who he is, at once destined for timeless glory and a mortal man—a brilliant speck in the vast cosmos depicted on the divine shield he bears. Zeus' will drags him into his final *aristeia*, which is not only glorious but charged with religious pathos, as it thrills its divine audience, and reveals to human onlookers something of the awful power of the Olympian gods. Again, one should not forget the terrors of 'piety': prophet, seer, and heroic soldier are often pushed unwillingly into the terrifying middle-space between mortality and divinity.

49 Eliot ([1944] 1971) 128.

50 Analogously, Morwood (1985) discusses how Aeneas' consciousness of his fate evolves from abstract (*Aeneid* 2) to certain (*Aeneid* 12).

That Achilles inhabits a sublime middle space is evident both before and after his *aristeia*. He abstains from sex, does not eat bread 'such as mortal men eat', but is sustained by nectar. He wears divine arms into battle, his chariot drawn by two immortal, prophetic horses. He fights the divine Scamander and threatens Apollo. He judges the fates of suppliants like Lycaon, and when Priam comes in the final supplication, his descent to the Greek camp is couched in terms of a *katabasis* to Hades—Trojans keen, a river is crossed, and Hermes guides the fearful pair—as if Achilles at the end of the journey were the god of death himself, implacable and pitiless. For a time, he is indeed like the god of death: with his own hands, he slays animals, and then Trojan captives, on the pyre of Patroclus. The taking of life is indiscriminate and universal, yet in this he definitely crosses a threshold. Homer does not share the later tragedians' fascination with human sacrifice, which occurs only here in the epics: indeed, in describing the killing of the captives, Homer replaces the regular words for ritual sacrifice (*hiereuein*, *sphazein*) with the more brutal *apodeirotomein* (23.22) and the word for battle-slaughter, *deioun* (23.176).[51] Such vocabulary, if deliberate, suggests that Achilles in his role as chief mourner and chief priest has perverted the right ritual: things are not being done right, the pyre does not kindle at first (23.192), and as Achilles continues to mourn by mutilating Hector's corpse, the gods are displeased (24.22–25).

Godlike in his wrath (*mēnis*) and power, and yet in the end, not a god: *Iliad* 24 ends the story of Achilles' anger with an emphatic act of 'piety', as Achilles obeys Zeus' command, relayed through Thetis, to return Hector's body (24.104–140). Here is a more extended exemplification of what Achilles stated sententiously to Athena at the start: 'he who obeys the gods will be heard by them' crisply captures how an ideal king should be 'piously' obedient to a higher purpose.[52]

Achilles' story is defined by Zeus' will, from Thetis' original request to Achilles' final acceptance of all that Zeus' nod entailed. It has been argued that a central theme of the *Odyssey* too is the hero's exemplary obedience to the divine will—and not only in isolated incidents (e.g. *Od.* 24.545). Namely, Dobbs

51 Cf. *Il.* 21.26–32 (takes captives for *poinē*), 23.174 (cuts the throats of two dogs). Virgil, by contrast, does not scruple to refer to Aeneas' killing of captives with the ritualistic *immolare* (10.515–520, 10.540–541, 12.949): possibly a 'perversion' of Aeneas' piety as proto-*rex sacrorum* (so Callen King [1982] 43–46), or a pessimistic recognition of the suffering divinely ordained in founding the Roman people (so Galinsky [1988] 344).

52 Should obey gods: *Il.* 1.218. Cf. Priam obeying Iris (24.218–224), Achilles obeying Iris (18.169–201) and Zeus (24.503–506).

calls attention to the Thrinacian incident to emphasize that Odysseus is distinguished by his reverence for the sacred boundaries between gods and mortals: he refuses to eat the sacred cattle and, even as Eurylochus gives his fatal argument to kill them, retires to pray to the gods; he refuses to marry Calypso, or to seek to rival the gods; and in all, he learns from Teiresias and hard experience how to 'check his *thumos*'.[53] Such self-restraint and pious recognition of mortal limits may be especially difficult for 'godlike' kings, as Homer hints in several scenes. Most notable is the long *aristeia* of Hector in which he disregards Polydamas and the omens, is confident in Zeus' continued favour, and trusts in his own strength to such an extent that according to Poseidon Hector 'boasts that he is the son of mighty Zeus' (*Il.* 13.54)—a moment of tragic self-delusion. Hector's *aristeia* reflects the tragic duality of these heroic kings, at once bursting with godlike vitality, and yet doomed to die. Achilles is even more trapped in his awareness of divine possibilities and mortal constraints: Patroclus' death plunges him into grief and rage at the human condition and makes him through his *aristeia* more god than man, yet in the end he recognizes his limitations, obeys Zeus, and accepts the mixed lots that he distributes. The whole trajectory of his rage and reconciliation illustrates how more than the Cyclic poets and other mythographers, Homer 'widens the gulf between mortals and immortal, which not even Herakles or Akhilleus can cross'.[54]

Achilles as Paradigm of 'Piety': Alexander and Julian

Regarding Achilles as a 'man in fate' in Eliot's sense may help to appreciate not only those aspects that Virgil may have grafted onto his own Aeneas, but also shed some light on the possible thinking of monarchs who took Achilles as a model. Here, the general notion of Achilles as *chosen* by Zeus for special honour may be, literally, the most influential legacy of the *Iliad*. Whether or not Aristotle himself edited a copy of the *Iliad* to serve as a 'mirror of princes' for the young Alexander, whether he taught Alexander that the best

53 Dobbs (1987) works most with the following passages, among others: *Od.* 1.7–9 (Thrinacian incident is almost as programmatic as 'the will of Zeus' is in *Iliad* 1.5); 12.333–338 (Odysseus praying); 1.58–59, 5.206–224 (refusing Calypso's offer); 5.208–224, 7.208–221, 16.186–191 (not rivalling gods); 8.221–225 (rivalling only mortals); and 11.105 (Teiresias' command to moderate *thumos*).

54 Janko (1991) 1–2.

king is like a 'god among men', complete in every virtue,[55] and that Homer's kings combined the piety of a priest with the justice of a judge and courage of a warrior to best exemplify the highest political ideal—is unknown and probably unknowable. Yet, it is well accepted that the great king cultivated a self-image as the second Achilles, and many episodes of his life have a Homeric precedent or atmosphere: he inaugurated his conquest of Asia by rituals at Troy, where he looked for Achilles' lyre and honoured the heroes of the place as ancestors and benefactors; on campaign, he threw himself into the front ranks 'where the fighting was thickest', and had his moments of *aristeia*, at Chaeronea, the Granicus, among the Mallians, and elsewhere; he mourned Cleitus and Hephaestion with the ferocity of Achilles mourning Patroclus; his anger could be terrible. Like Achilles, Alexander was *not* a priest, prophet or poet. But he had his conventional piety too. He respected prophets and oracles, and was punctilious in offering sacrifice himself. He was a lover of poetry and music, not only Homer, Euripides, and Timotheus, but also of the divine 'music' of philosophy, which he may have respected, or wanted to *appear* to respect.[56] In all, he *can* be seen as respectful towards poets, prophets, oracles, philosophers, and all those numinous figures with special insight into the divine. More obviously like Achilles is the tradition that Alexander too was a 'man in fate'. The issue of Alexander's self-conception is controversial, of course. Did he actually regard himself as son of Zeus, and even as a god? Or did he merely use Near-Eastern ruler-cult as a Machiavellian ploy to unify a disparate empire? Before such impossible questions, I can only suggest that if the Achilles-paradigm was important for Alexander throughout his life, then he may well have been aware of its deeper aspects: his strong sense of destiny, brooded over in terms shaped by Homer's narrative, may have contributed to a sense of his being a 'man in fate', chosen for superlative glory. If so, then

55 See his portrait of the ideal king as a 'god among men' (*Pol.* 3.8, 1284a3–b28) with brief discussion in Desmond (2011) 49–50.

56 For the central and lasting influence of the *Iliad* on Alexander, see e.g. Lane Fox ([1973] 1997) 33–36 (lifelong love of music and poetry), 47–55 (youth and education), 97–103 (the vitally symbolic Trojan visit), 156 (sacrifices to Thetis); cf. Erskine (2001) 228–230. For Arrian, Alexander was 'most conscientious in his devotion to the gods' (*An.* 7.28.1): Fredricksmeyer (2003) confirms this with exhaustive details on Alexander's (often personal) conduct of sacrifices and his respect for prophets and oracles. Less favoured now is the Plutarchan notion that as pupil of Aristotle, admirer of Diogenes and the Gymnosophists, Alexander was a quasi-philosophic bearer of Greek enlightenment; analogous to this higher 'piety' would be an interest in 'divine' music, as symbolized by Achilles' lyre (Plu. *Alex.* 15.9, D. Chr. 2.28–31).

as an Achilles-like king, he did not cultivate the mere appearance of divine appointment, but came to feel it ever more surely with each victory. As he resisted sceptics and mockers, refused Darius' gifts, refused calls to go home, and pressed on relentlessly through all opposition and suffering—an ever more isolated figure, consumed with a sense of difference that others could not understand, how could he not feel that he was a second Achilles, replaying his Trojan triumphs on a much vaster stage? Whatever his private thoughts, Alexander's awe-inspiring victories did make him a numinous figure for many later people, who have looked back on him 'as a god'.

Julian was a fervent admirer of both Alexander and Homer—and thus of Achilles, indirectly, whom he even makes a model for his own model king. In *Caesars*, he has the pious Marcus Aurelius state that he imitated the gods in all things—imitated the 'divine Achilles' in his love for Faustina, and 'highest Zeus' in his forbearance towards Commodus.[57] It is one of the many passages in which Julian rhetorically invokes Homer as part of the education and creed of all right-thinking Hellenists, but his respect for Homer may go beyond the rhetorical, for his own educational policy valorized poets like Homer as inspired by the deepest religious insights, and his conduct as general and soldier reminded onlookers like Ammianus of ancient, Homeric valour.[58] We will not pursue the relations between the *Iliad* and Julian's own ideology of sacred kingship. But that Neoplatonists did find Homeric precedent for sacred kingship is clear from Porphyry's scholion on *Iliad* 1.340. Porphyry knew the *Iliad* as intimately as Julian, and for his part assimilates the Homeric kings to divine kingship as understood by Neopythagoreans like Ecphantus, Diotogenes, and Sthenidas:

> The Pythagoreans, speaking about divine and human nature, have put a complete third venerable species [*sebaston genos*] in between, i.e. the king or the wise man. Homer was the first to put the king between gods and men and to have the king in turn honour the wise man as

57 *Caesars* 334c–d. The first association is inspired by Achilles' maxim that 'a good and sensible man loves and cares for his own wife' (*Il.* 9.341–342); the second by *Il.* 5.897, where Zeus tolerates the brutish Ares only because he is his son.

58 See Amm. Marc. 24.6.14 with Desmond (2011) 139–140 for 'Homeric' aspects of Ammianus' narrative and Julian's actions. Lamberton (1986: 135) focuses on Julian's erudite use of Homer, e.g. to praise Constantius II as more perfectly virtuous than all the Homeric kings combined: his *Oration* 2 depicts Constantius (the Augustus) as Agamemnon, while Julian himself (the Caesar) resembles Achilles 'singing the *klea andrōn* of his illustrious superior'.

> the higher one [...] They say that in India the kings throw themselves at the feet [*proskynein*] of the Brahmans who are in their country the philosophers.[59]

Thus Porphyry would multiply, in Neoplatonic fashion, the levels of reality, placing kings above other mortals, and 'the wise' above kings: in the Neoplatonic scheme, the philosopher or 'divine man' (*theios anēr*) is the highest human mediator with the divine, and in some versions (like Iamblichus') can take on attributes of prophet, priest and even poet, at least metaphorically, when one works with the Platonic conceit that philosophy is the highest 'music'.

In any case, if the argument of this paper is correct, then Porphyry was not entirely wrong: there are indeed aspects of Homer's poems that justify his placing Homeric kings between gods and mortals. Through epithets and formulae, scenes of regal sacrifice, of judicial presence and of awesome fighting force, through their close association with bards and prophets, and through the all-conquering *aretē* of the most superlative figures of Odysseus, and above all, the half-divine Achilles, Homer's kings are raised far above the toiling commoners, honoured by them as a breed apart, who in their excellence attract the interest, admiration, honour, and even love of the gods themselves. Their status between gods and mortals—representing each to the other, and mediating between divine power and mortal limitations—makes them worthy of heroic song, and the exaltation of poetry becomes a means for others to experience their magnificence, as well as to perpetuate their *kleos*. Poetic praise is akin to pious commemoration, yet this act of near reverence for heroic ancestors falls short of outright worship, for Homer ever reminds his hearers that those godlike kings of old were mortal too, also circumscribed in knowledge and power, and lost now to the heroic past.

Indeed, Porphyry's general idea is anticipated almost explicitly by Homer himself. In the remarkable opening of *Iliad* 12, Homer 'pans out' to place the Trojan War within the *longue durée*, and to catalogue the rivers and waters that would one day overwhelm the Achaean wall and all traces of that awesome generation:

> All the rivers that flow from Idan hills towards the sea—the Rhesus and Heptaporus and Caresus and Rhodius and Granicus and Aesepus and

59 Porph. *ad Il.* 1.340 (my translation); cf. MacPhail (2011) 24–27. For Ecphantus, Diotogenes, and Sthenidas, see Goodenough (1928); cf. Desmond (2011) 57–58.

> bright [*dios*] Scamander and Simoeis, where many bulls-hide shields and helmets tumbled in the dust, with that race of demigods.
>
> *Il.* 12.19–23; my translation

The epithet *hēmitheos* for 'demigod' is a *hapax* in the Homeric poems, but might be well construed in the terms of Porphyry's scholion. Certainly, the term *hēmitheos* is used in a parallel passage by Hesiod, where he gives his own vision of the *longue durée* of human history, locating the great Trojan War within the fourth race of men (*Op.* 157–173). Here Hesiod is even explicit in elevating the Homeric kings above the present race of miserable 'iron-age' people: those who fought for Helen were made 'more just and better, a divine race of heroes, who are called demigods (*hēmitheoi*)' (158–160), and though they too passed away, their superlative virtue was rewarded with a life apart, at the ends of the earth in the Blessed Islands, where they enjoy an almost Olympian happiness. Homer's heroic kings are less happy than Hesiod's, and in this he shows his more existential outlook yet again. The divine rivers will wash away the works of those ancient demigods, but their memory will live on in the cadences of the divine song: just one of myriad passages where Homer commemorates the lives of his kings, perched between worlds—intermediate between gods and mortals 'such as are born today'.

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A Speaker of Words and Doer of Deeds: The Reception of Phoenix' Educational Ideal

Jacqueline Klooster

Introduction: *Iliad* 9.438–443

In *Iliad* Book 9, the episode of the embassy, Achilles' old tutor Phoenix emotionally addresses his one-time pupil, who has just announced that he will no longer stay at Troy where he is not treated with the honour that he deserves. If Achilles goes so will he, Phoenix says, because:

> [...] σοὶ δέ μ' ἔπεμπε γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεὺς
> ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε
> νήπιον, οὔ πω εἰδόθ' ὁμοιΐου πολέμοιο,
> οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι.
> τοὔνεκά με προέηκε διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα,
> μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.
>
> *Il.* 9.438–443

> With you the old horseman Peleus sent me on the day when he sent you out from Phthia to Agamemnon, a mere child knowing nothing as yet of evil war, nor of gatherings in which men become preeminent. For this reason he sent me to instruct you in all these things, to be both a speaker of words and a doer of deeds.
>
> trans. MURRAY-WYATT

Besides highlighting the intimate bond of tutor and pupil and underlining the irony of the fact that Achilles is currently anything but a doer of deeds, the speech has largely been taken to express the composite ideal of Homeric male virtue: to be a speaker of words *and* a doer of deeds. Because of this, Phoenix' speech and the ideal it expresses have in fact been read as a Princes' Mirror of sorts, both in antiquity and in modern scholarship: the ideal often turns up in contexts of advice on how to rule, and features prominently in both ancient and modern discussions of Homer as the educator of the Greeks.[1] In

1 See the contribution of De Jong in this volume.

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this chapter, I trace the fortune of this ideal by looking at the way in which Phoenix' phrase is quoted in particular ancient contexts, or referenced by later authors. Besides reflecting the enduring authority of Homer as educator of the Greeks and general compendium of values,[2] this itinerary allows us to follow the development of important discourses in Greek thought. Examples are the relation between words and deeds in the ideal education of princes, but also the casting of Alexander the Great as a model ruler, through the link of his well-documented admiration for Achilles.

The theme of 'words and deeds', or even 'words versus deeds', in the context of good rule is potentially very broad. It might be said to include, on the one hand, the entire philosophical debate about the relative merits of the public *vita activa* (*bios politikos*) versus the philosophical and private *vita contemplativa* (*bios theōrētikos*), which finds its first systematic discussion in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.[3] That Phoenix' words were sometimes taken to epitomize a conciliation of these two ways of life can be seen in Cicero's *De oratore* 3.15.57:

> That ancient learning, indeed, appears to have been at the same time the preceptress of living rightly [*recte faciendi*] and of speaking well [*bene dicendi*]; nor were there separate masters for those subjects, but the same teachers formed the morals and the language; as Phoenix in Homer, who says that he was appointed a companion in war to the young Achilles by his father Peleus, to make him an orator in words, and a hero in deeds [*ut efficeret oratorem verborum actoremque rerum*].
>
> trans. WATSON

On the other hand, through its highlighting of *eloquence* in the life of the heroic king, the topic is crucial to the tradition of using Homeric epic as a model text for orators and the debate this entails on whether or not Homer was aware of rhetoric—and whether this meant it was a *technē* (art) or rather an *aretē* (inborn talent). This rich and well-studied theme is beautifully exemplified in Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* 2.17, also with a reference to our passage.[4]

2 For this role of Homer in antiquity, cf. Pl. *R.* 10.606e, X. *Smp.* 4.6, D. Chr. *Or.* 18.8; see e.g. Jaeger (1933) 3–56, Verdenius (1970), Pontani (2016). See also the contribution of De Jong in this volume, with further references.

3 Arist. *EN* 1.4.

4 Kennedy (1957 and 1980: 89–90) discusses the ancient debate on whether Homer was aware of an actual *technē* of rhetoric or whether this only came into existence with Tisias and Corax in the fourth century BC. See recently also Pontani (2016), with ample reference to the theme. Ancient discussions about this topic can be traced from Plato via Aristotle, Aelius Aristides,

> Some would have it that rhetoric is a natural gift [*naturalem esse*] though they admit that it can be developed by practice [*exercitatione*]. So Antonius in the *De oratore* [2.57.232] of Cicero styles it a knack derived from experience, but denies that it is an art [*obseruationem quandam esse, non artem*]. […] For my part I am not concerned with the date when oratory began to be taught. Even in Homer we find Phoenix as an instructor not only of conduct but of speaking [*cum agendi tum etiam loquendi*]. […] It is sufficient to call attention to the fact that everything which art has brought to perfection originated in nature.
>
> trans. BUTLER

Words and Deeds in the *Iliad*

Before looking at the various ways Phoenix' words are received in the later tradition, I address the Homeric context itself. Does the ideal posited by Phoenix reflect the reality of the relation between words and deeds in the value system represented in the *Iliad*? It is certainly true that throughout we find a notable emphasis on the idea that a hero, who is by definition a *basileus* or *anax andrōn* (a king/lord/prince or ruler of men), should conform to a model that combines command over words with command over actions: in the *Iliad*, both *machē* (battle) and *agora* (the council) receive the epithet *kudianeiros* (fame bringing), and 'speaking well' and 'doing valorous deeds' are often named in one breath.[5] Indeed, as for instance the etymology proposed in Plato's *Cratylus* 398a (to derive 'hero' from the verb *eirein*, 'to speak') shows, the ancient Greeks themselves were aware of the eloquence of Homer's valiant protagonists. In modern times, Solmsen, Schofield, and Martin have paid generous attention to this striking importance of eloquence to the Homeric heroes.[6] Schofield remarks:

> The greatest and most tragic displays of prowess in the *Iliad* are unquestionably the *deeds* of Diomedes, Patroclus, Hector and Achilles on the battlefield. But a good two thirds of the *Iliad* is direct discourse; and Homer surely expects us to revel, as the Achaeans do, in the splendid style of the

Hermogenes, Ps.-Plutarch's *Life and Poetry of Homer*, and Menander Rhetor, through to the Roman world, in Cicero and Quintilian.

5 Cf. *Il.* 2.273, 4.400, 9.53, 18.106, which also put speaking and acts of valour on a par. See Martin (1989) 22–26; for another early expression of this ideal, see Archilochus fr. 1W.

6 Solmsen (1954) 1–15, Schofield (1986) 6–31, Martin (1989) *passim*.

> counsels, pleas, threats and taunts of the chief heroes—much of what is glorious about them is crystallised in the guile, or arrogance, or nobility of their *talk*.
>
> SCHOFIELD 1986: 15, my emphasis

But how exactly do eloquence and physical courage interact with the other qualities or attributes that characterize the heroes in the *Iliad*? To begin with, 'age' is clearly a relevant factor. Throughout we note a general, and unsurprising, notion that prowess is the province of youth, but that this age may also entail a certain lack of judgment or experience, whereas old age, with its many physical drawbacks, usually has the positive side effect of accumulated wisdom, which finds its expression in excellent counsel and speech, and turns old men into exemplary advisors.[7] Diomedes, for instance, is the youngest of the Greek warriors, and certainly not the least. Yet, although he may be 'the best *of his generation* in council' (βουλῇ μετὰ πάντας ὁμήλικας ἔπλευ ἄριστος, *Il.* 9.54), and though his words deserve praise, he does not reach his goal in speaking, or so Nestor asserts (οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων, *Il.* 9.56), because of his youth. The oldest of the heroes, Nestor himself, on the other hand, is among the *Iliad*'s most impressive speakers because of his age, and indeed recognized as such,[8] but his great deeds all lie in the past. In fact, it seems that he also indulges at times, to quote Kirk, in 'garrulous reminiscences' about these deeds.[9] To return to Achilles, he thinks of himself and is thought of by others as the greatest warrior,[10] but judges his own abilities as a speaker to be deficient: 'in the public meeting there are others who are better' (ἀγορῇ δέ τ' ἀμείνονές εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι, *Il.* 18.106).[11] This too may be a symptom of his youth, as Odysseus implies in *Il.*

7 This is also the way Plutarch in his *An seni* (788B, 789D–F, 795AB) reads Homer's description of experienced, old men such as Nestor (with reference to *Il.* 2.53 and 2.372).

8 *Il.* 2.53, 2.372, 3.312–324.

9 Kirk (1985) 79. For the evident contradictions in the depiction of Nestor as both a sage counsellor and a garrulous old man with anachronistic and inefficient battle advice, see Roisman (2005) 17–38 and De Jong in this volume.

10 'Best of the Achaeans': *Il.*1.244, 412; 16.271, 274.

11 On the eloquence of Achilles, see Parry (1956), Janko (1991) 316, Martin (1989) *passim*, Friedrich & Redfield (1978) 236–288. They all note Achilles' exceptional, poetic style. Friedrich & Redfield remark, however, that Achilles' own judgment (and that of his peers) seems contrary to that of most readers of the *Iliad*, who do admire Achilles' poetic language. In this context, it may also be noted that 'while the speech that Achilles has delivered [preceding Phoenix' words in Book 9] makes his powers as an orator very clear, Phoenix' hopes that he would excel at the agora are unfulfilled throughout the *Iliad*.' (Wilson [1996] ad loc.) See further Desmond in this volume.

19.218–219: 'However, in counsel I would surpass you by far, since I am the elder-born and know the more' (ἐγὼ δέ κε σεῖο νοήματί γε προβαλοίμην / πολλόν, ἐπεὶ πρότερος γενόμην καὶ πλείονα οἶδα).

Age is not the sole determinant of eloquence; individual talent is perhaps even more important, as is acknowledged time and again.[12] Thus, Odysseus is generally considered to be the best speaker of the *Iliad*, but he is not the oldest.[13] Another instance is found in the Trojan princes Hector and Polydamas, who were born on the same night. The former is superior in war and the latter in wisdom and balanced judgement, as Polydamas himself points out (*Il.* 18.249–253). Polydamas here seems to imply that, although Hector sees himself as the champion of his city because of his courage and prowess on the battlefield, it is really the wise counsellor who can save the day. In the event, Hector refuses to listen to the advice of Polydamas to withdraw rather than remain camped outside the walls, with disastrous results, and thus indirectly proves him right. This crucial moment for the course of the *Iliad* shows *ex negativo* the importance of good counsel in the *Iliad*'s worldview.

As Solmsen has argued, the only quasi-absolute correlation that we find is between wisdom/intelligence on the one and eloquence on the other hand.[14] To be more accurate, in the *Iliad* at least, it is practically an automatic assumption that those who speak in a convincing way must also speak wisely and vice versa. Eloquence is a direct expression of an intellectual, and *de facto* also moral, quality.[15] This is called *euboulia*, 'good counsel', a term that subsumes wise, virtuous, and profitable thoughts, beautifully phrased, which ideally lead to successful action.[16] The idea of a character who is unwise, yet a truly good speaker, or very wise but unable to express himself accordingly is simply unimaginable in Homer's world. One might see in this a very early forerunner of Quintilian's (Catonian) ideal of the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* since it implies that in order to speak well one must be both virtuous and wise.[17] Indeed, this specific identification of virtue and wisdom with eloquence may explain some of the attraction of Homeric epic as recommended reading for political ora-

12 Cf. *Il.* 12.210, 22.99. For the specific antithesis between valour and wisdom, see *Il.*1.258, 4.322, 18.105.

13 See e.g. the description of the speech styles of Menelaus, Nestor, and Odysseus by the Trojan Antenor in *Il.* 3.312–324.

14 Solmsen (1954) 5.

15 Of course the many 'lying tales' of the *Odyssey* constitute a different paradigm. See e.g. De Jong (2001) 327–330, Scodel (1998) 171–194.

16 Although this is not always the actual effect: see De Jong's contribution to this volume.

17 *IO* 10.1.1.

tors, as we shall explore below. The ideal Homeric king is thus a heroic fighter as well as a wise speaker. This ideal is also echoed in the *Odyssey*, for instance by that other Homeric tutor of princes, Mentor-Athena, when she admonishes Telemachus to become like his father:

> Τηλέμαχ', οὐδ' ὄπιθεν κακὸς ἔσσεαι οὐδ' ἀνοήμων,
> εἰ δή τοι σοῦ πατρὸς ἐνέστακται μένος ἠΰ,
> οἷος κεῖνος ἔην τελέσαι ἔργον τε ἔπος τε.
>
> *Od.* 2.270–272

> Telemachus, nor hereafter will you be a base man or witless, if anything of your father's excellent spirit has been instilled in you; such a man was he to fulfil both deed and word.[18]
>
> trans. MURRAY-DIMOCK, adapted

Reception: Some Preliminary Remarks

I now turn to the *reception* of Phoenix' words, but not without some preliminary methodological remarks about the contexts of the receptions of Homer's phrase. For reasons of scope, I focus on the Greek rather than the Roman side of the story. Despite the rich Byzantine afterlife of the passage, I put my endpoint in the fourth century AD. Moreover, what I present is what is found by searching for direct quotations or variants of the phrase Phoenix speaks in the *Iliad*, and for contexts where Phoenix occurs in his specific quality of Achilles' tutor. I attempt to establish a rationale behind these instances of reception and discuss the most salient examples. The genres in which Phoenix' dictum is quoted are in the first place exegetical texts on Homer, such as are preserved in the ancient scholia and the Pseudo-Plutarchan *Life and Poetry of Homer*;[19] secondly we find varieties of the Princes' Mirror-genre[20] (Plutarch's *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs* and *Precepts of Statecraft*, Dio Chrysostom's second oration, several orations by Themistius) and rhetorical treatises (Cicero's *De Oratore*, Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, Aelius Aristides' *Against Plato in Defense of Rhetoric* and *Against Plato about the Four*). Finally, an interesting subcategory,

18 See on this passage also De Jong's contribution.

19 We might count the quote in Strabo 9.5.5 also under this heading; it seeks to argue that Phoenix accompanied Achilles also as a commander of troops, not merely as a counsellor.

20 See the introduction to this volume (esp. 1–8) on the question of whether an actual 'genre' of this kind existed.

overlapping with the Princes' Mirrors, consists of texts about Alexander the Great, who famously was a great admirer of the Homeric Achilles (Plutarch's *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander* and *Life of Alexander*, Dio Chrysostom, and Themistius). A connection is often established between Alexander as model-king on the one hand and reader of Homer/admirer of Achilles on the other, which explains why he features in combination with a reference to Phoenix' phrase in contexts of Princes' Mirrors.

Scholia and Exegetical Texts

I start with the scholia, because though perhaps not chronologically closest, they nevertheless conveniently single out a set of issues that recur in the reception of Phoenix' words.[21] In the first place, we here find eloquence simply pointed out as a distinctive talent (*aretē*) of men. Secondly, we encounter the much-debated question of whether Homer himself knew about rhetoric.[22] This feeds into the discussion of what exactly rhetoric, or eloquence, is, an art (*technē*) or an inborn talent (*aretē*); and hence, whether it can be taught or not. The scholia evidently reflect and synthesize the long-standing and complex debate between (predominantly peripatetic and academic) philosophers on the one hand, who held that rhetoric is a natural ability, and rhetoricians in the wake of figures like Hermagoras of Temnos (first c. BC) on the other, who conversely held that rhetoric is an art and can (or indeed, must) be taught.[23] I provide two examples from the scholia.[24] The first passage is a comment on Achilles' refusal of Agamemnon's hypothetical offer of a bride:

> οὐδ' εἰ χρυσείῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ κάλλος ἐρίζοι, / ἔργαδ' Ἀθηναίῃ: ὑπερβολῇ χρῆται. δύο δὲ οἶδεν ἀρετὰς γυναικός, κάλλος τε καὶ 'ἀγλαὰ ἔργ' εἰδυῖα', ἀνδρὸς δὲ 'μύθων τε †ῥητῆρα ἔμμεναι† πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων'.
>
> Schol. bT *Il.* 9.389–390 ed. Erbse

> *Not even if she were to rival golden Aphrodite in beauty and in handicraft Athena*: He makes use of hyperbole. [Homer] knows two qualities of a

21 On the inclusion in the scholia of much early (Hellenistic) material, specifically on the debate about Homer as the inventor of rhetoric, see Pontani (2016).

22 See above, n. 4.

23 See above, n. 5.

24 There are four more comparable instances: schol. bT *Il.*9.374–379, schol. A *Il.* 9.443b, schol. A bT *Il.* 9.443c, schol. T *Il.* 18.252.

woman, beauty and 'to know splendid handicraft' [*Od.* 15.418], and of a man 'to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds' [*Il.* 9.443].

My translation

In a second more elaborate composite lemma on the passage itself (*Il.* 9.443), we find a brief discussion of several issues:

μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων: ὅτι διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή. εἵπετο δὲ αὐτῷ Φοῖνιξ ὑποδείξων ἅ τε λεκτέον καὶ ἃ χρὴ πράττειν. φαίνεται οὖν καὶ τὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὄνομα εἰδώς· φησὶ γοῦν 'ὅτε κοῦροι ἐρίσ⟨σ⟩ειαν περὶ μύθων', ἀλλὰ καὶ 'βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισι' καὶ 'δικαζόμενος παρὰ νηυσίν'. οἱ περὶ Κόρακα δὲ καὶ Τισίαν ὕστερον ἐξεκόσμησαν τὴν ῥητορικήν. εἰ ὑπὸ Φοίνικος οὖν πεπαίδευται, τί παρὰ Χείρωνος ἐδιδάχθη; δηλονότι δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἰατρικήν.

Schol. bT *Il.* 9.443a ed. Erbse

To be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds: *Aretē* can be taught. Phoenix accompanied him, to teach him what to say and what to do. It seems that Homer knows the name of 'rhetoric'. Indeed, he says 'when boys fight over words' [*Il.* 15.284] but also 'in counsel and words' [*Il.* 4.323], and 'speaking judgments beside the ships' [*Od.* 11.545]. The followers of Corax and Tisias later elaborated the art of rhetoric. If he was educated by Phoenix, what was he taught by Chiron? Justice and Medicine, of course.

My translation

The questions discussed in this scholion are the following: (1) Can *aretē* be taught?[25] Yes, this is demonstrated by the fact that Phoenix accompanied Achilles to teach him several *aretai*. (2) Did Homer know what rhetoric was? Yes, it appears he both knew the term (since he uses the word ῥητῆρα), and the specific practical uses of this *aretē*, since he shows us the three typical contexts for, and hence genres of, oratory, *epideiktikon*/epideictic (*Il.* 15.284), *bouleutikon*/deliberative (*Il.* 4.323), and *dikanikon*/judicial (*Od.* 11.545).[26] This 'natural' rhetoric as found in Homer was later systematized into a *technē* by Corax and Tisias. (3) What did Chiron teach Achilles, if Phoenix taught him to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds? The answer is Justice and Medicine, which perhaps implies that these further two skills (*technai*) were held to complete the ideal of what a ruler should master to benefit his community.

25 That virtue can be taught is a Stoic tenet, which is ascribed by Diogenes Laertius (7.91) to Chrysippus, Cleanthes, and Posidonius.

26 Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.3.

Leaving out the finer issues of the debate about whether *aretē* can be taught, we note that the conclusions presented in the scholia about the way rhetoric functions are superficially in accordance with the situation as described in Homeric epic: eloquence is, like active heroism, a manly *aretē*, and as such an *aretē* that can be taught or trained—to some extent. The Pseudo-Plutarchan treatise *Life and Poetry of Homer*, traditionally dated to the late second century AD, also discusses the phrase three times in contexts which are very similar (or even verbally identical) to what we find in these scholia, viz. that eloquence is a virtue that can be taught (διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή 144 KL = 1735 Kindstrand) and that Homer was knowledgeable of rhetoric (170 KL = 2147 Kindstrand). In 142KL (= 1709 Kindstrand) we moreover find the thought that '*aretē* is useless if it is not practised', illustrated by contrasting Achilles in *Il.* 1.490–492 and *Od.*11.489–491 (where he is miserable and 'useless') with *Il.* 9.433, the description of 'the complete hero'.

Rhetorical Treatises and Political Treatises: Reactions to Plato

The two debates, about whether or not Homer knew what rhetoric was, and whether or not it was possible to teach eloquence, are related to another fundamental debate, the so-called 'quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy' (Pl. *R.* 607b5–6). The main problem with rhetoric, according to Plato (e.g. *Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic*), is in fact precisely that it is not an *aretē*, nor an art (*technē*), but a mere knack (*tribē*), and therefore not even something that can be taught in the true sense.[27] Indeed, rhetoric itself is neither bearer nor result of *epistēmē* (knowledge), just an instrument of persuasion which can be learned from experience (*empeiria*).[28] In Plato's representation it is *philosophical knowledge*, reached by dialectic reasoning, in particular knowledge about justice (what is right and what is wrong, what is owing to each) that should be regarded as the single most important requirement for good statesmanship.[29] Where this is lacking, we may expect to encounter either tyranny or mob rule, swayed by rhetorically successful demagogues. Whereas, as we have seen, ethical quality (*aretē*) and eloquence were firmly, and indeed, attractively, united in Homer in the concept of *euboulia*, Plato not only separates these two categories drastically, but moreover problematizes the authority of Homer as the educator of the Greeks, as is well known.[30]

27 Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 463a–465c. See on this passage e.g. Vickers (1989) 90.

28 Pl. *Grg.* 260d, 454e, 455a.

29 Cf. e.g. Pl. *R.* book 1 *passim.*

30 See the contribution of Lake in this volume.

Plato's attacks made many teachers of rhetoric as well as political thinkers feel compelled to respond to the charges, or tempted to find some kind of synthesis between Plato and Homer, the twin champions of Hellenic *paideia*. This is a particularly frequent phenomenon in the literature of the Second Sophistic, with different strategies used by different authors.[31] Thus in Plutarch's *Precepts of Statecraft*, a treatise addressed to the young Menemachus of Sardis who aspires to become a local politician, Phoenix' phrase is cited practically in the opening lines to circumscribe the tasks of the statesman as Plutarch sees them (798B).[32] A substantial part of the essay is in fact devoted to explaining the importance of combining good ethics and reputation (800B–801C) with persuasive rhetoric (801C–804D). Interestingly, Plutarch never once mentions Plato's objections to rhetoric, a fact that may profitably be linked to the programmatic opening of the treatise, which states that those philosophers who have restricted themselves to formulating abstract and impracticable ideas on statecraft 'have not reached their aim'.[33] In other words, a *real* statesman will, like a Homeric prince, need to know about rhetoric, even if an ideal *philosopher* king in an ideal state may not need to.

An especially intriguing instance of the turns the quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric might take is found in Aelius Aristides, the second-century sophist and hypochondriac, who in his lengthy *Against Plato in Defense of Rhetoric* (ca. 145–147 AD) cites Phoenix' words several times. I treat one instance, where Aristides cleverly takes Plato's charge that rhetoric is not a *technē* and turns it around: indeed, eloquence is not an art to be learnt, but rather a god given talent under the patronage of Hermes,[34] like poetry or divination. Since it is divine, it must inherently be good. In the second part of the oration, Aristides makes the following point about the kingly art of oratory:

> καὶ μὴν ὅστις γε ἃ προσήκει λέγειν οἶδεν οἶδεν ἃ πράττειν προσήκει. [...] Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ συνῆπτον τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ οὐ διέκρινον. ἀλλ' Ὅμηρος μὲν ἔφη τὸν Φοίνικα ὑπὸ τοῦ Πηλέως πεμφθῆναι τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ
>
> μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων,
>
> ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα ἅτε δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ἃ πράττειν ἄμεινον. καὶ πρό γε τούτου πρότερον αὐτὸς συνῆψεν εἰπὼν
>
> οὔπω εἰδόθ' ὁμοιίου πολέμοιο,
> οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσιν,

31 See e.g. Anderson (1993) 69–85.

32 In *An seni* 795E9 the phrase is used for exactly the same purpose.

33 *An seni* 798B: οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων, Nestor's words to Diomedes in *Il.* 9.56.

34 See e.g. *In Defense of Rhetoric* 56.

τὸ μὲν πρακτικὸν ἐξ ἑνὸς εἴδους τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμφανίζων, τὸ δ' αὖ λογικὸν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀγορὰς, μνησθεὶς δὲ ὅμως ἀμφοτέρων τὸ 'ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι' ταῖς ἀγοραῖς προσέθηκεν, οὐ τῷ πολέμῳ, ὡς ἀμείνω τὸν ῥήτορα ὄντα ὅταν λέγῃ περὶ τῶν πρακτέων, ἢ ὅταν αὐτὸς πράττῃ τὴν πρᾶξιν

Aristid. *In Defense of Rhetoric* ed. DINDORF, Jebb p. 97.6; 97.15–28

And indeed, whoever knows what it is proper to say, knows what is proper to do. [...] Therefore the ancients also joined these faculties together and did not discriminate between them. Homer said that Phoenix had been sent by Peleus to Achilles 'to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds' since the same man knew what ought to be said and what had to be done. And before this verse he first joined these qualities together in saying 'unknowing of fair-matched war and of the council places where men are famous' [*Il.* 9.440]. He stresses action from one of its forms, war, and reason from council places, and nonetheless having mentioned both, he attributed 'where men are famous' to the *council places*, not to war, as if the orator were a better man when he speaks about what must be done than when he himself performs the action.

trans. BEHR

This last argument is subsequently elaborated at length, with further references to *Odyssey* 8.171–172 and Hesiod's *Theogony* 80–90 to prove that rhetoric is indeed the kingly (*basilikon*) art *par excellence* (391), because it is better to stand alone and speak wise words and direct others than to act amid hundreds of others, warriors for example, and go unnoticed (388–392). Thus, by twisting Plato's argument and turning the tables on Homeric heroism, in Aristides' world deeds become *subordinated* to divinely inspired words. Homer and Plato are both saved, but they also seem to lose something in the process of this virtuoso argumentation in favour of Hellenism and rhetoric. It is attractive to interpret these and similar feats of reasoning in Aristides' works as ways of simultaneously showing off his deep knowledge of the Hellenic literary tradition (*paideia*) and defending his abilities as orator/teacher of rhetoric in the competitive field of Second Sophistic rhetoricians.[35]

35 Cf. *Against Plato About the Four* Jebb 151.21 where the Homeric phrase reoccurs. In general on Aristides' aims, see e.g. Boulanger (1923), Anderson (1993) 140, Pernot (1993) 330–331.

Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom: Alexander

If rhetoric was thus argued to be the kingly art *par excellence*, there was in this same period in fact one real, if by that time already heavily mythicized, king in particular who became bound up with Achilles and the heroic ideal, and that is Alexander the Great. This is not unexpected, in view of the great admiration of the *Iliad* Alexander allegedly exhibited during his lifetime, particularly visible in his attempts to establish a genealogical connection between Achilles and himself. Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, for instance, starts out by noting the commonly agreed upon genealogical connection between Alexander and Achilles (*Alex.* 1.8). In this context, I will be looking at three texts, two by Plutarch (the *Life of Alexander* and the twofold epideictic oration *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*) and one by Dio Chrysostom (the *Second Kingship Oration*). Plutarch and Dio were near contemporaries, and it is likely that the fact that both wrote under (and for) emperor Trajan played some role in the prominence of the Alexander theme in their writings since Trajan was known to be a great admirer of Alexander.[36] Thematically, the three pieces are related in complicated ways. In Plutarch, Alexander's connection with Homer as Princes' Mirror is treated. In the (probably chronologically later) *Life*, the traditional reading that Alexander used Homer's works as a compendium for his deeds of conquest is cited as true (*Alex.* 8.2), while in *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*, this story is rejected, or at least modified (327–328A). In the Alexander-related orations (i.e. Plutarch's *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander* and Dio's *Second Kingship Oration*) the recurrent theme is the relation between poetry, rhetoric, and philosophy in the education of the prince, a constellation that is configured quite differently in each of them.[37]

Let us begin with Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*. One example he gives of the identification that Alexander and his entourage sought with Achilles, is especially interesting in the present context, viz. the anecdote about the education of Alexander by one Lysimachus. Plutarch remarks that this man 'had nothing to recommend himself, but his lucky fancy (ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἔχων ἀστεῖον) of calling himself Phoenix, Alexander Achilles, and Philip Peleus.'[38] Besides focusing attention on the importance of Achilles for Alexander, the anecdote also implies that the true educator of Alexander was the philosopher Aristotle,

36 On Trajan's admiration for Alexander, see e.g. Gangloff (2006) 260–262.

37 On Dio's treatment of Homer in this discourse, see Gangloff (2006) 260–268; for his general treatment of Homer, see Kim (2010). Murray (1965: 161–182) argues for the influence of Philodemus' treatise *On the Good King According to Homer* on Dio in this oration.

38 Plu. *Alex.* 1.8 (trans. Perrin).

in whom we might see (although Plutarch does not make this point) almost a combination of Chiron and Phoenix, in that he taught Alexander medicine as well as his 'doctrines of Morals and of Politics' (*Alex.* 7.1). It is in fact the *Iliad* that forges an important link between Aristotle and his royal pupil, in the form of the *diorthōsis* or critical edition of this poem, which Aristotle had prepared for Alexander especially and given to him to take with him on his campaigns. Plutarch records that Alexander

> ἦν δὲ καὶ φύσει φιλόλογος καὶ φιλομαθὴς καὶ φιλαναγνώστης, καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἰλιάδα τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφόδιον καὶ νομίζων καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἔλαβε μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους διορθώσαντος ἣν ἐκ τοῦ νάρθηκος καλοῦσιν, εἶχε δ' ἀεὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἐγχειριδίου κειμένην ὑπὸ τὸ προσκεφάλαιον, ὡς Ὀνησίκριτος ἱστόρηκε.
>
> PLU. *Alex.* 8.2

> was also by nature a great lover of all kinds of learning and reading, and calling and considering the *Iliad* his guide for warlike valour, he constantly laid it, according to the copy corrected by Aristotle, called the 'casket copy', with his dagger under his pillow, declaring that he esteemed it a perfect portable treasure of all military virtue and knowledge, as Onesicritus informs us.
>
> trans. based on PERRIN

The placing of both a dagger and a book edited by a philosopher under the pillow of the young king seems especially suggestive in the context of the 'words and deeds' complex I am looking into, and underlines the function of Princes' Mirror that Homer is held to have had for Alexander, under Aristotle's influence.

Intriguingly enough, Plutarch complicates Homer's function for Alexander in the epideictic orations *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*, generally considered to have been a youthful work, probably earlier than the *Life*. In *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*, the question to be answered is whether Alexander was so great because he was merely fortunate, or whether it was his virtue that enabled him to conquer the world. The final answer in the second part is 'virtue' (*aretē*), but this is specifically defined as the kind that can only be obtained by a *philosophical* education, in which poetry has no place. Plutarch does not hesitate to sacrifice the alleged positive influence of Homer on Alexander for this argument:

> ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γράφουσιν, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἔφη ποτὲ τὴν Ἰλιάδα καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτῷ τῆς στρατείας ἐφόδιον, πιστεύομεν, Ὅμηρον σεμνύνον-

τες· ἂν δέ τις φῇ τὴν Ἰλιάδα καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν παραμύθια. πόνου καὶ διατριβὴν ἕπεσθαι σχολῆς γλυκείας, ἐφόδιον δ' ἀληθῶς γεγονέναι τὸν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας λόγον καὶ τοὺς περὶ ἀφοβίας καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔτι δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας ὑπομνηματισμούς, καταφρονοῦμεν.

PLU. *Alex. fort.* 327–328A

But although we believe those who record that Alexander once said that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* accompanied him as equipment for his campaigns, since we hold Homer in reverence, yet are we to contemn anyone who asserts that the works of Homer accompanied him as a consolation after toil and as a pastime for sweet hours of leisure, but that his true equipment was philosophic teaching, and treatises on Fearlessness and Courage, and Self-restraint also, and Greatness of Soul?

trans. BABBITT

In this *philosophical* Alexander, then, the quintessential Homeric virtues, fearlessness, courage, and greatness of soul are denied their Homeric genealogy, and are instead said to flow from philosophical teaching and the study of ethical treatises, which is probably why they are enriched with self-restraint (*sōphrosynē*), a virtue the Homeric Achilles is notoriously lacking. Note also that eloquence is conspicuously absent from the picture Plutarch here draws. Aristotelian philosophy rather than Homeric poetry or rhetoric has enabled Alexander to conquer the world.

In Dio's *Second Kingship Oration* we find discussion, in the format of a Platonic dialogue between Alexander and his father Philip, of Alexander's view that Homer is 'a most excellent disciplinarian […] and he who tries to give heed to him will be a highly successful and exemplary king'.[39] Young Alexander, a rash puppy dog (2.1), will read nothing but Homer, despite his father's scolding, because Homer is the sole author worthy to be read by a king.[40] He is moreover characterized by a somewhat childish jealousy of Achilles (2.15, 32), and thus perhaps not to be taken entirely seriously.

The coupling of rhetoric, poetry, and philosophy in this dialogue is unobtrusive, but pointed. Near the opening of the oration, Philip remarks that it is strange that Alexander admires the poetry of Homer but does not want to become a poet himself. Alexander denies this, in a variation on the theme of the opposition between *vita activa* and *contemplativa*, and remarks that it is far

39 D. Chr. 2.54.
40 D. Chr. 2.6.

superior to be the actual *performer* of great deeds than to merely *herald* the victories of another, taking his metaphor from the herald at the Olympic games.[41] He continues:

> οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον, εἶπεν, ὦ πάτερ, εἰ καὶ ποιητὴς ἀγαθὸς εἴην παρεχούσης τῆς φύσεως· ἐπεί τοι καὶ ῥητορικῆς δέοι ἂν τῷ βασιλεῖ.
>
> D. CHR. 2.18

> Still, it would not be at all strange, father, if I were to be a good *poet* as well, did nature but favor me; for you know that a king might find that also *rhetoric* was valuable to him.
>
> trans. COHOON, adapted, my emphasis

By its casual identification of poetry and rhetoric, this passage refers to the idea of Homer as the 'inventor of rhetoric' we have already encountered, and leads to the traditional question of what Homer thought about rhetoric. In this context we encounter our quotation of Phoenix again, cited as proof of the fact that rhetoric was known to Homer, and indeed judged by him a necessary tool in the capture of Troy, besides the military action.[42] Somewhat later on, on the authority of Homer and Hesiod, *poetry/rhetoric* is moreover coupled to *philosophy* by Alexander, both of them being disciplines that should by rights belong to the kingly sphere of interest.[43] A king should not exaggerate in this field, however, but should especially make poetry his delight and read it attentively—preferably Homer's of course, in Alexander's view (2.26–27).

Throughout, the general tone of the oration veers between a gentle irony with regard to Alexander's extreme and sometimes ill-advised enthusiasm for every single aspect of Homer's depiction of the lifestyle of kings (diet, dress, dancing, music, home decoration) on the one hand, and a genuine belief that the more philosophical readings of Homeric epic, attributed by Philip to Alexander's mentor Aristotle (2.79), can actually teach one how to be a good king on the other. It is noteworthy that the shift towards the latter view also entails a change on Alexander's part from the wish to excel the warrior Achilles to the wish to become more like the kingly Agamemnon.[44] The underlying mes-

41 D. Chr. 2.18–19.

42 D. Chr. 2.19–21.

43 D. Chr. 2.24.

44 The *spoudaiogeloion* element of the text seems to be marked out by such expressions of the 'narrator' as ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἅμα σπουδῇ ἐπαιξάτην ('So far did they both go in *mingling jest with earnest*', D. Chr. 2.17). The final paragraphs (2.65–79), in which Alexander

sage appears to be that every kingly reader of Homer (Trajan?) needs his philosophical mentor (Dio?) to point him to the right passages about kingship in Homer and explain; in that case, Homer will turn out to be a true and highly philosophical Princes' Mirror.[45] Thus, in this elegant piece, Homer's poetry, the art of rhetoric, and philosophy are happily united as the hallmarks of successful kingly education, if administered in the right proportions and by the right mentor.

We might say that we find three different Alexanders in these writings, which all exemplify in their own way the different outcomes of the debates on the relative merits of poetry and rhetoric as opposed to philosophy, and in particular on the possibility of using Homer as a Princes' Mirror for the philosophically inclined but active king. Plutarch's traditional, biographical Alexander is deeply inspired by the Homeric Achilles, and consequently sees the importance both of deeds and of words—and philosophy—, as is symbolized by the dagger (symbolizing deeds) and the Homeric text provided by the philosopher Aristotle, which he keeps under his pillow as his military textbook and Princes' Mirror. In Plutarch's philosophical Alexander, both words and deeds flow forth from philosophical virtue, fostered by Aristotle. He reads Homer as a mere pastime, not as a Princes' Mirror. Dio's Alexander is more like Plutarch's biographical one: he is perhaps overly enthusiastic about the value of Homeric epic for the instruction of kings, yet ultimately demonstrates that deep ethical lessons as well as practical ones (about rhetoric) can be culled from this text by the king who is guided by the right philosophical teacher (Aristotle). The difference between the two Alexanders as represented in Plutarch may be explained by pointing out that in the *Life* Plutarch was bound to the traditional image of Alexander as he found it in his sources, whereas in the essays, which in all likelihood represent a youthful rhetorical exercise, a kind of 'special pleading' is going on, as the author wants to make the rather novel case for regarding Alexander as a philosopher king according to the Platonic scheme.

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draws many wise lessons from Homer's example of Agamemnon about the justice of kings, seem to be more serious, as indicated by Philip's remark that Aristotle deserves praise, 'if such are the lessons which he gives you in government and the duties of a king, be it as interpreter of Homer or in any other way' (2.79). On the shift from Achilles to Agamemnon, see Gangloff (2006) 263.

45 Cf. D. Chr. 2.26–27, where Alexander states that a ruler should lend a willing ear to philosophy and read poetry; 2.79, where Philip praises Aristotle for the lessons he taught Alexander with regard to Homer.

Themistius: The Culmination of Achilles and Alexander

What we have seen so far is the great success of the *topos* that the complete man, and certainly the ruler, needs to combine eloquence (reinterpreted as *euboulia*, and thence identified with *sophia* or even *philosophia*) with the active and warlike life. This *topos* has received a specific link with Alexander the Great, who in the accounts of Plutarch and Dio has become a second Achilles, sometimes in the hardly recognizable garb of a philosopher king whose education receives particular attention.

This construct of *loci communes* finds avid reception and adaptation in the last author I discuss, Themistius of Constantinople. This thoroughly Hellenist orator and philosopher was active at the courts of many of the Christian emperors and the single pagan ruler of the fourth century AD, from Constantius to Theodosius.[46] In several of his late orations (13, 16, and 18, all datable to the reign of Theodosius, 380s onwards) Themistius poses as a Phoenix to the little Achilles he identifies in the six-year-old Arcadius, the son and heir apparent of Theodosius (e.g. *Or.* 16.213a). His discourses are rife with Homeric citations as well as traditional historical examples, with frequent reference in particular to earlier emperors and other wise rulers, and the function philosophers fulfilled as their advisers.

A passage from the eighteenth oration speaks abundantly clearly on this score, where Themistius proposes to offer the young Arcadius no food and wine (as Phoenix in *Il.* 9 remembers he did with the unruly toddler Achilles). Indeed, he will be far better than the Homeric Phoenix since he will offer *philosophy* as the nourishment for this future emperor. His co-educators will be Plato and Aristotle, and thus Arcadius will not only be better than Achilles, but even become a second Alexander, a true philosopher king, who, so Themistius hopes, will follow in the footsteps of his father, and will therefore put *Dikē* (Justice) at his right hand.

> Δεῦρ' ἴθι οὖν, ὦ φίλε παῖ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμῶν καθίζου γονάτων, ὅπως ἄν σε ἐκείνων γεύσαιμι τῶν παιδευμάτων καὶ ἀναθρέψαιμι, οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ Φοίνιξ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, σῖτα καὶ ὄψα ἐπάγων, ἀλλὰ τροφεῖα παρέχων ἃ μόνη σκευάζει φιλοσοφία τοῖς νέοις βασιλεῦσι καὶ εἴσω τῆς αὐτοκρατοῦς ἡλικίας, λόγους ἐγκάρπους καὶ ὑψηλοὺς καὶ ὠφελίμους καὶ παλαιῶν κλέα αὐτοκρατόρων, οἷς Κῦρος ὁ μέγας ἐτράφη καὶ Νουμᾶς ὁ Ῥωμαῖος καὶ Μάρκος ὁ κλεινὸς καὶ Τίτος ὁ γενναῖος, οὗ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ μέγα ἐκεῖνο ῥῆμα, ὅτι τήμερον οὐκ ἐβασίλευσα· οὐδένα γὰρ

46 On Themistius, see Vanderspoel (1995), Stertz (1976), Heather & Moncur (2001).

εὖ ἐποίησα. συμπαιδαγωγήσουσι δέ σε καὶ Πλάτων ὁ κλεινὸς καὶ ὁ θεσπέσιος Ἀριστοτέλης, οἳ καὶ τὸν μέγαν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπαιδαγώγουν καὶ ἐξ ἀδήλου χωρίου κύριον ἐποίησαν ὅλης τῆς γῆς. ἐὰν οὗτοί σε ἐκθρέψωνται καὶ τιθηνήσωνται, ἐπώνυμε τοῦ λογίου θεοῦ, ταχέως ἔσται ἐπιτελὴς ἡ τῶν σῶν γονέων εὐχή, 'Πατρὸς δ' ὅ γε πολλὸν ἀρείων,' ἢ ἥ γε μετριωτέρα καὶ δυνατωτέρα, 'Πατρὸς δ' εἰς ἴχνια βαίνοι.' καὶ τότε σοι ἐπιχαιρήσει ἡ μήτηρ οὐ μόνον ἐκ πολέμου ἐπανιόντι μετὰ σκύλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ δημηγοροῦντι καὶ θεμιστεύοντι καὶ τὴν δίκην πάρεδρον ποιουμένῳ, ἧς πρώτη αὕτη ἐμπίπλησι τὰ βασίλεια.

THEM. *Or.* 18, Harduin 224d3, ed. DOWNEY & SCHENKL

Come here then, sweet boy, and sit upon my knees, so that I may let you taste of those lessons and may rear you, not as Phoenix reared Achilles, feeding him bread and meat, but providing you with food such as only philosophy provides for young kings, and within the youth of emperorship, fruitful, elevated, and beneficial words, and the famed exploits of emperors of old, with which the Great Cyrus was reared and Numa the Roman and the famous Marcus [sc. Aurelius] and the noble Titus, who spoke the splendid and great words 'Today I did not rule; for I have not done good to anyone.' And my co-educators will be the famous Plato and the divine Aristotle, who in their turn educated Alexander the Great and turned him, coming from his obscure hometown, into the lord over the whole world. If these will rear and feed you—you, who bear the eponym of the god of the word,[47] then soon the prayer of your parents shall be fulfilled: 'May he be far better than his father' or, what is more moderate and more likely: 'May he follow in his father's footsteps.' For then your mother shall not only rejoice when you come back from war carrying the spoil, but also when you speak to the people, and declare law and right and make Justice sit at your side, of which she herself first filled the empire.

My translation

Again, we find the culmination of Achilles and Alexander in the addressee, the six-year-old Arcadius, but moreover also the culmination of their educators Phoenix and Aristotle (and even Plato, for good measure) in the old Themistius, the would-be educator of the little boy. The child is predestined to become a speaker of words, doer of deeds, and virtuous thinker of great and wise thoughts, or so Themistius would have his audience hope.

47 Arcadius refers to the traditional birthplace of the god Hermes who is often associated with the art of rhetoric.

Conclusion

I have traced the reception of a Homeric ideal from the *Iliad* to the fourth century AD. Mostly we find the actual positive 'reception', i.e. acceptance and approval of the basic ruler-ideal expressed in Phoenix' words, and hence its quotation for corroboration of one's own views. A prime example is formed by the repeated references to the passage in Plutarch's *Precepts*; and we also find affirmation of this in the scholia and other exegetical texts. But some contexts are more complex and it seems that not so much the genuine ideal as expressed in the *Iliad*, but rather Homer's authority as *livre de culture* is the reason for the quotation, while the literal text is disingenuously interpreted in such a way as to suit the needs of the later author, sometimes even going against the grain of the actual meaning of the original wording. This happens most obviously in Aelius Aristides.[48] Aristides is also exemplary in illustrating how the debates about the values of philosophy versus poetry/rhetoric could enlist Homer. Both Plutarch (*Life of Alexander*) and Dio (*Second Kingship Oration*) attempt to salvage both Plato (philosophy) and Homer (poetry/rhetoric) by emphasizing that every kingly reader of Homer needs a philosophical mentor to interpret him. This procedure is of course very similar to what we find in treatises like Plutarch's *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry*. Indeed, it is much more remarkable that Plutarch's youthful set of epideictic orations *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander* does not attempt to reconcile Homer and philosophy, but insists on philosophy as Alexander's sole leading light. This would appear to represent a specifically Platonic take on matters, but it simultaneously demonstrates that the connection between Homer and Alexander was there and needed addressing in any case, even if one wished to privilege Alexander's philosophical side; in the *Life* this is solved by giving especial relief to Aristotle's role as Alexander's mentor and the *Iliad*'s editor.

Speaking of these examples, we may note that there is a remarkable surge of quotations in the era of the Second Sophistic. On the one hand this may plausibly be explained with reference to the enduring, and indeed revived, cultural capital that intimate knowledge of Homeric epic represented in this particular period of archaizing, intellectual, rhetoric-focused writing for the elite, while on the other hand the political situation under the monarchy of the Roman empire was excellently suited for musings about ideal leadership and models of good or heroic rule, such as Achilles and Alexander the Great represented.

48 *In Defense of Rhetoric* Jebb 97.18; *About the Four* Jebb 151.21.

The fact that, in the tradition, the *topos* is so bound up with Achilles and hence with his descendant Alexander, leads to the result that to use it in panegyric is eventually to activate a double compliment. The *laudandus* who is a second Achilles is also a second Alexander: a heroic philosopher king, predestined for greatness in words, deeds, and thoughts. The giver of the compliment implicitly and effortlessly styles himself a second Phoenix and Aristotle in one.

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Plato's Homer as a Guide for Moderation and Obedience*

Patrick G. Lake

Introduction

In the *Republic*, Plato's Socrates dramatizes how easy it is to derive incorrect positions on the most important matters—the education of the ideal statesman, for example—if one blindly accepts the authority and *sophia* of Homer and his primary interpreters, the bards, rather than actively engaging the poet in philosophical dialogue. Plato turns Homer into a useful source for the training of the state's leaders and subjects by 'philosophically revising' his poetry, citing the bard's words in a philosophic context in such a way that they support philosophical aims, values, and positions. At times, Plato will achieve this 'revision' through outright censorship—taking out from Homer what is not in accord with his philosophical program—at other times, Plato will misappropriate or interpret Homer in such a way that his poetry is an ally rather than an enemy of philosophy. This paper, then, demonstrates how Plato carries out his 'philosophical revision' of Homer, by examining a specific series of citations of Homer from Book 3 of the *Republic* on the topic of 'moderation' (σωφροσύνη), specifically obedience to rulers. While there are many episodes in Homer that treat the idea of obedience, Homer's text only becomes a useful guide for this aspect of statecraft when it is reinterpreted and absorbed within the context of philosophical dialogue. In this way, positive examples of obedience in Homer can be praised and negative ones censured in a way that is reflective and useful for leaders who are trying to cultivate the virtue of moderation in both themselves and their subjects.

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Homer: Educator of Hellas

Plato's Socrates famously refers to Homer in Book 10 of the *Republic* as 'the educator of Hellas'.[1] The context in which these words appear, however, is seldom noted. At this point in the dialogue, Socrates is advising Glaucon to pity, in effect, those who value Homer too highly, those who uncritically accept Homer as an authority in all matters. He urges Glaucon to 'welcome these people and treat them as friends, since they're as good as they're capable of being'.[2] Thereafter, Socrates reiterates the 'justice' of having exiled poetry from his city-in-speech,[3] though he welcomes anyone to offer a defence of poetry, to demonstrate that it does have merit as an educational tool, that it is not only 'pleasurable' (ἡδεῖα) but also 'beneficial' (ὠφέλιμος).[4] As is often the case with Plato, here we have to be on the lookout for irony. I would argue, in fact, that Plato positions himself as the very champion that Socrates is looking for. In the first place, Homer's official and final exile in the *Republic* comes too late in the text: it is Book 10; the conversation is nearly over. In the second place, moreover, the exile is too late because Homer has already been thoroughly incorporated into the educational system set forth in the *Republic*. Far from being exiled in the *Republic*, Homer is quoted and referred to constantly and not always in a negative light.[5] Rather than playing *no* role in the education of the philosopher-king, Homer plays an essential one. In the same way that a just polis or soul depends on a beneficial harmony of reason, emotion, and appetite, poetry remains the emotional counterpart to philosophy's reason in the training of philosopher-kings and their subjects. In the *Republic*, Plato transforms poetry into an ally rather than an adversary of philosophy in

1 Pl. *R.* 10.606e2–3: τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητής ('this poet has educated Hellas'). The text of the *Republic* follows Slings' Oxford edition (2003); all translations from Plato's corpus are based on the edition of Cooper & Hutchinson (1997). On Homer as the basis of the Greek educational system and cultural practice in general, see e.g. Jaeger ([1939] 1946) 35–48, Beck (1964), Verdenius (1970), Marrou ([1956] 1982). See also De Jong in this volume.

2 Pl. *R.* 10.607a1–2: φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται.

3 Pl. *R.* 10.607b.

4 Pl. *R.* 10.607d–e.

5 While Tarrant (1951), esp. 59–60, contains an important statistical summary of poetic citations in Plato, Mitscherling (2009) 208–209 and Yamagata (2010), esp. 68–69, (though limited to Homer and Hesiod alone) are the most valuable and up-to-date sources for this material. Howes (1895), while a major leap forward in his day, is now thoroughly out-of-date. All of these aforementioned sources point out the extent to which Homer is by far the most frequently quoted author in the Platonic corpus. See also Murray (1996) 22 on this point.

a process I refer to as 'philosophical revision'. Plato uses Homer's poetry constantly, yet strips it of all that gives it an advantage over philosophy, namely its charm, beauty, and ability to effect an emotional response, rather than a considerate and rational one. What Plato does with poetry, if we consider Socrates' own definition of moderation—'something in which the better rules the worse is properly called moderate and self-controlled'[6]—is to introduce the virtue of moderation into poetic discourse. By subordinating poetry to philosophy, he corrects the problems he sees in poetic discourse and thus creates a just harmony between poetry and philosophy, similar to that which he describes in both society (between the different classes) and the human soul (between reason, emotion, and appetite). Plato moulds poetry in a way that is beneficial, i.e. educationally effective, and in a way that fulfils philosophic goals, not those of 'the pleasure-giving Muse' (τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν).[7] By weaving poetry into philosophic discourse, moreover, Plato turns poetry into something that encourages active, rational discourse, rather than something that creates a passive, emotional response. He does this by turning a silent, poetic audience into a vocal collection of philosophic interlocutors. Plato shows that Homer need not be exiled from Socrates' ideal republic, provided that he is used in the right way: if Homer is put in the service of philosophy, his poetry can become an integral part of the training of philosopher-kings and their subjects, as a key part of the educational program of the ideal state.

I would like to borrow a Platonic method, then, in my examination of Plato's use of Homer in the *Republic*. In the same way that Plato considered the proper functioning of the human soul by looking at it 'writ large', I work through a very small section of Book 3 (*Republic* 389d2–390d5) that is particularly dense with Homeric citation to draw some broader conclusions about the way Plato uses Homer as a guide for statecraft; these citations focus on a specific aspect of moderation as defined by Plato, and one crucial to the art of statecraft: obedience to authority. To Plato, obedience to authority is a key to effective and enlightened statecraft, as it reflects and arises out of a proper ordering of the elements of society and of the soul, as well. A ruler's charge is to order that which he controls in such a way that it functions as well as possible. When the lesser elements of the soul and society gain undue influence, the individual and society cannot achieve the best possible results. Thus, reason must always remain at the helm.

6 Pl. *R.* 4.431b6–7: εἴπερ οὗ τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ χείρονος ἄρχει σῶφρον κλητέον καὶ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ.

7 Pl. *R.* 10.607a5.

Our examination of Plato's citations of Homer will demonstrate that it is impossible to generalize about Plato's reception or use of the poet. For example, in the first set of citations, he implicitly denounces the expertise of the bards, flawed interpreters of Homer, in a method of citation I refer to as 'implied censorship'; in the second set, he quotes Homer, or rather cites Diomedes and the silent Greek army, as positive exemplars of obedience to authority; in the third, he explicitly censors Achilles' words and disobedient behaviour, thus using a negative exemplar to teach a positive lesson about obedience; finally, in the last set of citations, he employs a method of citation I refer to as 'philosophical revision': by misappropriating Homer's original Plato interprets it in such a way that the poet's words are so far removed from their original context and literary function that they are made to serve a philosophical purpose.

Implied Censorship: Denouncing the Expertise of the Bards (Citations 1–2)

Citation 1: Republic 3.389d2–3—Odyssey 17.383–384

At *Republic* 3.389d2–3, Plato quotes from *Odyssey* 17.383–384 and *Odyssey* 9.1–10 respectively, passages in the *Odyssey* that heap effluent praise upon Homer's 'divine bard' (θέσπιν ἀοιδόν).[8] Yet in his quotation of these passages, Plato quotes everything *but* Homer's praise of the bards. In my view, Plato's omissions here are meaningful and *not*, as some scholars have argued, the mere product of a forgetful Plato or an alternate textual tradition,[9] given the *context* in which they appear.[10] While Homer discusses bards in order to underline both their expertise and value to a community (especially in regards to giving pleasure), Plato carefully suppresses this material, quoting only the material I have italicized:

> For who in fact himself ever seeks out and bids a stranger from abroad, unless it be *one of those that are masters of some public craft, a prophet, or a*

8 On this phrase, cf. *Od.* 1.328, 8.498, 17.385; *hHom* 4.415; E. *Med.* 425. On Plato's view of the 'divine bard' in general, see Murray (1996) 183–184. See also *Ion* 534b3–4.

9 On these views, see Howes (1895) 205 and Labarbe (1949) 188, 292.

10 Clay (2003) argues persuasively that in a number of the Homeric quotations in Plato that he discusses, Plato expects his reader to recall and derive meaning from the *Homeric* contexts of the quotations as well.

> *healer of ills, or a maker of spears* aye, or a divine bard, who gives delight with his song? For these men are bidden all over the boundless earth. Yet a beggar would no man bid to be a burden to himself.
>
> *Od.* 17.382–387

By breaking off his quotation of Homer right before the mention of the expertise of bards, Plato silently registers his criticism of the bards' art through a kind of 'implied censorship'. Now I define 'implied censorship' as the act of calling to mind a known source, yet cutting a part of the original out for the purposes of making the omission all the more glaring. For example, consider the use of 'implied censorship' in the following quotation from Shakespeare's *MacBeth*:

> Out, out, brief candle! Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more: it is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound … signifying nothing.
>
> Act v, Scene v

In some ways, the omission of the missing phrase 'and fury' makes the missing phrase—if the omission is noticed—stand out all the more clearly, causing the reader's mind to fixate more on the words that are not there rather than those that are. In my view, Plato would have expected *his* audience to derive meaning from *his* exclusion of the bards in these citations of Homer. In Plato's Greece, learning Homer was the cornerstone of one's education. As such, Plato could have safely assumed that *his* contemporaries would have been familiar with the passage and also aware of his omission of 'bards'.[11] Now the *meaning* of this exclusion is thoroughly context-driven: we must know enough about Plato's attitude about bards, for example, to draw a meaningful conclusion about their 'exile'. By the end of this inquiry, I hope to reclaim a depth of meaning, an

11 It is striking that in Book 1 of the *Republic*, 331a–d for example, such characters as Polemarchus and Cephalus cannot even state a philosophic position—or even their own opinion, for that matter—without recourse to the words of a poet. In similar fashion, throughout the Platonic corpus, the poets are called to witness at nearly every turn. On the quotation of poetry as a cultural practice, see esp. Halliwell (2000). Finally, it is perhaps significant that Aristotle also quotes *Od.* 17.381–386 at *Pol.* 1338a25–29, thus suggesting its gnomic status. Aristotle cites Homer here in the context of discussing leisure as a purpose of poetry: 'Hence our predecessors included music in education not as a necessity (ἀναγκαῖον) … nor as useful (χρήσιμον) … it remains therefore [that music is pursued] for the sake of passing time in leisure (ἐν τῇ σχολῇ) …' Thereafter Aristotle cites *Od.* 17.381–386.

entire level of intertext, which is largely unavailable to or lost on Plato's modern readers, given that unlike his contemporaries, we lack an instant recall of the words of the 'divine bard', Homer.

The context of the citation in Plato concerns Socrates' warning to his interlocutors that the rulers of his city-in-speech must be wary of experts who misuse their authority to lie to and corrupt the young. He colours his point by quoting from Eumaeus' list of 'experts' (δημιοεργοί) from *Odyssey* 17.383–384:

> [Socrates:] 'Then if it is appropriate for anyone to use falsehoods [ψεύδεσθαι] for the good [ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ] of the city, because of the actions of either enemies or citizens, it is the rulers. But everyone else must keep away from them, because for a private citizen to lie [ψεύσασθαι] to a ruler is just as bad a mistake as for a sick person or athlete not to tell the truth [τἀληθῆ] to his doctor or trainer about his physical condition or for a sailor not to tell the captain the facts [τὰ ὄντα] about his own condition or that of the ship and the rest of its crew—indeed it is a worse mistake than either of these.'
>
> [Adeimantus:] 'That's completely true [ἀληθέστατα].'
>
> 'And if the ruler catches someone else telling falsehoods [ψευδόμενον] in the city—
>
> *One of those that are masters of some public craft,*
> *a prophet, or a healer of ills, or a maker of spears*
>
> —he'll punish him for introducing something as subversive and destructive to a city as it would be to a ship.'
>
> PL. *R.* 3.389b7–d5

While in Homer, Eumaeus provides his list in order to name only those 'professionals' who, in contrast to beggars, one would gladly welcome into a community, Plato shows by Socrates' omission not only that bards do not belong in a list of experts in the first place, but that they, like beggars, also ought to be shunned and prohibited from society. Their offense? They propagate and interpret the poets' 'lies'.[12]

Like any 'expert', the bards, as the Platonic passage spells out, have the ability to do a great deal of damage should they choose to lie without an aim toward

12 For a detailed discussion of the ethics of lying in the *Republic*, see Reeve (1988) 208–213 and Gill (1993) 45–55. Within the *Republic* itself, see 2.377a5–6 and especially the section on the 'noble lie' at 3.414b–415c. On the ethics of lying in Archaic poetry in general, see Page (1991) and Pratt (1993).

cultivating the Good; the bards also have instant credibility in their field and a great deal of authority and prestige in society. Yet in abusing this power with their poetic lies, lies which serve no 'useful' purpose beyond arousing emotion and cultivating pleasure, they do far more harm than a beggar in Plato's view.[13] Bards enchant their audiences, appealing to their emotions rather than their intellect. In this way, bards create the very psychic disharmony that in the *Republic* is so damaging to both the constitution of the human soul and by extension the state. We can imagine, then, that Plato, defining, like Eumaeus in the original Homeric passage, the proper limits of both expertise and *xenia*, concludes that the bards, like the poets whose lies they propagate, are also candidates for exile; poetry can, of course, be allowed in the city, but only if it is moderated by the appropriate experts, namely philosophers, and is consumed in a philosophic context, as it is in the *Republic* itself. This is a crucial lesson for the would-be philosopher-king: if poetry is to remain a part of the educational program of the state, it must be moderated by philosophy.

Citation 2: Republic 3.390a8–b2—Odyssey 9.1, 5–6, 8–10

As was the case in Citation 1 (*Republic* 3.389d2–3), the significance of the following citation lays as much in what is *not* quoted as in what *is* quoted; the irony of Plato's censorship here, the misdirection involved, is that he *feigns* censorship of a passage on the pleasure of eating and drinking—quoting it and thus in the process actually preserving rather than removing it—while *really* censoring the portion of the passage on the pleasure of poetry and the bard's song. Naturally, Plato would not want young people to memorize lines that praise the pleasures of eating and drinking—that is immoderate. But what he is in fact intent on *not* quoting is anything about the pleasure of the bards' art. Accordingly, he begins his quotation immediately *after* Odysseus offers his praise of poetic performance in general:

> Truly this is a good thing, to listen to a bard such as this man is, like to the gods in voice. For myself I declare that there is no greater fulfillment of delight than when joy possesses a whole people, and banqueters in the halls listen to a bard as they sit side by side, *and by them tables are laden with bread and meat, and the cupbearer draws wine from the mixing bowl and bears it round and pours it into the cups.*
>
> *Od.* 9.1–10

13 See Pl. *R.* 3.389b8.

Note also that immediately before this section, at *Odyssey* 8.474–491, Odysseus treats the bard Demodocus with extraordinary respect, indeed with the same kind of respect one would normally reserve for a war hero. Cutting off the choicest part of the roast for the bard, he asserts that 'among all men that are upon the earth bards win honor and reverence'.[14] As a result, even more so than Citation 1, Socrates' omission of the bards here is particularly blatant. Having paraphrased *Odyssey* 9.1, which introduces 'wise' Odysseus as the speaker, Plato's Socrates immediately skips the next four Homeric lines which, besides containing a direct address to Alcinous, include Odysseus' statement that listening to a bard is a 'good thing' (καλόν), especially one such as Demodocus, 'whose voice is like to the gods' (θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν). Next, Plato continues to paraphrase the Homeric passage, citing the next two lines that declare: 'there is no greater fulfillment of delight than when joy possesses a whole people'. Now while in Homer the very next thing said, which defines the primary source of that joy, is listening to a bard, Plato *completely* passes over these lines; he cites directly only those lines referring to meat and drink. An earlier commentator on this passage, Jules Labarbe, thoroughly misses the point of this omission, writing: '[these lines] contained therefore nothing that sins directly against the principles of moderation as issued by Socrates.'[15] If anything, poetry left to its own devices is *the* sin against moderation, at least insofar as the *Republic* and its ideal educational system is concerned. Psychic and social harmony are impossible to achieve in Plato's view so long as poetry, with its appeal to the emotions and imitations of a debased form of man and god, dominates Greek *paideia*. In short, Homer can only become a useful tool in guiding statecraft if it is consumed in a philosophic context.

Finally, we should note that in his introduction to the quotation, Plato thoroughly misrepresents the Homeric original, thus, perhaps, giving his audience a clue that he is going to use Homer in an unorthodox or playful manner. Plato's misinterpretation is all the more evident when one compares it with the interpretation of, for instance, an ancient scholiast of Homer, who explains Odysseus' words in *Odyssey* 9 by saying: '[Odysseus] has called pleasure the end not of life as a whole but only of some symposium.'[16] The scholiast thus argues that Odysseus is not attempting to present a life philosophy, but rather is only being gracious by agreeing with his host. However we read Homer's original, it *is* clear that Homer does not think that feasts are the finest activity for a

14 *Od.* 8.479–480: πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀοιδοὶ / τιμῆς ἔμμοροί εἰσι καὶ αἰδοῦς.

15 Labarbe (1949) 292.

16 Schol. QV *Od.* 9.5: οὐ παντὸς δὲ βίου τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος εἴρηκεν ἀλλὰ συμποσίου τινός.

human being to engage in. Plato, however, actively misquotes Homer's original in order to make his words all the more damning in view of his own moral position in favour of moderation over pleasure. First of all, Plato's Socrates, with at least a hint of mockery, says the quotation is from the 'the wisest man' (ἄνδρα τὸν σοφώτατον),[17] likely a reference to Homer himself[18] or perhaps a replacement for Odysseus' traditional epithet πολύμητις from *Odyssey* 9.1. Plato also thoroughly distorts the extent to which Odysseus values eating and drinking when he imagines him saying that such pleasures are 'the finest thing of all' (κάλλιστον)—note the superlative—rather than, as in the original, a 'good thing' (καλὸν).[19]

And thus, in the same way that the first citation we looked at concerned the limits of *xenia* in Homer, this text likewise serves to model that most important of cultural norms, depicting Odysseus as the gracious guest, Alcinous as the accommodating host. Plato ignores the literary and cultural context of Homer's text here, however, *not* because he is an insensitive reader, or even simply because he so passionately dislikes poetry, but primarily because in the context of his *own* dialogue, his *own* argument, his creation of an educational program for the ideal statesman, such statements as that of Odysseus, such high praise for bodily and poetic pleasures, simply cannot exist if the function of poetry is to educate. Plato thus shows that such statements as those of Odysseus must be critiqued in a philosophical context to teach the would-be statesman and his subjects about the value of the virtue of moderation.

In both citations we have treated, then, Plato implicitly censors 'Homer's' designation of the bard as a valuable expert in society. In these citations, Plato works implicitly to erode the authority of the lying bards, to erase them from the very texts they recite. In so doing, he contradicts and works to philosophically revise the longstanding position of poets of asserting their own expertise in their craft.[20] While the bards may sing that which is Beautiful, it is *not* Good

17 Pl. *R.* 3.390a8.

18 As Dover ([1974] 1994: 119–123) points out, σοφός applied to a poet means one thing, to a philosopher quite another. Down to the late fifth century, σοφία means artistic or technical skill, especially that of the poet. It was not until later, especially in the writings of the philosophers, that σοφία means 'intelligence' or 'wisdom', in terms of knowing how to live and behave properly. At any rate, taking σοφώτατον to refer to Homer rather than Odysseus, allows Plato to play with the ambiguity of the term. How could the 'most skilled' writer at the same time have so little in the way of 'wisdom'.

19 Pl. *R.* 3.390a9; *Od.* 9.3.

20 See Harriott (1969) 92–104, Murray (1981) 98–99, Verdenius (1983) 20–24, Nagy (1989) 18–24, Pratt (1993) 68.

in a Platonic sense. For Plato, a 'true' understanding of poetry, and perhaps even the use of it, is the specific purview of the *new* wise men: philosophers. Provided that Homer is read through the medium of philosophy, then, his texts can remain an invaluable element in the training of philosopher-kings.

Positive and Negative Examples of Obedience to Authority in Homer: Diomedes and Achilles (Citations 3–5)

Citation 3: Republic 3.389e6—Iliad 4.412

The next citation we shall treat immediately follows Citation 1 above in Plato's text. This passage is the first in the *Republic* to cite Homer as a positive authority. Such a positive use of Homer is striking as this is the twenty-first quotation of Homer out of the forty-two times total he is quoted in the *Republic*. Plato's positive use of Homer, however, is important in that it shows that his reception of Homer is hardly simple or merely negative. The point is that Plato is willing to use what in Homer is good, change other passages to suit his purposes, and censor the rest.

In Citation 3, Socrates quotes Diomedes' exemplary obedience to Agamemnon, when Agamemnon criticizes him and others of shrinking from battle:

> [Socrates:] 'What about moderation [σωφροσύνης]? Won't our young people also need that?'
> [Adeimantus:] 'Of course.'
> 'And aren't these the most important aspects of moderation for the majority of people, namely, to obey the rulers and to rule the pleasures of drink, sex, and food for themselves?'
> 'That's my opinion at any rate.'
> 'Then we'll say that the words of Homer's Diomedes are well put:
> *"Good friend, abide in silence, and hearken to my word."'*
>
> PL. *R.* 3.389d7–e6

Socrates cites this passage to support his idea that even when rulers lie—provided that they do so nobly, i.e. for a good purpose—they must still be obeyed. The citation fits Socrates' argument so well because Diomedes does not question or take umbrage at the lack of truth of Agamemnon's criticism. Diomedes had very much taken the lead in fighting and does not deserve any sort of rebuke, but he does not question the unfair insult of Agamemnon since he knows that the effect of it will be 'beneficial' and for the good of those around him. In this way, he proves himself to be a sort of anti-Achilles, a

warrior who does not have a selfish interest in his *timē*, especially if it detracts from the work of the army as a whole. He is, in effect, showing the sort of qualities that are key for a guardian class to adopt in remaining obedient to their superiors, if a city is to function in a harmonious way.[21] In citing Homer here in a positive light, Plato shows to his reader that, in select pieces at least, Homer is not beyond being salvaged as a model for creating the ideal state. It is just a matter of the philosopher taking the bard out-of-context, selecting specific lines that serve as positive exemplars, and recommending it directly to the public. It is perhaps telling, of course, that the ideal proposed here is one of unquestioning obedience, suggesting that the 'lower ranks', the guardian class, emotion itself, ought to respect the authority of *logos*, the philosopher-king, in silence.

Citation 4: Republic 3.389e8—Iliad 3.8;[22] *Citation 5: Republic 3.389e9—Iliad 4.431*

Immediately following Citation 3, Socrates cites two more Homeric lines as favourable representations of military obedience, from Books 3 and 4 of the *Iliad*, focusing once again on the theme of silent obedience. With extended similes of birds and ewes respectively, Homer compares the Greek heroes favourably to the Trojans. Whereas the Trojans show little self-restraint, being noisy, the Greek heroes advance in menacing silence, obedient and fearful of their leaders.[23] These passages serve as a means to model appropriate behaviour to the guardian class and thus serve as a means for the philosopher-king to reinforce the value of obedience and strengthen his authority in his own state:

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21 Odysseus, for example, earlier in the same passage (cf. *Il.* 4.349–355), does not take Agamemnon's criticism as well as Diomedes, saying that Agamemnon's rebuke is 'as empty as wind' (ἀνεμώλια, *Il.* 4.355).

22 Cf. *Il.* 2.536, 11.508, 24.364.

23 Note the noisy advance of the Trojans yet again at *Il.* 2.780, 810, and 13.39–41. The Greeks noisily arm themselves before battle at *Il.* 11.50; the Greeks shout only once in the midst of battle (*Il.* 17.755–759), when they panic being routed by Hector and Aeneas. Here the poet compares the Greeks to starlings fleeing a hawk. The fact that these negative comparisons involve animals—creatures devoid of reason—fits in well with Socrates' psychological theories and interest in the primacy of reason. See, for example, Pl. *R.* 4.441b where Socrates claims that young children and animals do not participate in rational calculation, though they have a good amount of the spirited element right from birth. For more on the contrast between the silent Greeks' advance and that of the Trojans, see Kirk (1985) ad *Il.* 3.8–9.

> [Socrates:] 'and so is what follows:
> *"the Achaeans came on, breathing fury,"* [*Il.* 3.8]
> *"all silent as they were through fear of their commanders"* [*Il.* 4.431] and all similar passages.'
> [Adeimantus:] 'Yes, well said.'
> PL. *R.* 3.389e7–11

Citation 6: Republic 3.389e13—Iliad 1.225

In Citation 6, which immediately follows Citations 4–5 in Plato's text, Socrates makes a radical shift away from using Homer's text as a treasury of positive exemplars to censoring a negative one. The key point, however, is that through a philosophical and controlled reception of Homer, Plato's Socrates is able to derive a positive lesson about statecraft, despite the original, damaging poetic context. Here that damaging context concerns the disobedience of Achilles to Agamemnon, which, in Plato's text in particular, stands in sharp contrast to Socrates' praise of Diomedes' obedience. The citation seems to suggest a hierarchy of positive to negative figures in Homer in respect to showing good forms of obedience, with Diomedes (see above) and Odysseus (see below) serving as positive examples and Achilles as a negative one:

> [Socrates:] 'But what about this?
> *"Heavy with wine, with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer,"*
> and the rest, is it—or any other headstrong words [νεανιεύματα] spoken in prose or poetry by private citizens against their rulers—well put?'
> [Adeimantus:] 'No, they aren't well put.'
> 'I don't think they are suitable for young people to hear—not, in any case, with a view for making them moderate. Though it isn't surprising that they are pleasing [ἡδονήν] enough in other ways. What do you think?'
> 'The same as you.'
> PL. *R.* 3.389e12–390a7

In Homer, Agamemnon has just informed Achilles that he will be taking Briseis from him. Achilles considers slaying Agamemnon on the spot, but Athene, sent by Hera, dissuades him. The key to understanding the force of this citation is considering it in the context of the argument of the *Republic*. Socrates does not object to this Homeric passage in any way on aesthetic grounds. He admits that '[the words] are pleasing enough in other ways'.[24] Yet, considering poetry

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24 Pl. *R.* 3.390a5: εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται.

purely in terms of social utility—the primary focus of the *Republic*—Socrates argues that such lines are 'not suitable for young people to hear—not, in any case, with a view to making them moderate'.[25]

The irony of the passage in the Platonic context is that while Socrates cites the passage as a negative exemplar of soldierly disobedience, Achilles is, in fact, entirely obedient to an authority higher than Agamemnon, the goddess Athene. When Athene learns of Achilles' intention of killing Agamemnon, she tells him verbal abuse is acceptable but physical violence is not. Achilles obeys the goddess immediately.[26] As usual, however, Plato has the advantage of alluding to as little or as much of the broader Homeric context as suits his purpose.

Finally, we have to wonder if Plato's Socrates cites Achilles' insubordination to political authority with some measure of irony. It is Socrates, after all, who tells the Athenians at *Apology* 29 that he would fulfil his mission to the god even if it meant that he would disobey the civil authority. But whereas Achilles' insubordination is carried out via anger, an emotion Socrates characterizes as 'without calculation' (ἀλογίστως),[27] Socrates is the reasoning hero *par excellence*, perhaps a city-destroyer himself, but one that operates based on *logos* rather than *thumos*.

Philosophical Revision: Poetry in the Service of Philosophy (Citations 7–8)

Citation 7: Republic 3.390d4–5—Odyssey 20.17–18[28]

In the final set of citations we shall examine, Socrates uses Homer in yet another way, this time forcing a philosophical interpretation on the poet's words, which is made possible by the context in which he appropriates the bard. At *Republic* 3.390d4–5, Socrates quotes *Odyssey* 20.17–18, similar to the Diomedes citation earlier, offering up the behaviour of Odysseus as a positive example of self-restraint:

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25 Pl. *R.* 3.390a4: Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι εἴς γε σωφροσύνην νέοις ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούειν.

26 Achilles' motives for obeying Athene, incidentally, are thoroughly wrong-headed according to the theological tenets as set forth by Socrates in the *Republic*. He obeys Athene out of self-interest, saying, 'Whoever obeys the gods, to him do they gladly give ear' (ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθηται μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ, *Il.* 1.218), a violation of Socrates' principle of divine immutability.

27 Pl. *R.* 4.441c2.

28 Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 94d8–e1.

> [Socrates:] 'But if, on the other hand, there are words or deeds of famous men, who are exhibiting endurance in the face of everything, surely they must be seen or heard. For example:
> *"But he struck his breast, and rebuked his heart, saying:*
> *Endure, my heart; a worse thing even than this did you once endure."'*
> PL. *R.* 3.390d1–5

In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is laying sleepless in his halls, tossing and turning as he considers how to bring vengeance upon the suitors and the other faithless members of his household. Homer compares Odysseus to a dog that growls at a stranger and is eager for a fight (*Odyssey* 20.14–16), a passage perhaps that Plato had in mind when he compared the nature of a good guardian to that of a watchdog.[29] At any rate, Odysseus shows restraint. Unlike Achilles in the quotation immediately above, Odysseus does not require divine intervention to stay him from the rash murder of his enemies. Just as was the case in the Cyclops episode of Book 9 of the *Odyssey*, which Odysseus himself recalls (*Odyssey* 20.19–21), Odysseus relies on his 'wit' (μῆτις). In the lines Socrates quotes, the hero strikes his breast and commands himself to endure, to wait for the right time to seek his revenge. Thus, in the same way that Diomedes above offered a favourable contrast to Achilles, Odysseus does so here. Unlike Achilles, who in Socrates' explanation of human development is ruled by his *thumos* much like a child (or worse yet an animal),[30] Odysseus establishes reason as the leader of his soul as Socrates reads *Odyssey* 20.17–18.[31]

In his first use here of *Odyssey* 20.17, Socrates highlights the most important sort of obedience in his opinion, that of the 'lesser' elements of the soul taking commands, without question, from reason. It is fitting for Plato's purposes that in the original Homeric context, the poet uses a metaphor referring to bodily appetite when he describes Odysseus' internal conflict. Homer compares Odysseus to a man who sits before a blazing fire, eager to see his dinner

29 Pl. *R.* 2.375d–376b, 5.451d. Indeed, the Homeric metaphor could not work any better for Plato had he chosen it for himself. Though Odysseus is no philosopher, he has (in this respect at least) a philosophic nature, not unlike that which Socrates ascribes to dogs (τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον, *R.* 2.376a11–b1).

30 Pl. *R.* 4.440a7–b1: 'Even in small children, one can see that they are full of spirit (θυμοῦ, a8) right from birth, while as far as rational calculation (λογισμοῦ, a9) is concerned, some never seem to get a share of it, while the majority do so quite late.'

31 On the danger from a Platonic perspective of Achilles' honour-loving and attachment to the *thumos*, see esp. Hobbs (2000) 204–205 with further bibliography.

roasted quickly so he can eat immediately. In the same way, Odysseus will use his reason to stay his emotional desire and will only take vengeance on the suitors at the opportune time. According to Socrates, such decision making as that of Odysseus can only arise if the emotional element of the soul has been cultivated properly through education: 'the spirited part (θυμοειδές) is a third thing in the soul that is by nature the helper of the rational part (λογιστικῷ), provided that it hasn't been corrupted by a bad upbringing.'[32] Odysseus, unlike Achilles, has learned to put his emotions in the service of reason rather than vice versa. A would-be statesman reading such a passage in its philosophical, rather than literary, context, would further understand the importance not only of ordering his own soul, with reason at the helm, but also the elements of the society which he governs.

Citation 8: Republic 4.441b6—Odyssey 20.17

It is fitting to note in passing, that Socrates also cites *Odyssey* 20.17 later on in the *Republic* and to much different effect at *Republic* 4.441b6. Here he uses Homer to 'prove' his own tripartite model of the human soul, arguing that Odysseus stays his 'breast' (στῆθος) and 'heart' (κραδίην) through the application of reason as the leading principle in his soul:

> [Socrates:] 'Or rather, just as there were three classes in the city that held it together, the money-making, the auxiliary, and the deliberative, is the spirited part [θυμοειδές] a third thing in the soul that is by nature the helper of the rational part [λογιστικῷ], provided that it hasn't been corrupted by a bad upbringing?'
> [Glaucon:] 'It must be a third.'
> 'Yes, provided that we can show it is different from the rational part [λογιστικοῦ], as we saw earlier it was from the appetitive one [ἐπιθυμητικοῦ].'
> 'It isn't difficult to show that it is different. Even in small children, one can see that they are full of spirit [θυμοῦ] right from birth, while as far as rational calculation [λογισμοῦ] is concerned, some never seem to get a share of it, while the majority do so quite late.'
> 'That's really well put. And in animals too one can see that what you say is true. Besides, our earlier quotation from Homer bears it out, where he says,
> *"But he struck his breast, and rebuked his heart"*

32 Pl. *R.* 4.441a2–3.

> For here Homer clearly represents the part that has calculated [ἀναλογισάμενον] about better and worse as different from that part that is spirited without calculation [τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ].'
>
> 'That's exactly right.'
>
> PL. *R.* 4.440e10–441c3

To be sure, Plato has Socrates take serious liberties with the meaning and original intent of the Homeric text. Now, not only does Socrates take the Homeric terms for the seat(s) of human emotion (στῆθος, κραδίην) as univocal with his own (θυμοειδές), but he also takes advantage of Homer's authority—an authority that at some points in the *Republic* he criticizes and degrades mercilessly—to prove a philosophic point that was never intended in the original Homeric context. In so doing, Plato is able to have his cake and eat it, too. When it suits him, as here, he can 'use' Homer out-of-context to support his philosophic views, while elsewhere he can erode the authority of the 'divine bard' by pointing out his 'false' or 'lying' depictions of the gods and heroes.[33]

Conclusion

The *Republic* demonstrates that if the beauty and charm of poetry are harnessed properly, made to be subordinate to philosophy, poetry itself can be saved; not only can it be saved, but it can be a crucial part of a ruler's educational program of his citizenry. Further, poetry's service to philosophy acts as a reflection of reason's primacy in the ordering of a just and well-functioning society and soul. Poetry, 'philosophically revised', can, as Plato's Socrates demonstrates, preserve and encourage social and psychic harmony rather than destroy it. The lesson for the ruler is that outright censorship of the arts is not necessary. Homer after all cannot be removed from Greek education any more than emotion can be removed from a human being. The key is that philosophy and reason are 'leaders' themselves, controlling poetry and the products of emotion.

33 In similar fashion, Socrates quotes *Od.* 20.17–18 at *Phd.* 94d8–e1 to support his contention that the soul is not in harmony with the body, but rather rules over it as it 'hold[s] converse with desires and passions and fears' (ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις, *Phd.* 94d5–6). Here he uses Homer to support his philosophical theories on the relationship between the soul and 'the affectations of the body' (τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, e3).

In the end, Plato's *Republic* strikes a beneficial harmony between philosophy and poetry, thus resolving in a sense their 'ancient quarrel'.[34] Poetry remains in the *Republic*, in the ideal city, in the educational program sponsored by a good ruler, just in vastly altered form. It is misappropriated and misinterpreted at times by Plato, but only to cultivate the Good. It is no longer memorized or recited without due reflection. Instead, poetry's assertions and opinions are used as the starting point for philosophy. Poetry is absorbed into philosophical dialogue, engaged as if it were part of the substance of philosophy itself, and rejected when it leads to behaviour or opinions that are neither good nor beneficial. Poetry, in its new form, now engages the listener. Poetic texts, in the hands of Plato, in the hands of the character Socrates in particular, become fodder for philosophic discussion, key elements in a philosopher-king's educational program. And so in the end, Plato himself becomes the champion of poetry that Socrates seeks, and Homer's reputation as the 'Educator of Hellas' is preserved. The philosopher-king is meant to take two lessons away from this: Homer is a useful part of the educational program of his citizenry provided that it is controlled by philosophy, and he himself must always order his own soul and society, taking care that the 'lesser' elements remain obedient to reason.

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34 Pl. *R.* 10.607c.

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The Problem with the Prince: Agamemnon in the Ancient Exegetical Tradition on Homer

Elsa Bouchard

The Homeric poems are filled with issues pertaining to the rightful exercise of power. In both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, these issues are openly addressed, most often in scenes rife with conflict and duress. The poems also abound in authority figures—kings, princes, counsellors, commanders of all sorts—who provide various models of political power, both on the human and the divine level. Among them, Agamemnon is by far the most controversial, especially so because his role in the Trojan War, the core event of the heroic cycle, is pivotal. Modern commentators of Homer are generally very critical of the commander of the Greek armies at Troy. Oliver Taplin, for example, has described him as 'a nasty piece of work' who 'behaves like a rat', and there is no denying that in many Iliadic scenes Agamemnon causes contemporary readers to feel intensely uneasy.[1]

Homer's ancient audiences were more ambivalent. After all, the tradition unanimously accepted by ancient historians and scholars saw him as the main driving force behind what was considered the first historical gathering of the Greek states,[2] a watershed moment in the self-representation of the Hellenes as members of a cultural community.[3] Thus Agamemnon could arguably be cast as the first Panhellenic prince. Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, that is exactly what Isocrates, the most eloquent partisan of Greek unity, makes of him. However, next to this patriotic view of 'the Great Commander' stood a very different one, which was elaborated by a tradition of Homeric scholarship whose approach to the poems was much more critical. As early as the sophistic period, canonical poems (especially Homer's) were scrutinized in an effort to identify and solve exegetical and grammatical 'problems' (ζητήματα).[4] These pointed enquiries addressed a great number of different issues, including

1 Taplin (1990) 65.

2 See Thuc. 1.3.1–5. On Thucydides' use of Agamemnon as a paradigm in his account of the Peloponnesian War, see Rabel (1984) and Zadorojnyi (1998).

3 Cf. Dowden (1992) 47–48.

4 See Gudeman (1927), Apfel (1938), Hintenlang (1961), Pfeiffer (1968) 69–70, Richardson (1975), Slater (1989) 40–42.

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artistic merit, narrative plausibility, and the depiction of morally questionable behaviour. The result of this extensive ancient practice is that the Homeric scholia are teeming with *zetemata*, as well as with wide-ranging and often divergent responses to them, since a single *zetema* could attract numerous attempts to work out a viable solution.

A large proportion of these *zetemata* focus on the behaviour of poetic characters in specific situations. The way that the problems are framed reveals many of the latent assumptions of ancient readers with respect to these characters.[5] Unsurprisingly, Agamemnon is a hot topic in their discussions. Although they generally consider him the unequivocal leader of the Greek armies and abstain from questioning the pre-eminence of his position,[6] the particular rights to which this position entitled him remain debatable for them.

This paper offers an overview of the interpretations of Agamemnon in the ancient exegetical tradition. The discussion will take us from Aristotle, the first 'problem-solver', whose solutions are partly available to us in the fragmented remains of his treatise on *Homeric Questions*, to Porphyry, who stands at the end of this tradition. However, by way of a *prolegomenon* to the main discussion, I shall first examine a curious passage in Isocrates that looks like an early example, albeit in a typically rhetorical form, of the same stance (both zetematic and apologetic) toward Agamemnon that we subsequently find in the later tradition of Homeric criticism. Next I shall consider a portion of Aristotle's account of the different types of monarchy in the *Politics*, an account in which Agamemnon's status already appears somewhat problematic. It is true that these sources stretch over a fairly long period and belong to different genres (oratory, philosophy, and literary criticism); however, this makes it all the more remarkable to find the same concerns about Agamemnon constantly recurring at different times and in such a diversity of contexts. Moreover, although none of these discussions can be described as belonging to the Princes' Mirror genre,[7] they all provide glimpses into the reception of the most well-known ruler in Greek mythology, a ruler whose status as an outstanding

5 See Nünlist (2009) 252–253, Bouchard (2010) 318–322.

6 As Sammons (2014) shows, there existed an alternative tradition, which can be traced in the *Odyssey* and in Attic tragedy, that apparently put Menelaus on a par with Agamemnon as regards the leadership of the expedition. However, this tradition is generally rejected by the poet of the *Iliad*, whose view of Agamemnon as the single headman was the most influential in the later Greek political reflection.

7 On the generic markers of the *speculum principum*, which is best exemplified in extant archaic literature by Hesiod's *Works and Days*, see Martin (1984) 30–33.

example—either of a righteous king or of a vicious rogue, depending on the interpretation[8]—is incontestable.

Isocrates' Panhellenic Prince

Isocrates' work contains some of the earliest traces of a reflection on statesmanship in the Greek tradition, for example in his speech *To Nicocles*, which consists of a list of advice for the king of Cyprian Salamis.[9] Such an innovation is consistent with the combination of political and pedagogical interests that is so typical of his work, but it also reflects the historical circumstances surrounding the orator's life, which saw the decline of Athenian democracy and the rise of a centralized Macedonian power. In this section I will focus on a passage from Isocrates' last speech, the *Panathenaicus*, a passage that happens to be the most expansive analysis of Agamemnon's political qualities in the extant literature of the Classical period. Formally, the *Panathenaicus* is an encomium of Athens designed to be delivered during the city's greatest festival. In the middle of this encomium, which stresses the city's self-proclaimed merits just as much as the supposed vices of its Spartan rival, Isocrates delivers an extended eulogy to Agamemnon.[10] Its length and the numerous rhetorical precautions surrounding it have caused critics to wonder about the function of the 'Agamemnon digression'. Should it be considered a covert tribute to Philip or a mere symptom of the orator's senescence and diminishing relevance?[11] More convincingly, it has been argued that the frame of the digression serves Isocrates' rhetorical aims.[12] Nevertheless, the orator's unexpected emphasis on the figure of Agamemnon and the hyperbolic nature of his praise remain puzzling.

As an example of the Spartans' many misdeeds, Isocrates rails against their violence against their Peloponnesian neighbours, especially the ones, like Aga-

8 The *speculum principum* does not exclude a degree of admonition and the use of negative examples. For example, Odysseus' reprimand of the Phaeacian youth Euryalus (*Od.* 8.174–177) can be interpreted in the light of the Princes' Mirror genre: see Martin (1984).

9 See Born (1936) 46–49.

10 Isoc. *Panath.* 74–90.

11 These alternative explanations are documented by Race (1978) 175–176 (with bibliography). Another possibility is that the encomium should be read as a disguised list of instructions for Athenian (or Macedonian) leaders. On the similarity between the encomium and the *speculum principum* as genres, see Born (1934).

12 See Race (1978).

memnon's Argos, whose exploits during the Trojan War should entitle them to the greatest honours. Then he offers a long account of Agamemnon's merits as a leader and his highly beneficial political and military accomplishments. This account invites Isocrates' readers to attribute the following qualities to Agamemnon. He was powerful, yet moderate (77.1–2), and had skills as a mediator (77.3–5). He was realistic (77.5–7), yet ambitious (78.1–2), persuasive and frugal (79.3–9), patriotic in a Panhellenic sense (80.3–8), prudent and responsible (80.8–10), protective and paternal (82.6–8). His power was not founded on bribes and money but on his intelligence and resourcefulness (82.1–6). Tenacious and invested with a righteous mission (83.5–9), he was authoritative enough to hold together for ten years an army of headstrong men filled with anger, envy, and ambition (81.4–8). Still, in Isocrates' view, Agamemnon failed to obtain the reputation that he deserved 'because of those who enjoy marvels more than public services and lies more than truth' (78.6–7).[13]

This last comment unexpectedly introduces a forensic element into an otherwise epideictic text, revealing a hidden apologetic agenda in Isocrates' hyperbolic encomium. A closer look at the text confirms that the orator is in fact responding to unknown opponents who have denigrated Agamemnon—by underestimating his great merits and refusing to acknowledge the extraordinary worth of his accomplishments—in ways that recall the unjustified lack of appreciation of Isocrates himself by his contemporaries. Indeed, near the beginning of the digression the orator explicitly associates his own fate with that of Agamemnon, claiming that the latter suffered 'the same injustice' as himself, that is to say, he was deprived of the reputation to which he was entitled as a benefactor of his people.[14]

Not only does Isocrates claim that he and Agamemnon suffered a similar fate, but he might even want to suggest that they were victims of the same opponents. A passage from the prologue to the speech, in which he defends both his rhetorical style and his school of thought, points to the following suspects:

> Three or four of those common sophists were sitting in the Lycaeum [...] discussing poetry, in particular that of Homer, Hesiod, and the other poets [...] As the audience showed its approval of their lecture, one of them, the most audacious, attempted to slander me [...] So it was not without reason

13 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

14 *Panath.* 75.2–6.

> that I complained earlier about the misfortune that constantly follows me in such circumstances. It is the cause of the lies, the slander, and the envy that I have to endure, and it is the reason that I am unable to gain the reputation that I deserve.
>
> Isoc. *Panath.* 18.1–21.6

Could it be the case that these sophistic scholars who specialize in commenting poetry and who reject Isocrates' model of civic education are the same as the anonymous denigrators of Agamemnon? After all, both Isocrates' and Agamemnon's enemies are characterized by the same disregard for truth and the same ingratitude toward a benefactor of the people (which is exactly how Isocrates sees himself).[15] Moreover, discussions of ethical topics using famous poetic characters were popular in sophistic circles, as is evinced by such works as Gorgias' *Helen* and *Palamedes* or Antisthenes' *Speeches of Ajax and Odysseus*. Although the best-known examples of this tradition are apologetic accounts of the behaviour of mythical characters, they were apparently written in reaction to an equally important and yet opposed tendency to subject these same characters to severe criticism.[16] For instance, the sophist Zoilus was remembered for his exclusively critical and controversial stance on Homer and Homeric characters.[17] It is quite likely that authors like Zoilus indulged in the kind of 'Agamemnon bashing' that Isocrates reports. If so, it may be the case that these scholars stand at the head of the prolific tradition of political Homeric criticism that I shall consider later. Since the *zetemata* concerning Agamemnon mostly deal either with his qualities as a military commander or with his political qualities, precisely the aspects that Isocrates focuses on in his apologetic 'encomium', the probability that the latter was written in reaction to some form of critical discourse is quite high.

15 See *Panath.* 11–12 and Isoc. *passim*.

16 See e.g. Isoc. *Hel.* 45 (a response to some unknown critics of Paris); Gorg. *Hel.* 2 (on Helen's bad reputation); Antisth. fr. 51 Caizzi (on the ethical neutrality of Odysseus' epithet *polytropos*); Pl. *Hp. Mi.* 363b–371e (on Achilles' and Odysseus' respective moral worth).

17 Friedländer (1895), Apfel (1938) 250–252. According to the *Suda* (ζ 130), Zoilus' speeches included one with the title Κατὰ Ἰσοκράτους τοῦ ῥήτορος ('Against the Orator Isocrates').

Aristotle on Laconian Monarchy

Before moving on to the *zetemata* themselves, I shall examine a brief passage from Aristotle's list of different types of kingship in the *Politics*. The description of the first item in this list, the Laconian monarchy, contains a surprising reference to Homer's Agamemnon:

> The kingship in the Laconian constitution […] does not carry sovereignty in all matters, though when a king goes on a foreign expedition [ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν] he is the leader in all matters relating to the war […] The king has no authority to put a subject to death, except in a certain form of kingship, as in ancient times kings on their military expeditions could kill an offender with their own hand [ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ],[18] as Homer proves, for Agamemnon endured being reviled in the assemblies [κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις] but when they were on an expedition [ἐξελθόντων] had authority to put a man to death: at all events he says 'But whomsoe'er I see far from the fray […] Shall have no hope to fly from dogs and vultures. For death is in my hands!'[19]
>
> Arist. *Pol.* 1285a3–14 (trans. RACKHAM, modified)

Aristotle's use of Homer as evidence for his claims about Laconian monarchy is more confusing than illuminating. It is apparently supposed to illustrate not only the special case of the right of life and death that a Laconian king would have over his subjects, but also the usual limitations of this type of kingship: Agamemnon, according to Aristotle, 'endured being reviled in the assemblies', but was ruthless during military expeditions. Yet is this distinction actually operative in the *Iliad*? The assemblies depicted in the poem are not ordinary civic assemblies. They occur in an unambiguously military context. Indeed, Homer always represents Agamemnon as exercising power in such a context, since the assemblies in the *Iliad* are all connected to a military operation 'on foreign land'.[20] Moreover, Aristotle's claim that Agamemnon 'endured' (ἠνείχετο) abuse attributes to him a more lenient attitude than that which he actually

18 For this meaning of the locution ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ (or νομῷ), see Wilhelm (1936) 142.

19 The Homeric lines are from *Il.* 2.391–393, but the last sentence, 'For death is in my hands' (πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος), is absent from our text of the *Iliad*.

20 Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1285a5: ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν, 'when a king goes on a foreign expedition'. One possible solution to this difficulty would be to give ἐξελθόντων at 1285a12 the narrow meaning 'when they were out on an assault', but that seems implausible given the different meaning that ἐξέλθῃ has seven lines before.

displays in Homer, especially in the scene of his quarrel with Achilles in the first book of the *Iliad*. Despite the brevity of this passage and the interpretative problems that it contains,[21] one is left with the overall impression that Aristotle holds a somewhat tendentious view of Agamemnon. This impression will receive confirmation in the next section.

The Problems

As one might expect, political issues are at the heart of many of the discussions in Aristotle's collection of *Homeric Questions*.[22] These issues are problematized in terms that evoke his description of Laconian kingship, that is to say, with a focus on the special martial context in which Agamemnon's authority is exercised. Moreover, a similar approach is taken in numerous scholia that comment, in quasi-zetematic form, on various aspects of the king's behaviour.

One of the longest and most detailed ancient discussions of Agamemnon's skills as a general focuses on the infamous 'test' of the armies in the second book of the *Iliad* (2.73–210). The decision to use this test seems odd in the first place, but as the episode plays out, it shows itself to be extremely imprudent, if not altogether foolish. Hence the following *zetema*:

> Why did Agamemnon test the Achaeans and act in such a way that he almost caused the opposite of what he wanted to happen? […] Aristotle says […] that it was natural not to urge the army to rush into battle immediately, but rather to believe it necessary to do a test to see if they were inclined to do so. For the men were exhausted by the plague and disheartened by the length of time ⟨they had spent at war⟩ […] The test was a necessity, provided that the commanders were told to object, since he first asked them to oppose his exhortation to abandon the war […] What happened was natural, given the general excitement [διά τε τὸ ὀργᾶν] and the fact that Agamemnon did not know that if he did this test, the men would be glad to hear him say what he said, and would quickly start preparing to leave before anyone could speak against him. Therefore, Agamemnon's plan was right [ὁ οὖν Ἀγαμέμνων ὀρθῶς ἐβουλεύσατο].
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> Porph. *ad Il.* 2.73, 1–12 ed. MACPHAIL

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21 For example, Aristotle's idea of the chronology of Agamemnon's reign with regard to the establishment of Lycurgus' constitution (about which see *Pol.* 1269b19–1271b19) is anything but clear. I hope to address this and other problems in a further study.

22 A few of these 'political' *zetemata* are examined in Huxley (1979) 75–77.

Aristotle appears to go out of his way to justify, and defend as rationally coherent, Agamemnon's disastrous plan and his plainly incompetent handling of the situation. However, claiming that the king could not anticipate the consequences of using this test is hardly a suitable defence of a man whose role necessarily requires foresight and leadership. Aristotle obviously has some *a priori* notion that Homer thought of Agamemnon as a great military commander, so that it would have been impossible for him to represent the Mycenaean king as responsible for the outcome of the test.[23] The only way to exonerate Agamemnon is to find fault either with the 'mass' of the army or with the commanders who occupy an intermediate position between their men and Agamemnon. Aristotle's mention of the excitement of the troops and of the commanders' inability to carry out their orders serves just that purpose.[24]

In his digression on Agamemnon, Isocrates notes the latter's frugality, his disregard for money, and his refusal to bribe his allies. However, many *zetemata* accuse him of being corrupt and quite open to *accepting* bribes. One frequently cited example occurs near the end of the *Iliad*, when Homer refers in passing to a mare that was once offered to Agamemnon by a wealthy resident of Sicyon. In exchange for the mare, Agamemnon exempted the latter from his obligation to join the Trojan expedition. Plutarch reports that some readers reproached Agamemnon for making this exchange:

> It is suspected that it was because of his corruptibility [διὰ δωροδοκίαν] that Agamemnon exempted from duty this rich man who gave him the horse Aithea: 'a gift, in order not to follow him to windy Ilion, but stay comfortably home; for Zeus had given him a large fortune' [*Il.* 23.297–299]. But according to Aristotle, he did the right thing [ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἐποίησεν] to prefer a good mare to such a man.
>
> Arist. fr. 165 ed. ROSE = Plu. *Quomod. adul.* 32E

Aristotle's remark is echoed in the relevant scholium: 'he thought that a good fighting horse was superior to an unwarlike man'.[25] Despite appearances, Aga-

23 As I shall argue in my conclusion, this dismissive attitude toward Agamemnon's blunders cannot be explained away by the general tendency of ancient scholars to defend Homer against all criticism. On Homer as an all-round source of wisdom, see De Jong in this volume.

24 On the excitement of the troops, cf. Isocrates' description of Agamemnon's intractable army at *Panath.* 81.4–8 (*supra*, p. 107). For a positive evaluation of the 'test' by Christophoros Kondoleon, see Pontani (this volume) 250. See also McKenzie (this volume) 268.

25 Schol. bT *Il.* 23.297b1 ed. Erbse.

memnon's decision was motivated both by the martial qualities of the horse and their absence in its owner, in sum, by a strategic calculation. As is the case with many problems related to Agamemnon, the solution provided consists in encouraging the reader to adopt a prudential instead of a moral perspective on the issue in question. On other occasions too, Agamemnon's behaviour opens the door to accusations of greed, such as in the following:

> Thersites insults Agamemnon as a womanizer [πολυγύναιος]: 'your tents are full of bronze, many are the women inside them, women of choice, whom we Achaeans give to you before all' [*Il.* 2.226–228]. According to Aristotle, it is not likely that he keeps this group of women for sex, but rather as a mark of honour [εἰς γέρας]—nor did he stock his numerous wines to get drunk.
>
> Arist. fr. 144 = Ath. 13.556e

Aristotle's response to the accusations of greed, lechery, and drunkenness levelled against Agamemnon is all the more necessary since Thersites' blame partially echoes that of a much more respectable character in the *Iliad*. In the midst of his quarrel with Agamemnon, Achilles had already attacked the king for his greed as well as for other inglorious traits, most famously in the line 'You heavy with wine, with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer' (*Il.* 1.225). This line attracted considerable attention from ancient scholars,[26] some of whom saw it as an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with Agamemnon's overall character:

> Isocrates attests that there are three good things that commonly belong to a general when he says: '[Conon] was the most careful of the generals, the most trusted by the Greeks, and the most experienced in the dangers of war' [*Paneg.* 142]. Homer is divinely inspired [ἐνθεάζει][27] when he accuses Agamemnon of the vices that are opposite to these virtues. When calling him 'heavy with wine' he reproaches him for his great carelessness—for who is careful when drunk? In saying that he is the most shameless of all, he refers to his untrustworthiness, and cowardice is the greatest of all obstacles to leadership.
>
> Porph. *ad Il.* 1.225, 4–7

26 Plato (*R.* 3.390a) already mentions it as an example of the insults addressed 'by common men to their leaders' (ἰδιωτῶν εἰς ἄρχοντας) that a poet should avoid representing.

27 This word is Janko's emendation from the manuscript reading ἐκθειάζει, which is indeed incomprehensible; see app. crit. in MacPhail (2011) 20.

This text has been attributed to Porphyry's *Homeric Questions*, and no doubt it stems from a philosophical tradition, for another scholium with a virtually identical content, presumably from the same source, ends with a very Platonic-sounding statement about the unity of virtues: 'The vices, as well as the virtues, naturally accompany one another.'[28] This interpretation of Achilles' insults also betrays a concern that goes beyond the scholiasts' usual obsession with decorum: in the case of Agamemnon, carelessness, untrustworthiness, and cowardice not only ruin an individual man's character, they also have dreadful consequences for the whole community. It is indeed remarkable that Porphyry (and the scholiast ad loc.) should interpret these insults as targeting flaws that affect in particular the competence of a leader, and specifically that of a military commander.

Another scholium on this same line, one which represents the 'pro-Agamemnon party' in the debate,[29] defends Agamemnon with respect to all three accusations contained in Achilles' words:

> Men often present as weaknesses [ἐλαττώματα] what are in fact advantages [πλεονεκτήματα]. [...] Because a bigger cup of wine is offered to kings on account of their rank, he insults the king by calling this drunkenness. And the boldness and the inexorability of kings, which prevent them from being despised, he calls that 'shamelessness'. And since it is not proper for a king to take risks by going out ahead of the phalanx, he calls that 'cowardice'. But we should not believe that Agamemnon is such as Achilles describes him in insulting terms here. The Greeks counted him among the foremost [...] And when one compares his *aristeia* with those of the others, one finds that it is greater.
>
> Schol. bT *Il.* 1.225c

The argument that a king's prominent position exposes him to envy and slander is of course part of the standard rhetorical arsenal of ancient politicians and their counsellors. Here as in other scholia, an effort is made to explain away most of Agamemnon's arguably moral flaws as manifestations of his legitimate desire to protect his noble standing. The necessity for a commander to avoid contempt and inspire respect in order to maintain his authority is a useful justification of the king's frequent *faux pas*. Indeed, as numerous examples make clear, the dangers of insubordination and outright rebellion are always

28 Schol. bT *Il.* 1.225b.

29 Kirk (1985) 76.

present.[30] However, as is announced in the last sentence of the above passage, here the scholiast will go more than one step further in belittling the respective *aristeiai* of Ajax, Diomedes, Patroclus, and Achilles, in order to exalt the relatively modest one of Agamemnon.[31]

The generally overindulgent attitude toward Agamemnon that is found in the scholia can be illustrated by a few more examples. At the very beginning of the poem, after the priest Chryses has implored the Achaeans to give back his daughter, the narrator reports that there was a general consensus that it would be right to respect the holy man and abide by his wishes, but that Agamemnon refused to listen. The scholium to this line provides two justifications for his attitude. The first is a king's inherent right to ignore the opinions of his subordinates. The second consists in drawing attention to what amounts to a minor oversight on the part of the priest with respect to diplomatic procedure:

> 'This didn't please the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus': It is a privilege of the ruler not to make his decisions according to the whims of his subjects. Besides, the priest did not send a herald, but instead he requested the king's gift of honour from his subjects.[32]
>
> Schol. A bT *Il.* 1.24b

In the lines that follow, Agamemnon sends Chryses away with insults and threats. Once again the scholiast reacts with a rather cynical point of view.

> 'Beware, old man, that near the ships [...]': Agamemnon hastily dismisses Chryses, because he knows that his presence intimidates [δυσωπεῖ] the Greeks.
>
> Schol. A *Il.* 1.26

30 Cf. e.g. schol. Q *Od.* 9.44 ed. Dindorf, which comments on the passage of the *Odyssey* where Odysseus' companions refuse to leave the country of the Cicones as quickly as possible after they had sacked it: 'It is the characteristic of a poor general to be despised [...] We will say then that the companions have just won a victory and are thus puffed up by their good luck. This happened to Agamemnon too, for the Greeks often opposed him. The story goes that in later times, even Alexander of Macedonia's own soldiers revolted against him.'

31 This is found in the following lines of the scholium, which are not quoted in the above passage.

32 To be strictly accurate, Chryses addresses the Atreidae and the rest of the army at the same time (see *Il.* 1.15–16: λίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιούς, Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω). The scholiast apparently believes that Chryses should have made his plea to Agamemnon alone.

Another scholium to this passage appeals to the same distinction as Aristotle does between Agamemnon's tolerance to insults and his ruthlessness in war:

> He offends the old man in order to build up the conflict progressively. For, as the dictum [ἐπίγραμμα] says, he is 'both a great king and a powerful spearman' [*Il.* 3.179]. This is why he accepts insults from his subjects but is very harsh toward his enemies like Adrastus [cf. *Il.* 6.53–65] and the sons of Antimachus [cf. *Il.* 11.137–147].
>
> Schol. A bT *Il.* 1.29d

The scholiast rightly describes *Iliad* 3.179 as a 'dictum' (ἐπίγραμμα), for other Greek writers refer to this line as if they saw it as expressing a general truth.[33] Moreover, the combination of the two epithets in the line could be considered an argument in favour of the idea that in addition to his generalship over the Trojan expedition Homer's Agamemnon had the status of a king.[34] But these comments on Agamemnon's treatment of Chryses also cast him as an astute political strategist who always acts in accordance with the dictates of *Realpolitik*. His pitiless cruelty to enemies is counterbalanced by a strategic acceptance of his own subjects' reproof, as is seen in his rejecting the pleas of Adrastus and Antimachus' sons, while passively receiving criticism from Odysseus and Diomedes.[35]

Nevertheless, it is surprising that there should be no criticism whatsoever of Agamemnon's behaviour in the scene with the priest. Why does the scholiast not see it as sacrilegious?[36] One explanation may be the persistent belief that

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33 See, for example, Xenophon (*Smp.* 4.6.10, *Mem.* 3.2.2).

34 The question of whether Homer's Agamemnon is both a general and king, and if so, whether his kingship extends over all the Greek armies or only those from the region of Argos, has continued to be debated by modern scholars. See e.g. Nilsson (1933) 225 and Jachmann (1953).

35 The contrast between these two reactions is explicitly drawn in schol. bT *Il.* 3.179, which comments on the 'dictum': 'both a great king and a powerful spearman' (ἀμφότερον βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής).

36 For example, a scholium to Hesiod thus comments on *Op.* 240 ('Oftentimes a whole city suffers because of a single bad man'): 'The city often shares the effects of a single bad man, just as it does those of a disease […] This can also mean that the whole city receives punishment for a single bad man because it did not prevent his wickedness while it was in its power to do so. Such was the case with Agamemnon: after he had cruelly treated the priest, the plague then spread to all the Greeks because they did not care to come to the aid of the priest' (schol. Hes. *Op.* 240–241 ed. Pertusi). Compared with Homer and his ancient commentators, the Hesiodic tradition (starting with Hesiod himself) adhered to a

the king has a special connection to the gods that allows him to know their will.[37] Just as the transcendent justice of Zeus is sometimes unfathomable to mortals, Agamemnon's decisions are occasionally motivated by a higher end that defies human understanding. As a matter of fact, in the scholia one frequently finds comments suggesting that Zeus and Agamemnon are similar in this respect. For example, a scholium to *Iliad* 21.389–390, lines that describe Zeus' superior-sounding, amoral laugh at the sight of the *Theomachy*, explicitly compares this laugh to Agamemnon's rejoicing at the quarrel between Achilles and Odysseus, as alluded to in Demodocus' first song:

> 'His dear heart laughed': [...] Agamemnon too rejoiced 'when the best of the Achaeans were quarrelling' [*Od.* 8.78], because he saw them competing for excellence [περὶ ἀρετῆς αὐτοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους].[38]
>
> Schol. b *Il.* 21.389a

Among Homeric commentators, Porphyry is certainly the one who associates kingship and divinity the most explicitly, going so far as to claim that Homer sets kings apart in a special category between men and gods:

> Next to the divine and the human races, the Pythagoreans[39] posited a third one, the general category of the 'august', that is to say, the king or the wise man. Homer was the first to place the king between gods and men and, in turn, to have the king honour the wise man over himself [...] The king himself does not send for Nestor, the one who ponders what is expedient, but instead goes to meet him himself [see *Il.* 10.17]. It is said that when Indian kings meet Brahmans, they pay reverence to them, since they are this people's philosophers.[40]
>
> Porph. *ad Il.* 1.340

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more moral and religiously scrupulous view of the world. At any rate, 'the idea that justice is a responsibility shared by all the citizens in the polis is an idea, it seems, regarded as specifically Hesiodic' (Koning [2010] 177).

37 See Desmond's paper in this volume.

38 In schol. Ge. *Il.* 21.390b the special nature of the quarrel between the gods is described in identical terms: 'it was for excellence that they were competing' (περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμιλλῶντο).

39 On the Pythagorean conception of divine royalty, see Goodenough's (1928) remarkably detailed discussion.

40 Gildersleeve (1853: 21–22) assigns this text to Porphyry's treatise *On the Utility of Homer for Kings*, a title that is transmitted in the *Suda* s.v. 'Porphyry' (π 2098), but about which nothing is known. It seems just as likely that this text derives from the *Homeric Questions*.

According to Porphyry, Homer's classification of 'races' not only ascribes to kings a special ontological status that places them between gods and men, it also closely associates them with wise men. Theoretically, the latter belong to the same category as kings, that of 'the august', but in practice kings must recognize their superiority and pay them due respect, recognition that is illustrated in Homer's world and also in Indian society. The scene from the *Iliad* to which Porphyry refers, where Agamemnon seems to demonstrate rare modesty by going to Nestor himself instead of summoning him, can be seen as having an apologetic function itself, since excessive pride features in the most frequent accusations levelled against Agamemnon.

Without going as far as Porphyry does, one scholiast still finds reasons to excuse Agamemnon's sometimes distasteful behaviour—or at least make it more understandable—by focusing on his divine mission. Near the beginning of *Iliad* 6, Agamemnon urges his brother to show absolutely no pity in battle: 'May not a single Trojan escape deep death from our arms, not even a boy in his mother's womb, not even he shall escape! May all the citizens of Ilion perish, unburied and forgotten' (*Il.* 6.58–59). About these rather disturbing lines, the scholiast has this to say:

> These words are despicable and not appropriate for a royal character [μισητὰ καὶ οὐχ ἁρμόζοντα βασιλικῷ ἤθει]. Indeed they show the brutality of his manners, and the listener of the poem, being a human being, hates what is excessively cruel and inhumane [...] One must answer that if Agamemnon had said this before the oaths had been betrayed, there would have been matter for an accusation. But since it took place after the oaths and their violation, Agamemnon is not a horrible man, for it may be that the listener too wants the whole race of perjurers to disappear. Thus his [Agamemnon's] anger is, perhaps, on behalf of the gods [σχεδὸν οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν ὀργίζεται]. Otherwise: the king is kind to his subjects, but hard on his enemies, for that is characteristic of a good and strong king.
>
> Schol. bT *Il.* 6.58–59

The scholiast's first comment borders on allegorical interpretation, the most extreme form of exegesis, and one especially well suited to the task of explaining the behaviour of divine characters.[41] It construes Agamemnon's angry words as a description of the divine punishment that awaits perjurers. Moreover, the scholiast rather disingenuously ignores the fact that the 'perjury' of

41 See Bouchard (2016) 68–73.

which the Trojans were guilty was itself the result of a direct divine intervention.[42] As to the alternative solution that concludes the scholium, we have already seen it being invoked in a similar context: the exoneration of Agamemnon in the scene with Chryses.[43] The difference is that the attitude consisting in being kind to one's subjects and behaving harshly toward one's enemies, which may be part of a purely topical argument aiming at the *ad hoc* solving of a *zetema*, is here promoted to the status of a general principle of healthy politics. For if such an attitude is indeed 'characteristic of a good and strong king', then Agamemnon does nothing more than follow a sound precept of political leadership, and he should not only be excused, he should also be seen as a model for other leaders. Plato himself notoriously adopted such a principle when he compared the guardians of his ideal city to purebred dogs who are 'kind to their own, but fierce to enemies'.[44]

Conclusion: Agamemnon as an Exegetical Case Study

Many of the comments I have examined come from the corpus of the so-called bT scholia, most of which are usually attributed to the late imperial period.[45] However, the content of many of them has close parallels with the remaining fragments of Aristotle's and Porphyry's *Homeric Questions*, and it is safe to say that a considerable proportion of the bT scholia derive from a common stock of material accumulated through centuries of Homeric criticism. Of course, this tradition is not homogeneous, and different voices can be heard promoting different exegetical approaches to the poems. Yet, as regards the role of Agamemnon, the ancient commentators show a remarkably consistent attitude: although not blind to the potentially offensive aspects of his behaviour, they are obviously anxious to justify them, whether by appealing to political 'principles' or by putting forward situational arguments that draw on the poetic context. The second strategy is ubiquitous in the zetematic tradition that pervades the scholia, but the first one seems to be more specific to the problems related to the particular case of Homer's Agamemnon.

This preference cannot be sufficiently explained by appealing to the apologetic stance that ancient critics generally adopt when they discuss *the Poet*.

42 *Il.* 4.86–103.
43 Schol. A bT *Il.* 1.29d, quoted *supra*, p. 115.
44 Pl. *R.* 3.375c.
45 Other scholia from this corpus that offer a positive appraisal of Agamemnon are listed in Schmidt (2011) 148–153.

Although Homer's authority was beyond question in the 'didactic tradition' that largely dominated Homeric criticism throughout antiquity,[46] the moral authority ascribed to the poems was by no means a direct function of the virtuousness of the characters that they portrayed. Indeed, critics were well aware of the didactic potential of representations of morally flawed actions or characters. We find the most explicit example of the awareness of this didactic potential in the reading lessons that Plutarch gives in his treatise *How a Young Man Should Study Poetry*, but Plutarch was heir to an extremely long critical tradition.[47] At the same time, it seems rather obvious that the poetic representation of characters who behave badly—provided that it is done effectively and appropriately—can help clarify a moral lesson.

Nevertheless, the zetematic tradition, both in its approach to the problem of Homer's Agamemnon and in its approach to other types of problems, possesses idiosyncrasies that must be taken into account. For example, in contrast to theoretical treatises or to other kinds of texts addressing the good ruler as a specific topic, it is characterized by its *ad hoc*, non-systematic treatment of the topics that it discusses. Moreover, the solving of *zetemata* can be understood as an endeavour involving a certain playfulness on the part of the critic who has the opportunity to display his ability to devise clever solutions to the problems. These peculiarities are absent from sources, such as Isocrates, where a similarly lenient approach to Agamemnon is found, and this suggests that Homer's ancient readers were more tolerant of the political values that the king embodied than their modern counterparts are. Or perhaps this tolerance is the result of the pervasiveness of Homeric epic in Greek culture. This ensured an everlasting place for Homer's Agamemnon, who stood out as the supreme example of a Greek commander in the field. Because Homer's poems were both the object of conscious references by ancient authors and the material that unconsciously informed their values, we find ourselves in something of a hermeneutic circle when it comes to analysing the reception of Homeric epic.

One thing remains clear: Homer's Agamemnon inspired continuous respect all the way from Isocrates to late antiquity. As leader of the Greek armies during the Trojan War, he enjoyed almost complete immunity from reproach, for it was

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46 On the didactic ideology of Homer's ancient scholiasts, see Sluiter (1999) 176–179. Sluiter's (1998) account of the 'principle of charity' endorsed by ancient commentators, the 'assumption that the source was presumably right' (15), can be more easily verified with sources dealing with technical subjects (where the author's point of view is not filtered through fictional characters) than with poetic texts (and literary texts in general).

47 See Plu. *Quomod. adul.* 25D and Hunter (2009) 190–194.

understood that he had to manage a critically important military expedition—the ten-year siege of Troy—and that this called for special measures, like the risky test of the troops and the brutal treatment of the priest Chryses. It is uncertain whether the principles of political authority that the commentators put forward in order to justify Agamemnon reflect the genuine political ideals of these different generations of scholars. However, it is very likely that Agamemnon's role in the *Iliad* helped shape theoretical reflection on the duties of a military commander campaigning in foreign lands. This is certainly the case in the passage from Aristotle's *Politics* examined earlier. Isocrates was similarly impressed, and no doubt influenced, by the epic, prototypical model of statesmanship provided by the first Panhellenic leader.

Of course, this does not mean that Agamemnon was the sole, or even the most privileged, example of political leadership available to Homer's audiences. It is striking that a political thinker like Polybius completely ignores him and makes Odysseus the πραγματικός and ἡγημονικός king *par excellence*,[48] and that a conqueror with imperialistic ambitions like Alexander the Great, a fervent reader of the *Iliad*, preferred to identify himself with Achilles rather than with Homer's supreme military commander.[49] The latter's heritage had to be defended when attacked, but in contexts where one needed positive models, it may have seemed advisable to choose less controversial figures to illustrate what political leadership *should* be in an ideal world. In a word, Agamemnon represented a borderline case showing what rulers are required to do—and what they have the right to do—in those extreme situations that the most enlightened leaders strive not to find themselves in too often.[50]

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48 See Plb. 9.16.1, 12.27.10. On Polybius' view of Odysseus' travels, see Gerolemou in this volume.

49 On Alexander's emulation of Achilles, see Edmunds (1971) 372–374, with references.

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Educating Kings through Travel: The Wanderings of Odysseus as a Mental Model in Polybius' *Histories*

Maria Gerolemou

This paper delves into the critical role of spatial orientation in the cognitive development of a ruler and analyses the manipulation of spatial knowledge as an instrument of imperialism and expansion. This theme is first expressed in the *Odyssey*, particularly in the hardships Odysseus encounters in his wanderings, and further developed in Herodotus' transformation of the pattern of the wandering king into the motif of the traveling sage. In the Hellenistic period, and especially in Polybius' *Histories*, the Odyssean wanderings return, albeit transformed under Herodotean influence, in the context of the historian's concern with the proper training of commanders.[1] Arguably, the use of the Odyssean wanderings as a motif in discourses on historical accuracy and good rule in this era was influenced by the contemporary discussion on the veracity of Homeric geography.[2] The process of strengthening the status of geography as a science based on systematic calculations also plays a role in such discourses.[3] At the same time, there was an increasing interest in the person of Odysseus and his ability to survive and gain knowledge through the changes of fortune, especially within the Stoic movement in the early centuries of the Roman Empire.[4]

The use of the motif of Odysseus' wanderings as a way to represent the ruler's need for training in spatial understanding and to express historiographical concerns entails two different ways of approaching physical space. On the

1 On Herodotus' Odyssean persona, see Strasburger (1972) 40–41, Montiglio (2005) ch. 6, Marincola (2007) esp. 13–15. Generally on the Homeric qualities of Herodotus, see Marincola (1997) 63–64, 67; Boedeker (2000) 103–106 and (2002).

2 See Eratosthenes' dismissal of the reality of Homeric geography and Strabo's defence of Homer's geographical knowledge against Eratosthenes, e.g. in Str. 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.3.4, 1.4.3; on Strabo and Homer, see Kim (2007) and (2010) 47–84. On Polybius' criticism of Eratosthenes' denial of Homer's excellence, see Plb. 34.4 (also in Str. 2.4.1–2); see Walbank (1957–1979) vol. 3: 567, 577–578, 584–587. On Polybius' geographical concerns in general, see Walbank (2002), Pédech (1964) 515–597, Clarke (1999) 77–128, Janni (2003), Prontera (2005), Maier (2011), Rood (2012) 179–197.

3 See Gehrke (1998), Geus (2005), Engels (2013) on imperial times (Strabo) in particular.

4 See Dougherty (2001) 139, Montiglio (2011) 67. Due to space limitations, this article cannot expand in this direction.

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one hand, Odysseus' wanderings ignore the possibility of traveling based on a prepared abstract symbolic medium such as maps.[5] Maps could provide knowledge without effort, but when designed and used without serious endeavour, they could lead to false conclusions.[6] Conversely, wanderings without topographical knowledge require an active engagement on the part of the vagabond in the mode of his travel, i.e. he needs to make an effort to acquire knowledge of space to survive his wanderings.[7] As the destinations of such wanderings are undefined, they suggest spatial and temporal expansion, in contrast to the narrow perspective of a scheduled journey. Unstructured wanderings can include unexpected delaying factors which can be human, physical, or metaphysical. In other words: as multidimensional traveling acts, wanderings can produce accurate geographical information about various settlements as well as appeal to the personal engagement of the traveler, who is forced to readjust his experience to a constantly changing environment, both physical and metaphysical, in order to survive.

The static pictorial representation of the *oecumene* and the artificial and therefore restraining character of the maps circulating during the Hellenistic era stand in contrast to the use of the Odyssean wanderings by Polybius. This contrast, as far as we can deduce from the fragmentary nature of his work, points to Polybius' intention to present the *homo vagans* as the *hegemon*'s and historian's prototype.[8] The widely known motif of the wanderings along with its cultural expectations provides his narrative with evocative and emotive power with regard to rulership and history. However, in order for the Odyssean wanderings (with their fixed goals of returning home and re-establishing hegemony) to function as mental model for the formation and expansion of the ruler's and historian's cognitive map, Polybius must convert the empirical data of this unquantifiable mode of travel, as portrayed in the wanderings and perceptions of an individual wanderer, into scientific facts with a practical application. The toilsome character of the wanderings is translated by Poly-

5 On Greek cartography, see Dilke (1985) 21–38, Harley & Woodward (1987) ch. 8–11; see further Jacob (2000), Geus (2004) on Eratosthenes and Ptolemy in particular, and Brodersen (2012). On thinking through maps in the Roman world, see Brodersen (1995), Talbert (2008) with a bibliographical overview.

6 Herodotus, too, deals with the opposition between cartographic and hodological space: see e.g. Hdt. 4.36, 4.42, 4.45; see Romm (1992) 32–41, Rood (2012) 131–134 especially regarding the Aristagoras' episode in 5.49; on this, see further Purves (2010) 111, 119, 132–138.

7 For the distinction between traveling and wandering, see esp. Montiglio (2005).

8 See recently Flatt (2017) on the Odyssean theme in Polybius as a historiographical model connected to περίπλους narratives.

bius into an engaged traveling action. In place of the gods as agents of the unpredictable journey, *tyche* is employed as accompanying the trip: fateful encounters would bring wisdom to the ruler. In Polybius' history, the knowledge Odysseus acquired of different people and cities is translated into awareness of the physical environment and of navigational skills; the much-traveled ruler is able to construct reliable predictions and make military choices based on his αὐτοψία, his eyewitness experience.[9] Thus, in order to acquire knowledge about the surroundings of cities to be conquered, the ruler should actively engage in the learning process of traveling, as toilsome as this could be. In the end, a passive traveler's knowledge, whether he be a ruler or a historian, is less accurate and more rudimentary than that of an active traveler. In Polybius' work, then, the traveler's status as 'active' or 'passive' constitutes a determining factor of the quality of rulers and historians. Ignorant rulers and historians differ from intelligent historians and rulers in terms of their ability to learn from their encounter with spatial diversity.

How Does Epic Wandering Become Historic Traveling?

In contrast to the tradition represented for example by the Epic Cycle, where Odysseus is portrayed as a reluctant traveler who even uses δόλος ('guile') in order to avoid traveling away from home to Troy,[10] the Homeric epics and the *Odyssey* in particular largely ignore Odysseus' reluctance.[11] Instead, the importance of the journey for the preparation of the ruler is underlined and established as a vital component of his hegemony.[12] The traveling of the ruler in the *Odyssey*, especially when juxtaposed with the *ex negativo* example of Penelope's suitors who stay in Ithaca as uninvited guests and merely squander Odysseus' wealth,[13] seems to function as a means for him to obtain prestige and

9 On spatial cognition, see Montello (2015) and Montello, Grossner, Janelle (2014) 3–29; on ancient *Raumverfassung*, see Brodersen (1995), Geus & Thiering (2012).

10 See Procl. *Chr.* 119–120: Odysseus, reluctant to join the expedition to Troy, pretends to be mad by sowing his fields with salt.

11 According to Telemachus, Odysseus traveled before the Trojan War, too: see *Od.* 1.176–177, 19.315–316, 10.38–39; see Stanford (1954) 86–87, Hartog (2001) 15, Montiglio (2005) 52, and Marincola (2007) 3 n. 6.

12 Even if Odysseus' reluctance is mentioned already in the *Odyssey* (e.g. in 15.343 and 24.118–119).

13 See e.g. *Od.* 14.91–92: […] ἀλλὰ ἕκηλοι κτήματα δαρδάπτουσιν ὑπέρβιον, οὐδ' ἔπι φειδώ, 'but at their ease they waste our property insolently, and there is no sparing' (all translations of the *Odyssey* are taken from Murray, rev. Dimock 1995); cf. further 19.293–295.

political power. It enables the ruler to accumulate goods, to build relationships with third parties via a hosting-network, to gain fame, and to gain knowledge based on eyewitness experience.[14] Moreover, this last attainment is connected not only with the act of traveling according to a fixed itinerary, but more importantly with unplanned wandering, due to its greater temporal duration and spatial scope.

For example, Telemachus, seeking information about his father, visits Nestor in the hope that the latter has seen or heard something from a wanderer (πλαζομένου, *Od.* 3.95). But Nestor, who arrived at Pylos directly from Troy (*Od.* 3.165–166, 176–179, 182–183), is unable to provide first-hand information: he has learned nothing from his journey. Instead, he offers Telemachus the information he gathered from others who traveled, probably for much longer than him (*Od.* 3.184–187). Contrary to Nestor, Menelaus wandered much (4.81–89) and saw many cities; he learned the counsel and the mind of many warriors (4.267–268),[15] and is willing to narrate his experiences to Telemachus, although he does not have any knowledge about Odysseus from his own experience but only through Proteus, who told him that Odysseus is being held on Calypso's island (4.555–560).[16]

While Odysseus' journey is often conducted under guidance (e.g. Circe's guidance: *Od.* 10.488–515, 12.21–141), his movement, like that of Menelaus at *Odyssey* 4.469, is random, as unfortunate winds change his direction constantly as a result of the capricious attitude of the epic gods towards him (cf. e.g. *Od.* 5. 262–296). The state of the geographically lost Odysseus clearly disrupts the sense of security that the epic ruler should traditionally provide to his people.[17] Yet, at the same time this state ultimately makes Odysseus into the one who gained knowledge through his travels, since 'he saw the cities of many men and learned their mind' (πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω, *Od.* 1.3). Odysseus in his guise of a beggar tries to exploit the knowledge that the others assume that he may have from his wandering and claims to have infor-

14 Accumulate goods: see e.g. *Od.* 1.179–185, 1.307–313, 4.90–91, 8.390–397, 15.80–85; build relationships: *Od.* 2.325–327, 9.127–129; gain fame: *Od.* 1.343–344, 3.75–78, 13.422–423 (on Telemachus); see also Olson (1995) 1–23. On Telemachus' journey and its effects, see Scott (1918) and Millar & Carmichael (1954).

15 On Menelaus' wanderings, see Str. 1.2.32.

16 See Hartog (2001) 17, Montiglio (2005) 123–128, Marincola (2007) 3–6.

17 Odysseus has lost his men and ships during his wanderings and killed the best of men on his return to Ithaca (*Od.* 12.226–231, 15.10–13; cf. the speech of Eupeithes in 24.426–429). See Cairns (2015). The journey may lead to the reorganization of the kingdom as the throne is left unprotected (*Od.* 2.363–370, 3.301–305, 3.313–316, 4.90–93, 15.10–12).

mation about the fate of Odysseus in order to approach Eumaeus and Penelope (*Od.* 14.192–400, 19.165–235). Moreover, he is ready to regain his throne precisely through this experience.[18] Indeed, in order to win back his property, Odysseus relies on this acquired knowledge which enables him to learn the minds of his household's residents and to test them out patiently, thus retracing his alliances.[19] More importantly, during his wanderings Odysseus has been confronted with various environments, physical and cultural, in which he was forced to take many decisions which, *inter alia*, trained his self-constraint.[20] For instance, in *Odyssey* 12.279–287 Odysseus does not want to drop anchor off the island of Thrinacia, despite the hunger and fatigue of his comrades, aware as he is of the risks of the enterprise. Investigating people in order to learn their habits, as on the Cyclops' island (*Od.* 9.172–176),[21] developing skills such as shipbuilding (*Od.* 5.243–261),[22] and taking crucial decisions and giving instructions (*Od.* 12.208–225, 22.411–445) constitute only some of the numerous examples in the *Odyssey* that illustrate the cognitive value of the epic king's wanderings.

Odysseus' nostalgia for his homeland features as the strongest driving force behind his endless wanderings, and leaves him little room to appreciate his experiences (cf. his stay at Calypso's). Yet, this does not drive him to neglect his responsibility for personal development but rather elicits an unrelenting zeal to survive in every environment. The type of the 'wandering king' seems to contribute to the discussion on the characteristics of good rule as developed in the *Iliad*, which featured the dispute between a traditional hegemony based on descent from Zeus (i.e. on heredity: see *Il.* 2.203–206), and a new kind of hegemony supported by other qualities, such as wealth (although Agamemnon in *Il.* 1.281 is φέρτερος, better, because he rules over more people, rather than being wealthier), strength, alliances, eloquence, and good counsel.[23] The wandering-motif ultimately provides an answer, not to the question of who *is* best among the kings, but who can *become* more skilled,[24] since the motif

18 He is now, as Dougherty (2001: 162–176) argues, a kind of colonial founder.

19 See e.g. *Od.* 13.335–338 (about testing his wife), 19.501 (εὖ νυ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ φράσομαι καὶ εἴσομ' ἑκάστην, 'I myself will mark them well, and come to know each one'); see Austin (1975) 200–238, Marincola (2007) 2.

20 See Stanford (1954) 33–35.

21 Cf. *Od.* 8.572–576.

22 Cf. also Odysseus as a smith in *Od.* 9.391–394.

23 On the presuppositions of kingship in the epics, see Desmond (2011) 5 and Cairns (2015). On Homeric kingship in general, see Nilsson (1952), Deger (1970).

24 On the skilled Odysseus, see Purves (2010) 16–17.

of the wandering king promotes the idea of adaptability as a virtue of special importance for the leaders of the geometric and colonization period.[25]

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In Herodotus' *Histories* the triptych wandering, knowledge, and good rule is abandoned.[26] The Herodotean deviation from the Homeric relationship between travel, kingship, and knowledge reveals Herodotus' intention to degrade kingship. He associates spatial expansion with imperialism and tyranny: the unknown world that cannot be mapped intrigues tyrants.[27] Hence, in Herodotus the epic king who gains authority and knowledge through his wanderings gives way to the traveling sage or historian who desires to discover the world beyond the known horizons. In addition, in historiography, unlike epic, the accidental or counterintuitive element of traveling is confined to the human realm only. While epic wanderings are directed by the gods and run the risk of turning into endless random wanderings,[28] in Herodotus they are transformed into effortful, deliberate travels in search of knowledge—common among historians—where knowledge is an end in itself.[29] We may think of the travels of sages like Solon (Hdt. 1.29, 30) and Anacharsis (4.77). And of course Herodotus himself features in his own works as a traveling *histor*, when he expresses the historical necessity of traveling in order to interrogate people and gather knowledge (2.43–44).[30] It is not until Xenophon that geographical knowledge is again connected with a cognitive value for kingship and that hegemonical authority is once more established through the use, according to Rood (2012: 178), of a 'geographical argument'.[31]

25 Colonial movement of course involves confrontation with various unknown environments.

26 For the journey of the sage (θεωρία), see Koller (1958), Rausch (1982), Rutherford (1995). For θεωρία in Herodotus, see Montiglio (2000).

27 See e.g. Hdt. 4.126. See Rood (2012) 124–135, 168–169, 172–178, who discusses the political implication of cartography in Herodotus. See also Purves (2010) 144.

28 See *Od.* 1.239–241, 2.174–176, 11.164–167.

29 On effort as part of gaining knowledge, see Marincola (1997) 148–158 and (2007) 20–34.

30 On Herodotus acting like a σοφός, see R. Fowler (1996) 86–87, Thomas (2000) 262–263, Węcowski (2004) 157. For Solon as an alter ego of Herodotus, see Montiglio (2000) 89, Montiglio (2005) 134–136, Marincola (2007) 15.

31 See also Rood (2012) 168–169, 172, 175–176. Cf. e.g. Xenophon's praise for the Athenian general Iphicrates who went out himself in order to examine the geographically most advantageous spot for military action (6.1.33, 6.2.32, 39). See also Dan (2012: 59) on X. *An.* 2.4.6 and 2.5.9.

In the Hellenistic period the disappearance of borders due to the expansion by Alexander to the East and by Rome to the West had proved the world to be traversable.[32] As a result, the necessity of spatial orientation as an essential parameter of good rule grew more important, while the development of geography as science could endorse a ruler's potential. Such interactions between ruler ideals and geographical knowledge find expression in tactical skills which guarantee the flexibility that the ruler needs to transcend the boundaries he encounters in the vast geographic space of the Hellenistic world.[33] The scientific and geographical apparatus central to the consolidation of rule in Hellenistic times could be acquired in two different ways: either the ruler engages in strenuous traveling, which until this moment had been celebrated as the most reliable option in terms of its results, or, by contrast, he tries to achieve knowledge through maps and handbooks that promise world-knowledge in the leisure and safety of the confined space of a library. As far as the second option is concerned, in the proem of Pseudo-Scymnus' *Ad Nicomedem regem*, a didactic poem of the late Hellenistic period, the author instructs the young prince Nicomedes in the art of kingship.[34] His teaching involves a summary presentation of the known parts of the world and a detailed presentation of the unknown parts, concerning their location and people, although only within the compass of a few verses. The prince would not only enjoy reading this information, but he would also gain a considerable amount of knowledge, not just about foreign life, but also about the cities and laws of all nations—and that without taking upon himself the wanderings of Odysseus, but staying in the safety of his home.[35] Likewise, in later times Diodorus, favouring bookish knowledge, disregards the moral value of Odysseus' sufferings. Although he describes Odysseus as a man of suffering and hence as the most experienced man, also in terms of geographical knowledge,[36] he argues that Odysseus merely suffered to the benefit of the students of history, who now do not have to experience sufferings themselves in order to gain knowledge; they can simply read about his adventures (1.1.1–2).

The other option, that is to say, to engage in 'real travel' as a ruler to master space and gain experience and wisdom by connecting traveling with toil, harks back to the Odyssean way of viewing space through toilsome wandering as the

32 This idea is for instance expressed in Plb. 3.58–59.
33 See Walbank (2002) 45–47, Ma (2003) 183, 193.
34 The second option also occurs in Lyc. *Alex*. 1242–1245.
35 See Korenjak (2003) 13–19 and Hunter (2006).
36 Marincola (2007) 26–28.

only mode to grasp ἐμφαντικῶς, 'intensely', the great expanses of the Roman Empire (cf. Plb. 12.27.10).

Polybius' Odyssean Wanderings

Contrary to a passive approach to space based on sterile bookish knowledge or a cartographic view of space marking out itineraries without any human, thus, unpredictable perspective, Odysseus' wanderings, a product of an indefinite period of traveling and as such especially suitable to symbolize the expansion of space in the early Roman Empire in particular,[37] function as a model for Polybius' insistence on physical interaction with topographies in which historical events take place. In 3.36–38 Polybius, describing the acts of Hannibal, decides not only to name the cities involved but also to refer to them in detail,[38] although he usually does not name unknown lands, as it would be difficult for the reader to recall them; they do not possess cognitive value.[39] He thus offers the reader a world map on which he describes the division of the three continents and their place under the heavens following the old Ionian division of the earth.[40] He does so in order for the readers who are ignorant of the localities described to gain a sense of space despite the fact that all directions are relative to the position of the observer.[41] Nevertheless, though Polybius himself at times

37 See Plb. 1.1.5, 1.2, 3.59.3–4, 4.40.2. See Clarke (1999) 78, 118–120, 121 and Rood (2012) 179: 'Polybius, like Thucydides, begins his work by using extension in space as a criterion for the greatness of his subject.' Cf. 194: 'Like Herodotus, Polybius brings out the dynamics of imperial expansion while also historicizing the spatial perceptions of the imperial power.' See further Leigh (2013) 128–129.

38 See esp. Plb. 3.36.1–3, 3.38.4; cf. 1.79.6–7.

39 Plb. 3.36; cf. 1.41.6 and 5.21.4. See Rood (2012) 181: 'Polybius was alert to the danger that excessive geographical information could interrupt the narrative.'

40 Polybius ignores Eratosthenes' new scientific data: see Walbank (1957–1979) vol. 1: 368.

41 Plb. 3.38.4: Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ τελέως ἀνυπότακτον εἶναι τοῖς ἀπείροις τῶν τόπων τὴν διήγησιν, ἀλλὰ κατά γε τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαφορὰς συνεπιβάλλειν καὶ φέρειν ἐπί (τι) τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ λεγόμενον, τεκμαιρομένους ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος. 'I have said so much in order that my narrative should not be without something to range itself under in the minds of those who are ignorant of the localities, but that they should have some notion at least of the main geographical distinctions, with which they can connect in thought and to which they can refer my statements, calculating the position of places from the quarter of the heaven under which they lie.' The text of Polybius' *Histories* follows the edition by Dindorf & Büttner-Wobst (1985). All translations of Polybius' *Histories* are from Paton (2010).

overloads his reader with geographical details,[42] it seems that in general he prefers to offer him transparent and adequate information in order to enable the recognition of unknown space through known space-paradigms, i.e. to help him create a mental map where he can store knowledge of places and routes ready to use in the future, whenever needed.[43] More precisely, according to Polybius:

> ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκείους μεταφερομένων καιροὺς ἀφορμαὶ γίνονται καὶ προλήψεις εἰς τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν εὐλαβηθῆναι, ποτὲ δὲ μιμούμενον τὰ προγεγονότα θαρραλεώτερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις […].
>
> PLB. 12.25b.3

> It is the mental transference of similar circumstances to our own times that gives us the means of forming presentiments of what is about to happen, and enables us at certain times to take precautions and at others by reproducing former conditions to face with more confidence the difficulties that menace us.[44]

Thus he makes clear that personal inquiry into and engagement with a specific past event is absolutely necessary for a reader to attain a satisfactory educational effect. The reader as a knowing subject, however, differs from the ruler or the historian, whose actions cannot be restricted to *memory*, i.e. to activating past patterns. Polybius is, obviously, influenced by the Stoic notion of memory which differentiates between the ability to remember and the act of remembering and which underlines the ability of memory to form 'preconceptions' (προλήψεις), conceptions, and thus knowledge.[45]

Nevertheless, when Polybius comes to speak about the preconditions of good rule and history, he states that understanding of the events should result from 'inquiry' (ἱστορία), from the routine 'engagement' (τριβή) with events, and from systematically acquired concrete experience.[46] In 9.14.4–5 he is more precise: here, αὐτουργία, i.e. the engagement of the ruler with the unfolding events,

42 See Plb. 34.1.5; however, see Walbank (2002) 41 and Clarke (1999) 104, 112: the 34th book with the most geographical indications is in a fragmentary condition and is preserved by Strabo and others. On measurements regarding cities, see e.g. Plb. 4.65.3, 10.11.4.

43 See Walbank (2002) 40, Clarke (1999) 111–112, Prontera (2005), Maier (2011) 48, 50, 54–55, Rood (2012) 180–182.

44 Cf. Plb. 1.1.2, 1.2, 1.35.7, 3.36.4, 5.21.

45 On Stoic memory, see Ierodiakonou (2007).

46 Walbank (1957–1979) vol. 2: 139.

and ἱστορία constitute τριβή and as such differ from practical skills, i.e. ἐμπειρία, gained e.g. from astrology and geometry. In 11.8.1–3 he argues again that generals should study history and acquire knowledge through actual practice and by following the systematic instructions of experts. Thus, in matters of embedded knowledge, i.e. of ἱστορία and ἐμπειρία, as requirements for generalship, Polybius argues that if a ruler studies events in advance this could give him military advantages.[47] Indeed, a military leader, according to Polybius, must be fully informed about circumstances and geographical locations; knowledge must be the aim of the individual commander's effort, of his αὐτουργία, τριβή, and αὐτοπάθεια.[48] The emphasis on bodily interaction with the circumstances and locations clearly indicates Polybius' intention to underscore the importance of an embodied approach to knowledge for the historian and ruler.[49] To present an example from practice: Hannibal, as Polybius argues (3.48.4), never took his army to regions without making careful inquiries beforehand. This illustrates his claim that only well-informed rulers can perceive spaces correctly. He emphatically states:

> πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἂν τίς φανείη στρατηγὸς ἀλογιστότερος Ἀννίβου, τίς καὶ σκαιότερος ἡγεμών, ὃς τοσούτων ἡγούμενος δυνάμεων καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐλπίδας ἔχων ἐν τούτοις τοῦ κατορθώσειν τοῖς ὅλοις, οὔτε τὰς ὁδοὺς οὔτε τόπους, ὡς οὗτοί φασιν, οὔτε ποῦ πορεύεται τὸ παράπαν οὔτε πρὸς τίνας ἐγίνωσκε, τὸ δὲ πέρας, οὐδ' εἰ καθόλου [τοὐναντίον] δυνατοῖς ἐπιβάλλεται πράγμασιν;
>
> PLB. 3.48.1–4
>
> For in the first place, can we imagine a more imprudent general or a more incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been, if with so large an army under his command and all his hopes of ultimate success resting on it, he did not know the roads and the country, as these writers say, and had absolutely no idea where he was marching or against whom, or in fact if his enterprise were feasible or not?

47 Plb. 9.14.1–5, esp. 9.14.1: Τῶν δὲ προειρημένων τὰ μὲν ἐκ τριβῆς, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἱστορίας, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν μεθοδικὴν θεωρεῖται [...], 'these things are learned either by routine or inquiry or by experience systematically acquired'. Cf. 9.12–16, esp. 9.12.4: καὶ μὴν διότι παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων ἀγνοίας ἢ ῥᾳθυμίας ἐπιτελεῖται τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, οὐδεὶς (ἂν) τοῦτ' ἀπορήσειε, 'nor can anyone doubt that most of the failures are due either to error or to negligence on the part of the commander'. See Poiss (2012) 149–150.

48 Walbank (2002) 31–52, Clarke (1999) 86, 100–101, Leigh (2013) 129.

49 For the concept of history as a bodily experience, cf. e.g. Plb. 1.3.3–4, 1.4.7, 12.28.6. On this point, see Clarke (1999) 93, 128 and Wiater (2017).

Hannibal's knowledge of local topography helps him succeed in ventures thought to be impossible, thus surprising his unsuspecting enemies.[50] Again, in the third book of his *Histories*, when discussing Hannibal's march through the Alps, the historian argues that 'because people do not know the position of the Alps and ignore the fact that there are people living there, they come to the conclusion that Hannibal was not lost there because some hero appeared and showed him the way'.[51] In this case, according to Polybius, various other historians try to justify the success of the ruler by referring to divine providence; they simply cannot come to terms with the idea that Hannibal conducted his plans with rational sense.[52]

Eventually, the ways that rulers travel affect their cognitive maps, resulting in different degrees of knowledge of destinations and political opportunities. Strabo, arguing for the benefits of spatial knowledge and traveling in accordance with the paradigm of Odysseus, states, following Polybius, that the ruler who is equipped with spatial knowledge is able to manage his affairs more effectively, since he knows the topography of the military destination and foresees how he could cope with its peculiarities, knowledgeable as he is of pitching a camp in a region, setting an ambush, or directing a march (1.1.16–18). These same premises are found in Polybius' concept of political history:

> τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας ὑπαρχούσης τριμεροῦς, τῶν δὲ μερῶν αὐτῆς ἑνὸς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν παράθεσιν τῆς ἐκ τούτων ὕλης, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν θέαν τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν τόπων περί τε ποταμῶν καὶ λιμένων καὶ καθόλου τῶν κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἰδιωμάτων καὶ διαστημάτων, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς [...].
>
> PLB. 12.25e

50 Cf. Plb. 3.49.2, 3.61.5–6, 3.71.2–3, 5.7.2, 7.15.2. See Davidson (1991) 12.

51 Plb. 3.48.7: καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐδηλώσαμεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων φῦλον κατ' αὐτὰς οἰκεῖν συμβαίνει τὰς Ἄλπεις, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες ἕκαστα τῶν εἰρημένων ἥρω τινά φασιν ἐπιφανέντα συνυποδεῖξαι τὰς ὁδοὺς αὐτοῖς.

52 See esp. Plb. 3.48.10–11: Ἀννίβας γε μὴν οὐχ ὡς οὗτοι γράφουσιν, λίαν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πραγματικῶς ἐχρῆτο ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς. καὶ γὰρ τὴν τῆς χώρας ἀρετήν, εἰς ἣν ἐπεβάλετο καθιέναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄχλων ἀλλοτριότητα πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐξητάκει σαφῶς, εἴς τε τὰς μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας ὁδηγοῖς καὶ καθηγεμόσιν ἐγχωρίοις ἐχρῆτο τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων μέλλουσι κοινωνεῖν. 'Of course Hannibal did not act as these writers describe, but conducted his plans with sound practical sense. He had ascertained by careful inquiry the richness of the country into which he proposed to descend and the aversion of the people to the Romans, and for the difficulties of the route he employed as guides and pioneers natives of the country, who were to take part in his adventure.' Cf. further 3.50.3, 3.51.2, 10.52.7, 10.54.8. In 3.48.5, however, he criticizes former reports discussing the δυσχωρία, the difficulty of the road.

> In the same fashion political history too consists of three parts, the first being the industrious study of memoirs and a comparison of their contents, the second the survey of cities, places, rivers, harbors, and in general all the peculiar features of land and sea and the distances of one place from another, and the third being political activity.

Polybius clearly argues that political history must consist of three parts.[53] However, different levels of access to these types of information, i.e. passive or active engagement with the material, produce history of diverse quality.[54] Polybius is interested in a history of the protagonists' ἔργα ('deeds') and λόγοι ('words') written through the direct involvement of the historian who is an agent himself, and not produced as a compilation from various sources found in books (12.25, 12.27).

Hence, in dealing with Odysseus' wanderings, Polybius underlines the practical use of traveling in terms of the reader's education, the statesman's training, and the historian's qualities. On the one hand, Odysseus' wanderings serve as a pattern familiar to the readers of history, i.e. as activating visual mnemonics and information processing without which the narrative runs the risk of becoming vague and meaningless. On the other hand, they function as a model for the ruler and historian, in promoting the search for accurate knowledge that results from autopsy and interaction with war events. Odysseus, whom Polybius recognizes as τὸν ἡγεμονικώτατον ἄνδρα ('the most capable of commanders', 9.16.1), and who in the *Odyssey* proved to be both a man of words and action (see e.g. *Od.* 16.240–243), is also recognized as the prototype of a πραγματικός man (12.27.10–11).[55] This is why Polybius does not discuss the wanderings of Odysseus in terms of their geographical truth; he treats them not as a source of precise geographical knowledge, nor as the opposite, i.e. fiction (34.2.3–4). More precisely, in an attempt to highlight the qualities a man of action should possess, Polybius cites *Odyssey* 1.1–3:

> ἐκεῖνος γὰρ βουλόμενος ὑποδεικνύειν ἡμῖν οἷον δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν πραγματικὸν εἶναι, προθέμενος τὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρόσωπον λέγει πως οὕτως·
> ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα
> πολλὰ πλάγχθη,
> καὶ προβὰς

53 Cf. Plb. 9.13.6. See Marincola (1997) 72–75 and (2007), Clarke (1999) 79.

54 Marincola (1997) 136, 145, Clarke (2001) 86–87, 100, 105.

55 Cf. on *polypragmosyne* furnishing practical experience, Clarke (1999) 100, Leigh (2013) 97–103. See further Marincola (1997) 149–150 and (2007) 20–28, Kim (2007) 368–375.

πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,
πολλὰ δ' ὅγ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν
PLB. 12.27.10–11

Wishing to show us what qualities one should possess in order to be a man of action he [sc. Homer] says, putting on the mask of Odysseus:
'The man for wisdom's various arts renowned,
Long exercised in woes, O muse, resound,
Wandering from clime to clime;'
and further on
'Observant strayed,
Their manners noted, and their states surveyed,
On stormy seas unnumbered toils he bore;'

For Polybius, the Odyssean wanderings are paradigmatic in their ability to symbolize expansion of space and time which forces rulers and historians to confront various incomprehensible and unexpected experiences, the causes of which are initially impossible to ascertain, as they seem to be the result of fortune.[56] Philip V or Hannibal knew how to adapt themselves to the mutability of fortune in order to face the new reality of a defeat or victory with prudence.[57] Despite the fact that prior knowledge saved the Carthaginians entering the Alps from destruction (3.47.9), there is always a chance that a well figured-out plan fails (3.50.4, 3.53.1). In the face of an unexpected turn of events a ruler must decide upon a course of action, activating his intellect and effort in dealing with the new situation instantaneously. In the tenth book of his *Histories*, Polybius gives another example of a successful ruler observing topographies. Before attacking New Carthage, Scipio makes sure to collect information about its topographical position (10.8, 34.15). Polybius is the only one to ascribe his triumph to this foresight; all other historians refer to the intervention of divine providence, ignoring even the letter sent by Scipio to Philip V of Macedonia explaining his calculations before the invasion (10.9.3).

56 See e.g. Plb. 10.33, 10.37.4, 11.4.4, 11.4.7, 11.19.6, 15.10.5, 18.33.7, 24.9.1–2; on the notion of *tyche* in Polybius, see W.W. Fowler (1903), Shorey (1921), Hau (2011).

57 Plb. 18.33.7: καὶ τὰς ἐν ταύτῃ πράξεις μετ' ἀποδείξεως ἐξηγησάμεθα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρὴ καὶ τὴν μετάνοιαν αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι καὶ τὴν εὐστοχίαν, καθ' ἣν μεταθέμενος τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἐλαττώμασιν εὐλογιστότατα δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς καθ' αὐτὸν καιροῖς. '[S]o must I in the same manner point out his new change of mind and the ability with which, adapting himself to the reverses of fortune, he faced the situation in which he found himself with exceptional prudence.'

So how does all this reflect on the figure of the historian? The fact that Odysseus survives his wanderings, a hard exercise of body and mind, qualifies him to narrate his story to various audiences.[58] Likewise, in an effort to authenticate his own narration, Polybius does not fail to mention that he himself, like Hannibal, crossed the Alps,[59] implicitly comparing his own value as a historian with that of Hannibal as a ruler.[60] Polybius himself received a fleet from Scipio towards the end of the third Punic War, in order to reconnoitre the coastline of the region westward as far as Mount Atlas and beyond.

But there were different types of historians. In the twelfth book of his *Histories*, Polybius negatively contrasts the historian Timaeus with Callisthenes, who immortalized Alexander the Great as a man of action, on the grounds that Timaeus glorified Timoleon, a man who 'not only never seems to have achieved anything great, but never even to have attempted to do so, and in his whole life accomplished but one move and that by no means important, considering the greatness of the world (*oecumene*), the move from his country to Syracuse'.[61] Like his hero Timoleon, Timaeus, writing only about Italy and Sicily, cannot be compared with historians of universal world-encompassing histories. On the other hand, Polybius judges that in the case of such universal historians, 'when they attempt to write in detail about cities and places the result must be very similar, many things worthy of mention being omitted and many things not worth speaking of being treated at great length'.[62] Nevertheless, although in 12.27a3 Polybius admits that Timaeus has a talent for detailed research and a competence based on inquiry, he still judges him to be taking the lesser road by pursuing a type of inquiry that does not require much labour (12.27). Similarly, according to Polybius, historians like Zenon demonstrate more interest in the elegance of their style, thus underlining the ἀπειρία ('inexperience') of the writer and exacerbating that of their readers (16.17). A refined style must not be the ἡγεμονικώτατον, the driving force for a historian (17.9–11). So, to

58 E.g. to Aeolus in *Od.* 10.13–15, to the Phaeacians, and to Circe in *Od.* 12.33–35 (about the underworld). See Burgess (2012) 284.

59 See 3.48.12; cf. 3.4.13, 4.2.2, 10.11.4.

60 Rood (2012) 193, Maier (2012).

61 Plb. 12.23.6: τὸν οὐχ οἷον δόξαντά τι πεπραχέναι μεγαλεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπιβαλόμενον, μίαν δ' ἐν τῷ βίῳ γραμμὴν διανύσαντα, καὶ ταύτην οὐδὲ σπουδαίαν τρόπον τινὰ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς οἰκουμένης, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος εἰς Συρακούσας.

62 Plb. 12.25g.3: ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τόπων ὅταν ἐπιβάλωνται γράφειν τὰ κατὰ μέρος, ὄντες ἀτριβεῖς τῆς τοιαύτης ἐμπειρίας, δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν τὸ παραπλήσιον, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἀξιόλογα παραλείπειν, περὶ πολλῶν δὲ ποιεῖσθαι πολὺν λόγον οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων.

conclude, like the statesman, the historian must have personal contact with places in order to avoid errors,[63] and he must equip the facts he tells with vividness.[64] To produce such vividness and provide an authentic description, ensuring veracity for the reader, he must base his writings on first-hand experience gained through effort, as Homer had shown vividly through the paradigm of Odysseus.[65]

Epilogue

After Alexander's conquests and the opening up of numerous roads and routes under the Roman Empire, travel became important for many men of action, whether commanders or rulers, in preparation of their scientific and/or political activities. The situation is illustrated by Polybius' use of the Odyssean wanderings as a model in his *Histories*. The πολύτλας ('much-enduring') hero of the *Odyssey* serves as a prototype of a cognitive agent and supplements the cartographic, fixed approach of space introduced in the early Roman period. The ideal Polybian commander and historian is thus an educated and skilled man, who gains experience, here defined as geographic awareness, through both his actions and his studies.

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63 Clarke (2001) 92.

64 See Plb. 12.25g–h. See Marincola (2007) 23, Kim (2007) 370–371.

65 Plb. 12.27.10: ἔτι δὲ τούτων ἐμφαντικώτερον ὁ ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους, 'Homer has been still more emphatic on this subject than these writers'.

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Some Critical Themes in Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer*

Jeffrey Fish

Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer* is both a work of Homeric scholarship and an example of kingship literature which provides practical advice about ruling. As a monograph of Homeric scholarship, it examines a particular aspect of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, namely Homer's opinion about what makes a good ruler.[1] In the part of the treatise that survives, and presumably in the whole work, Philodemus approves and recommends the Homeric opinions that he introduces and analyses. In this regard, the treatise conforms to the genre of kingship literature which conveys principles of practical advice for a ruler—a *speculum principis*. It was not a stretch for Roman noblemen like Philodemus' friend and dedicatee, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58 BC), to relate their own experience and status to that of kings, whether Homeric or historic, and to draw from Homer's wisdom. Through the guidance of a philosopher like Philodemus (Epicureans believed that only the sage could discourse properly about poetry), they could do so in a philosophically and ethically correct way.[2] Philodemus' approach and method in *On the Good King According to Homer* (hereafter *On the Good King*) has been analysed in detail elsewhere.[3] My purpose here is to present some of the important themes in the treatise. New advances in the reconstruction of the text allow for a fuller presentation of several of these themes.[4]

1 On the treatise as a sub-category of *peri*-literature, cf. De Sanctis (2006) 46.

2 D.L. 10.119.

3 See Asmis (1991).

4 Much can be said in the way of in-depth comparison with other kingship treatises and ancient Homeric scholarship, and I will engage at this level in the commentary (see e.g. Fish [2016]), but here my task is mainly to provide a bare exposition of some important themes in the work. My edition in preparation contains a significant increase of new text over the previous editions. Much of the new text has been recovered from fragments which adhered to the wrong layers when the scroll was unrolled in 1808. The latest complete edition of the text is Dorandi (1982), an English translation of which is found in Asmis (1991) 28–34. Columns 21–31 Dorandi are re-edited in Fish (2002); The last columns of the treatise (cols. 95–98 Fish / 40–43 Dorandi) have been re-edited in Fish (2016). With the help of stichometry and measurements

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Reputation Management

Although we lack roughly the first twenty columns of the treatise, the beginning of what we possess forms part of a lengthy discussion of how the virtuous leader tends to enjoy affection and protection from others, whereas the unvirtuous leader finds himself isolated and friendless. Paris' own brother criticizes him as a 'great misery to his city and all the people, a joy to his enemies, and a shame to yourself'.[5] Helen herself hates him, and expresses the wish that he had perished during his duel with Menelaus.[6] Paris' own people 'would not hide him out of friendship'.[7] In contrast, the Trojans have 'tender love' (φιλοστοργία) for Hector, and Achilles' mistreatment of his body is to them like 'all lowering Ilion had been burning top to bottom in fire'.[8] For an Epicurean, these sentiments found in the *Iliad* would have served as textbook examples of the Epicurean theory of personal relationships and safety, that 'virtue is facultative not just of εὔνοια, but of φιλία'.[9]

Philodemus' analysis of the role of beauty in relation to Homer's heroes underscores the notion that cardinal virtues are not optional for a ruler. A beautiful appearance can be advantageous, and Philodemus as an Epicurean appreciates Homer's calling beautiful kings 'god-like' (θεοειδής), but beauty is of no value apart from having a reputation for being virtuous. Philodemus compares Paris to Demetrius Poliorcetes, venturing to speculate about what Homer would have thought about Demetrius on the basis of what is said about Paris in the *Iliad*:

> φα|νẹρ̣ὸc δ̣' ọὗ̣τός̣ γε κἂṿ μυcα̣|χθεὶ̣c τὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶι̣ κάλλ[ει] θρυ̣πτόμενον Δημήτρ[ι]|ον τὸν Πολιορκητὴν οὐ|χ ὅτι ταῖc πράξεcι χ[α]υνού|μενον, εἴ γε 'τῶι

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of folds of the papyrus which reveal the circumference of the scroll at any given point, I have been able to calculate how long the scroll would have been and thus determine absolute column and line numbers. My numeration of the columns and lines is thus different from Dorandi's. Several new readings appear here for the first time.

5 *Il.* 3.50–51; Col. 21, 23–27 Fish.

6 Philodemus quotes *Il.* 3.48 at col. 22, 36–37 Fish.

7 *Il.* 3.453; Col. 25, 8–10 Fish.

8 *Il.* 22.411–412; Col. 25, 26–41 Fish. All of the citations to the *Iliad* in this paragraph are newly recovered in the treatise, except for *Il.* 22.411–412 in col. 25, 36–40 Fish / col. 5, 18–22 Dorandi.

9 The summary statement is Armstrong's (2011: 113). On the details of the Epicurean view, see Armstrong (2011) 109–116, Fish (2011a).

> Πά̣ριδι' κα|τέγραφεν 'οὐ βοηθήcε[ιν] | κί̣θ̣αριν τ̣ά τε δῶρ' Ἀφρ[ο]|δίτηc τήν τε κόμην τ̣[ό]|τε εἶδοc, ὅτ' ἐγ κονίη`ι´cι μι|γείη', καθάπερ ἐκεί̣νωι cυ̣ν|έβη{ι} ληφθέντι μετὰ τ̣ῆc | ὅληc cτρατιᾶc αἰχμαλώ|τωι.
>
> He [sc. Homer] obviously [*a few words missing*] and would himself have been disgusted with Demetrius Poliorcetes, who not only vainly boasted in his own accomplishments, but also was conceited over his own beauty, if, as in fact he did, he [sc. Homer] wrote that 'the lyre and the gifts of Aphrodite would not help Paris, nor his hair nor his beauty, when he rolls in the dust' [*Il.* 3.54–55], just as in fact happened to Demetrius when he was taken captive with his whole army.[10]

The fact that Paris does not suffer the fate his brother predicts in the narrative space of the *Iliad* does not deter Philodemus. He produces an example of a historical king who underwent a fate like the one Paris was promised, and then continues with a list of figures in Homer who are beautiful but shown to be ineffective or insignificant because of their lack of virtue:

> καὶ τὸν καλὸν Ἄρην̣ | καὶ̣ αὐ̣τῆc ἐρώμενον τῆc | Ἀφ̣[ρο]δίτηc ὑπὸ χωλοῦ τὰ | [δύο cκέ]λ̣η cυνδούμενον, | [καλὸν δ' ὄντ]α̣ τὸν Νειρέα μὲν | [ο]ὕτωc ε[ὐτέλ]ιζε, τὸν δ' Εὐ|ρ̣[ύα]λον ...
>
> And the beautiful Ares, beloved even of Aphrodite herself, bound by one lame in both feet. In the same way he slights Nireus, beautiful though he was, and Euryalus [*a few words missing*].[11]

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10 Col. 92, 9–23 Fish. It is somewhat unusual that Philodemus equates Hector's opinion here with Homer's, i.e. the narrator. He commonly does this with Odysseus and Nestor, but not with other characters. The text of *On the Good King* here and in the following quotation differs at several points from previous editions (the latest of which is found in col. 37 Dorandi). Some of the textual advances in these and the following lines are not my own but were suggested to me by others who will be acknowledged in the published edition of these lines.

11 Col. 92, 23–29 Fish. A lacuna follows the name Euryalus. Nireus is said at *Il.* 2.671–675 to have been the most beautiful of all the Greeks after Achilles, but weak in warfare. Euryalus (former editors had read Eumelus here) is the insolent Phaeacian athlete who is described as being beautiful (*Od.* 8.115–117) but who is rebuked by Odysseus as being stupid (cf. *Od.* 8.166–177). No doubt Philodemus believed this opinion was shared by Homer.

One aspect of maintaining a good reputation pertains to a ruler's being able to enforce justice in the right manner. Perception is crucial. Rather than being an object of fear, a ruler 'needs to be loved with reverence'.[12] Philodemus elaborates upon what his Roman counterparts would have understood as *clementia* and related virtues:

> π̣άλι τ[ὸ] σπουδαῖ̣ο̣ν̣ β̣α̣ς̣ιλεῖ | παραι[νῶ]μεν· αὐς̣τ̣[ηρὸ]ν̣ | μὲν κα̣[ὶ] τ̣ραχύ [τι ἦ̣θος καὶ | πικρὸν ἐχθαίρει̣[ν καὶ] π{α}ραό̣|τητα δι̣ασκεῖν κ[αὶ] ἐπιεί̣|κειαν καὶ τὸ βα[ςιλέ]ως ἥ|μερον καὶ ςυ̣[γ]γν̣[ω]μονι|κόν, ἐφ' ὅςον π̣λ̣εῖςτον, ὡς | φοροῦ̣[ν]τα̣ π[ρ]ὸς εὐςταθῆ μο|ναρχ[ία]ν [καὶ] μὴ δες[ποτικῶι | φόβωι δυνα[ς]τ̣εί[αν.
>
> Departing therefore from such topics, let us again recommend that which is good for a king to possess, to be averse to a harsh, austere, and bitter character, and to practice gentleness, goodness, and a king's mildness and leniency as much as possible.[13]

It is important for Philodemus that the gentleness of a ruler be perceived as being based not upon laxness, but upon a rational decision.[14] Little of this particular part of Philodemus' treatise refers directly to Homer, which may indicate that he thought Homer lacking in models when it comes to the kingly virtue of clemency. While he is convinced that Odysseus acted justly (ἐνδικῶς) when he slew the suitors,[15] he observes that it was not his slaying of the suitors that resulted in his people considering him as a father.[16]

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12 ἀ|γαπᾶςθ̣[αι] μετὰ ςεβαςμο̣ῦ col. 75, 23–24 Fish / col. 20, 18–19 Dorandi. A phrase in col. 25, 22–25 Fish begins: 'for the one thinking by force and fear alone … he can be lord over the multitude … in a satisfactory way'. Plainly the sentence continued with the folly of such intentions.

13 Col. 79, 13–23 Fish (cf. Fish [2002] 194). The text differs only slightly from Dorandi col. 24, 8–18. On this text and Roman *clementia*, cf. S. Braund (2009) 34–36.

14 Col. 80, 15–20 Fish (= Fish [2002] col. 25, 11–16): [ἵ]ν̣α μ̣ὴ δι' ἔκλ̣υ̣ςιν | [ἀλ]λ̣ὰ διὰ κρίςιν φ[α]ίνηται πρᾶ|[ο]ς̣, δ̣[ι]ὰ μὲν τὴν ἠπιότη|⟨τ⟩α φιλῆται, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπί|ταςι̣ν̣, τὴν ὅτε χρή, μὴ κατα|φ̣ρονῆται.

15 Col. 91, 34 Fish / col. 36, 26 Dorandi.

16 If this is the right interpretation of col. 80, 20–23 Fish (= Fish [2002] col. 25, 16–19): θεωρεῖται δὲ τοι|οῦτο[ς] οὐ τῆι τ̣ιμ̣ωρ̣ίαι τῶν | ἐπιβουλῶν ὁ πα̣τ̣ρὸς̣ εὔ̣[νο]ι|αν ἐ[ς]χ̣ηκ̣έναι ῥ̣ηθ̣είς ('Not by his punishment of conspiracies is the one said to have had the good will of a father seen as such'). This sentence may also be a criticism of Cicero's failure to show *clementia* to the Catilinarian conspirators in the year of his consulship. When the legality of Cicero's action was under question during Piso's consulship, Piso had said that he 'had always been merciful' (*se semper misericordem fuisse*, Cic. *Sen.* 17) and he had never liked cruelty (Cic.

A ruler need not try single-handedly to manage his or her reputation. Reputation managers can help, and Homer himself was well aware of this.[17] The sort of people suited to be reputation managers are φιλόλογοι ἄνδρες, 'men who are articulate and learned'. The word φιλόλογοι, an almost certain reading in the papyrus,[18] is wonderfully suited for figures in Homer like Odysseus and Nestor, who speak on Agamemnon's behalf and enjoy his confidence as spokesmen for him, and it is also suited for a person like Philodemus himself, who may be reminding Piso of his services, or (I think less likely) offering them for the first time.[19] In his discussion of this topic, Philodemus also bridges the gap between the heroic past and the late Roman Republic by speculating that Homer would advise both the kings of his poems and rulers who lived in Philodemus' time to have reputation managers. Leaders in his own age (i.e. Philodemus' addressee and people like him) are in need of cultivating a 'beneficial reputation' (ὀνησιφόρος γνῶσις).[20] Philodemus recommends a philosophically approved concern for one's reputation—not the seeking of glory for its own sake, but the cultivating of a reputation that arises from virtue and enhances one's safety.[21] According to Philodemus, both Odysseus and Telemachus were careful to cultivate bards and prophets, in the hopes that they might be faithful spokesmen on their behalf. The newly reconstructed text of this portion of the treatise is a masterpiece of subtle interpretation and one of the highlights of the treatise.[22]

Pis. 14); Cf. Griffin (2001) 88. Cicero's efforts against the Catilinarians earned him the title *pater patriae*, to which Philodemus may be alluding here with irony.

17 The Greek text for this column, with translation and full commentary, can be found in Fish (2016). This paragraph presents some of the conclusions of the commentary on the relevant lines.

18 I owe the supplement to David Armstrong. It requires a slight correction of the text of the pencil drawing of the papyrus, but only a small one, and other alternatives are unpersuasive (e.g. εὔλογοι).

19 On the basis of much less text, Oswyn Murray (1965: 172) had already suggested that in the column Philodemus was offering his own services to Piso.

20 For parallels of the passive use of γνῶσις ('reputation') and full discussion, see Fish (2016) 70.

21 The distinction Philodemus makes may be a useful one for understanding fame in the *Aeneid*, as I hope to show in forthcoming work. Cf. the expedition of Nisus and Euryalus when Nisus says *nam mihi facti / fama sat est* ('for me the fame of the deed is enough', 9.194–195) and Euryalus is *magno laudum percussus amore* ('struck with a great love of praise', 9.197).

22 See col. 96, 29–41 Fish with commentary in Fish (2016).

The Peaceableness of Homer's Good King and the Primacy of Good Counsel

If Homer's heroes sometimes delight in war, Homer himself certainly believes that a good king is no lover of war. 'For the most part', Philodemus asserts, by wise counsel (εὐβουλία) 'affairs are brought to a successful issue'.[23] Homer shows his awareness of this truth by the privileged status Nestor holds in the *Iliad*. Although a frail old man, he is called 'protector of the Achaeans',[24] and Agamemnon asserts that Troy would have already been captured if there were ten men such as Nestor, a 'very venerable old man'.[25] Further, when 'good counsel' and 'battle' are paired, Philodemus observes that often the word 'good counsel' is mentioned first, indicating its priority for Homer.[26] One might say that Troy was ultimately captured 'by Athena' (i.e. understanding the goddess as broadly as intelligence personified),[27] and statements in Homer about Odysseus' intelligence also underscore the superiority of wisdom to Homer.[28]

Homer and his good kings detest strife (ἔρις) as well as war.[29] 'Jealousy must be absent, and the being irritated by anyone's having a share in what they themselves have'.[30] Homer's favourite models of a good king, Nestor and Odysseus, are 'the most sensible (φρονιμώτατοι) of the Greeks' partly because they are free from these vices, and are thus able to cooperate for the benefit of the Achaeans.[31] They are found in Homer trying to reconcile alienated figures.[32]

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23 Col. 87, 17–19 Fish / col. 32, 13–16 Dorandi.

24 οὖρος Ἀχαιῶν, *Il.* 8.80, etc.

25 Philodemus paraphrases *Il.* 2.371–374 in col. 87, 20–27 Fish. 'Very venerable old man' (τρι[γέρον]τι) is not Homeric, but fits the context. The term is common in the Palatine Anthology where it is used to describe Nestor.

26 Col. 88, 14–19 Fish. Philodemus quotes *Il.* 1.258 and 2.273, but there are instances where the words are paired and war is mentioned first (e.g. *Il.* 4.39–40).

27 Col. 87, 32 Fish. Philodemus has Athena here in the dative case (a new reading I owe to Richard Janko).

28 *Il.* 10.247, *Od.* 13.89. Cf. col. 87, 36–41 Fish / col. 32, 32–37 Dorandi.

29 'Friendless, lawless, homeless is the one who loves terrible civil strife' (*Il.* 9.63–64) is a favourite verse of Philodemus' who quotes it also in two other works (*On Piety* col. 95, 22 and *On Anger* col. 44, 22 Indelli). It was frequently quoted in antiquity. For a list of authors, see Dorandi (1982) 175.

30 Col. 84, 23–26 Fish: τὸ | ζηλότυπον [δ'] ἀ̣πεῖναι | δεῖ καὶ βαρ̣[υνό]μ̣ενον εἰ | τινι μέτε̣c̣τ̣[ιν] ὧ̣ν ἔχ[ο]υ̣cιν. Cf. col. 29, 15–17 Dorandi.

31 Col. 84, 30–40 Fish / col. 29, 15–17 Dorandi.

32 Col. 83, 33–38 Fish: καὶ τὸν Νέcτ̣ορα̣ παρειc[ά]|γων cπε[ύδ]οντα λύειν τ̣ὴν | cτά̣c̣ιν κἀ̣[ν τ]οῖ̣c πρὸc Ἀγ[α]μέ|μνονα κἀν̣ ταῖc τῶν πρέc|βεων ἐν[τ]ολαῖc κἀν τῆι | Πα[τρ]όκλου παρακλήcει

Others, whether dependents or equals, will not be so virtuous, and naturally strife will occur. Only fools think that discord between their subordinates is beneficial, since in reality it can destroy households and kingdoms.[33] A good king knows how to respond appropriately to the slanderous competition of his courtiers, who will 'manipulate as if by strings anyone who will give ear to their hostile fictions concocted against one another'.[34] Sometimes the best approach is to simply ignore such slander, as Zeus does to Athena when he quietly dismisses her complaints against Aphrodite at *Iliad* 5.418ff. At other times a harsh rebuke is required, as the one Zeus delivers to Ares at 5.888–891.[35]

Homer and the Development of a Good King

Philodemus discusses different kinds of character development in his treatise. One is the maturing of a prince. He suggests that Homer makes important plot choices in the *Odyssey* for the purpose of occasioning the development of Telemachus. Since Telemachus has grown up in a dysfunctional kingdom, he 'must be one who has neither seen nor heard of many things and has had no experience of free speech with equals, and often ill-mannered' (καὶ ἀ|θέατο[ν] ἀ̣νάγκη καὶ ἀνιc|τό̣ρητον εἶναι πολλῶν | καὶ π̣αρρηcίαc ἄ̣πειρον ἰ|cηγόρου̣, πολλάκιc δ̣ὲ̣ κ̣[αὶ] ἀ̣|παίδευτ̣ον).[36] He needs to go to Sparta and Pylos 'where he was to have dealings with such great people' (ὅπου τ̣[η]λ̣ικο̣[ύ]τ̣ο̣ιc ἔμε`λ´λε | c̣υ[μ]με̣ί̣ξε[ι]ν).[37] Philodemus also apparently discusses the moral development of Odysseus. He quotes *Odyssey* 9.275–276, in which Polyphemus claims that the Cyclopes are superior to Zeus, though it is apparently not the arrogance

('And introducing Nestor as eager to resolve discord in his words to Agamemnon, and in the instructions for the emissaries, and in the calling aside and appealing to Patroclus'). In this context is found a new phrase in the treatise which speaks of how warning figures appear in Homer, again apparently underscoring attemps to resolve conflict or avoid the use of force. See col. 98, 8–13 Fish: Ἑ[ρμῆν] μὲν [εἰc] τοὺc [τοῦ πα]|τρο̣`c̣´ κατ̣α̣φονεῖc Ὀρέcτο̣[υ], | Φοίν̣ι̣κα δ̣ὲ ⟦ι⟧ τἀχιλλεῖ π̣α̣|ρ̣α̣ι̣νοῦ[ν]τ̣α̣ φυλάξαc̣[θαι μ]ὴ | τα̣ὐ̣τ̣ὰ [τ]ο̣ῖ̣c̣ π̣ερὶ Μελέαγ̣[ρ]ο̣ν | πά[θ]η[ι ('Hermes going (?) to the murderers of the father of Orestes, and Phoenix advising Achilles to be on his guard lest he suffer the same things as Meleager').

33 Col. 83, 14–25 Fish / col. 28, 8–19 Dorandi.

34 Col. 95, 34–39 Fish / col. 40, 29–35 Dorandi.

35 Col. 95, 30–41 Fish; col. 96, 6–9 Fish. On the text, see now Fish (2016) with commentary.

36 Col. 78, 18–23 Fish.

37 Col. 78, 35–36 Fish. On this new text and its implications, see Fish (1999). Until these textual developments, Porphryry was the earliest source which clearly articulated a view of the Telemachy as being about the education of Telemachus.

of Polyphemus that is the issue, but rather Odysseus' mistake in yielding to improper anger and then gloating over the blinded Polyphemus. After a lacuna we find Philodemus speaking of Odysseus 'not allowing (Eurycleia) to cry out in triumph even over those justly avenged, and exclaiming that "it is not piety to glory over slain men"'.[38] One plausible interpretation of the passage is that Philodemus understood Odysseus to have learned from his mistakes, and that his stopping Eurycleia is evidence that he has learned that gloating over a defeated enemy, even one justly punished, is a forbidden pleasure.[39]

On the Communication of Homer's Good King

If a ruler needs articulate helpers who will speak positively about his reputation, there are nevertheless times when he must assert his own excellence. Near the end of the treatise, after cataloguing several quotations in which Greek leaders speak positively about themselves, Philodemus says, 'And all these men, for the reasons I have said, make their own encomia, but not in order that they may speak egotistically (περιαυτολογήσωσιν)'.[40] The fragmentary context of the treatise leaves partly to us the task of reconstructing what these justifications were. There are some clear examples of speaking about oneself that Philodemus forbids. One is the obvious vice of boastfulness (ἀλαζονεία), that is,

38 Col. 91, 33–37 Fish: οὐκ ἐ]ῶν ἐπολọλụ́ζειν | [τοῖ]ς ἐνδίκ̣ως τετιμω|[ρη]μ̣ένοις, καὶ ἐπιφωνῶν | ῳ̣̂ς 'οὐχ ὁςίη φθιμένοιςιν | ἐπ' ἀνδράςιν εὐχετάαςθαι' [*Od.* 22.412].

39 Cf. Friedrich (1991) 28: 'This development and growth of the *Odyssey*'s hero can be gleaned from the strikingly different attitude Odysseus displays after his next heroic victory: the slaying of the suitors. When Eurycleia is about to raise the cry of triumph over the slain, Odysseus forbids is as 'unholy' (οὐχ ὁςίη, xxii, 410). No *euchos* seals this victory; and the words by which Odysseus describes himself as a mere tool of divine justice (τούςδε δὲ μοῖρ' ἐδάμαςςε θεῶν, xxii 413) are said this time with true modesty.' On the possible significance of this passage for the *Aeneid*, see Fish (2004). For an ancient expression of the idea of character development in poetry, cf. Plutarch, *How a Young Man Should Study Poetry* 26A: ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον οἰέσθω, μίμησιν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν ἠθῶν καὶ βίων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὐ τελείων οὐδὲ καθαρῶν οὐδ' ἀνεπιλήπτων παντάπασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένων πάθεσι καὶ δόξαις ψευδέσι καὶ ἀγνοίαις, διὰ δ' εὐφυΐαν αὑτοὺς πολλάκις μετατιθέντων πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ('But let him [the young reader] cherish the belief that poetry is an imitation of character and lives, and of men who are not perfect or spotless or unassailable in all respects, but pervaded by emotions, false opinions, and sundry forms of ignorance, who yet through inborn goodness frequently change their ways for the better').

40 Col. 94, 34–38 Fish / col. 39, 26–30 Dorandi. Self-praise is a fairly common topic in Greek and Roman literature; cf. Gibson (2003), Miletti (2015).

making untrue or exaggerated claims about oneself. After listing some Homeric quotations in which the beauty of the Greek heroes is spoken of in Homer, Philodemus concludes: 'To such an extent, then, does Homer make them (sc. the Achaeans) differ from the many, that he portrays them as being free from boastfulness.'[41] Homer's Greek heroes are free from boastfulness because they are every bit as great as they claim to be! Philodemus' defence of the heroes' self-praise is of course more sophisticated than this. In general, self-praise should never be gratuitous, but rather serve justifiable purposes. Fairly early on in the treatise, Philodemus claims that Nestor, in speaking about the valour he showed when he was young, spoke 'not on account of idle talk which characterizes old age, but …'.[42] The text must have continued on with something like 'for the sake of correcting Achilles'.

In a passage unusual in the treatise for its rhetorical artifice, now clearer thanks to the correct placement of a new fragment, Philodemus addresses the need for Homer's good king (perhaps Odysseus in particular) to sometimes proclaim his own excellence:

> ọụ γ̣ὰρ ἦν ἂν τὸ πά̣[ντων | ὑπ]ερ̣έχειν, εἰ̣ καὶ ἐ̣κ τοῦ cυγ|[κ]εχωρημένου πᾶ̣[cιν ἀ]πε|c̣τ̣έρει τῆc ἐπιcημαcί̣αc | ὧν ἔχει προτερημάτων· | δι' ἣν, χωρὶc τῶν ἄλλων, | τοῖc μὲν ἀνιcτορήτοιc | αὐ̣τὸν ἐπιδείξει, τοὺc | δ' ἐπιλανθανομένουc ἀ|ναμνή[c]ει, τοὺc δὲ̣ ἀχαρι|cτοῦνταc ὀφθαλμ̣ωρυχή|cει, τοὺc δὲ παραλείπονταc.
>
> For there would be no 'excelling all' if, even when everyone agreed it were so, he [sc. Homer] were to deprive him [sc. Homer's good king] of calling attention to the superior qualities he has, through which recognition, apart from the other considerations, he will display himself to those who don't know him, he will remind those who do know him but are becoming unmindful, will gouge out the envious eyes of those who are ungrateful to him, and those who fail [*several words missing*].[43]

The excellence of Homer's good king is thus partly bound up with his calling attention to his own superior qualities, but only in the right way and on the

41 Col. 93, 23–26 Fish: οὕτω̣ δ' [οὖ]ν πο̣[ιεῖ τ]ῶ̣ν πολ|λ̣ῶ̣ν Ὅμηρος̣ διαφ̣έ̣ρ̣ε̣ι̣ν ὥc|[τ]ε̣, καθάπερ ἔφην, ἀλα̣ζο|[νεία]c καθαρ̣ο̣ὺc εἰc[άγει]ν̣ ('To such an extent, then, does Homer make them [sc. Homer's Greek heroes] differ from the many, that he portrays them as being free from empty boastfulness, just as I said before').

42 Col. 34 Fish / col. 10 Dorandi. Cf. *Il.* 7.132–160.

43 Col. 93, 30–41 Fish; cf. col. 38, 25–36 Dorandi.

right occasion.[44] He will not always be able to wait for others to note them. Philodemus admiringly observes how Homer's heroes are good about giving credit to others.[45] Someone says to Odysseus, 'For by your counsel we even sacked the steep citadel of Priam',[46] and Agamemnon acknowledges that it was Achilles who captured Lesbos.[47] Once again Philodemus seems to be thinking of the Achaeans as opposed to the Trojans.[48] Although these philhellenic themes are common in ancient Homeric scholarship, the prominence of such themes suggests that Philodemus considered them important and relevant to his rhetorical plan.[49]

The Trojans come off rather poorly in *On the Good King*. Although Hector inspires the Trojans' 'tender love' towards himself, Philodemus sees him as a failure in other regards, not least for his false boasts. He claimed that he could come against Achilles 'if his hands are like flame, if his hands are like flame' (*Il.* 20.371–372), but, as Philodemus observes, 'before he (Hector) saw him (Achilles) well, he is seen fleeing not even to the wall, but rather around the wall in consequence of his rashness'.[50] After this criticism of empty boasting, Philodemus' criticism of Hector only intensifies. According to Philodemus, Hector's empty boasting is part of a fundamental lack of self-awareness. The text continues:

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44 On Odysseus' superiority over all, cf. *Od.* 13.297–298: ἐπεὶ cὺ μέν ἐccι βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριcτοc ἁπάντων / βουλῇ καὶ μύθοιcιν ('since you are the best by far of all mortals in counsel and words'). 'Excelling over all' (τὸ πά̣[ντων | ὑπ]ερ̣έχειν) may be an allusion to Peleus' instructions to his son Achilles at *Il.* 11.784: αἰὲν ἀριcτεύειν καὶ *ὑπείροχον* ἔμμεναι ἄλλων ('always be the best and be distinguished above the others').

45 Cf. Fish (2001).

46 The quotation addressed to Odysseus is a plus-verse of the *Odyssey* (F 25 Davies = EGF 110), on which see Fish (2007).

47 *Il.* 9.128–130. Both quotations occur in col. 89 Fish (cf. col. 34 Dorandi).

48 It is well known that there is a philhellenic bias in the Homeric scholia. Nevertheless a convincing case can be made that Trojans and Greeks speak differently; the Trojans are in fact not characterized by the same degree of frank speech as the Greeks, as Mackie (1996) demonstrates.

49 Cf. Fish (2001).

50 Col. 91, 11–14 Fish: ὁρᾶται̣ πρὶν κ̣αλῶc αὐτὸν | [ἰ]δ[εῖ]ν̣ φ̣εύγων οὐδ' εἰc τὸ | τεῖ̣χ̣ο̣ς̣, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ τεῖ|χο[c] ὑ[π]ὸ̣ †π̣α̣ρ̣α̣τρεπ̣ειαc. By 'not even into (*or*: to) the wall' Philodemus means that if Hector were going to flee, he should at least have fled in such a way that would have saved himself. The last word is apparently corrupt, probably an error (by metathesis) for προπετείαc ('rashness'). I recovered much of the new text here from sovrapposti located on another frame of the papyrus; cf. col. 36 Dorandi and fr. 80 Dorandi.

πο|λὺ̣ δ̣ὲ̣ [μ]ᾶ̣λλον ἐν ταῖϲ εὐ|[τυχία]ι̣ϲ ἄνθρωποϲ ὢν ⟨οὐκ⟩ ἐ|[γίνω]ϲκεν, ἀ̣λ̣λ' {οὐκ̣} ἴ̣ϲα θε|[οῖϲ] ἐφρόνε̣ι̣ καὶ τοῖϲ θεοῖϲ̣ | [ἤρι]ζεν αὐτοῖϲ.[51]

And much more, in favourable times, he failed to understand that he was just a human being, but thought himself equal to gods and strove with the gods themselves.

This allegation seems exaggerated even for the ancient contempt that ancient scholarship showed Hector,[52] but it is important to keep in mind that Hector shows unmistakable signs of arrogance in the *Iliad*, in particular in his despising of oracles.[53]

One hallmark of the speech of the Greek heroes is their frank criticism (παρρησία), which is directed not just towards inferiors, like Thersites, but also towards other kings.[54] It is partly for this experience of frank speech between equals that Telemachus must leave Ithaca in search of his father.[55] It appears that Philodemus did not see this kind of conversation as characteristic of the Trojans, since he only lists instances of its exercise by the Greeks.

The Good King and His Symposia

Even the worst of Homer's kings, the suitors, although they are presented as deranged at one point in Homer, are not given to drunkenness (οἰνοφλυγία). As a support for this claim, Philodemus alludes to Antinous rebuking Odysseus as being distracted by wine when he prepares to string the bow (*Od.* 21.288–

51 Col. 91, 14–19 Fish. The Greek text given here assumes a transposed negative, without which the sentence neither follows from what was previously said nor reasonably precedes what follows.

52 As Van der Valk (1963: 475) notes, already Aristarchus seems to display this tendency somewhat, as is evidenced in Aristonicus calling Hector a boaster in schol. A *Il.* 8.526, 8.535, and 14.366. The bT scholia are very harsh indeed in their judgment of Hector, describing him as θραϲύϲ, ἀλαζονικόϲ, ὑπερήφανοϲ, ἀναιδήϲ, τυραννικόϲ, and βάρβαροϲ, all catalogued in Van der Valk 1963, vol. 1, 475 n. 339. Cf. Richardson (1980) 265–287. In *Il.* 3.19 the bT scholia classify Hector, along with Thersites, Paris, and Dolon, as being a θραϲύδειλοϲ.

53 Cf. *Il.* 12.231–250 on which schol. T comments ὁ φρόνιμοϲ καὶ θεοὺϲ τιμήϲει καὶ οἰωνοῖϲ πείϲεται, ὡϲ ὁ 'Οδυϲϲεύϲ ('the prudent man will both honour the gods and obey bird signs, as Odysseus').

54 In col. 81 Fish / col. 26 Dorandi Philodemus notes that Menestheus, king of Athens, gets rebuked (*Il.* 4.336–447).

55 See above on character development.

294).[56] Behind this claim of Philodemus' lies the assumption that the suitors must not have been hard drinkers themselves, for otherwise their criticism of Odysseus would have been blatantly hypocritical. Not all ancient critics would have agreed with Philodemus' assessment of drunkenness in Homer,[57] but his view illustrates a common theme in *On the Good King*: even the worst behaviour by the worst kings in Homer is often better than that of post-Homeric kings.

Entertainment at the courts of Homer's heroes is not indecent, and Philodemus observes that, 'there are woven into the dances of the chosen youths at the house of Alcinous stories that turn one from intemperateness'.[58] On an occasion which might have allowed for laxness, specifically the dancing at the court of Alcinous in Phaeacia, stories were told which actually turned one away from bad behaviour. The raciest story in all of Homer, the capturing of Ares and Aphrodite in the act of adultery, actually discourages adultery. Philodemus contrasts with Homer the 'succeeding kings' who were given to abusive language (αἰσχρολογία) and coarse jesting (βωμολοχία).[59] Philodemus does not single out in the surviving text kings whose courts were notorious for lewd entertainment, but stories of the wild escapades of Hellenistic monarchs were in circulation, and the contrast of such stories with what is found in the entertainment at the courts of Homer's kings could hardly be greater.[60] Philodemus even hazards the suggestion that Demodocus, the bard of Phaeacia, is more discreet than Homer himself. Demodocus uses euphemisms to refer to sexual intercourse, while Homer (i.e. the narrative voice) is more explicit when referring to

56 Col. 72, 37–col. 73, 2 Fish (cf. col. 17, 14–19 Dorandi): το]ὺϲ δὲ |μ⟨ν⟩ηςτῆρα̣[ϲ] κα̣ὶ π̣αρακ̣ό-π̣ουϲ, | [ἀ]λ̣λ' οὐδὲ πα̣ρὰ τούτοιϲ ἔμ|[φ]α̣ϲιϲ οἰν̣ο̣φλυγίαϲ ἀλλὰ | [ε]ἷϲ αὐ̣τῶ[ν], καὶ ἐπιτι̣μῶν | ὡ̣ϲ παρα[φ]ρονοῦ̣ντ̣ι̣ τὸ οἰ||[νοποτάζειν λέγει βλάπτειν ἑαυτόν ('but the suitors [are] even deranged, yet not even among them is there indication of drunkenness, but one of them, even giving a rebuke as if he were out of his mind says that drinking wine harms him').

57 In sharp contrast with Philodemus' view was the historian Duris of Samos, who takes at face value Achilles' abuse of Agamemnon as 'wine sodden' (οἰνοβαρές, *Il.* 1.225) and supposes that the manner of his death 'around the mixing bowl' (*Od.* 11.418) indicates drunkenness (Ath. 12.66 Kaibel = FGrH 76 F15).

58 Col. 75, 6–12 Fish: παραπλ[έ]|κ̣[ονται δ'] ἐν Ἀλ[κίν]ο̣υ ταῖ̣ς | τ[ῶν] ἐ̣κ̣λεκτ̣ῶν νέων | ὀρχήϲεϲιν μῦθοι τῆ[ϲ] ἀκο|λαϲίαϲ ἀ̣ποτρέποντ̣εϲ, εἰ | κ̣α̣ὶ̣ δι' οὐκ ἐπιτηδεί[ων] | προϲώ̣[π]ω̣ν; cf. col. 20, 2–7 Dorandi.

59 Col. 75, 12–16 Fish / col. 20, 8–12 Dorandi.

60 A vivid example is presented by the comic poet Machon (Ath. 13.577f = Gow XIII), who describes Demetrius Poliorcetes as fondling his male member in the presence of a *hetaira*, while making a joke about the smell of his semen. On another occasion (Ath. 579a) he is said to have asked a *hetaira* for an anal sexual favour in exchange for a gift, which was granted him. On both anecdotes, and for similar ones, see Pellizer (1990) 181.

sex.[61] A king cannot be too careful in these matters, and 'even for a king to be a lover of laughter at all, however free from lewdness he may be, does not seem appropriate', according to Philodemus,[62] who observes approvingly that Thersites is despicable to both Odysseus and Achilles, 'the very men about whom Homer writes his works'.[63] If it seems hypocritical for the author of some racy epigrammatic poetry to write such directives, we must remember that Philodemus is discoursing about the standards necessary for a ruler, not a lay person. Rumours of debauched entertainment could endanger a statesman's reputation, and thus his political survival.[64]

Not only is Homeric entertainment free from scandalous elements, the internal audiences who listen to it are orderly and attentive. Even the suitors, claims Philodemus, sounding the theme that even the worst in Homer is not really very bad, are not so disorderly as to disrupt the basic decorum of entertainment.[65] The very subject of their entertainment, both for the sober and for those drinking, is a serious one: the glories of men (κλέα ἀνδρῶν).[66] The high level of the entertainment is reflective of the kind of people who appear at the courts of Homer's kings, only 'the best in thought and action'.[67]

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61 This is a probable interpretation of the end of col. 75 Fish (cf. col. 20 Dorandi).

62 Col. 76, 20–24 Fish / col. 20, 19–21 Dorandi: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ | φιλογέλοιον ὅλως εἶναι | τὸν βαϲιλέα, κἂν αὐτὸϲ ἀ|προύνικοϲ [...... ..] οὐ|κ ἔοικεν.

63 Col. 76, 33–41 Fish / col. 21, 30–38 Dorandi.

64 Philodemus' analysis of reputation in the beginning of what survives of *On the Good King* included a discussion of Bellerophon and Anteia (col. 21 Fish / col. 1 Dorandi), which probably dealt with the good ruler and sex scandals. The text is too fragmentary to admit of certainty, but we may suppose that Bellerophon was introduced by Philodemus as a contrast to Paris—an innocent person enveloped in a scandal. Philodemus may have thought Bellerophon naive in failing to avoid the repeated advances of Bellerophon's wife (*Il.* 6.160–162), or perhaps Philodemus mentioned Bellerophon merely as an example of the risks of being involved in public life, among which is the risk of being falsely accused.

65 Philodemus infers this at col. 74, 10–17 Fish by observing that Odysseus, as he approaches his house in Ithaca, mentions the preparation of banqueting and the playing of the lyre (*Od.* 17.269–270). For the new text here see Fish (2011b).

66 Achilles, refusing to fight with the Achaeans, plays a lyre and sings the 'glories of men' (κλέα ἀνδρῶν) when visited by Agamemnon's embassy (*Il.* 9.186–189). In a sympotic context (cf. 'those drinking') the Phaeacian bard Demodocus sings the 'glories of men' at *Od.* 8.73, specifically a quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles.

67 Philodemus observes (col. 76, 14–15 Fish / col. 21, 11–12 Dorandi) in a rather recherché comment that this is even the case with the father of Eumaeus, the swineherd (cf. *Od.* 15.465–468).

The Macedonian Context of *On the Good King*

On the Good King was probably delivered to Piso when he was proconsul of Macedonia, thus sometime between 57–55 BC.[68] We can with some confidence place Philodemus himself in this Macedonian context as well, and indeed foregrounding a Greek philosopher would make sense in a Macedonian context.[69] If Macedonia is the proper context for the treatise, we can reasonably imagine *On the Good King* as a kind of court performance, setting up an implied contrast between Piso as Roman Viceroy and the futile Hellenistic kings he has supplanted, some of whom get specific mention in Piso's speech,[70] and all of whom are unfavourably contrasted in general with Homer's kings.[71] A provincial context, moreover, makes the best sense of the title and nature of the piece itself. Piso and Roman governors like him had an authority in their provinces that was vice-regal, very much like that of a king. They were seen as kings by Hellenistic monarchs, and governors of Piso's stature were able to perceive themselves as equivalent to such monarchs.[72] Philodemus could convey to Piso that, as the ruler of the very land which Philip II and Alexander the Great ruled, not to mention their less impressive successors before the Roman conquest, he can excel their dissolute regimes and can project an image of justice

68 See Fish (2016) 56–68. Persuasive suggestions for Piso's governorship (or the year before) as the context of the treatise are found in D. Braund (1996) 31–34, with an excellent discussion of the supreme importance of reputation for a Roman governor. For an overview of possibilities for the context of the treatise, see Asmis (1991) 1 n. 1. A deferential comment that Philodemus makes at col. 25 Dorandi (= col. 80 Fish) indicates that Philodemus is speaking to someone who is in command of armies, or who has commanded them, namely someone with *imperium*. Such a statement would only be relevant during his governorship of Macedonia, or (perhaps) slightly before it, the precise range of dates being January 1, 57 to mid-summer 55.

69 See Cichorius (1922) 295 and Fish (2016) 57–58.

70 Demetrius Poliorcetes (see above) and Nicomedes III, who is criticized for his reckless management of Bithynia (col. 77 Fish / col. 22 Dorandi).

71 They are referred to twice in the treatise as 'the subsequent kings' (οἱ μεταγενέστεροι βασιλεῖς), where they are said to lack the decorum of Homer's kings (col. 75 Fish / col. 20 Dorandi). Technically speaking, 'subsequent kings' could refer to non-Greek kings, and Cambyses is mentioned in the treatise, but clearly the emphasis falls upon debauched Hellenistic kings.

72 This is convincingly demonstrated by Rawson (1975) and Christian (2014). As Momigliano (1941) notes, the analogy of a Roman proconsul to a 'king' is not an analogy that anyone would be comfortable using after Caesar became a dictator more than a decade later, but earlier the association could be made comfortably.

and self-control which will win him friends and personal safety. Homer could give Piso some of the right models to do so, and, if Homer is read with the help of a philosopher, he can convey very practical help for ruling wisely and effectively.

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Eumaeus, Evander, and Augustus: Dionysius and Virgil on Noble Simplicity*

Casper C. de Jonge

Introduction

Eumaeus might not be the first character to come to mind when we think of Homeric epic as Princes' Mirror. To be sure, Eumaeus is of royal descent: his father was Ctesius, son of Ormenus, king of the island Syria.[1] But Eumaeus is also a slave: as a child he was sold to Laertes and, having been raised together with Odysseus' sister Ctimene, he became the family's swineherd.[2] Eumaeus is one of the lower-status figures to which the *Odyssey* pays more attention than the *Iliad*. Like Eurycleia, the other prominent lowly character, Eumaeus is portrayed as a loyal servant. During Odysseus' absence he takes good care of his master's animals (*Od.* 14.5–28, 524–533), although he is defenceless against the suitors, who continually force him to send in pigs for their feasts (*Od.* 14.17–20). The detailed description of Eumaeus' pig-farm (*Od.* 14.7–22) brings out its modesty in comparison with the luxurious palaces of kings like Menelaus, Alcinous, and Odysseus. But with its vestibule (πρόδομος), courtyard (αὐλή), and defensive wall the farm adequately fulfils its function.[3] When Odysseus arrives in Ithaca, Eumaeus gives him hospitality and offers him a double meal (*Od.* 14.72–111 and 14.410–454) and a bed (*Od.* 14.454–533), not yet knowing that his guest is actually his master. The next day the host and his guest share

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1 *Od.* 15.413–414. Eumaeus offers his autobiography in *Od.* 15.403–484. On the Homeric characterization of Eumaeus, see Thalmann (1998) 84–100, De Jong (2001) 341–342, and Thalmann (2011).

2 *Od.* 15.483; 363–370.

3 Bowie (2013: 19–20) compares Eumaeus' farm (*Od.* 14.6–20) with the palaces of Menelaus (*Od.* 4.71–75), Alcinous (*Od.* 7.81–132), and Odysseus (*Od.* 17.264–271). On Alcinous and Eumaeus, see also Bakker (2013) 31. The words in which Homer describes the farm of Eumaeus also invite comparison with the palace of king Priam in the *Iliad* (6.242–250): see Bowie (2013) 19–20.

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another evening meal (*Od.* 15.301–302); they are having breakfast (*Od.* 16.1–3) when Telemachus appears. It is debated at what moment Eumaeus precisely recognizes the real identity of the beggar; but he consistently shows his loyalty to his master, and in Book 22 he efficiently assists Odysseus in the fight against the suitors.[4]

Eumaeus ('seeker after good') is explicitly characterized as pious, hospitable, and devoted to the family of Odysseus.[5] In the formulaic language of the Homeric epics he is called 'noble' or 'excellent' (δῖος) and 'leader of men' (ὄρχαμος ἀνδρῶν).[6] The Homeric narrator shows an intriguingly warm interest in the swineherd: Eumaeus is the only character in the *Odyssey* whom the narrator addresses in the second person.[7] All these features of the Homeric Eumaeus were of course noticed by ancient readers of the *Odyssey*; but it was especially his moral excellence and his ambiguous status—both a slave and nobly born—that allowed the swineherd to become an influential model of what we may call noble simplicity.

This paper seeks to demonstrate that the Eumaeus character received special attention from both Greek literary critics and Latin poets at the end of the first century BC in Rome. It will suggest that the literary fascination with Eumaeus' humble and honest lifestyle mirrors the discourse of Augustan Rome, which favoured such qualities as moral excellence (*virtus*), justice (*iustitia*), and piety (*pietas*).[8] I will argue that the reception of the Homeric Eumaeus in Greek and Latin texts of the Augustan Age draws attention to some of the qualities that were attributed to good rulers. Octavian was not a swineherd, but he would be happy to be associated with the generosity, unpretentiousness, and industriousness that characterize the Homeric servant.

Exploring the Eumaeus motif in Augustan literature, we will start from the Greek rhetorician, literary critic, and historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who was active in Rome under Augustus. Homer's swineherd is mentioned remarkably often in the examples cited in Dionysius' rhetorical treatise *On Composition*. In the same period, but in a very different way, Eumaeus implicitly turns up

4 See Roisman (1990) on Eumaeus' 'covert recognition' of Odysseus.

5 For the etymology, see Frisk (1973) 161 s.v. μαίομαι and Thalmann (2011) 270; for Eumaeus' 'moral rectitude', see De Jong (2001) 341.

6 For δῖος, see *Od.* 14.3; for ὄρχαμος ἀνδρῶν, see *Od.* 14.22, 121. Note that Eumaeus himself owns the slave Mesaulius (14.449–451).

7 See De Jong (2001) 345 on *Od.* 14.55. In the *Iliad* several characters are addressed with apostrophe.

8 See Galinsky (1996) 83–90: apart from *virtus, iustitia*, and *pietas*, he also mentions *clementia* (clemency).

in Virgil's *Aeneid*, as one intertextual model of the legendary king Evander, who welcomes Aeneas in Pallanteum, the future site of Rome. Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities* assign Evander an equally decisive role in the early history of Rome. While Evander's hospitality evokes that of Eumaeus, his humble dwelling foreshadows Augustus' house on the Palatine.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Augustan Poetry

Dionysius of Halicarnassus came to Rome in 30/29 BC, 'at the very time that Augustus Caesar put an end to the civil war'.[9] In 8/7 BC he published the first part of his *Roman Antiquities*, in which he argued that the earliest Romans were Greeks and that Rome was a Greek city.[10] The work was in twenty books, of which the first eleven have been preserved. Dionysius also published a number of rhetorical treatises, critical essays, and letters on the orators and historians of classical Greece. Engaged as he was in the literature of the classical Greek past, Dionysius himself lived in the Golden Age of Latin literature: in Rome he was roughly contemporary with the poets Virgil (70–19 BC) and Horace (65–8 BC), and he was slightly older than Ovid (43 BC–17 AD).[11] In his works Dionysius does not refer to the Augustan poets, nor do we find references to Dionysius in the Latin literature of his time. His prominent status as a scholar in Rome, however, is evident from the work of Quintilian, who regards Dionysius as one of his influential predecessors in Rome.[12]

Dionysius is one of many intellectuals in the first century BC who moved from various places of the Greek-speaking world to Rome. His activities illustrate the complex relationship between Greek and Roman identity in the first centuries BC and AD.[13] On the one hand, Dionysius obviously represents Greek culture: he writes in Greek about the literature of classical Greece. On the other hand, Dionysius reads the Latin works of earlier historians, teaches rhetoric to Roman students, and dedicates some of his works to Roman addressees, includ-

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9 *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.2. On Dionysius, see De Jonge (2008), Wiater (2011), and Hunter & De Jonge (forthcoming).

10 *Ant. Rom.* 1.89.1. See Gabba (1991).

11 Dionysius was born before 55 BC. See *Ant. Rom.* 2.6.4; cf. Hidber (1996) 2.

12 Quint. *Inst.* 3.1.16.

13 See Luraghi (2003). On Greek and Roman identity in Greek imperial literature, see e.g. Goldhill (2001).

ing the young student Metilius Rufus, the addressee of *On Composition*.[14] So far scholars have devoted limited attention to the intriguing connections between Dionysius and the Latin poets of his time.[15] Richard Hunter however has rightly pointed out that 'further close attention to Dionysius may reveal that we can know more about the interaction of Augustan criticism and Augustan poetry than is often believed'.[16] This paper provides a case study of this interaction in exploring the reception of Eumaeus in Dionysius and Virgil.

As Dionysius and the Latin poets do not mention each other, it is not an easy task to identify traces of the relationship between scholarship and poetry in Augustan Rome. If we do find common themes and interests, these parallels can of course be explained in different ways. In some cases they may be accounted for by direct interaction in the form of written texts or oral communication, or by the use of a common source or tradition. But in many cases such parallels between Greek and Latin texts must be understood as reflecting a common discourse and a general set of ideas circulating in Rome.

Homer's *Odyssey* in Dionysius' *On Composition*

One of Dionysius' major works is the treatise Περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων (*De compositione verborum*): the title is translated as *On the Arrangement of Words* or simply *On Composition*.[17] Usually this work is interpreted as a typical product of the Greek tradition of rhetoric and scholarship: Dionysius is regarded as creatively combining ideas of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Aristoxenus, and the Hellenistic critics.[18] This paper will argue that Dionysius' literary criticism can also be fruitfully interpreted as actively participating in the discourse of Latin literature under Augustus.[19] *On Composition* is the only extant ancient

14 For Dionysius' knowledge of Latin, see *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.2; cf. Delcourt (2005) 28–30, De Jonge (2008) 60–65, and Nesselrath (2013). On his Greek and Roman addressees, see De Jonge (2008) 25–34.

15 Hunter (2009) 125–127, De Jonge (forthcoming). More work has been done on Philodemus (110–35 BC) and Latin poetry: see Obbink (1995) and Armstrong, Fish, Johnston, Skinner (2004).

16 Hunter (2009) 124.

17 References to D.H. *Comp.* indicate the numbers of the chapters and paragraphs in the edition by Aujac & Lebel (1981). Translations are adapted from Usher (1985).

18 See Roberts (1910), Bonner (1939) 71–77, Pohl (1968), and Donadi (2013). On the sources of *Comp.*, see De Jonge (2008) 41–48.

19 See also De Jonge (forthcoming) on D.H. *Comp.* and Hor. *Ars.*

treatise on the art of combining words into sentences and texts. Adopting the form of a technical handbook it systematically discusses the nature, the means, the aims, and the types of σύνθεσις (composition). Dionysius cites many examples from Greek prose and poetry, including passages from Pindar, Sappho, Simonides, Euripides, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Plato. But no author provides Dionysius with more examples of beautiful composition than Homer; and he has taken a substantial number of the Homeric citations from the *Odyssey*.[20]

As Dionysius' readings of the *Odyssey* aim at the education of a Roman student who is preparing for a political career, there is at least one obvious way in which the term 'Princes' Mirror' is relevant to this technical treatise: the addressee Metilius Rufus, who was to become the governor of Achaea, receives his training in political rhetoric by reading Homer and other Greek authors under the guidance of his Greek teacher.[21] Homeric epic provides the young Roman with *exempla* of excellent word arrangement; many exemplary passages however seem to have been selected not only for their formal qualities, but also for their contents. We must remember that in Greek rhetorical theory there is always a close link between style and ethics. The very first citation of Homer in Dionysius' treatise makes it clear that Dionysius regards Homeric poetry as a style guide for both writing and life in general. *On Composition* starts with a quotation from *Odyssey* Book 15: while presenting the treatise as a birthday gift for his pupil, Dionysius cites the lines in which Helen offers Telemachus a robe as a parting gift:

> 'Δῶρόν τοι καὶ ἐγώ, τέκνον φίλε, τοῦτο δίδωμι', καθάπερ ἡ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ φησὶν Ἑλένη ξενίζουσα τὸν Τηλέμαχον, πρώτην ἡμέραν ἄγοντι ταύτην γενέθλιον, ἀφ' οὗ παραγέγονας εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἡλικίαν, ἡδίστην καὶ τιμιωτάτην ἑορτῶν ἐμοί· πλὴν οὔτε χειρῶν δημιούργημα πέμπω σοι τῶν ἐμῶν, ὡς ἐκείνη φησὶ διδοῦσα τῷ μειρακίῳ τὸν πέπλον, οὔτ' ἐς γάμου μόνον ὥραν, καὶ γαμετῆς χάριν εὔθετον, ἀλλὰ ποίημα μὲν καὶ γέννημα παιδείας καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς ἐμῆς, κτῆμα δὲ σοὶ

20 *Od.* 1.1 (*Comp.* 5.2); *Od.* 3.1 (*Comp.* 5.2); *Od.* 3.449–450 (*Comp.* 5.8); *Od.* 5.402 (*Comp.* 16.1); *Od.* 6.115–116 (*Comp.* 5.7); *Od.* 6.137 (*Comp.* 16.9); *Od.* 6.230–231 etc. (*Comp.* 4.12); *Od.* 9.289–290 (*Comp.* 16.12); *Od.* 9.39 (*Comp.* 17.11); *Od.* 9.415–416 (*Comp.* 15.14); *Od.* 11.593–596 (*Comp.* 20.11); *Od.* 11.596–598 (*Comp.* 20.16); *Od.* 14.1–7 (*Comp.* 26.11–12); *Od.* 14.425 (*Comp.* 5.8); *Od.* 15.125–126; (*Comp.* 1.1–2); *Od.* 16.1–16 (*Comp.* 3.8); *Od.* 16.273 (*Comp.* 4.12); *Od.* 17.36–37, 19.53–54 (*Comp.* 16.8); *Od.* 22.17 (*Comp.* 5.5). On the Homeric citations in *Comp.*, see Calvani Mariotti (1990).

21 Metilius Rufus is addressed in *Comp.* 1.4. On his political career, see Bowersock (1965) 132. On Dionysius' strategies as the Greek teacher of a Roman student, see Weaire (2010–2011).

> τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ χρῆμα πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρείας ὁπόσαι γίνονται διὰ λόγων ὠφέλιμον, ἀναγκαιότατον ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἴ τι κἀγὼ τυγχάνω τῶν δεόντων φρονῶν, ἅπασι μὲν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀσκοῦσι τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους, ἐν ᾗ ποτ' ἂν ἡλικίᾳ τε καὶ ἕξει τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς μειρακίοις τε καὶ νεωστὶ τοῦ μαθήματος ἁπτομένοις ὑμῖν, ὦ Ῥοῦφε Μετίλιε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ κἀμοὶ τιμιωτάτου φίλων.
>
> DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *On Composition* 1.1–4

> 'This gift, dear child, I too give you' [*Od.* 15.125], as Helen says in Homer when she is giving Telemachus a parting gift. You are celebrating your first birthday since reaching man's estate, and of all festive events this is the one which I enjoy and prize most highly. However, I am sending you not the work of my own hands (as Helen says when she gives the robe to the young man), nor what is suited only to the season of marriage and to please a bride, but the product and the offspring of my learning and my mind, which will at the same time be a possession and a useful aid in all the business of life that is transacted through speech: the most necessary of all aids, if I have any idea of what is required, to all alike who practice civil oratory, whatever their age and disposition may happen to be; but particularly necessary to young men who are just beginning to take up the study, like yourself, Rufus Metilius, son of an excellent father, who is to me the most honorable of friends.[22]

The analogy between Dionysius' gift to Metilius Rufus and Helen's gift to Telemachus implicitly and explicitly evokes a number of intriguing ideas about the relationship between Dionysius and his Roman student.[23] Dionysius adopts the role of Helen, but he contrasts her handwork with his own product of learning. Helen is 'hosting' (ξενίζουσα) Telemachus; as a teacher Dionysius might be said to be 'hosting' his student Metilius, but at a different level the situation is reversed: the Greek teacher could be said to be 'hosted' by the father of his Roman student ('the most honorable of my friends'), who seems to have been his patron. Dionysius' gift is in one respect similar to Helen's 'robe' (πέπλος): he has 'woven' a treatise that brings together the most beautiful compositions of Greek literature; as such, the treatise *On Composition* is itself an example of effective σύνθεσις.[24] Finally, young Telemachus is presented as an

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22 Translation adapted from Usher (1985).

23 Cf. Hunter (2009) 123 and Weaire (2010–2011) 51–53.

24 On the analogy between word arrangement and 'weaving', see *Comp.* 15.13: authors 'arrange

inspiring model of emulation for Metilius Rufus, whose rhetorical education, to which the treatise *On Composition* seeks to contribute, becomes a kind of Telemachy, a journey through the adventures of composition theory. It is surely no coincidence that Dionysius also cites a substantial passage from the beginning of *Odyssey* Book 16, which narrates Telemachus' return to Ithaca and his arrival at Eumaeus' hut.[25] On his journey, Metilius Rufus visits the highlights of Greek stylistic writing, including nineteen passages from the *Odyssey*.

Eumaeus in Dionysius' *On Composition*

If we examine the Homeric examples in *On Composition* more closely, we will notice that the swineherd Eumaeus appears in four of these citations:

Comp. 3.8: Odysseus in Eumaeus' house; Telemachus arrives (*Od*. 16.1–16)
Comp. 4.12: Eumaeus will accompany Odysseus to the city (*Od*. 16.273)
Comp. 5.8: Eumaeus sacrifices a boar (*Od*. 14.425)
Comp. 26.11: Odysseus approaches Eumaeus' hut (*Od*. 14.1–7)

The opening of *Odyssey* 16 is cited in the programmatic Chapter 3, where Dionysius presents evidence for the view that in stylistic writing word arrangement is more important (and more effective) than selection of words or subject matter. He illustrates this technical point by citing the lines in which Odysseus and Eumaeus are having breakfast in the swineherd's hut. The opening of *Odyssey* 14 is cited in the final chapter of the treatise, where Dionysius aims to show how poetry can be made to resemble beautiful prose. This passage describes Odysseus while he is approaching Eumaeus' house from the harbor. Apart from these two longer passages, Dionysius includes two more citations from the Eumaeus episode: in Chapter 4 Dionysius cites a line in which Odysseus tells his son that the swineherd will lead him (disguised as beggar) to the city; and in Chapter 5 he quotes a line from the scene in which the swineherd performs a sacrifice—'one of the great indicators of the moral status of those whose homes Odysseus comes to'.[26]

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their words by weaving them together (συμπλέκοντες) with deliberate care' etc. See also *Comp*. 3.10, 12.8, 13.3, 23.2, etc.

25 *Comp*. 3.8: see below.

26 Bowie (2013) 218. On this motif, see also Desmond (this volume).

Why does Dionysius cite so many lines from *Odyssey* books 14 and 16 in central parts of his treatise *On Composition*?[27] The answer to this question lies in the lowly subject matter of the Homeric scenes, which present the swineherd and Odysseus in modest, humble, and pastoral surroundings. The ordinary, trivial character of these passages, which contrasts with the elevated subject matter usually associated with epic poetry, serves a specific function in Dionysius' argument. The central message of his treatise *On Composition* is that word arrangement (σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων) is more important and more effective than the selection of words (ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων).[28] But how can a scholar or student, while analysing a text, perceive the specific effects of composition separate from those of vocabulary? Dionysius claims to solve this problem by citing two well-known literary passages, which are—despite their trivial subject matter, reflected in their plain vocabulary—generally regarded as beautiful compositions: the breakfast scene featuring Eumaeus and Odysseus (*Od.* 16.1–16 cited and discussed in *Comp.* 3.7–12) and the famous story of Gyges and Candaules from Herodotus (1.8–10 in *Comp.* 3.14–18), in which Candaules persuades his friend to see his wife naked, 'a story undignified and unsuitable for artistic embellishment', as Dionysius points out.

Having cited these two passages, he argues that both narratives consist of ordinary words—i.e. the words are as ordinary as the things they describe. According to Dionysius, only one conclusion can be drawn from his examination: it is neither the words, nor the subject matter, but only the composition (σύνθεσις) that accounts for the beauty of the passages cited:

> πολλοὶ γοῦν καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ συγγραφεῖς φιλόσοφοί τε καὶ ῥήτορες λέξεις πάνυ καλὰς καὶ πρεπούσας τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐκλέξαντες ἐπιμελῶς ἁρμονίαν δὲ αὐταῖς ἀποδόντες εἰκαίαν τινὰ καὶ ἄμουσον οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἀπέλαυσαν ἐκείνου τοῦ πόνου. ἕτεροι δ' εὐκαταφρόνητα καὶ ταπεινὰ λαβόντες ὀνόματα, συνθέντες δ' αὐτὰ ἡδέως καὶ περιττῶς πολλὴν τὴν ἀφροδίτην τῷ λόγῳ περιέθηκαν.
>
> DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *On Composition* 3.2

> Many poets and prose-writers, both philosophers and orators, have carefully chosen expressions that are very beautiful and suited to their subject-matter, but have reaped no benefit from their efforts because they have given them a haphazard and unmusical arrangement; whereas others

27 For Homeric epic as a model of rhetorical composition, see also Van den Berg (this volume) on Eustathios.

28 See esp. *Comp.* 3.1–4.

> have taken contemptible and humble words and by arranging them in a pleasing and striking manner, have succeeded in investing their discourse with great beauty.[29]

These εὐκαταφρόνητα καὶ ταπεινὰ ὀνόματα are not just words that are often used in everyday language, but rather words that denote banal and trivial things. *Odyssey* 16.1–16 (cited in *Comp.* 3.8) portrays Odysseus and the swineherd sitting together in the hut (κλισίῃ, *Od.* 16.1), while preparing their morning meal (ἄριστον, *Od.* 16.2); the dogs (κύνες, *Od.* 16.4) bark when Telemachus approaches; as soon as he suddenly appears in the doorway, Eumaeus springs up in amazement, and from his hands fall the vessels (ἄγγεα), 'with which he was busied as he mixed the sparkling wine' (*Od.* 16.13–14).[30] Dionysius asserts that 'the whole passage is woven together (πέπλεκται) from the most commonplace, humble words (τῶν εὐτελεστάτων καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτων)', which closely correspond to the lowly subject matter; they are 'such words as might come readily to the tongue of a farmer, a seaman, and a handicraftsman (γεωργὸς καὶ θαλαττουργὸς καὶ χειροτέχνης), or anyone else who takes no trouble to speak well'.[31] For Dionysius, the conclusion is clear: the persuasiveness and the beauty of the passage is due only to the arrangement.

Dionysius is not alone in finding banal and humble words in the poetry of Homer; nor is he alone in associating such vocabulary with the language of a 'farmer'. The Homeric scholia contain similar observations, for example on Eumaeus' κισσύβιον (bowl of ivy wood, *Od.* 14.78), which is explained as a 'rustic drinking cup'.[32] Commenting on the word λύχνος, 'lamp', another scholiast points out that Homer 'is accustomed not to reject as unworthy cheap words (τὰ εὐτελῆ), like "fly", "beans", and "chick-peas"'.[33] The commentators use the same terminology as Dionysius, describing the Homeric vocabulary as ταπεινός (humble) and εὐτελής (cheap, banal).[34]

The other substantial passage on Eumaeus cited in *On Composition* is the beginning of *Odyssey* book 14 (*Comp.* 26.11). With this example Dionysius primarily seeks to illustrate how poetry can resemble prose. In *Odyssey* 14.1–7

29 Translation adapted from Usher (1985). De Jonge (2012) connects this passage with the composition theory of Horace (*Ars Poetica*) and Longinus (*On the Sublime*).

30 Translation Murray & Dimock (1995).

31 *Comp.* 3.9–12.

32 Schol. V *Od.* 14.78 ed. Dindorf: κισσυβίῳ] ἀγροικικῷ ἐκπώματι.

33 Schol. BQ *Od.* 19.34 ed. Dindorf: λύχνον] [...] εἴωθε δὲ ὁ ποιητὴς μὴ ἀποδοκιμάζειν τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ εὐτελῆ, ὡς τὸ μυῖαν, κυάμους τε καὶ ἐρεβίνθους.

34 Nünlist (2009) 296.

Homer has several instances of enjambment, making his clauses unequal in length (either shorter or longer than a hexameter line), so that the reader 'forgets the metre'. Although the Homeric lines are thus explicitly cited for their prosaic style, it is possible that Dionysius has also selected them for their pastoral character. The beautiful Homeric composition does not present heroic, epic subject matter, but a rustic walk through the countryside of Ithaca, which leads us back to the modest dwelling of the swineherd, arising high above its setting:

> Αὐτὰρ ὁ ἐκ λιμένος προσέβη τρηχεῖαν ἀταρπὸν
> χῶρον ἀν' ὑλήεντα δι' ἄκριας, ᾗ οἱ Ἀθήνη
> πέφραδε δῖον ὑφορβόν, ὅ οἱ βιότοιο μάλιστα
> κήδετο οἰκήων, οὓς κτήσατο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.
> τὸν δ' ἄρ' ἐνὶ προδόμῳ εὗρ' ἥμενον, ἔνθα οἱ αὐλὴ
> ὑψηλὴ δέδμητο, περισκέπτῳ ἐνὶ χώρῳ,
> καλή τε μεγάλη τε, περίδρομος.
>
> *Odyssey* 14.1–7, cited in *On Composition* 26.11–12

> But Odysseus went up from the harbour by the rough path up over the woodland and through the heights to the place where Athena had showed him that he would find the noble swineherd, who cared for his property above all the slaves that noble Odysseus had acquired. He found him sitting in front of his house, where his court was built high in a place with a wide view, a beautiful great court with an open space around it.[35]

Throughout his treatise *On Composition* Dionysius draws a contrast between humble words (which correspond to unpretentious subject matter) and beautiful word arrangement: his ideal piece of writing is a beautiful, melodic, and rhythmic composition that is built from common words. The use of ordinary words is also one of the central lessons of his treatises *On the Ancient Orators*, which represent the programme of Greek Atticism in Rome.[36] Dionysius praises Lysias for his use of pure vocabulary and ordinary words, which results in clear and accessible style; and he repeatedly criticizes the obscure, exotic, and exuberant vocabulary of Thucydides' *Histories*.[37] These stylistic observa-

35 Translation Murray & Dimock (1995).

36 On Dionysius' preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, his 'manifesto of classicism', see Hidber (1996).

37 See *Lys.* 3.1: 'the expression of ideas in standard, ordinary, everyday language'; *Thuc.* 24.1:

tions obviously have moral overtones, as rhetorical style is supposed to reflect lifestyle. Hence, the eloquence of the Attic orators is often described in ethical terms. In his preface to *On the Ancient Orators*, Dionysius celebrates the comeback—in Augustan Rome—of the Attic muse, who stands for decent oratory and literature of high standards: she is called 'modest' (σώφρων), 'old' (ἀρχαία), and 'philosophical' (φιλόσοφος). Her rival from Asia, who dominated the writing of what we call the Hellenistic period, is associated with wealth, luxury, and splendour (εὐπορία, τρυφή, μορφή).[38] This discourse of classicizing Atticism can be found both in Greek and in Latin texts of the period.[39]

Dionysius wrote his treatise *On Composition* for a student who belonged to an influential Roman family. We are therefore encouraged to ask how a Roman audience (including but not restricted to Metilius Rufus and his family) would read Dionysius' selection of passages from the *Odyssey*. I will argue that the Roman readers of Dionysius' treatise may have appreciated his focus on the Eumaeus character, as the moral connotations of the Homeric passages that he cites resonated with motifs in contemporary poetry.

From Eumaeus to Evander, from Homer to Virgil

Several scholars have observed that the meeting of Evander and Aeneas in Virgil's *Aeneid* Book 8 echoes the Eumaeus scenes in *Odyssey* 14–16.[40] Knauer has listed a number of parallels, including such details as the organization of a meal and the preparation for the night, which demonstrates that Eumaeus' entertainment of Odysseus was one important model (or subtext) for Aeneas' visit to Evander.[41] Eumaeus ('seeker after good') was a prince who lived in Ithaca; Evander ('good man') was a Greek king from Arcadia who founded the settlement Pallanteum (or Pallantium, according to other sources) on the place where Rome would later arise. Virgil's story of Evander and the founding of the

'In his choice of words he preferred those which are metaphorical, obscure, archaic and outlandish to those which were common and familiar to his contemporaries'. Translation Usher (1974).

38 *Orat. Vett.* 1. See Hidber (1996) and De Jonge (2014).

39 On the connection between Roman and Greek Atticism, see Wisse (1995).

40 E.g. Gransden (1976) 24–26. As far as there is a chronology of myth, Evander lived slightly earlier than Eumaeus: according to D.H. *Ant. Rom.* 1.31.1–4 (cited below) Evander travelled to Italy sixty years before the Trojan War; both Aeneas' visit to Evander in Virgil and Odysseus' visit to Eumaeus in Homer take of course place after the fall of Troy.

41 Knauer (1964) 252–254.

primitive Pallanteum has parallels in the works of four other Augustan authors: Livy, Propertius, Ovid, and Dionysius (to whom we will return below).[42]

In Virgil's *Aeneid* Evander is portrayed as a poor, honest, and hospitable character. Eumaeus' pigs correspond to Evander's cattle (*armenta*); the swineherd's farm becomes the modest dwelling of a king; both Eumaeus and Evander perform a sacrifice and both men entertain their heroic guests, who have now finally come home—Odysseus in Ithaca, Aeneas on the Palatine hill, where the future city of Rome will flourish. During the meal, Eumaeus hands Odysseus a σκύφος (a cup, *Od.* 14.112); Evander offers Aeneas a *scyphus* (*Aen.* 8.278).[43] The word σκύφος probably figured in Alexandrian lists of rare Homeric vocabulary. The allusion functions as a marker of intertextuality, which confirms the close relationship between *Odyssey* 14 and *Aeneid* 8. But it also shows that Evander, like Eumaeus, is characterized as a simple man who is surrounded by kitchen equipment: σκύφος belongs to the group of 'ordinary words' that the contemporary rhetorician Dionysius, as we have seen, favours in his *On Composition*.

Virgil repeatedly contrasts Evander's poverty and his modest dwelling on the Palatine with the glorious future of Rome at the same place. When Aeneas and his men catch eye of Pallanteum for the first time, they (and we) behold Evander's village:

> *sol medium caeli conscenderat igneus orbem*
> *cum muros arcemque procul ac rara domorum*
> *tecta vident, quae nunc Romana potentia caelo*
> *aequavit, tum res inopes Evandrus habebat.*
>
> VIRGIL, *Aeneid* 8.97–100

> The fiery sun had scaled the mid arch of heaven, when at a distance they see walls and a citadel, and scattered rooftops which today Roman might has exalted to heaven, but then Evander ruled, a scant domain.[44]

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42 Verg. *Aen.* 8.51–54, Livy 1.5.1–3, Prop. 4.1.1–4, Ov. *Fast.* 1.539–542, 4.635–668, 5.643–644, D.H. *Ant. Rom.* 1.31 (cited below). Virgil calls Evander's settlement Pallanteum; according to Livy and Dionysius, however, the settlement was called Pallantium. Livy 1.5.1–3 states that the hill was called 'Pallantium from Pallanteum, the Arcadian city, then later Palatine' (*a Pallanteo, urbe Arcadia, Pallantium, dein Palatium montem appellatum*).

43 On this 'Homeric hapax in Virgil', see Wills (1987) and Farrell (1997) 226. The same word occurs in Theocritus, *Idyll* 1.143.

44 Translation Fairclough & Goold (2000).

The Arcadian king welcomes Aeneas and, having completed the sacrifice for Hercules, he invites the Trojan hero to his modest dwelling. 'So talking to each other, they came to the house of humble Evander' (*pauperis Evandri*, 8.359–360). The king himself draws attention to his poor conditions:

> *'aude, hospes, contemnere opes et te quoque dignum*
> *finge deo, rebusque veni non asper egenis.'*
> *dixit, et angusti subter fastigia tecti*
> *ingentem Aenean duxit stratisque locavit*
> *effultum foliis et pelle Libystidis ursae:*
> *nox ruit et fuscis tellurem amplectitur alis.*
> VIRGIL, *Aeneid* 8.364–369

> 'Have the courage, my guest, to scorn riches; make yourself, too, worthy of deity, and come not disdainful of our poverty.' He spoke, and beneath the roof of his lowly dwelling led towering Aeneas, and set him on a couch of strewn leaves and the skin of a Libyan bear. Night rushes down, and clasps the earth with dusky wings.[45]

It has been suggested that the word *angusti* ('narrow', 'small', 8.366) not only contrasts with *ingentem* (8.367, 'enormous' Aeneas), but also contains an allusion to *Augusti*.[46] This might appear far-fetched in the first instance, but reconstructions do indicate that Evander's house on the Palatine was thought to be situated on the southwest of the Palatine, precisely where at the end of the first century BC Virgil—and Dionysius—would have seen the house of Augustus.[47]

Evander and Augustus

Suetonius' description suggests that the house of Augustus symbolized the—relative—modesty and simple lifestyle with which the emperor sought to be associated:

> *In ceteris partibus vitae continentissimum constat ac sine suspicione ullius vitii. Habitavit primo iuxta Romanum Forum supra Scalas anularias, in*

45 Translation Fairclough & Goold (2000).

46 Gransden (1976) 132–133 ad loc.

47 Gransden (1976) 30. On the house of Augustus, see e.g. Galinksy (1996) 187–191 and esp. 220 on its 'relative modesty'.

> *domo quae Calvi oratoris fuerat; postea in Palatio, sed nihilo minus aedibus modicis Hortensianis, et neque laxitate neque cultu conspicuis, ut in quibus porticus breves essent Albanarum columnarum et sine marmore ullo aut insigni pavimento conclavia. Ac per annos amplius quadraginta eodem cubiculo hieme et aestate mansit, quamvis parum salubrem valitudini suae urbem hieme experiretur assidueque in urbe hiemaret.*
>
> SUETONIUS, *Augustus* 72.1

> In the other details of his life it is generally agreed that he was most temperate and without even the suspicion of any fault. He lived at first near the Forum Romanum, above the Stairs of the Ringmakers, in a house which had belonged to the orator Calvus; afterwards, on the Palatine, but in the no less modest dwelling of Hortensius, which was remarkable neither for size nor elegance, having but short colonnades with columns of Alban stone, and rooms without any marble decorations or handsome pavements. For more than forty years too he used the same bedroom in winter and summer; although he found the city unfavourable to his health in the winter, yet continued to winter there.[48]

The first house of Augustus had belonged to the orator C. Licinius Calvus, who was, as we may remind ourselves, a leading figure of Roman Atticism: rhetorical style and lifestyle are thus perfectly intertwined.[49] The emperor's second house had been owned by the orator Q. Hortensius Hortalus, Cicero's opponent in the Verres trial, who was known for his Asiatic, florid style—the style that is rejected by Dionysius and the Atticists.[50] Hortensius' house, however, was 'no less modest' than that of Calvus. Suetonius' description of Augustus' modest residence reminds us of Virgil's description of Evander's house on the same location;[51] and we have seen that Evander's dwelling in its turn echoes Eumaeus' farm. Evander, we might say, echoes Eumaeus, while anticipating Augustus.

Let me emphasize that I am not suggesting that when Dionysius cites the Homeric passage on Eumaeus as an example of beautiful word arrangement,

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48 Translation Rolfe (1998).

49 On Calvus and his leading role in the Atticism movement, see Wisse (1995) 68–69.

50 Wardle (2014: 453) identifies the two orators and observes that 'Augustus cultivated a deliberate contrast with the extravagances of some of the other members of the elite who had houses on the Palatine'.

51 Wardle (2014: 454) lists ancient and modern sources for the parallels between (the houses of) Augustus and Evander (and Romulus).

he expects contemporary readers to think directly of Evander and Augustus. What I do argue is that Dionysius' interest in the Eumaeus character and its connotations of noble simplicity fits into a broader pattern that connects Greek rhetoric and literary criticism (Dionysius' *On Composition*) and historiography (Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities*) with Latin poetry (Virgil's *Aeneid*) composed in Augustan Rome. Adopting different modes and genres, these texts are all responding to the political discourse of their age.

Evander in Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities*

We can further strengthen the connection between Eumaeus, Evander, and Augustus when we turn back to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, this time not to his rhetorical treatises but rather to his history of early Rome. Dionysius was not only deeply familiar with the story of Eumaeus, but also with that of Evander; and he was aware of the ways in which Evander was relevant to the Augustan Age. In his *Roman Antiquities*, Dionysius (like several authors of his age) draws connections between the humble beginnings of Rome in the distant past and the glorious present. Like Virgil, Dionysius presents the Arcadian king Evander as an important figure in the prehistory of Rome, which according to Dionysius was originally a Greek πόλις. According to his account, several waves of Greeks had landed in Italy: first came Arcadian Aborigines, then Thessalian Pelasgians; the third group consisted of Arcadians from Pallantium who were led by Evander:[52]

> Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον στόλος ἄλλος Ἑλληνικὸς εἰς ταῦτα τὰ χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας κατάγεται, ἑξηκοστῷ μάλιστα ἔτει πρότερον τῶν Τρωικῶν, ὡς αὐτοὶ Ῥωμαῖοι λέγουσιν, ἐκ Παλλαντίου πόλεως Ἀρκαδικῆς ἀναστάς. ἡγεῖτο δὲ τῆς ἀποικίας Εὔανδρος Ἑρμοῦ λεγόμενος καὶ νύμφης τινὸς Ἀρκάσιν ἐπιχωρίας, ἣν οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες Θέμιν εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ θεοφόρητον ἀποφαίνουσιν [...]. οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες, ὡς ἡ Θέμις αὐτοῖς ἐπιθειάζουσα ἔφραζεν, αἱροῦνται λόφον ὀλίγον ἀπέχοντα τοῦ Τεβέριος, ὅς ἐστι νῦν ἐν μέσῳ μάλιστα τῆς Ῥωμαίων πόλεως, καὶ κατασκευάζονται πρὸς αὐτῷ κώμην βραχεῖαν, δυσὶ ναυτικοῖς πληρώμασιν ἐν οἷς ἀπανέστησαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀποχρῶσαν, ἣν ἔμελλε τὸ πεπρωμένον σὺν χρόνῳ θήσειν ὅσην οὐθ' Ἑλλάδα πόλιν οὔτε βάρβαρον κατά τε οἰκήσεως

52 Dionysius mentions two further groups: Hercules with Peloponnesians (*Ant. Rom.* 1.34) and Aeneas with the Trojans (*Ant. Rom.* 1.45). Important discussions include Gabba (1991) 98–118, Fox (1996) 49–95, and Luraghi (2003).

μέγεθος καὶ κατὰ δυναστείας ἀξίωσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἅπασαν εὐτυχίαν, χρόνον τε ὁπόσον ἂν ὁ θνητὸς αἰὼν ἀντέχῃ πόλεων μάλιστα πασῶν μνημονευθησομένην. ὄνομα δὲ τῷ πολίσματι τούτῳ τίθενται Παλλάντιον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ σφῶν μητροπόλεως· νῦν μέντοι Παλάτιον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων λέγεται συγχέαντος τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἀκρίβειαν καὶ παρέχει πολλοῖς ἀτόπων ἐτυμολογιῶν ἀφορμάς.

DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Roman Antiquities* 1.31.1–4

Soon after, another Greek expedition landed in this part of Italy, having migrated from Pallantium, a town of Arcadia, about the sixtieth year before the Trojan War, as the Romans themselves say. This colony had for its leader Evander, who is said to have been the son of Hermes and a local nymph of the Arcadians. The Greeks call her Themis and say that she was inspired […]. And the Arcadians, as Themis by inspiration kept advising them, chose a hill, not far from the Tiber, which is now near the middle of the city of Rome, and by this hill built a small village [κώμην βραχεῖαν] sufficient for the complement of the two ships in which they had come from Greece. Yet this village was ordained by fate to excel in the course of time all other cities, whether Greek or barbarian, not only in its size, but also in the majesty of its empire and in every other form of prosperity, and to be celebrated above them all as long as mortality shall endure. They named the town Pallantium after their mother-city in Arcadia; now, however, the Romans call it Palatium, time having obscured the correct form, and this name has given occasion to many to suggest absurd etymologies.[53]

There are obvious differences between Dionysius' history of early Rome and Virgil's account of the same events—in some respects Livy's version of these events is closer to that of Dionysius.[54] But the parallels are also clear: both the Greek historian and the Latin poet present an opposition between the small beginnings of Rome and its glorious future under Augustus; both assign an important role to the poor and humble Evander; and both hint at the continuity

53 Translation Cary (1937).

54 The two historians have Pallantium where Virgil has Pallanteum. On Dionysius and Virgil, see Hill (1961). Livy 1.5.1–2 and 1.7.3–15 mentions Evander, a 'refugee from the Peloponnese' (*profugus ex Peloponneso*, 1.7.2) in connection with the Lupercal on the Palatine hill and the legend of Hercules and Cacus. Fox (1996) compares the accounts of the regal period in Livy, Dionysius, Propertius, and Ovid.

between past and present, between Evander and Augustus. These can be called Augustan motifs, which also figure in Propertius' *Elegies*.[55]

The emperor's house on the Palatine associated Augustus not only with the house of Evander (the founder of Pallantium / Pallanteum), but also with that of another great predecessor: the *casa Romuli* was also located on the southwest flank of the Palatine. Dionysius of Halicarnassus happens to be one of our main sources on this ancient hut, which is also alluded to in Virgil's *Aeneid* book 8.[56] Dionysius' pastoral description of the lives of Romulus and Remus may remind his readers of the hard-working swineherd Eumaeus:

> βίος δ' αὐτοῖς ἦν βουκολικὸς καὶ δίαιτα αὐτουργὸς ἐν ὄρεσι τὰ πολλὰ πηξαμένοις διὰ ξύλων καὶ καλάμων σκηνὰς αὐτορόφους· ὧν ἔτι καὶ εἰς ἐμὲ ἦν τις τοῦ Παλλαντίου ἐπὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν ἱππόδρομον στρεφούσης λαγόνος Ῥωμύλου λεγομένη, ἣν φυλάττουσιν ἱερὰν οἷς τούτων ἐπιμελὲς οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνότερον ἐξάγοντες, εἰ δέ τι πονήσειεν ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἢ χρόνου τὸ λεῖπον ἐξακούμενοι καὶ τῷ πρόσθεν ἐξομοιοῦντες εἰς δύναμιν.
>
> DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Roman Antiquities* 1.79.11

> The life of Romulus and Remus was that of herdsmen, and they lived by their own labour, generally upon the mountains in huts that they built, roofs and all, out of sticks and reeds. One of these, called the hut of Romulus, remained even to my day on the flank of the Palatine hill which faces towards the Circus, and it is kept holy by those who have charge of these matters: they add nothing to it to render it more stately, but if any part of it is injured, either by storms or by the lapse of time, they repair the damage and restore the hut as nearly as possible to its former condition.[57]

The Noble Simplicity of Philemon and Baucis

Both the swineherd Eumaeus and king Evander belong to the literary tradition of theoxeny, 'the reception of a god or hero into a simple dwelling'.[58] The

55 Cf. Prop. 4.1, esp. 1–38, with reference to Evander in line 4. See also Prop. 4.4. Cf. Fox (1996) 142–154, 158–165 and Hutchinson (2006) 62 on Prop. 4.1.3–4.

56 For Romulus' hut, see Ov. *Fast.* 1.199, Prop. 2.16.19–20, D.H. *Ant. Rom.* 1.79.11, Plu. *Rom.* 20. See also Verg. *Aen.* 8.654 with Gransden (1976) 170–171.

57 Translation adapted from Cary (1937).

58 Gransden (1976) 26; Hollis (2009) 341–354 on the 'hospitality theme'.

hospitality theme plays a role in several Hellenistic and Latin poems, which share several recurring elements: firstly, the host or hostess is usually old and always poor (though often of good or royal descent); secondly, the heroic or divine nature of the guest contrasts with the humble host and his small house; and thirdly, host and guest share a meal, which is often described in precise detail: this is the kind of scene in which vessels, pots, and pans are mentioned (cf. the σκύφος and *scyphus* in Homer and Virgil)—the words that Dionysius and the scholiasts refer to as 'banal' or 'cheap' (ταπεινός and εὐτελής).

One of the most famous examples of this narrative pattern belongs to the later Augustan Age. It is the story of Philemon and Baucis in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (8.626–724). Jupiter and Mercury visit the old couple, whose *casa* turns out to be even more modest than the dwellings of Eumaeus and Evander:

> *tamen una recepit,*
> *parva quidem, stipulis et canna tecta palustri,*
> *sed pia Baucis anus parilique aetate Philemon*
> *illa sunt annis iuncti iuvenalibus, illa*
> *consenuere casa paupertatemque fatendo*
> *effecere levem nec iniqua mente ferendo.*
> OVID, *Metamorphoses* 8.629–634

> Still one house received them, humble indeed, thatched with straw and reeds from the marsh; but pious old Baucis and Philemon, of equal age, were in that cottage wedded in their youth, and in that cottage had grown old together; there they made their poverty light by owning it, and by bearing it in a contented spirit.[59]

Like Virgil, Ovid elaborates on the vertical contrast between high and low: the heavenly gods (*caelicolae*) come to the small home (*parvos penates*, 8.637) and, stooping, enter in at the lowly door (8.638). Philemon and Baucis show hospitality to the gods, who partake of their simple meal. The parallels with both Eumaeus and Odysseus and Evander and Aeneas are numerous. Furthermore, Hollis suggests that the word *casa* (8.633) may have reminded Ovid's readers of the *casa Romuli*.[60] This interpretation may be strengthened by the observation that the word *casa* in Latin poetry regularly evokes associations with Romulus

59 Translation Miller & Goold (1977).

60 Hollis (1970) 115 ad loc. Bömer (1977) 190–195 discusses the (oriental, Jewish, Greek) traditions behind the story of Philemon and Baucis.

(even if his name is not explicitly mentioned). In Ovid's *Fasti* Romulus' small hut (*casa parva*) symbolizes the poor beginnings of Rome:

> *pluris opes nunc sunt, quam prisci temporis annis,*
> *dum populus pauper, dum nova Roma fuit,*
> *dum casa Martigenam capiebat parva Quirinum* [...]
> OVID, *Fasti* 1.197–199

> Wealth is more valued now than in the years of old,
> when the people were poor, when Rome was new,
> when a small hut sufficed to lodge Quirinus, son of Mars [...][61]

Propertius similarly alludes to the *casa Romuli* when he complains that his beloved Cynthia is always demanding precious presents:

> *atque utinam Romae nemo esset dives, et ipse*
> *straminea posset dux habitare casa!*
> PROPERTIUS 2.16.19–20

> Oh would that no man were rich at Rome and even our leader could live in a hut of straw![62]

These poetic allusions to Romulus suggest that the *casa* of Philemon and Baucis, likewise described as a small hut of straw, could indeed evoke associations with Romulus. We may conclude that the Augustan Age revered a variety of literary, legendary, and historical huts. The hut of Romulus and the house of Evander, both located near Augustus' relatively modest house on the Palatine, and the hut of Philemon and Baucis all belong to this group of idealized, primitive dwellings. They symbolized the noble simplicity of their inhabitants and could be associated with the early and primitive stages of Roman history.

Hellenistic Influences: Callimachus' *Hecale*

In the previous sections I have adopted a synchronic perspective on Augustan literature: I have argued that there are connections between Dionysius, Virgil,

61 Translation Frazer & Goold (1996).

62 Translation Goold (1990).

and Ovid, and their portrayals of Eumaeus, Evander, and Philemon and Baucis as models of noble simplicity. Parallel passages from Livy and Propertius, dealing with Evander and the primitive beginnings of Rome, have further strengthened the idea that Dionysius' interest in the Eumaeus character reflects the concerns of the Augustan Age. That is not to say, however, that noble simplicity was not valued in earlier literature. Ovid's story of Philemon and Baucis in particular seems to have been influenced by Callimachus' *Hecale*.[63] One of the characters of this Alexandrian epyllion was the poor widow Hecale, who hosted Theseus before he fought the bull of Marathon. Marios Skempis has analysed the intertextual lines between Homer's *Odyssey* and Callimachus' *Hecale* in a book appropriately called *Kleine Leute und Grosse Helden*.[64] The character of Hecale combines traits of two Homeric figures of low status, namely Eumaeus and Eurycleia.[65] The fragmentary remains of *Hecale* demonstrate that Callimachus alludes to Homer's Eumaeus episode. *Hecale* fr. 26 Hollis mentions Hecale's 'small house' (ἐλαχὺν δόμον);[66] in fr. 29 Hecale makes Theseus sit down on a 'humble couch' (τὸν μὲν ἐπ' ἀσκάντην κάθισεν);[67] in fr. 80 the old widow is remembered for her 'hospitable cottage' (φιλοξείνοιο καλιῆς).[68] Characters of lower social status satisfied the Hellenistic interest in common people as opposed to epic heroes. Callimachus indeed exploits the contrast between the poor Hecale and the heroic Theseus, just as Virgil and Ovid emphasize the contrasts between Evander and Aeneas, and between Philemon and Baucis and their divine guests.[69]

Augustan poets and rhetoricians built on the work of their Hellenistic predecessors, so we should not be surprised to see Virgil and Dionysius taking up a theme with a Callimachean ring. The influence of Callimachus on Augustan poetry has been studied in detail, the *Aitia* and *Hecale* being important subtexts for both Virgil and Ovid.[70] Dionysius of Halicarnassus never cites any

63 Bömer (1977) 191–192 mentions several possible 'sources', including Nicander and Callimachus. Cf. Hollis (1970) 126–127. On the *Hecale*, see Hollis (2009).

64 Skempis (2010).

65 Skempis (2010) 72–150 on Eumaeus and Hecale; Skempis (2010) 306–348 on Eurycleia and Eumaeus.

66 Hollis (2009) 165: '[…] it may represent Theseus' first glimpse of Hecale's cottage'.

67 Cf. *Od.* 14.48–51, *Aen.* 8.367–368, *Met.* 8.639. For ἀσκάντης, see Ar. *Nub.* 633.

68 A similar story is the narrative of Molorcus, who hosted Heracles in Callimachus' *Aetia* Book 3. See Harder (2012) vol. 2, 384–499 on Call. *Aet.* fr. 54–60j.

69 Cf. Hollis (1990) 6.

70 Hunter (2006) with further bibliography.

Alexandrian poetry, because he prefers the models of classical Greece.[71] But he certainly made use of Hellenistic commentaries and treatises for his literary criticism: he refers to the studies of Callimachus, whom he admired not as a poet, but as an important scholar.[72]

Conclusion

The literary, cultural, and political climate of Rome helps us to understand why a rhetorician like Dionysius of Halicarnassus would select some of his examples of beautiful word arrangement from the Eumaeus episode in Homer's *Odyssey*. I have interpreted Dionysius' technical examples of composition (σύνθεσις) in the broad context of Augustan literature and its Homeric and Hellenistic backgrounds. We do not know whether Dionysius' citations of Homer really invited his Roman students and readers to think of Evander and his relevance to Rome. But even if we are careful not to read too much into a few examples cited in a rhetorical treatise, we should at least acknowledge that Dionysius shares his admiration for *Odyssey* 14–16 with the Latin poets of his time. Characteristic of the reception of the Homeric hospitality theme in Dionysius, Virgil, and Ovid is the contrast between high and low, on various levels. Firstly, there is the opposition between the humble host and the heroic or divine guest (Odysseus, Aeneas, Jupiter). Secondly, there is a contrast between the ordinary scenes from everyday life, featuring breakfast, pots and vessels, pigs and cows, and the sublime connotations of epic poetry. And finally there is the opposition between common, 'cheap' or 'trivial' words denoting simple things and the sublime composition in which they have been arranged.

It is not possible to pin down the exact lines of communication between Greek scholars and Latin poets in Augustan Rome. If we wish to point to a common source that may have influenced both Greek rhetoricians and Latin poets, Philodemus of Gadara (110–35 BC) would be a good candidate. The Epicurean philosopher, rhetorician, critic, and poet may in fact have preceded Dionysius in using the Eumaeus scene as an example of excellent stylistic composition. In one of the fragments of *On Poems* Book 1 (fr. 159 Janko) we read part of the word συφορ[βός] (swineherd), and it is striking that in the context of this fragment Philodemus is indeed discussing Hellenistic views on word choice (ἐκλογή) and word arrangement (σύνθεσις). As Richard Janko observes, 'this may refer

71 For Dionysius literary decline started after the death of Alexander the Great: *Orat. Vett.* 1.2.

72 D.H. *Din.* 1.2.

to the swineherd Eumaeus in the *Odyssey*, an unexpectedly low character for the high genre of epic'.[73] If there are indeed suggestive connections between Greek scholarship and Latin poetry, Philodemus' *On Poems* may have played an important role in the emergence of this interaction.[74]

Homer's characterization of Eumaeus carried connotations of noble honesty and modesty that provoked the enthusiasm of Greek critics as well as Roman poets. In drawing a line between Eumaeus, Evander, and Augustus, this paper has suggested that the reception of Homer's *Odyssey* in Augustan Rome could be loosely connected with the perception and (self)-portrayal of Augustus' leadership. To be sure, no Greek rhetorician in Rome will have taught his students that a swineherd should be the primary model of leadership for the Roman emperor—even if the swineherd was actually a prince. However, we have seen that Eumaeus incorporated the ideal of a humble, modest, and generous lifestyle, exposing virtues that appealed to the taste of the Augustan Age. This ideal of noble simplicity connects a number of texts of different genres, backgrounds, and languages, demonstrating the subtle correspondences in taste and discourse between Greek literary criticism, Greek historiography, Latin poetry, and the self-fashioning of Augustus as a good ruler.

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73 Janko (2000) 367.

74 On the κριτικοί in Philodemus and Dionysius, see De Jonge (2008) 37–39, 195–196.

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Speaking Homer to Power: Anecdotes of Greek Intellectuals and Their Rulers in Plutarch's *Symposia**

David F. Driscoll

In the *Quaestiones Convivales* (*Table Talk*), his longest work by far, Plutarch portrays himself dining, drinking, and most of all talking with a variety of his friends and associates in Rome and all over mainland Greece. Book 9, the last book of the *Quaestiones Convivales*, is taken up entirely with a symposium at Athens celebrating the 'Festival of the Muses'. This symposium opens with the invited intellectuals recounting to one another a series of anecdotes (*chreiai*), in which Greek intellectuals quote canonical poetry—mostly Homer—to rulers. This paper focuses on these anecdotes and fundamentally asks why these intellectuals are telling them to one another. I first present a characteristic example of such anecdotes outside Plutarch before surveying them in another sympotic author, namely Athenaeus. I then turn to analyse the social value of these anecdotes by focusing on the opening of *Quaestiones Convivales* 9, arguing that these anecdotes are particularly appropriate for the symposiasts of this event: namely, the middling elite whose only claim to social status is their cultural capital, of which Homer and other canonical poetry forms such an important part. In the world of these intellectuals, the ideal ruler is as steeped in Homer as they themselves are and just as eager to learn and engage with the epic text. Implicitly, knowledge of Homer undergirds what it means to be a king.

An Anecdote of Diogenes and Alexander

To begin, an excellent example of this genre of anecdotes where figures quote Homer to rulers is found in Arrian's *Dissertationes* on Epictetus, likely to have been composed within a decade of *Quaestiones Convivales* 9:[1]

> πάλιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐπιστάντι αὐτῷ κοιμωμένῳ καὶ εἰπόντι
> 'οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα'

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1 Bowie (2002) 48.

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ἔνυπνος ἔτι ὢν ἀπήντησεν
'ᾧ λαοί τ' ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν'.
ARR. *Epict.* 3.22.92

In another example [of Diogenes' wit], when Alexander stood beside him [sc. Diogenes] while he was asleep and said, 'A *boulēphoros* man should not sleep all night long' [*Il.* 2.24], Diogenes, still asleep, replied, 'To whom the people have been entrusted and to whom many things are a concern' [*Il.* 2.25].[2]

In a virtual re-enactment of the original epic context, where a dream appears to Agamemnon while asleep, Alexander approaches Diogenes while sleeping and urges him to wake up since a *boulēphoros anēr* should not sleep all night long. Diogenes does not wake up but quotes the next line of the epic, which emphasizes the responsibilities of the monarch: his rule over subordinates and affairs.

Kennedy, in his treatment of this anecdote in Theon, notes 'Diogenes' point was that he was not a ruler.'[3] For Kennedy, the central point of the anecdote is to lay bare the fault lines between monarch and philosopher: the monarch with his responsibilities is not permitted to rest, while the philosopher, lacking those responsibilities, may sleep easy.[4] Yet the interpretation is not as simple as that.

The translations maintain this opposition between monarch and philosopher by translating *boulēphoros* as 'counsellor' *vel sim.*[5] Under this interpretation, Alexander approaches Diogenes and tells him that a counsellor—i.e. the philosopher—should not sleep the whole night. Diogenes, on the other hand, ups the ante by offering a masterful performance reciting the very next line of the *Iliad*, which puts the onus back on Alexander. And yet *boulēphoros* does not mean 'counsellor' to Imperial Greeks.[6] The Homeric lexica surviving from this period—Apollonius, fragments attributed to Apion and Philoxenus—unanimously gloss *boulēphoros* as tantamount to *basileus*, and indeed Apollonius'

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2 My own translation. This example is also found in a slightly different form in Theon, *Prog.* 98 and *P. Osl.* 177. See Giannantoni (1990) 2.245–246.

3 Kennedy (2003) 17 n. 68.

4 Cf. Pseudo-Hermogenes' expansion of *Il.* 2.24 (Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 10): κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἐναντίον δ' ἔστι βασιλεῖ μὲν ἰδιώτης, τῷ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν. 'Elaboration by contrast: the private citizen is opposite to the king, and sleeping is opposite to being awake.'

5 Kennedy (2003) 17 ('counselor'), Hock & O'Neil (1986) 314 ('counsellor'), Patillon (2008) 21 ('Qui se mêle de conseiller').

6 While this anecdote deals with Hellenistic figures and could certainly date from the Hellenis-

lexicon quotes this very line as its example of that meaning.[7] Diogenes' reply to Alexander may be a correction to the king, where Alexander means *boulēphoros* to mean 'philosopher' but Diogenes interprets it as 'king'. Alternatively, in approaching Diogenes and asserting that a *boulēphoros* should not sleep, Alexander may then potentially be alluding to the Cynics' habit of referring to themselves as 'kings' or 'rulers' and suggesting that the 'king' of philosophy should not sleep.[8] Whether or not one assigns the meaning of 'king' to Alexander's use of *boulēphoros*, Diogenes' witty reply accepts the label of 'king', but distinguishes between two types of kingship: the one that Alexander possesses, where rule over many people gives Alexander political power but also many concerns, and the one that Diogenes possesses, whose 'kingship' is not derived from external power but rather from his embrace of a carefree Cynic lifestyle that grants him freedom from Alexander's responsibilities.

Indeed, the relationship between Cynic ease of life and Cynic kingship seems to be linked to Diogenes' *paideia*. Diogenes appears to 'win' this encounter with Alexander: Alexander wishes to awaken Diogenes, but Diogenes manages to deny the king's will and remain asleep. In this contest of wills Diogenes emerges triumphant. Crucial to Diogenes' victory is *paideia*, manifested in his and Alexander's control of Homer: Alexander believes that he has a line of Homer which will persuade Diogenes, but Diogenes responds with a line that challenges Alexander's interpretation and ensures that Diogenes is able to remain sleeping. Diogenes, then, quotes Homer better than the Homer-loving Alexander, even quoting the next line of the epic, a game which Athenaeus informs us was a typical sympotic pastime.[9] This virtuosic display of *paideia* is highlighted by the showmanship involved: Diogenes is able to perform and win this act of competing Homeric interpretations while still asleep, making a show of his skill with Homer.

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tic period (though it is striking all three attestations date from the first century AD), I am here concerned not with the history of the anecdote but with its effect and purpose in the imperial texts it is attested in.

7 E.g. Apollon. *Lex.* 52.30: βουληφόροι ποτὲ μὲν βασιλεῖς, 'οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα', ποτὲ δὲ ἐπιθετικῶς αἱ ἐκκλησίαι ἐν αἷς αἱ βουλαὶ ἀναφέρονται. '*Boulēphoroi.* Sometimes "kings", e.g. "A king should not sleep all night long", and sometimes, as an epithet, the assemblies in which decisions are derived.' The reference presumably is to *Od.* 9.112: ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι. Cf. Apion s.v. βουληφόρος and Philox. Gramm. fr. 258*.

8 E.g. D.L. 6.29, Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.20.121 (ἡδονῇ ἀνδραποδώδει ἀδούλωτοι καὶ ἄκναπτοι ἀθάνατον βασιλείαν ἐλευθερίαν τ' ἀγαπῶσιν, 'Those unenslaved and unbended by servile pleasure, love the immortal kingdom and freedom' [trans. Wilson]; cited in Moles [2000] 431).

9 Ath. 10.457e, cited in Hock & O'Neil (1986) 315.

Diogenes accepts the label of king, but one whose kingship is founded in a *paideia* where his moral excellence and his poetic education are synonymous.[10] At the same time, unlike the real Diogenes and the 'hard' Cynics, he recognizes Alexander's kingship as legitimate. The people have genuinely been entrusted to him, and as a result his cares are indeed many. Alexander is right to stay up all night being worried about his subjects. And yet Diogenes is still able to get what he wants out of this monarch through his *paideia*. Though Alexander wants Diogenes to wake up, his temporal power proves no match for Diogenes, who through the proper Homeric quotation manages to remain asleep. Though small on the grand scheme of things, this anecdote shows the power of *paideia* as a means of bending the temporal ruler to the will of the *pepaideumenos*, who here is equally kingly.

A Genre of *Chreiai* Where Intellectuals Quote Homer to Rulers

Let us turn now to briefly survey the genre of anecdotes for which the one of Alexander and Diogenes is an excellent example. This anecdote is not alone; rather, it belongs to a family of anecdotes where intellectuals quote canonical poetry, particularly Homer, to rulers. With an eye to an ultimate analysis of Plutarch's *Quaestiones Convivales* Book 9, I survey the examples in another sympotic work, namely Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae*, and I restrict my analysis to only those examples where Homer is invoked.

First, it is worth pointing out that not all anecdotes dealing with quotations of Homer involve intellectuals quoting the poet to rulers. Rather, at least to judge from Athenaeus, the use of Homer is attributed throughout the *chreia* tradition to a variety of characters: the individuals that employ Homer in one way or another range through the typical *chreia* cast of characters, including in addition to rulers and intellectuals athletes and musicians. It is perhaps not surprising that Homeric quotation or interpretation is never associated with uneducated individuals that are often found in such anecdotes, including prostitutes and parasites.[11] Nevertheless there are at least three such anecdotes in Athenaeus where intellectuals invoke Homer to rulers. In each of these anecdotes intellectuals recognize the power of the ruler and use Homer as a

10 Höistad (1948) is still the source for the link between *paideia* and kingship for Second Sophistic Cynics, even if his attempt to retroject those views to Diogenes himself is unconvincing. For Cynics and politics, see Moles (1995) and (2000). On the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' Cynics, see Moles (1995) 129–158.

11 For these figures in *chreiai*, see Hock & O'Neil (1986) 6.

means of asserting their own cultural capital and influencing the ruler. I present these in their order of affinity to the Alexander and Diogenes prototype.

First, in Athenaeus 8.340f the philosopher Democritus relates an encounter between the Hellenistic poet Antagoras of Rhodes and Antigonus II.[12] Like the Alexander and Diogenes example, this anecdote virtually restages an incident from Homer (here Agamemnon's *epipolesis* of the Achaean camp in *Iliad* 4) and again takes the form of duelling interpretations of Homer in which it is the ruler who starts citing Homer: Antigonus asks Antagoras whether Homer produced his account of Agamemnon's accomplishment while stewing eels, as Antagoras is doing, and Antagoras asks whether Agamemnon produced those accomplishments while worrying who in his camp was stewing eels. Again we have a sharp separation of the role of the intellectual and the ruler: Antigonus, not Antagoras, is supposed to produce *praxeis*, and it is surely no accident that the king should be told to abandon the question of who is stewing eels in the Homeric camp—really a question for an intellectual, and indeed very similar to the classic questions surrounding the absence of fish in the Homeric diet.[13] Implicitly then Antagoras insults Antigonus for his failure to produce deeds worthy of Antagoras' song, as a king should. Yet Antagoras does recognize Antigonus as a king and obtains from him what he wants: namely, the freedom from responsibilities where he can be a glutton (the topic of Democritus' contribution) and eat eels. Like with Diogenes and Alexander, we have an anecdote where an intellectual wins a competition and thereby extracts a concession from the ruler.

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12 Γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ οἵδε ὀψοφάγοι. Ἀνταγόρας μὲν ὁ ποιητὴς οὐκ εἴα τὸν παῖδα ἀλεῖψαι τὸν ἰχθὺν ἀλλὰ λοῦσαι, ὥς φησιν Ἡγήσανδρος. ἐν δὲ στρατοπέδῳ ἕψοντι, φησίν, αὐτῷ γόγγρων λοπάδα καὶ περιεζωσμένῳ Ἀντίγονος ὁ βασιλεὺς παραστάς, 'ἆρά γε,' εἶπεν, 'ὦ Ἀνταγόρα, τὸν Ὅμηρον οἴει τὰς τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος πράξεις ἀναγράψαι γόγγρους ἕψοντα;' κἀκεῖνον οὐ φαύλως εἰπεῖν· 'σὺ δὲ οἴει', φησί, 'τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα τὰς πράξεις ἐκείνας ἐργάσασθαι πολυπραγμονοῦντα τίς ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ γόγγρους ἕψει;' 'The following individuals were also gluttons. The poet Antagoras did not let his slave pour oil on his fish, but made him "give it a bath", according to Hegesander [fr. 15, FHG iv.416]. He was wearing an apron and stewing a casserole-dish full of conger eels in camp, Hegesander reports; and King Antigonus stood beside him and said: "So, Antagoras; do you think Homer produced his account of Agamemnon's accomplishments by stewing conger eels?" Antagoras offered a clever reply: "Do you think", he said, "that Agamemnon produced those accomplishments by worrying about who in his camp was stewing conger eels?"' (trans. Olson) This popular anecdote is also found at Plu. *Quaest. Conv.* 4.4.668D and Plu. *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 17.182F.

13 First attested in the fourth century in Pl. *R.* 3.404b. It is a topic of conversation in Ath. Book 1.

The intellectual's recognition of the ruler's power and willingness to use one's *paideia* to extract what one wants from them can easily tip into flattery. Such is explicitly the case with my second example, about the pancratiast Dioxippus of Athens, who when Alexander was wounded flattered the king by quoting *Iliad* 5.340, 'ichor, such as flows in the blessed gods'.[14] Dioxippus is not an intellectual in the strict sense, of course, but he is disliked by the army for being useless in battle like intellectuals such as Alexander's secretary Eumenes.[15] Indeed, Dioxippus is virtually a living ancient hero himself: Diodorus praises his strength and condition and even compares him to Heracles due to his use of a club. Democritus, who tells this anecdote as well as the preceding one with Antigonus and Antagoras, presents it as an example of how 'flatterers fare better than anybody else',[16] and though Democritus does not describe what benefits Dioxippus may have received from his comment, in the following anecdote Epicrates of Athens 'received many gifts from [Alexander]',[17] and it is logical to assume that in Democritus' telling Dioxippus too is assumed to have received similar benefits. In this anecdote again a figure uses Homeric quotation to obtain goods from the ruler.

The flip side to this pattern is that while Homer is a powerful force in the interactions between ruler and ruled, the encounter is high-stakes and can yield either great rewards or punishments. This Dioxippus, for example, ultimately commits suicide when he brings displeasure to Alexander after humiliating a Macedonian in a Homeric-style duel.[18] Indeed, in an alternative, Latin version of the above anecdote, in Seneca the Elder, when the philosopher Callisthenes observes that Alexander's blood is not ichor, Alexander kills him on the spot.[19] My final anecdote in Athenaeus falls into this group: when Alexan-

14 Ath. 6.251a: Ἀριστόβουλος δέ φησιν ὁ Κασσανδρεὺς Διώξιππον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον παγκρατιαστὴν τρωθέντος ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ αἵματος ῥέοντος εἰπεῖν· ἰχώρ, οἷός πέρ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν [*Il.* 5.340].

15 Baynham (2007) 431.

16 Ath. 6.248c: πράττει γὰρ πάνωτν ὁ κόλαξ ἄριστα.

17 Ath. 6.251b: πολλὰ δῶρα παρ' ἐκείνου λαβών.

18 Homeric echoes abound in the description in Diodorus Siculus (17.100–101): the fight is a θεομαχία between Ajax and Heracles (for the specifically Homeric overtones of the word θεομαχία see Pl. *R.* 2.378d, Longin. 9.6–8), and the duel itself resembles a Homeric fight: first exchange of spear throws (which one character avoids by leaning to the side, cf. *Il.* 3.360), then fighting at close range with swords.

19 Sen. *Suas.* 1.5. The anecdote is repeatedly retold, but never elsewhere attributed to Dioxippus or Callisthenes: once to Anaxarchus, also a flatterer of Alexander (D.L. 9.60), and in each of the three times Plutarch tells it the speaker is Alexander himself (Plu. *Reg. et imp. apophth.* 180E, *Alex. fort.* 341B, *Alex.* 28). The anecdote also occurs without the exact

der wrote to the Chians and asked for purple fabric, the sophist Theocritus of Chios, 'said he now understood the Homeric line, "purple death and a harsh fate lay hold of him"'.[20] And indeed Theocritus' insolence and willingness to assert Homer in ways that do not recognize the ruler's authority ultimately get him killed: in Pseudo-Plutarch's *Education of Children*, this anecdote is told with one where Theocritus compares Antigonus the One-Eyed to the Cyclops, for which he is either executed or imprisoned.[21] It is important to recognize the superiority of the ruler and to offer one's *paideia* in a mode that benefits him: the insolence of asserting one's cultural capital in too sharp a way can lead to trouble.

In anecdotes where intellectuals quote poetry to rulers, the ruler necessarily possesses sufficient *paideia* to appreciate the performances of these intellectuals. That is, the link between *paideia* and material rewards depends on a ruler who is competent to judge and who is willing to reward or punish the aptness of one's quotation of Homer. We have already seen an instance where the ruler himself not only judges knowledge of poetry but also tries to show it himself when Alexander unsuccessfully uses his knowledge of Homer in an attempt to awaken Diogenes. Elsewhere in the anecdote tradition rulers do occasionally quote poetry themselves; when they do, it is often to deter individuals from using their knowledge of poetry to extract concessions from their monarchs. When Plutarch, for example, reworks the anecdote involving Alexander and the Homeric verse 'ichor, such as flows in the blessed gods', he puts the verse in Alexander's mouth to forestall flatterers, who presumably might be tempted to use the line themselves.[22] Likewise in Plutarch's *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* Archelaus refuses Timotheus' poetic request for more money with a punning reworking of Timotheus' verse, and Augustus refuses a philosopher's request for dismissal with an apropos quotation of Simonides.[23] Even when it is rulers who are doing the quoting of poetry, the link between *paideia* and

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Homeric quotation three times, each time attributed to Alexander as in Plutarch (D. Chr. 64.21, Sen. *Epist.* 49.12–13, Curt. 8.29).

20 Ath. 12.540a: ἔγραψεν δὲ καί ποτε Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ταῖς ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πόλεσιν καὶ πρώτοις Χίοις, ὅπως αὐτῷ πορφύραν ἀποστείλωσιν· ἤθελεν γὰρ τοὺς ἑταίρους ἅπαντας ἁλουργὰς ἐνδῦσαι στολάς. ἀναγνωσθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς Χίοις παρὼν Θεόκριτος ὁ σοφιστὴς νῦν ἐγνωκέναι ἔφη τὸ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ εἰρημένον· 'ἔλλαβε πορφύρεος θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή' [*Il.* 5.83].

21 Ps.-Plu. *De lib. educ.* 11A–C.

22 The anecdote occurs three times in Plutarch: see n. 19 above.

23 177B, 207C–D. Other anecdotes in this collection put in the mouths of rulers either disparage the value of poetry and learning altogether (only Antigonus, at 182C and 182E) or emphasize the powerlessness of the deposed ruler (Eumenes, 184B; Pompey, 204E).

compensation remains intact. Rulers can and must possess *paideia* themselves, but in these anecdotes they do not refuse requests for compensation by simply saying 'no', but rather by putting on a show of greater *paideia* themselves. Underlying all these anecdotes is an assumption that knowledge of Homer, in a sense, 'trumps' political power.

A Series of These Anecdotes in Plutarch *Quaestiones Convivales* 9

Now that I have surveyed the range of anecdotes involving the quotation of Homer before rulers by looking at the occurrences in Athenaeus, I would like to consider what the social value of these anecdotes might be. Where and under what conditions would people retell these anecdotes? What would be the benefit? To try to answer these questions, I would like to analyse a hotbed of these anecdotes in a represented social environment, namely the opening of the ninth book of Plutarch's *Quaestiones Convivales*. In perhaps 66/7 AD,[24] Plutarch's teacher, the Platonic philosopher Ammonius, invited the leading intellectual figures of the city to dinner after a series of competitions in intellectual topics at the Diogeneion in Athens, a site of ephebic instruction. The meal was a gathering of those teachers whose students had succeeded in these competitions, as well as other *philologoi*, and 'nearly all my close friends'.[25] At the best of times, these professionals competed with one another for students and prestige; under the influence of wine, their strained interpersonal relationships threaten to break down into open hostility. Ammonius forestalls this academic war with a conversational topic that all can agree on:

> Διὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκέλευσεν ᾆσαι τὸν Ἐράτωνα πρὸς τὴν λύραν· ᾄσαντος δὲ τὰ πρῶτα τῶν Ἔργων 'οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος', ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς τῷ καιρῷ πρεπόντως ἁρμοσάμενον· ἔπειτα περὶ στίχων εὐκαιρίας ἐνέβαλεν λόγον, ὡς μὴ μόνον χάριν ἀλλὰ καὶ χρείαν ἔστιν ὅτε μεγάλην ἐχούσης. καὶ ὁ μὲν ῥαψῳδὸς εὐθὺς ἦν διὰ στόματος πᾶσιν, ἐν τοῖς Πτολεμαίου γάμοις ἀγομένου τὴν ἀδελφὴν καὶ πρᾶγμα δρᾶν ἀλλόκοτον ⟨νομιζ⟩ομένου καὶ ἄθεσμον ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπῶν ἐκείνων 'Ζεὺς δ' Ἥρην ἐκάλεσσε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε·'
>
> PLU. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.1.736E–F

24 Jones (1967) 206–207.

25 Plu. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.1.736D: πάντες ἐπιεικῶς οἱ συνήθεις.

> For this reason he first told [a musician] Erato to sing to the lyre. And when Erato had sung the beginning of the *Works and Days*, 'So there is not one kind of strife' [Hes. *Op.* 11], Ammonius praised him because he had accommodated himself fittingly to the occasion. Then he introduced a conversation about the appropriateness of poetic verses, on the grounds that it sometimes provides not only pleasure but also great utility. Immediately one rhapsode was on everyone's lips. Performing at the wedding of Ptolemy when the king was marrying his sister and was perceived to be acting strangely and unlawfully, the rhapsode began his recitation with these lines, 'And Zeus called upon Hera, his sister and wife' [*Il.* 18.356].
>
> My translation

To preserve the cordiality of the symposium Ammonius directs the conversation toward the uncontroversial: how the quotation of poetic verses can be not only pleasurable but also useful. The pun on *chreia*—both 'utility' and 'anecdote'—leads the participants in the conversation to recount famous anecdotes of opportune quotations, beginning with the wedding of Ptolemy II Philadelphus before listing four more examples of opportune quotation and three anecdotes of inopportune quotation. It is this series of anecdotes I analyse and which I present in schema form:

Schema of anecdotes in Plu. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.1.736E–737C

OPPORTUNE

1. a rhapsode to Ptolemy II Philadelphus (*Il.* 18.356)
2. a musically-skilled guest to Demetrius II (*TrGF* adespoton 399)
3. Anaxarchus the 'happiness philosopher' to Alexander (E. *Or.* 271)
4. a boy competent in reading and writing to Mummius (*Od.* 5.306)
5. the wife of Theodorus speaks to her husband, the tragic actor (S. *El.* 2)

INOPPORTUNE

6. a *didaskalos* to Pompey the Great (*Il.* 3.428)
7. a senator to Cassius Longinus, one of Caesar's assassins (Hes. *Op.* 763)
8. a man in the crowd speaks to a grammarian (*Od.* 10.72)

Most of these anecdotes clearly belong to the genre discussed up to this point. In six of the eight anecdotes (one of the two exceptions to be further discussed) an intellectual quotes poetry to a ruler (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 above). The two

exceptions (5 and 8 above) both close their two series, namely of opportune and inopportune quotations. Several of these anecdotes have close structural affinities with examples we have already looked at. Looking at the examples of opportune quotation, three of the five flatter the addressee by hinting that he is a god, like Dioxippus to Alexander: the rhapsode compares Ptolemy II's incestuous marriage to Zeus and Hera; the musician compares Demetrius II and his son Philip V to Heracles and his son; and Anaxarchus compares Alexander simply to a god. The wedding of Ptolemy II furthermore is a locus not only for the comparison of king and queen to Hera and Zeus, as represented in Theocritus *Idyll* 17 and implied in Callimachus fr. 75,[26] but also in particular for anecdotes describing the quotation of poetry: Sotades of Maroneia is executed for reciting one of his lines of poetry, itself probably part of his feminizing *Ilias*,[27] that condemned Ptolemy's wedding and implicitly his administration as 'pushing your prick into an unholy hole'.[28]

It is worth looking more closely at what the symposium deems the 'best' of these, namely that of the educated boy and Mummius during the sack of Corinth:

> πάντων δ' ἄριστος Κορίνθιος παῖς αἰχμάλωτος, ὅθ' ἡ πόλις ἀπώλετο καὶ Μόμμιος ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς ἐπισταμένους γράμματα παῖδας ἐξιστορῶν ἐκέλευσε γράψαι στίχον, ἔγραψε 'τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις οἳ τότ' ὄλοντο·' καὶ γὰρ παθεῖν τι τὸν Μόμμιόν φασι καὶ δακρῦσαι καὶ πάντας ἀφεῖναι ἐλευθέρους τοὺς τῷ παιδὶ προσήκοντας.
>
> Plu. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.1.737A

> But best of all was the captive Corinthian boy. When his city was lost and Mummius, who was searching for the free-born that understood letters, ordered them to write a verse, this boy wrote 'thrice and four times blessed are the Danaans who perished then' [*Od.* 5.306]. They say that Mummius was terribly affected by this and wept and let all the boy's relatives go as free.

This is a clear example of an educated person using their knowledge of canonical poetry to try to influence a ruler. First, this anecdote exemplifies the power dynamics previously discussed at their most extreme: the 'intellectual', namely

26 Theoc. 17.131–132, Call. fr. 75.4–7, are listed in Hunter (2003) 192–193.

27 Sotadea fr. 16 links Hera and Zeus in the Sotadean meter (Pretagostini [1991] 111).

28 Sotades fr. 1 Powell: εἰς οὐχ ὁσίην τρυμαλιὴν τὸ κέντρον ὠθεῖς. Ps.-Plu. *De lib. educ.* 11A, Ath. 14.620f–621b with discussion in Hunter (1996) 79–80.

the boy who knows his letters, has no power whatsoever, whereas the foreign ruler has all of it: there are few more unequal relations possible than between a victorious general and a potential slave. Second, this anecdote highlights the ability of one's cultural capital to influence the ruler. This child, unlike presumably many others in the city of Corinth during its sack, is able to obtain freedom from Mummius for his family and (presumably) himself. In that sense this anecdote highlights the ability of *paideia* to produce real-world effects.

Third, this anecdote is an exception to some of the boundaries between flattery and insult I had earlier suggested and so highlights the capriciousness of the ruler's decision: that is to say, there are no rules or guidelines that can teach you to use your *paideia* successfully to influence the ruler in the direction you want. We have already seen how the anecdote concerning Alexander's blood as ichor shifts from telling to telling, where the result can either be great rewards for the quoter or his immediate death. Much depends here on the character of the ruler: Alexander's receptiveness to the Homeric verse seems to depend on whether in this particular telling he is immune to flattery or affected by it, or indeed whether he forestalls such attempts by deploying the verse himself. Here, the child's decision to quote *Odyssey* 5 to Mummius seems on the face of it to be a self-destructive one: far from flattering the ruler, the line reminds Mummius of the great suffering he is inflicting on innocents like this child, in a way one could think would be unpleasant for Mummius. An Alexander might kill someone for speaking to the king in this way. As it happens, Mummius is moved to pity, perhaps out of a recognition of their shared human condition of misfortune;[29] hence the child is rewarded, but the child in choosing this particular line is playing a high-stakes game, where the whim of the ruler's reaction determines success.

The Social Function of Such Anecdotes

I would like to turn now to consider the social role of these anecdotes. I would argue that their basic function is bolster the identity of those elites who per-

29 Several Homeric verses were commonly read as expressions of misfortune as a common trait of humanity (e.g. *Il.* 17.446–447 with scholia ad loc., *Il.* 24.527 at schol. *Od.* 8.63; both also cited for this reading in Ps.-Pl. *Ax.* 367d). This verse (*Od.* 5.306), however, does not seem to have been read along these lines; Eustathios perhaps comes closest when he uses this line to consider the nature of human life in the face of death, though there is no evidence he is relying on a pre-Byzantine source in this particular reading (Eust. *in Od.* 1542.37–38).

form them, as is represented in the sympotic setting but presumably elsewhere as well. Identity-formation of the elite appears to be a basic function of *chreiai* and other short easily transmitted forms of popular wisdom in general: for Morgan, for example, *gnōmai* encourage students to 'identify with powerful and high-status Greek or Roman socio-cultural groups' and the *chreiai* of one papyrus, namely P. Bouriant 1, where Diogenes wittily insults various marginalized individuals, tell the listener or reader that he should be 'the opposite of all the objects of [Diogenes'] disdain, which is to say, powerful, male, and Greek'.[30] I would argue that these anecdotes have a similar function: the symposiasts who read or re-perform them identify with their male Greek speakers, the intellectuals, who derive a certain degree of power from their skill in poetic quotation and ability to use this skill to extract concessions from the ruler.

As I will demonstrate, this symposium is a particularly good setting for such anecdotes, since a large portion of the symposium consists of middling elites whose only claim to power is their cultural capital. In particular, the honoured guests of the symposium are the teachers whose ephebic students at the Diogeneion[31] have performed well in competitions. Despite teaching in what is presumably a prestigious location in Athens, these teachers are certainly of lesser status: their students are said to be studying *grammata, geōmetria, rhētorikē,* and *mousikē*, a list which maps well onto a first century AD conception of the *enkyklios paideia* or *mesē paideia*, i.e. a student's education before the final and most prestigious stage of philosophy.[32] Philo at least defines *mesē paideia* as including the four subjects in Plutarch—*grammatikē*, *geōmetria*, *rhētorikē*, *mousikē*—as well as *astronomia* and 'every other intellectual *theōria*'.[33] Many of the named participants in the symposium are teachers of these subjects, including a musician Erato, *grammatikoi* Protogenes and Marcus, a geometer Hermeias, a *grammatistēs* Zopyrio, and rhetors Maximus and Glaucias. It is perhaps no surprise that this group of schoolteachers deems best the anecdote of the little boy: he is a perfect demonstration of the use of education for even people as young as their pupils.

Much recent work has shown how grammarians in particular occupy an 'awkward liminal position', where they are gatekeepers of elite culture but

30 Morgan (1998) 150, 188.

31 For a discussion of the location and purpose of the Diogeneion, probably to the east of the Roman Agora in present-day Plaka, see Miller (1995) 207–208. Plutarch's mention is the only literary reference to the Diogeneion (Miller [1995] 231 n. 42), but the epigraphic remains suggest that the term may refer to the lectures and library for the ephebes in the Gymnasion of Ptolemy.

32 Morgan (1998) 34.

33 Ph. *De Cong.* 11–18.

socially marginalized within it,[34] and given that geometry and music are often linked with grammar as vital but inferior elements of *paideia* it would not be surprising that their teachers are also socially marginal.[35] These figures dominate the early parts of Book 9 of the *Quaestiones Convivales* before they yield the floor to higher status figures like the philosophers Plutarch and Ammonius and a rhetor named Herodes likely to be the *consul suffectus* Claudius Atticus Herodes, Herodes Atticus' equally wealthy and connected father.[36]

Not only do the subjects they teach suggest these educators are of a fairly low status among the elite, but they act that way in Book 9 as well. That is to say, their conduct in Book 9 of the *Quaestiones Convivales* is typical of how Plutarch characterizes the lesser elite. In particular, as figures for whom their meagre amount of cultural capital is their sole source of influence, it is not surprising that their discussions in the early parts of Book 9 are more contentious than elsewhere in the *Quaestiones Convivales*, since more is at stake for them in these competitive displays of *paideia*. Repeatedly their discussions are called competitions (ἅμιλλα, φιλονεικία; 9.1.736E) and compared to Homeric warfare and duels between gods (9.1.736D, 9.4.739D, 9.5.739E, 9.6.741B). In one particularly telling example, the grammarian Hylas is dejected because of his failure in the competitions earlier that day. In what is labeled 'an awkward reply' (ἀπεκρίνατο σκαιῶς), he quotes from Menander, from the conclusion to a monologue where a character contrasts the strict social hierarchy of animals to the unsure hierarchy of humans, where flattery, blackmail, and spite allow men to rise: 'Better to be reborn an ass than to see inferior men live more distinguished than me'.[37] Hylas insults his fellow teachers by suggesting that they have cheated to get ahead, but more important is the underlying assumption: Hylas implicitly constructs the social hierarchy as being ideally largely based on skill in these intellectual competitions when performed fairly. For Hylas, and presumably many of the other participants who lack other signifiers of status, skill with *paideia* lies at the heart of his conception of his place in his social world. It is for this reason, then, I would argue that these anecdotes, which valorize *paideia* in front of the ruler, are so effective at creating peace in this particular symposium.

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34 Notably Kaster (1997). Eshleman (2013) is excellent on grammarians in the *Quaest. Conv.*

35 See Clarke (1971) for the link between these three topics.

36 Other higher-status figures that appear later in the book include Menephylus the Peripatetic, Trypho the doctor, Meniscus the *paidotribēs*, Sospis the rhetorician and Plutarch's brother Lamprias. For the possible identification of the *Quaest. Conv.*'s rhetor with Claudius Atticus Herodes, see Bowie (2002) 42–43.

37 Plu. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.5.739F2, quoting Men. *Theophorymene* fr. 2.19 Meineke: ὄνον γενέσθαι κρεῖττον ἢ τοὺς χείρονας / ὁρᾶν ἑαυτοῦ ζῶντας ἐπιφανέστερον.

This social reading of these anecdotes is supported by the similarity of one of these anecdotes to Machon. To return to the anecdotes in 9.1 that I omitted before that do not have rulers, one of these anecdotes discusses the wife of Theodorus, who speaks to her Thespian husband: 'Mention was also made of the wife of Theodorus the tragic actor who would not receive him to sleep with her while the competition was imminent, but when he entered her room victorious welcomed him with the words "Agamemnon's child, you have permission now"' (S. *El.* 2).[38] This anecdote of course has royalty and intellectuals in it of a sort: the Sophocles quotation places Theodorus' wife and the actor himself in the position of Orestes' *paidagōgos* showing the prince his kingdom as he returns from exile. It may be best to interpret this anecdote through the lens of a very similar anecdote told in Machon, the fragmentary Hellenistic author of poetic *chreiai*. This anecdote, about the king Demetrius Poliorcetes and the hetaira Mania, makes the same punning use of *Electra* 2 to refer to sexual activity: 'They say that Mania, once having been asked for her ass by King Demetrius, asked him also for a favour in return. And when he had given it, after a little time she turns around and says, "Child of Agamemnon, now it is permissible for you [to see/to have?] those things …"'[39] Leslie Kurke has convincingly argued for a political interpretation of Machon's *chreiai*, namely that Machon's anecdotes are a parody of a philosophical *chreiai* tradition, where instead of a democratic civil public sphere and debased private sphere, it is the demimonde that enforces good old Athenian values. In this particular anecdote Kurke argues that, reading Athens as the hetaira, the 'hidden transcript' of the anecdote is that 'Athens manipulates Demetrius with honours as skilfully (and cynically) as a hetaira wheedles gifts from an infatuated "john"'.[40] I would argue that Plutarch's anecdotes bear a similar message that these middling intellectuals are willing to hint at during such a closed-doors symposium: that Greek intellectuals can use their *paideia* to obtain what they want from the ruler, just as Theodorus' wife refuses him sexual favours until he obtains the lucrative victory that will benefit both of them.

38 Plu. *Quaest. Conv.* 9.1.737A–B: ἐμνήσθησαν δὲ καὶ τῆς Θεοδώρου τοῦ τραγῳδοῦ γυναικὸς οὐ προσδεξαμένης αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ συγκαθεύδειν ὑπογύου τοῦ ἀγῶνος ὄντος, ἐπεὶ δὲ νικήσας εἰσῆλθεν πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀσπασαμένης καὶ εἰπούσης 'Ἀγαμέμνονος παῖ, νῦν ἐκεῖν' ἔξεστί σοι' [S. *El.* 2].

39 Machon fr. XV, 11.226–230 Gow (trans. Kurke): Αἰτουμένην λέγουσι τὴν πυγήν ποτε / ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Μανίαν Δημητρίου / ἀνταξιῶσαι δωρεὰν καὐτόν τινα, / δόντος δ' ἐπιστρέψασα μετὰ μικρὸν λέγει, / Ἀγαμέμνονος παῖ, νῦν ἐκεῖν' ἔξεστί σοι [S. *El.* 2].

40 Kurke (2002) 37–38.

I would like to try now to place these anecdotes within a broader context within Plutarch. Anecdotes of kings and intellectuals only occur twice in the *Quaestiones Convivales*: here, and in a speech by Polycrates in *Quaestiones Convivales* 4.4 that appears to be a parody of typical grammarian talk. I would argue that this is significant: these anecdotes are appropriate for the middling elite who make up the bulk of the participants of Book 9, but not for the higher-status figures that are more often the participants in Plutarch's symposia. Indeed many of Plutarch's symposiasts are not merely local elites but figures who possess real power on an imperial scale, such as the prince of Commagene and *consul suffectus* Philopappus and the dedicatee of the *Quaestiones Convivales*, the general and consul Sosius Senecio.[41] Plutarch himself seems to have largely avoided political advancement, except for a token procuratorship at the end of his life,[42] but many participants in Plutarch's symposia have wealth and resources beyond simply their knowledge of poetry. This point is highlighted by the leader of the symposium, namely the Platonic philosopher and Plutarch's teacher Ammonius, who, as the narrator conspicuously points out at the beginning of 9.1, is serving as *stratēgos* at Athens at the time of the symposium, a position which at the time ensured the grain supply and was the principal civic magistracy of the city.[43] Such figures have no need to tell anecdotes that emphasize the access to power that their *paideia* offers them, and in fact would perhaps disdain the reduction of cultural learning to its ability to extract concessions from the ruler. In contrast, the middling elites of *Quaestiones Convivales* 9 do wish to reassure themselves that their temporal masters respect their learning and that their expertise in *paideia* offers them material rewards. I would argue then that putting these anecdotes in the mouths of the lesser elite serves to characterize and subtly criticize them, much as the narrator directly damns one of these men's later speeches as 'what is spoken in the schoolrooms' (9.2.737E). Despite how these schoolteachers imagine the relationship between kings and intellectuals, not all rulers' ears can be bent by an apropos line of Homer.

41 Generally see Jones (1961), (1966), (1971), Puech (1992).

42 Though the *Suda*, not impossibly, claims Trajan awarded him the honour of the *ornamenta consularia* (*Suda* π 1793). For Plutarch's probable ability and refusal to advance in the early years of Trajan's reign, see Bowie (2002). For the procuratorship, see Bowersock (1969) 112.

43 Geagan (1967) 18–31, esp. 30.

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Homeric Ideals *Versus* Roman Realities? Civil War, Autocracy, and the Reception of Homer in Silius Italicus' *Punica*[*]

Elina Pyy

Silius Italicus' *Punica* is one of the three great war epics of the Flavian period. In terms of scope and topic, it differs considerably from the other two, Statius' *Thebaid* and Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica*. Whereas Statius and Valerius found their topics in Greek mythology, Silius depicted the recorded past of Rome, following the model of Ennius and Lucan.[1] In the *Punica*, he relates the events of the second Punic War as a backstory for Rome's Mediterranean empire.

What makes the *Punica* particularly intriguing is its nature as an exemplary epic: the poem revolves around the theme of good governance and leadership.[2] Silius' epic can be observed as a series of *exempla* through which the poet examines the qualities that make a good ruler—or a bad one. Considering the topic of the poem, it is natural that military excellence, in particular, is emphasized—in the *Punica*, a good ruler is first and foremost a good military leader. However, Silius makes clear that battlefield excellence is not sufficient for the needs of a civilized society—in times of crisis, there needs to be a strong civilian government to counterbalance the military command.

In this paper, I explore Silius' engagement with Homeric heroism in his depiction of *multi viri* in the first part of the *Punica* as well as Cornelius Scipio's synecdochic heroism in the latter part of the poem. I will suggest that whereas Silius subscribes to the Homeric definition of the ideal warrior as a combination of military courage and good counsel, he contests the glory-based competitive mode by which the epic heroic society operates.[3] By doing

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1 For Silius' literary models, see Kennedy Klaassen (2009) 99 and Pomeroy (2009) 28–32.

2 See Tipping (2009) 193, (2010) 7–13. As Pomeroy (2009: 28) notes, the Punic Wars were the favourite material of exemplary stories for many writers, such as Cicero and Valerius Maximus.

3 See e.g. Nagy (2013) 26–28.

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so, the Flavian poet examines the Roman issues of civil war and autocracy. I will propose that instead of adopting an optimistic approach to monarchy and offering a model of good rulership, Silius' epic recalls Lucanian cynicism even as it reflects the inevitable yet deplorable decline towards tyranny and autocracy.

A Collective Model for Heroism: An Archaic Ideal for Republican Rome

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the *Punica* is that its model of leadership is strongly based on *multi viri*.[4] The long years of the Punic War enable the poet to bring forth a series of heroes that embody the essence of *Romanitas*. Fabius, Paulus, Marcellus, Servilius, Scipio—these are the great men of Rome who each in their own way set an example of leadership for others to follow. The multitude of leaders means that heroism is an ambivalent concept in the *Punica*.[5] In effect, this 'rotating display of heroes' has sometimes made critics consider Silius' work to be an unconventional epic, or 'an epic without a hero'.[6] Of course, when it comes to Roman epic, 'unconventional' typically means 'different from Virgil'. The idea of the *Punica* as a poem that lacks a hero clearly derives from the attempt to examine it in relation to the *Aeneid*.[7] However, in this crucial matter—the model of heroism and leadership—Silius distances himself from his Augustan idol, as he makes clear from the beginning by stating:

> *da, Musa, decus memorare laborum*
> *antiquae Hesperiae, quantosque ad bella crearit*
> *et quot Roma viros,* [...].[8]
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 1.3–5

> Grant me, O Muse, to record the splendid achievements of Italy in ancient days, and to tell of all those heroes whom Rome brought forth for the strife [...].

4 Spentzou (2008), Tipping (2010) 2.

5 Spentzou (2008). See also Tipping (2009) 217.

6 See Spentzou (2008), 133–134. Marks (2005: 62–63) speaks of a 'polyheroic' and a 'hero-less' reading.

7 Spentzou (2008) 134.

8 The text and translations of the *Punica* follow the Loeb edition by Duff (1934).

Instead of a *vir*, there are *viri*—instead of the One, there are many who make the Roman destiny. Although to deny Virgil's significance for the style and content of Flavian war epic would be unfair, it is crucial to acknowledge that to examine Flavian epics strictly in terms of the *Aeneid* might actually harm our understanding of these poems. For instance, exemplarity based on *multi viri* is far more typical of ancient epic—even of Roman epic—than exemplarity based on a single man.[9] In effect, it is something downright Homeric.

In order to understand the model of leadership in the *Punica*, it is necessary to pay attention to the ways in which Silius interprets Homer.[10] After all, the poet expressly declares his admiration of and his debt to his great predecessor in book 13, where the young P. Cornelius Scipio descends to the underworld. It is a classic making-of-the-hero episode, where the youngster consults great men of the past in order to become a good ruler himself. Homer himself walks among the souls of the dead and it is told that

> *et fuit in tanto non parvum pectore numen.*
> *carmine complexus terram, mare, sidera, manes,*
> *et cantu Musas et Phoebum aequavit honore.*
> *atque haec cuncta, prius quam cerneret, ordine terris*
> *prodidit ac vestram tulit usque ad sidera Troiam.*
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 13.787–791

> a great genius dwelt in his mighty mind. His poetry embraced earth and sea, the sky and the nether world; he rivalled the Muses in song and Apollo in glory. All this region also, before he ever saw it, he revealed to mortals; and he raised the fame of Troy to heaven—Troy the mother of Rome.

In this passage, two things are evident: first of all, Homer is the supreme model for Silius as a poet. Secondly, Troy is the unquestionable forerunner of Rome, throughout the *Punica* described as *gens Troiana*.[11] This strong Homeric connection foreshadows Silius' definition of the good ruler, which is indicated more clearly in the following lines, where the poet introduces the heroes of the *Iliad*.

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9 Compare with the *Pharsalia*, the *Thebaid*, or the *Argonautica*.

10 Kennedy Klaassen (2009) 103–104.

11 Sil. *Pun.* 16.655; see also 1.125–126, 2.342–343, 3.126–127, 3.710, 7.483–484, 9.530–532, 10.433–434, 10.628–629.

Invicto stupet Aeacide, stupet Hector magno
Aiacisque gradum venerandaque Nestoris ora
miratur, geminos aspectat laetus Atridas
iamque Ithacum, corde aequantem Peleia facta.
SIL. *Pun.* 13.800–803

> [Scipio] marvelled at Achilles the invincible and gigantic Hector; the vast stride of Ajax and the reverend face of Nestor moved his wonder; he looked with delight at the two Atridae and the Ithacan, as great in counsel as Achilles in battle.

Military excellence, courage, dignity, and good counsel—these are embodied in the heroes of the *Iliad*, and they are the characteristics on which the model of leadership is based in Silius' Roman epic. Instead of wrapping the ideal qualities of a leader into one man, Silius recalls the Homeric concept of *multi viri*—a collection of complementary virtues that can be found in a group of outstanding individuals. Thus, at the first look at least, Homer's archaic warrior community appears to function as an optimal mirror for Silius' representation of the Roman Republic, a community based on the collaboration of capable men.

Courage without Consideration: Varro and Flaminius' Problematic Leadership

In the passage quoted above, there is one line that appears to be of particular importance: it is told that '[Scipio] looked with delight at the two Atridae and the Ithacan, as great in counsel as Achilles in battle'. This is telling, as tension between courage and consideration can be considered a central theme in the *Punica*. In Book 5, Corvinus advises the quick-tempered Flaminius by stating that 'War calls for strategy: valour is less praiseworthy in a commander'.[12] However, in Book 13, the ghost of Alexander—the greatest of all leaders—tells Scipio that 'cunning and caution disgrace a general. Boldness is the way to win a war.'[13] These kinds of contradictions appear to be deliberate and

12 Sil. *Pun.* 5.99: *bellandum est astu: levior laus in duce dextrae*.

13 Sil. *Pun.* 13.772–773: *turpis lenti sollertia Martis. / audendo bella expedias*.

meaningful—they draw the reader's attention to the juxtaposition of boldness and consideration.[14]

The contradiction between courage and consideration is naturally a very old epic *topos*, although it is by no means an epic ideal. As Klooster points out, in Homeric epic, the ideal warrior possesses both of these qualities: he is bold in battle but wise in counsel, a man who 'combines command over words with command over actions'.[15] This balance, however, is hard to strike, and quite often the two qualities are represented as mutually exclusive. In the *Iliad*, some men—such as Nestor and Polydamas—are by nature wise counsellors while others—Hector and Achilles, in particular—are courageous warriors.[16]

In the *Punica*, Silius takes this aspect of Homeric epic and develops it to suit his Roman story. By giving examples of both good and bad leadership, the Flavian poet discusses the *de facto* dichotomy between courage and counsel, gradually developing it into a discussion about the conflict between *multi viri* and one-man rule. In the *Punica*, the two examples of mindless leadership are Gaius Flaminius and Gaius Terentius Varro. Both are men of action, hungry for glory but lacking in reason and restraint. As a result, they cause the two worst defeats of Roman war history, the battle of Lake Trasimene and the infamous battle of Cannae.

Flaminius and Varro's shortcomings have clear Homeric echoes. The character of Flaminius displays many similarities with Homer's Achilles, as the qualities of *ira* and *furor* define his nature—the same anger that marks Homer's Achilles and grows into the prevalent theme of the *Iliad*.[17] Flaminius boosts his soldiers' morale and arouses their anger by reminding them of their personal losses.[18] Besides anger, hunger for glory is what drives him on. These characteristics are not weaknesses *per se* in the heroic code of Greco-Roman epic, quite the contrary[19]—however, if not combined with reason and wisdom, they can easily turn into such. This seems to be the central message that Silius seeks to convey through his depiction of Flaminius. On the eve of battle, Flaminius

14 Laudizi (1989), Marks (2005) 35–37.

15 Klooster (in this volume) 67. For the importance of speech, see also Schofield (1986) 15 and Martin (1989) 22–25, 92.

16 See e.g. *Il.* 9.434, 13.726–734, 18.105–106.

17 For further discussion of these qualities, see Zanker (1994) 94–113 and Buchan (2004) 122, 129–130.

18 Sil. *Pun.* 5.153–157.

19 See Nagy (1979) 26–40 and (2013) 26–31.

refuses to wait for the back-up legions because he resents the idea of sharing the glory with another general.[20] Again, the reader is reminded of Achilles, who explicitly forbids Patroclus from advancing too far in the battle without him:

> [...] εἰ δέ κεν αὖ τοι
> δώῃ κῦδος ἀρέσθαι ἐρίγδουπος πόσις Ἥρης,
> μὴ σύ γ' ἄνευθεν ἐμεῖο λιλαίεσθαι πολεμίζειν
> Τρωσὶ φιλοπτολέμοισιν· ἀτιμότερον δέ με θήσεις·
>
> *Il.* 16.87–90

> [...] if the loud-thundering lord of Hera grants you to win glory, be not eager apart from me to war against the war-loving Trojans: you will lessen my honour.

Thus, Silius depicts Flaminius as an Achilles-like warrior, driven on by anger and thirst for glory. It is implied that this is what makes him a good soldier, but a poor leader. The poet describes Flaminius' leadership with a simile that leaves little room for interpretation:

> *inde ubi prima dies iuris, clavumque regendae*
> *invasit patriae, ac sub nutu castra fuere,*
> *ut pelagi rudis et pontum tractare per artem*
> *nescius, accepit miserae si iura carinae,*
> *ventorum tenet ipse vicem cunctisque procellis*
> *dat iactare ratem: fertur vaga gurgite puppis,*
> *ipsius in scopulos dextra impellente magistri.*
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 4.711–717

> When his first day of office came, he seized the helm of the state and commanded the armies. So, if a mere landsman, with no skill to manage the sea, has got the command of a luckless vessel, he himself does the work of foul weather, and exposes the ship to be tossed by every gale; she drifts at random over the sea, and the hand of her own captain drives her upon the rocks.

Clearly, Flaminius is a man who, despite his bravery, is completely unsuitable to lead a massive military campaign in the Republic's hour of need. A similar

20 Sil. *Pun.* 5.114–116.

image is given of Varro who, instead of anger, is marked by a terrible haste. In Book 8, he is described as follows:

> [...] *nullus, qui portet in hostem,*
> *sufficit insano sonipes; incedere noctis,*
> *quae tardent cursum, tenebras dolet; itque superbus*
> *tantum non strictis mucronibus, ulla retardet*
> *ne pugnas mora, dum vagina ducitur ensis.*
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 8.336–340

> No war-horse is swift enough to carry that madman against the enemy; when the darkness of night comes on, he resents the hindrance to his activity; he marches proudly on, with swords that are all but drawn, that the drawing of the blade from the sheath may not delay the battle.

The striking similarities in Silius' depiction of Varro and Flaminius have been noted by critics before—Varro is an *alter Flaminius*, who reflects and complements the vices of the other.[21] The apparent overlap of these two characters implies that Silius does not really attempt to depict them as historical figures—instead, he merges Flaminius and Varro into one in order to construct a textbook example of a bad ruler. Intriguingly, this *exemplum* is of a strongly Homeric, Achillean, nature, as the defining characteristics of these leaders are exactly the *ira*, the thirst for glory, and the short-sightedness that can be attributed to Homer's hero.

But whereas Flaminius lives up to the Achillean model by being a skilful warrior despite his rashness and quick temper, Varro is lacking in all qualities that make an epic hero.

> *atque illi sine luce genus surdumque parentum*
> *nomen* [...].
> [...]
> *idem, ut turbarum sator atque accendere sollers*
> *invidiam pravusque togae, sic debilis arte*
> *belligera Martemque rudis versare nec ullo*
> *spectatus ferro* [...].
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 8.246–247, 258–261

21 Sil. *Pun.* 8.218, 8.310. Notice a strikingly similar simile concerning Varro's leadership: Sil. *Pun.* 8.279–283. See Ariemma (2009) 244, 266–267, Fucecchi (2009) 228, Tipping (2010) 110.

> His birth was obscure; the name of his ancestors was never heard; […] Also, though a bad citizen, skilful to stir up trouble and kindle hatred, he was helpless in the field, unpractised in the conduct of war, and not approved by any deed of valour.

No impressive parentage, no military skills, and no restraint whatsoever—far from being an exemplary epic hero, Varro appears rather, as Ariemma (2005: 250–251) perceptively notes, as a representative of Roman *populares* politicians, a shameless demagogue and an opportunist.[22] Interestingly, on this occasion too, a Homeric model can be observed, as in these qualities Silius' Varro recalls Homer's Thersites.[23] In his thirst for glory and opportunism, Varro moreover appears as a reflection of the ambitious generals of the last century BC—Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar—who did not recoil from monopolizing Republican politics by courting the people.

Horrendous *exempla* as they are, Varro and Flaminius both appear as representatives of the 'Roman spirit'. They embody the fatal weaknesses that mark the Roman destiny and that, in due time, will ransack the Republic. They stand out from the other *viri* in significance if not in virtue. This rhetoric can be heard in Fabius' speech in book eight. While praising Paulus as a consul worthy of Rome, he refers to Varro asking '[i]f a single man may destroy our country, why should not a single arm preserve it?'[24] The idea that *multi viri* are being replaced by the One—in good and bad—is evident in these words.

Courage *and* Consideration: Marcellus and Fabius' Exemplary Leadership

Silius thus repeatedly recalls Homeric models in order to assess his characters' capability as leaders. However, it is not only negative *exempla* that the poet has to offer. In the *Punica*, the good rulers are marked precisely by their ability to combine the two Homeric virtues—courage and consideration. M. Claudius Marcellus, conqueror of Syracuse, is an example of this. In the *Punica*, he is a bold man of action but not blinded by his hunger for glory. He makes quick decisions but is also a skilful and patient tactician. He encourages his soldiers to compete for glory and spoils, but he is also famous for his *clementia* towards

22 See also Ariemma (2009) 253; see e.g. Sil. *Pun.* 8.243, 8.249–251; cf. Liv. 22.26.4.

23 For Thersites, see e.g. *Il.* 2.225–242; for further discussion, see Martin (1989) 109–113.

24 Sil. *Pun.* 8.317–318: *cur, uni patriam si affligere fas est, / uni sit servare nefas?* See also 8.250–251.

the conquered.[25] In effect, Marcellus embodies the good commander to such an extent that the poet makes him an *exemplum* for his contemporaries: 'Happy would the nations be, if our peaceful governors would imitate our former generals.'[26]

Another positive *exemplum* is Q. Fabius Maximus 'Cunctator'. Famous for his successful tactics of delay in the second Punic War, Fabius is one of the great figures of Roman history.[27] In the *Punica*, he becomes a man of mythical measure—as Tipping (2009: 193) points out, with his patience and *magnanimitas*, Fabius recalls the synecdochic status of Virgil's Aeneas.[28] Yet, he is first and foremost a Homeric hero. Throughout the epic, Fabius is represented as a wise, elderly warrior—*bellator vetus*—and as a necessary counterpart to the passionate young generals.[29] Obviously, the reader is supposed to think of Nestor, the ultimate counsellor of Homeric epic.[30] In the *Iliad*, Nestor's role is to be a mediator between the quarrelling chiefs of the Achaeans. Time after time, he gives good advice to Agamemnon in particular and restrains his anger.[31] In a similar manner, Silius' Fabius is a counsellor to other leaders: he advises the Senate, the consuls, and the generals in a calm and considerate manner. As in Homer's Nestor, there is something semi-divine in his deliberation and restraint.[32] This is indicated in the very first book, where Fabius advises the Senate to refrain from prompt action against Hannibal: 'Mindful of the future and musing on the war to come, Fabius, prophet-like, uttered this advice from his lofty soul.'[33]

Fabius' greatest accomplishment in the art of *euboulia* takes place after the disaster of Cannae.[34] *Patres populusque* are furious at Varro for destroying the army and, worse still, for surviving the bloodshed.[35] Upon Varro's return, Fabius

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25 Sil. *Pun.* 14.182–183, 14.186–187, 14.294–297, 14.625–626, 14.665–675, 14.681.

26 Sil. *Pun.* 14.684–685: *felices populi, si, quondam ut bella solebant, / nunc quoque inexhaustas pax nostra relinqueret urbes!*

27 See e.g. Liv. 44.22.10, Cic. *Off.* 1.84, Val. Max. 7.3.7, Verg. *Aen.* 6.845–846.

28 On the 'synecdochic hero', see Hardie (1993) 3–11, 27–35.

29 See also Sil. *Pun.* 1.687, 6.616, 7.3–4, 7.517, 7.588, 7.730, 8.303, 15.322, 16.603.

30 As Klooster (in this volume: 68) notes, in the Homeric code old age is often connected to wisdom 'which finds its expression in excellent counsel and speech'. See also Martin (1989) 25. On Nestor as wise counsellor, see e.g. Roisman (2005).

31 *Il.* 1.247–284, 2.333–393, 9.79–161. For Nestor's exemplary position, see Martin (1989) 101–108.

32 For Nestor's 'theological insight', see Martin (1989) 102–105.

33 Sil. *Pun.* 1.685–686: *providus haec, ritu vatis, fundebat ab alto / pectore praemeditans Fabius surgentia bella.*

34 For the definition of *euboulia*, see Schofield (1986) and Klooster (in this volume) 69–70.

35 Sil. *Pun.* 10.605–614.

calms the anger of his fellow citizens. He warns them of hatred and dissolution among the Romans.[36] As a result, the disdain is appeased and the people are able to put together a united front. The episode reminds the reader of *Iliad* 9, where Nestor claims that 'a clanless, lawless, hearthless man is he who loves the horror of war among his own people'.[37] Thus, Silius employs a Homeric model to construct an archetype of an ideal Roman leader—a man with outstanding foresight, who remains calm even in times of crisis.[38]

Fabius' greatest asset as leader is that he, unlike many others, is able to combine his consideration with military excellence.[39] In Book 7, the poet depicts Fabius as excelling in battle.[40] He expressly compares him to Nestor, stating that '[t]hus the King of Pylus fought in his second stage of life, when youth was gone and old age not yet come'.[41] With his distinctively Homeric heroism, Silius' Fabius is not only a great civic leader but also a valiant warrior.

> [...] *'non hunc', inquit, 'superaverit unquam*
> *invidia aut blando popularis gloria fuco;*
> *non astus fallax, non praeda aliusve cupido.*
> *bellandi vetus ac laudum cladumque quieta*
> *mente capax; par ingenium castrisque togaeque.'*
> SIL. *Pun.* 6.613–617

> 'This man', he [sc. Jupiter] said, 'will never yield to jealousy or the sweet poison of popular applause; he will be proof against artful devices and desire of plunder and all other passions. A veteran soldier, he can meet success and disaster with a quiet mind; neither war nor peace is beyond his capacity.'

Most importantly, Silius exemplifies in the character of Fabius a sort of leadership that is needed in *Republican* Rome. It is crucial that although displaying

36 Sil. *Pun.* 10.615–619.

37 *Il.* 9.63–64: ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος / ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος.

38 Tipping (2010: 116–117) examines Fabius as a Stoic *vir bonus* and a characteristically civic hero.

39 Polybius uses Fabius as an example of how a mere warrior and a general differ from one another. See Plb. 3.105.8–9.

40 Sil. *Pun.* 7.567–616.

41 Sil. *Pun.* 7.596–597: *qualis post iuvenem, nondum subeunte senecta, / rector erat Pylius bellis aetate secunda.*

Homeric virtues, Fabius is not a hero of the archaic past, but the kind of ruler a growing empire needs: a great general, a skilful senator, and a middleman in the quarrels of his fellow leaders. Moreover, as a Republican hero he is able to put the welfare of the state before his own pursuit of fame.[42] In this respect, he resembles (and surpasses) Marcellus, while being the polar opposite of Varro the demagogue. In the character of the Cunctator, we can observe how masterfully Silius employs the Homeric heroic code, but modifies it to fit the topic and content of his Roman poem.

In the previous section, I pointed out that despite their vices and weaknesses, Varro and Flaminius occasionally achieve a synecdochic status as representatives of the 'Roman spirit'. This phenomenon can be more clearly observed in the case of the positive *exempla* of Marcellus and Fabius. On many occasions, they become not only representatives but embodiments of the state and the people. Silius states about Fabius that 'all the men and arms of Italy were comprised in his person',[43] and that 'Fabius is our country, and the walls of Rome rest on the shoulders of a single man!'[44] Marcellus, in turn, is called 'that name of terror, that pillar of the Roman state'.[45] These statements mark a change of tone in the epic. After showing the audience Republican heroism and leadership at their best, the poet seems to turn over a new leaf—in the latter part of the *Punica*, he moves from *multi viri* to rewrite the Homeric 'best of the Achaeans' theme.

Silius' Fabius and Marcellus have often been considered as very different, yet complementary and comparative models of epic heroism.[46] Fucecchi (2009: 230, 238), for instance, examines them as embodiments of two patterns of leadership whose difference lies in temperament. Yet, it is important to note that, due to their ability to combine the Homeric ideals of boldness and consideration, they are both completely adequate heroes as such. Neither Marcellus nor Fabius lacks any prerequisite of an ideal leader. What they do lack, however, is the 'effectively charismatic stature of the one'.[47] And this is why they can only perform as forerunners of the individualism that emerges in the latter half of the epic.

42 Fucecchi (2009) 223, 230.

43 Sil. *Pun.* 7.8: *in sese cuncta arma virosque gerebat.*

44 Sil. *Pun.* 7.743: *hic patria est, murique urbis stant pectore in uno.* See also 7.1, 7.6–8, 7.252, 8.2–3.

45 Sil. *Pun.* 15.384–385: *exitiabile nomen, / Ausonii columen regni.*

46 Fucecchi (2009) 220.

47 Fucecchi (2009) 221, 239.

Towards the One: Scipio as Synecdochic Hero

The apparent celebration of 'Republican' heroism notwithstanding, the reader of course knows that Republican Rome was an outdated idea in Silius' day. Flavian Rome was an autocracy and as such had its own specific standards of leadership. This is something that greatly impacts the ideological tone of the *Punica*. There is an ongoing tension between individual heroism of charismatic leaders and the Republican, democratic governance.[48] In theory, heroes of the *Punica* are not 'rulers'—they are consuls and generals and as such should be under the Senate's control. In practice, however, their heroism raises them above the others and makes them appear as the heads of the nation.

The tension between the One and the Many is a *topos* that arises from Homeric epic. As Adkins (1960: 30–60) notes, the heroic society in the *Iliad* operates by the glory-based competitive mode; even when the chiefs cooperate, their motivation is often grounded in personal ambition, honour, shame, or guilt.[49] The competitive spirit and the self-aggrandizement that endanger the entire social order are particularly evident in the strife between Achilles and Agamemnon that forms the core of the *Iliad*.[50] The clash between the egos of the 'best of the Achaeans' raises the question of whether a shared authority between leaders—the ideal of *multi viri*—can actually ever work out. In *Iliad* 2, Odysseus argues for Agamemnon's authority, stating that a multitude of rulers is not a good thing and that there should be only one lord.[51] Thus, despite the multitude of heroes—or because of it—the Homeric heroic code is strongly engaged with the contradiction between the One and the Many.

Since the tension between consular rule and autocracy is the defining feature of Roman history, it is not surprising that the theme is prevalent in Roman war epic.[52] Certainly, the tension between the One and the Many can be considered one of the central themes in the *Punica*.[53] As Tipping (2009: 203, 214, 217) observes, Silius' epic is largely a story about the Republican spirit being overshadowed by the rise of individualism. I would suggest that whereas the first part of the *Punica* confirms the Homeric definition of the ideal hero as a 'speaker of words and doer of deeds' through several positive and negative *exempla*, the latter part of the epic in turn revises with critical overtones the

48 E.g. Tipping (2010) 35–50.

49 See also Schofield (1986) and Zanker (1994) 21–42.

50 Buchan (2004) 112–115, Zanker (1994) 30–31.

51 *Il.* 2.196–197; see also 1.278–279.

52 See e.g. Hardie (1993) 10.

53 Marks (2005) 71.

Homeric model of competitive, glory-seeking heroism. This discussion, naturally, is strongly connected to the issues of autocracy and civil war in Silius' subtle political rhetoric.

The conflict between individual heroism and democratic governance is expressed in *Punica* 3, where Jupiter explains to Venus why he is letting Rome go through such a painful war.

> [...] *hinc nomina nostro*
> *non indigna polo referet labor; hinc tibi Paulus,*
> *hinc Fabius gratusque mihi Marcellus opimis.*
> *hi tantum parient Latio per vulnera regnum,*
> *quod luxu et multum mutata mente nepotes*
> *non tamen evertisse queant.* [...]
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 3.585–590

> Thus suffering shall produce famous men, worthy to dwell with us in heaven; thou shalt see a Paulus, a Fabius, and a Marcellus who has pleased me by honourable spoils. These men, by their defeats, will gain for Latium an empire so great, that their descendants will be unable to overthrow it, for all their luxury and degenerate hearts.

Thus, Jupiter represents Rome as an empire built by the deeds of the many. Nevertheless, immediately after this celebration of *multi viri*, his speech becomes a eulogy of the One:

> [...] *iamque ipse creatus,*
> *qui Poenum revocet patriae Latioque repulsum*
> *ante suae muros Carthaginis exuat armis.*
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 3.590–592

> Already the man is born who shall drive Hannibal back from Latium to his own land, and strip him of his arms before the walls of his native Carthage.

This man is Scipio, the '[b]right star of Italy' with martial feats 'too great by far for a single arm'.[54] In the last five books, Scipio little by little absorbs the

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54 Sil. *Pun.* 13.707: *lux Italum*; 708: *multum uno maiora viro*. After praising Scipio, the poet continues by eulogizing the Flavian emperors, culminating in a praise of Domitian himself. See Marks (2005) 210–244, Kennedy Klaassen (2009) 125–126, Tipping (2009) 200–203.

qualities of the leaders who came before him, becoming a synthesis of previous rulers.[55] During his visit to the underworld, the hero encounters the souls of the generals who fell in the war—he admires the figures of Paulus, Marcellus, Gracchus, and Servilius, and wishes to consult them for advice.[56] Likewise, he notices the first *decemviri* and urges to talk to them.[57] Thus, the poet denotes Scipio's desire to become a combination of these men of the past—a great warrior and a great legislator.

The same idea is conveyed by Hannibal's nightmare in Book 17. Before the decisive battle of Zama, Hannibal has a dream that foretells his imminent ruin:

> *namque gravis curis sarpit dum nocte quietem,*
> *cernere Flaminium Gracchumque et cernere Paulum*
> *visus erat simul adversos mucronibus in se*
> *destrictis ruere atque Itala depellere terra.*
> SIL. *Pun.* 17.160–163

> For while resting at night from his burden of anxiety, he dreamed that Flaminius and Gracchus and Paulus were all attacking him at once with drawn swords and driving him off the soil of Italy.

Thus, the poet represents the victorious Scipio as an embodiment of *virtus* that came before him. He becomes the undisputable 'One' who embodies Roman destiny and connects the past with the future.[58] As such, he brings a strong imperial overtone to the epic. Scholars have often labeled Silius' Scipio 'proto-emperor' or 'proto-*princeps*',[59] the underlying idea being that he is the forerunner of Roman autocracy—as a synecdochic hero, Scipio becomes a *pater patriae* before his time. As such, he strongly evokes the glory-seeking and self-aggrandizing heroic ethos of the *Iliad*—however, as I will argue, while this concept might be appropriate in Homeric epic, it is much more problematic in the Roman context.

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55 Tipping (2009) 194; see also Hardie (1993) 97 and Marks (2005) 66, 77–80.

56 Sil. *Pun.* 13.705–720. Cf. Verg. *Aen.* 6.817–825. See Kennedy Klaassen (2009) 121–122, Tipping (2009) 198.

57 Sil. *Pun.* 13.752–757.

58 For further discussion, see Marks (2005) 214, Fucecchi (2009) 239, Tipping (2009) 200 and (2010) 45.

59 Marks (2010) 195, Tipping (2009) 194.

Shadows of Civil War

The reason why the concept of competitive heroism and the pursuit of individual glory are so much more inflammable in Roman than in Homeric epic is Rome's traumatic civil war background. This is a feature that marks Roman imperial literature throughout—on this occasion, it is sufficient to have a brief look at the scholarly dispute about Silius' representation of the hero of his epic. Critics are divided over the question of whether the poet represents Scipio's synedochic status as a good or as a bad thing. According to optimists, Scipio is an 'ideal king', and the embodiment of the poet's argument for one-man rule—perhaps a model for Domitian himself.[60] Others, however, consider him a power-hungry opportunist whose character foreshadows the competitive generals of the civil war period.[61] Tipping (2009: 198), for instance, calls attention to the fact that the late-Republican heroes whom the Sibyl introduces to Scipio are none other than Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar, the men who destroyed the Republic.[62] Indeed, strikingly Lucanian overtones can be heard in the Sibyl's exclamation: 'Alas, unhappy men, how often will you wage war over the whole earth! And the victor will pay no less dearly for his crimes than the vanquished.'[63] Here we can observe a prime example of a topsy-turvy exemplary circle typical of Roman epic: as Scipio follows the example of these ghosts yet to be born, he becomes an ambitious and competitive proto-*princeps* and, as such, a forerunner of these very same generals.[64]

In effect, by his very sublimity, Scipio weakens the basis of democratic governance. In Book 16, upon requesting permission to cross over to Africa, he overrules the Senate through his charismatic personality and transfers the fate of Rome from the hands of the *patres* to the hands of his army.[65] Scipio's rhetoric is strikingly egocentric and self-congratulatory; he represents himself as the only man who, with the blessing of the gods, can save the state.[66] As many scholars have pointed out, threatening echoes of civil war can be heard

60 See e.g. Marks (2010) 195.

61 Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy (1986), MacGuire (1997), Spentzou (2008) 143, Tipping (2009) 195, 218.

62 Sil. *Pun.* 13.850–867. See also Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy (1986) 2523–2531.

63 Sil. *Pun.* 13.866–867: *heu miseri, quotiens toto pugnabitis orbe! / nec leviora lues, quam victus, crimina victor.*

64 Cf. Verg. *Aen.* 6.752–885.

65 Sil. *Pun.* 16.592–700.

66 Sil. *Pun.* 16.645–651, 16.654–663, 16.663–669.

in this episode.[67] Considering the Lucanian colours elsewhere in the *Punica*, it seems that the decisive debate in Book 16 is not primarily a shift from one military mode to another, nor a 'conflict between generations'[68]—it is a battle over *imperium* between the One and the Many.

Unsurprisingly, this looming of autocracy is consistently discussed in relation to Homer. This can be clearly observed in the *Nekyia* episode in Book 13, which as a whole is a respectful nod to Homer and Virgil. As Kennedy Klaassen (2009: 103, 114) points out, in his role as a representative hero, Scipio recalls both Aeneas and Odysseus, the unquestionable 'Ones' of the epic tradition. I would, however, argue that even in the underworld episode, the primary model for Silius' *unus vir* is actually Achilles, and not just any Achilles, but Homer's glory-hungry and ambitious Achilles, reflections of whom I observed in Varro earlier. Scipio's words, when he admires Homer, are telling: 'How fortunate was Achilles, when such a poet displayed him to the world! The hero was made greater by the poet's verse.'[69]

Scipio's pursuit of eternal fame becomes more evident still when he encounters the ghost of Alexander. Mesmerized by Alexander's fame and blinded by his own ambition, Scipio dreams of matching the king's achievement:

> [...] *Libyci certissima proles*
> *Hammonis, quando exsuperat tua gloria cunctos*
> *indubitata duces, similique cupidine rerum*
> *pectora nostra calent, quae te via, fare, superbum*
> *ad decus et summas laudum perduxerit arces.*
>
> SIL. *Pun.* 13.767–771

> O true-born son of Libyan Ammon, since your undisputed fame eclipses that of all other commanders, and my heart is fired with the same thirst for glory, tell me the path by which you rose to your proud eminence and the topmost pinnacle of achievement.[70]

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67 Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy (1986) 2502, MacGuire (1995) 118 and (1997) 140–141, Tipping (2010) 177–179.

68 Marks (2005) 32, 51–52.

69 Sil. *Pun.* 13.796–797: *felix Aeacide, cui tali contigit ore / gentibus ostendi! crevit tua carmine virtus.*

70 Scipio also identifies himself with Alexander by means of divine parentage; a few moments earlier, the ghost of his mother has revealed that Jupiter is his real father. See Sil. *Pun.* 13.628–649. For the story of Alexander's origin, see e.g. Liv. 26.19.7, Plu. *Alex.* 2, D. Chr. 4.19.

Critics have pointed out the association between Achilles and Alexander in the Greco-Roman tradition and argued that Scipio's idolization of Achilles is implicit in his admiration of Alexander.[71] Indeed, it appears that Silius' Scipio idolizes Alexander in the same manner that Alexander is told to have idolized Achilles.[72] In the *Punica*, Alexander is the link between the Homeric hero and Silius' protagonist—and he is exactly the link that brings the darker, gloomier overtones in the story of Scipio's heroism. Silius undoubtedly was aware of the ambivalence of Alexander's image in Roman culture.[73] He knew that the men who ransacked the Republic, the victorious generals of the civil war, used to idolize him—not as a unifying force, but as the single ruler of the world.[74] Thus, Alexander stands for the pursuit of immortal renown and unlimited personal glory—aspects that in Homer's Achilles are not vices *per se*, but which in the Roman context immediately bring back the ghosts of civil war and recall the destruction of the state built by *multi viri*.

Thus, in the latter part of his epic, Silius adopts a highly cynical attitude towards the competitive individual heroism that marks the Homeric heroic code. It would appear that to the Flavian poet, anger and rashness are not, in the end, the most severe shortcomings in a leader. They are dangerous, yes, but, ideally, they can be counterbalanced with reason and consideration. The actual danger lies in another defining characteristic of the Homeric hero, namely his self-centred personality, unmindful of the needs of others.[75] The same egocentricity that can be observed in Homer's Achilles is evident in Silius' depiction of the young Scipio. Considering that he is destined to become the saviour and representative of the Roman people, he is surprisingly strongly focused on his personal suffering. In Book 13, upon hearing that his father and uncle have fallen in battle, Scipio is stricken by uncontrollable grief. He tears his garment and shuts himself in the privacy of his dwelling.[76]

71 Tipping (2009) 207 and (2010) 171–172. For further discussion, see Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy (1986) 2551, Laudizi (1989) 133, Tipping (2009) 204–205.

72 See e.g. Klooster (in this volume) 76–80. For Alexander's admiration of Achilles, see e.g. Cic. *Arch.* 24 and Plu. *Alex.* 15.8–9.

73 See Luc. *Phar.* 10.20–52, Suet. *Aug.* 18, Sen. *Ben.* 1.13, 2.16, 7.2.506, Liv. 9.17–19. Different, 'Trajanic', readings by Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom are discussed by Klooster (in this volume) 76–80.

74 For this 'Lucanian' reading, see Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy (1986) 2551–2552, Tipping (2010) 172.

75 This is pointed out by Nestor, who remarks: αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς / οἶος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπονήσεται· ἦ τέ μιν οἴω / πολλὰ μετακλαύσεσθαι, ἐπεί κ' ἀπὸ λαὸς ὄληται ('But Achilles will have profit of his valour alone. I suspect, in fact, he will often lament later on when the army perishes', *Il.* 11.762–764).

76 Sil. *Pun.* 13.388–389.

Non comites tenuisse valent, non ullus honorum
militiaeve pudor: pietas irata sinistris
caelicolis furit atque odit solacia luctus.
iamque dies iterumque dies absumpta querelis.
SIL. *Pun.* 13.390–393

No efforts of his friends, no regard for his high station and military command, could restrain him: his love raged against the cruelty of Heaven and refused all consolation. Day followed day, and was spent by him in lamenting.

Just like Achilles, Scipio is wallowing in grief and neglecting his duties.[77] Now, this sort of behaviour might be understandable coming from some run-of-the-mill epic warrior—but from the One who is supposed to end the war and lead Rome to its bright new future? Ironically, as Silius shows, the synecdochic, representative status more often than not goes hand in hand with outstanding egocentricity. This is a characteristic that, in the light of the epic tradition alone, probably cannot be considered a vice or a weakness—but examined in terms of the gloomy civil war rhetoric of the *Punica* as a whole, it appears as something that eventually ransacks the Republican collective spirit.

Thus, in many little details we observe how Silius assimilates the hero of his epic to Homer's Achilles—not to glorify him, but to emphasize the qualities that make him a less than ideal leader. In this manner, the poet implies that the ideal of a Homeric hero is—or actually, should be—an outdated ideal for the Roman world. The ruler of an empire should rise above the archaic standards and combine his warlike courage with civil counsel and good governance. Moreover, the man who is to rule over the empire, should never put his vanity and glory-hunting before the state and the people.

Yet, Roman history as Silius observes it has a very different story to tell. Scipio in the *Punica* is indeed the link between Rome's Republican past and its imperial future—but as a personification of the quality that is simultaneously a Homeric virtue and a Silian vice: *gloriae cupiditas* that, in the Roman context, leads to a never-ending circle of civil war and tyranny. This is the bridge between Homeric epic and Roman history and by crossing it, Silius follows in the footsteps of Lucan. This vitally important side to his epic has rarely been sufficiently appreciated or acknowledged in modern scholarship. This paper suggests that the commemorative tradition of epic poetry, 'singing of κλέα

77 Sil. *Pun.* 15.205–207.

ἀνδρῶν',[78] is by no means at odds with Lucanian pessimism and obsession with the civil war. The ideal of Homeric heroism goes hand in hand with the Roman epic discourse of civil war and, in fact, is a generative force behind it.

Conclusion

Silius' immense debt to Homer's heroic code and to his model of leadership can be observed throughout the *Punica*. As such, the poem is a synthesis between Homeric heroic song and Lucanian cynicism. In order to stress the difference between an archaic warrior community and a multicultural empire, Silius chooses as his topic the war that transformed Rome from a mere Italian power player into the master of the Mediterranean. However, in a cynical manner, he reveals the inability of the Roman people and their rulers to evolve with the state. The qualities that in the *Iliad* appear as heroic virtues—the pursuit of personal glory and the fierce competition that accompanies it—turn into fatal pitfalls in Silius' Roman epic. In the end, they are the spoils that the Romans bring to the new empire after their victory over Carthage. As a result, the ghosts of civil war constantly lurk behind the corner as Rome proceeds towards its imperial future. This can be observed at the finale of the epic, where Scipio celebrates his triumph over Hannibal. Dressed in royal purple and gold, he is the new Alexander into whose lap the world will fall.[79] However, the poet subtly implies that for the spirit and the morale of Rome, this is not a step forward—rather, it is a step backwards, back to the threatening shades of the archaic past, back to the world of epic where the law of the strongest prevails and the glory of the One comes at the expense of the many.

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78 Marks (2005) 273–275.

79 For further analysis of the imperial elements in the episode, see MacGuire (1997) 101–102, Tipping (2010) 185–192, Spentzou (2008) 137.

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Homer and the Good Ruler in the 'Age of Rhetoric': Eustathios of Thessalonike on Excellent Oratory*

Baukje van den Berg

The Byzantine twelfth century gained a reputation of being an 'age of rhetoric', not in the least because from this period a large amount of occasional prose and verse has survived.[1] In this context, rhetoric should be understood in a broad sense as the art of speaking, the art of saying the appropriate thing in the appropriate way, or, in short, as a near synonym of eloquence. Rhetorical education was imperative for everyone pursuing a career in the complex and sophisticated imperial or patriarchal administration, and for every aspiring intellectual competing in the intellectual arena of twelfth-century Byzantium.[2] The curriculum included rhetorical handbooks by, for instance, Hermogenes (second century AD), Menander Rhetor (probably late third century AD), and Aphthonios (fourth century AD) on the one hand, and ancient literature on the other.[3] Throughout the Byzantine period, Homer remained the most influential ancient author and continued to be considered 'The Poet'.[4] Homeric poetry provided twelfth-century writers with a treasure trove of material to quote from and allude to. Moreover, writers of rhetorical prose should study Homer's admirable methods and techniques in order to imitate them in their own writings, as Eustathios, archbishop of Thessalonike, argues in the proem of his *Commentary on the Iliad*.[5] Following earlier rhetoricians like Hermoge-

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1 Magdalino (1993) 335–336.

2 On the intellectual world of twelfth-century Byzantium, see e.g. Kazhdan & Epstein (1985) 130–133, 220–230; Magdalino (1993) 335–356.

3 On education in (twelfth-century) Byzantium, see e.g. Browning (1997), Markopoulos (2006), Giannouli (2014).

4 On Homer in Byzantium, see e.g. Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou (1971–1972), Browning (1975) and (1992).

5 Eust. *in Il.* 1.27–30. See Cullhed (2016) 9*–11* for a discussion of Eustathios' Homeric commentaries in their social and intellectual context. On Homer and rhetoric in Eustathios'

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nes,[6] Eustathios considers poetry a form of oratory and the greatest poet, Homer, the greatest orator of all time.

The central position of rhetoric in twelfth-century Byzantium is reflected in the image of emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143–1180) as it emerges from the imperial encomia composed in his honour. Manuel is celebrated for his wide learning and oratorical accomplishments especially in the encomia from the later years of his reign.[7] In his *epitaphios* or funeral oration for Manuel, Eustathios recapitulates many of the virtues and achievements that he had praised in Manuel in prior encomiastic orations,[8] most of which he gave in his capacity of *maistōr tōn rhētorōn*, head of rhetoricians and official court orator.[9] At both a previous occasion and upon the emperor's death, Eustathios celebrated Manuel's outstanding oratorical skill.[10] He specifies various qualities that made Manuel an excellent orator: his voice was sonorous and majestic; his memory was extraordinary; his wisdom was all-encompassing.[11] In the *epitaphios*, three aspects of the good ruler as a good 'speaker of words' receive much attention: firstly, the emperor successfully combined attractive style and profound content, thereby appealing to both educated and uneducated audiences; secondly, his orations never failed to display novelty; thirdly, the dense content of his orations was expressed with remarkable clarity of style.

These three qualities of Manuel's excellent oratory are also found in Eustathios' *Commentary on the Iliad* as the qualities of Homeric oratory. This parallelism is programmatic: for Eustathios, Homer is the consummate orator and

commentaries, see also Nünlist (2012) and Van den Berg (2016). On the productive aim of Byzantine engagement with ancient literature, see e.g. Hunger (1969–1970) and (1981), Nilsson (2010).

6 Hermogenes expounds his ideas on poetry as panegyric rhetoric and Homer as the best poet in *Id.* 2.10.29–33 ed. Patillon (2012b). On Hermogenes and Eustathios, see esp. Lindberg (1977).

7 Wide learning and excellent oratory are not set topics of imperial encomia from the Komnenian period. See Magdalino (1993) 465–468.

8 On Eustathios' *epitaphios* for Manuel, see Stone (2000), Bourbouhakis (2017). References to and quotations from the *epitaphios* follow the edition by Bourbouhakis (2017).

9 On Eustathios' life and works, see e.g. Kazhdan & Franklin (1984) 115–195, Schönauer (2004), Pontani (2015) 385–393.

10 The earlier oration is *Op. min.* 13 ed. Wirth. On this oration, see Karla (2007).

11 Voice: *Epitaphios* 31, p. 32.9–13. Cf. *Op. min.* 13, 227.14–228.46 ed. Wirth with discussion in Karla (2007) 95–98; memory: *Epitaphios* 31–32; wisdom: *Epitaphios* 34–40 and *passim*.

the *Iliad* presents various examples of heroes with excellent oratorical skills.[12] The *Iliad* can thus be said to constitute for Eustathios a rhetorical handbook for rulers and other members of the educated elite, an idea that had a rich history by the time he composed his monumental Homeric commentaries. The Homeric scholia, for instance, identify Odysseus, Nestor, and Menelaus as models for the grand, middle, and simple style respectively, while Pseudo-Plutarch in his *Life and Poetry of Homer* argues that Homer was the first rhetorician and surpassed all others in the force of his thoughts and expression.[13] Appropriating earlier views on rhetoric in Homeric poetry, Eustathios presents Homer as a model to be followed by twelfth-century orators—and a model can of course only be relevant and effective if it meets contemporary ideas on excellent oratory. The aim of this paper is to explore the parallels between Manuel and Homer *qua* orators in terms of the three excellent qualities of Manuel's oratory from the *epitaphios*: (1) 'tasteful' or attractive style combined with profound content, (2) novelty, and (3) density of thought combined with clarity of style. For didactic reasons, these qualities receive a more elaborate and concrete discussion in the *Commentary on the Iliad*.

Speaking for Each Man: Profound Philosophy and Tasteful Style

Eustathios opens his praise of the emperor as orator by likening Manuel's words to manna raining down from heaven.[14] Manuel's oratory provided those who were hungry for beauty, whether educated or uneducated, with pleasure in many forms.[15] Eustathios goes on to say:

> Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄλλως ἡδὺς, τοῦ προφαινομένου ἦν, εἰς γλυκεῖαν αὐτὸ βάπτων ἔννοιαν· ὁ δὲ λόγιος, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔνδον φιλοσοφούμενον ἐνεβάθυνεν, ἐκμυελίζων τὸ νόημα. Καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐξέπιπτέ τι τῶν ἐκείνου ἀργόν, καὶ ὡς οἷον εἰς ὀστῶδες τι ἐκλογίζεσθαι· ἤρτυε δὲ τὸν λόγον ἅλατι μὲν διόλου τῷ διὰ παντὸς νοστίμῳ τῆς μεταχειρίσεως, καὶ βαθείαις δὲ θεωρίαις, ταῖς μέν, ὅσας οἱ ἀπόστολοι μαθηταὶ καὶ ὁ ἀποστείλας μέγιστος διδάσκαλος ἀνέπτυξαν, ταῖς δέ, ὁποίαις οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ σεμνύνονται.
>
> EUST. *Epitaphios* 29, p. 30.14–20

12 Eustathios repeatedly praises Odysseus and Nestor in particular, as the most powerful and the best orator respectively. See e.g. *in Il.* 220.40–221.20 for a comparison of both orators.

13 Schol. A bT *Il.* 3.212, Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 161 (1989–1993 ed. Kindstrand).

14 Eustathios also employs the image of manna in *Op. min.* 13, 226.29–36 ed. Wirth.

15 Eust. *Epitaphios* 29, p. 30.13–14.

> And an otherwise simple[16] person concentrated on the outward appearance, dipping it into sweet meaning;[17] a learned person, by contrast, would also sink deep into the philosophical idea within, sucking the very marrow of the thought. Indeed, not did any of his words escape him uselessly and turned out to be, as it were, something bony to contemplate. Rather, he seasoned his speech throughout with the altogether tasteful[18] salt of the treatment and with profound theories, some as great as the ones disclosed by the apostles and the Great Teacher who sent them on their mission, and others such as those for which profane authors are renowned.[19]

Eustathios draws a dichotomy between the style and the content of Manuel's oratory and connects this dichotomy with different target audiences: the pleasant style was there for everyone to appreciate, while the learned among the audience also enjoyed the depth of Manuel's thought.[20] The alimentary and culinary metaphors of this passage occur frequently throughout Eustathios' literary and scholarly output. In the introductory epistle of the commentary on Dionysios Periegetes' *Description of the Known World*, for instance, Eustathios argues that, in his commentary, he serves his addressee John Doukas 'sophistic marrow' (μυελὸν σοφιστικόν), by removing 'every bony part of poetic roughness' (ὀστῶδες ἅπαν ποιητικῆς σκληρότητος).[21] In other words, he presents the

16 ἡδύς here seems to refer to a simple person, as opposed to a λόγιος or learned person. See LSJ s.v. ἡδύς II.

17 Cf. Plu. *Phoc.* 5.4: ὁ Ζήνων ἔλεγεν, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον εἰς νοῦν ἀποβάπτοντα προφέρεσθαι τὴν λέξιν ('Zeno used to say that a philosopher ought to utter his words while dipping them in meaning'); Anna Komnene, *Alexiad* 4.5.6.7 eds. Kambylis & Reinsch: τοῖς μὴ εἰς νοῦν βάπτουσιν ('those who did not dip into his intention'). In line with the culinary metaphors of this passage, we may think of the image of dipping food into sauce *vel sim.* (cf. e.g. *HA* 605a29 where Aristotle speaks of animal fodder being 'dipped into' honey).

18 In *in Od.* 1383.40 ed. Cullhed, Eustathios explains that authors after Homer use νόστιμος with regard to food and that νόστος means ἡδύτης ('sweetness'). Cf. *in Il.* 214.16–17 and *in Od.* 1675.2–3 ed. Stallbaum. Similar explanations are found e.g. in the lexicon by Hesychius (ν 669) and the *Suda* (ν 501).

19 My translation of the *epitaphios* is based on Bourbouhakis (2017).

20 Eustathios makes the same point in *Op. min.* 13, 226.84–89. For Eustathios' ideas on Homer's heterogeneous audience, see Pizzone (2016).

21 Eust. *in Dion. Per.* ep. 85–87 ed. Müller. In the *Commentary on the Iliad*, Eustathios repeatedly connects poetic expression with 'roughness', termed σκληρότης (e.g. *in Il.* 2.30 and 199.28) or τραχύτης (e.g. *in Il.* 2.30 and 944.25). On such rough expressions, see Hermog. *Id.* 1.7.14–15 ed. Patillon (2012b).

content of Periegetes’ poem in a more tasteful and easily digestible form, so to speak. The image of seasoning one’s writings, whether with salt or other spices,[22] is repeatedly found in Eustathios’ letters and Homeric commentaries as well.[23]

Throughout the Homeric commentaries, Eustathios indicates how Homer caters to the needs of different audiences, for instance by including comic elements to entertain the uneducated listener and employing rhetorical techniques to impress the educated among the audience.[24] Moreover, like Manuel, Homer combines tasteful style and profound content, a combination that Eustathios especially observes in Homer’s similes and myths. In his comments on the first extended simile of the *Iliad* (2.87–93), Eustathios explains the functions of similes in Homeric poetry:

> Ὅτι πολλοῖς ἡδύσμασι παραρτύων ὁ ποιητὴς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ποίησιν ἕν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἔχει καὶ τὴν παραβολήν, δι’ ἧς πολλά τινα ἐξανύει καλά. δι’ αὐτῆς γὰρ πολλαχοῦ καὶ ζῴων ἰδιότητας καὶ φυσικὴν ἱστορίαν ποικίλην ἐκτίθεται, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς δηλωθήσεται. καὶ ὅλως οὐ μόνον φιλόσοφόν τι πρᾶγμα ἡ παραβολὴ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πραγμάτων τῶν ὁσημέραι γινομένων διδασκαλία καὶ ἐναργείας ποιητικὴ καὶ πολυπειρίας περιποιητική.[25]
>
> EUST. *in Il.* 176.20–26

22 Bourbouhakis (2017: 153) mentions a parallel of the image of salt in Paul’s letter to the Colossians (4.6): ‘your speech always pleasant, seasoned with salt, it is necessary that you know how to address every single person’ (ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν πάντοτε ἐν χάριτι, ἅλατι ἠρτυμένος, εἰδέναι πῶς δεῖ ὑμᾶς ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ ἀποκρίνεσθαι). Michael Choniates, a former student of Eustathios and a prominent intellectual himself, praises the oratorical style of *megas doux* Michael Stryphnos in similar terms: ‘his speech was not diluted, as it were, with wheedle and garrulity, but seasoned with elements that are dipped into meaning and with pungent salt’ (φθέγμα δὲ οἷον οὐ τῷ αἱμύλῳ καὶ πολυρρήμονι ἐξυδαρούμενον, τῷ δ’ εἰς νοῦν βαπτομένῳ ὅσα καὶ ἅλατι καταστύφοντι ἀρτυόμενον, *Or.* 19, 330.28–30 ed. Lampros).

23 On culinary imagery in Byzantine literature, see Kolovou (2007); for similar imagery in Eustathios in particular, see Kolovou (2006) 57*–73* and Van den Berg (2017) 40–43. Cooking as metaphor for composing discourse was common in ancient literature, too, with the analogy between rhetoric and cookery in Plato’s *Gorgias* (462c–463b) as a famous example.

24 Comic passage for the simpler listener: Eust. *in Od.* 1837.4–11 ed. Stallbaum; προαναφώνησις (‘announcement in advance’) for the intelligent listener: *in Il.* 777.49–50. Cf. *in Il.* 10.4: Homer leaves it to the intelligent listener to infer that the Muse he is invoking is Calliope.

25 Quotations from the *Commentary on the Iliad* follow the edition by Van der Valk (1971–1987); translations are my own.

> The poet, seasoning his poem with many spices, also has the simile as one of such good things, by means of which he accomplishes many beautiful things. For by means of the simile in many places he sets forth properties of animals and various kinds of information on natural phenomena, as will be indicated in what follows.[26] And in general, in the poet's writings the simile is not only a philosophical matter, but it also teaches matters that happen every day and produces vividness and yields much experience.

In Eustathios' view, the simile is one of the 'spices' (ἡδύσματα or, elsewhere, ἀρτύματα) by means of which Homer seasons his poem, making it into 'an admirable dish of rhetoric'.[27] By means of similes, Homer enhances his poem on the stylistic level—Eustathios here lists 'vividness' (ἐνάργεια) as one of their effects, and elsewhere mentions 'clarity' (σαφήνεια) and 'variation' (ποικιλία).[28] On the content level, they serve as vehicles of philosophical lessons. In this context, philosophy must be understood in a broad sense, covering a wide array of topics, including the animal world and natural phenomena, two topics that often feature in Homeric similes.[29]

Eustathios repeatedly argues that Homer sweetens his poetry through myths, i.e. fictional stories involving the Homeric gods.[30] With the attractive myths, the poet intends to catch the attention of the uneducated listener in particular, as Eustathios explains in the proem of his commentary:

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26 See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 472.7–11 and 856.49–50.

27 Eust. *in Il.* 829.48: θαυμασίαν οἷαν δαιταλουργίαν ῥητορείας. In addition to similes (see also *in Il.* 1088.47–55), Eustathios identifies the insertion of historical narratives (e.g. *in Il.* 100.29–31 and 769.60–64), witticisms (e.g. *in Il.* 1084.8), episodes with duels (e.g. *in Il.* 386.34–387.8), and repeated reminders of Achilles (e.g. *in Il.* 503.21–23) as 'spices' of the *Iliad*. See Van den Berg (2016) 77–84, 91–92, 98–106, 110–113.

28 Eust. *in Il.* 1065.31–32.

29 Eustathios specifies the subject matter of similes in *in Il.* 932.55–58 (the animal world, natural phenomena, ethical lessons, historical facts) and 1065.37–40 (natural phenomena, the animal world, everyday matters).

30 See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 11.7–8, where Eustathios lists 'plans of the gods, their wars, schemes, love affairs, journeys, and manifold actions in general' (θεῶν βουλὰς καὶ πολέμους ἐκείνων καὶ ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ ἔρωτας καὶ ἀποδημίας καὶ ὅλως πράξεις παντοίας) as 'mythical matters' (μυθικά τινα). For the sweetening effect of myth, see e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 625.63–626.1 and 717.45.

> ἔπειτα οὐδὲ ἔχαιρεν αὐτόθεν μύθοις ὁ τῆς σοφίας τρόφιμος. […] ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαγωγὸν αὐτοὺς τῇ ποιήσει παρεμπλέκων τεχνάζεται, ἵνα δελεάσας καὶ θέλξας τῷ προφαινομένῳ δικτύων, ὅ φασιν, ἔσω λάβῃ τοὺς ὀκνοῦντας τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας γλαφυρόν, εἶτα καὶ γεύσας τῆς ἐν ἀληθείᾳ γλυκύτητος ἀφήσει σοφοὺς πορεύεσθαι καὶ θηρᾶσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἄλλοθεν.
>
> EUST. *in Il.* 1.42–2.5

> This nursling of wisdom [sc. Homer],[31] then, did not simply gain pleasure from myths. […] But he artfully weaves them into his poetry with a view to the allurement of the masses, in order that he, having enticed and enchanted them through the outward appearance, draws into his nets, as they say,[32] those who shrink from the subtlety of philosophy; and next, having given them a taste of the sweetness found in truth, he will set them free to go as wise men and pursue it elsewhere too.

This passage displays clear verbal similarities with the *epitaphios* as quoted above: the less educated among Homer's audience are enticed by the attractive 'outward appearance' (τὸ προφαινόμενον) of myths, which seduces them to take their first steps on the path of philosophy and get a first taste of the 'sweetness' (γλυκύτης) of the truth conveyed in myths.[33] The idea of myth as 'bait' for the less educated listener and the young student is often found in ancient and Byzantine literature. For example, in the essay *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry*, Plutarch argues that 'poetry, by taking up its topics from philosophy and mixing them with myth, provides the young with light and agreeable learning'[34] and, therefore, should be studied as a preliminary to philosophy. Strabo makes a similar point, explaining that the marvellous and portentous nature of myth creates the pleasure that incites children to learn by way of 'charm' (φίλτρον) or 'bait' (δέλεαρ).[35] Closer to Eustathios' time, John Tzetzes divides the subject matter of Homeric poetry into mythical stories, serving as an allurement for the young reader, and philosophical allegories, functioning as a bait for more learned minds.[36] By means of myth, then, Homer

31 In the *epitaphios*, Eustathios calls Manuel, too, 'a nursling of wisdom' (39, p. 44.26).

32 Cf. E. *Ph.* 263–264.

33 Eustathios expresses a similar idea in e.g. *in Il.* 35.34–46 and *in Od.* 1379.7–41 ed. Cullhed.

34 Plu. *Quomod. adul.* 15F: τοὺς λόγους ἡ ποίησις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναλαμβάνουσα μιγνυμένους πρὸς τὸ μυθῶδες ἐλαφρὰν καὶ προσφιλῆ παρέχει τοῖς νέοις τὴν μάθησιν.

35 Str. 1.2.8.

36 Tz. *Ex.* 43.6–9 ed. Papathomopoulos.

gives the uneducated 'a first taste of truth' or allows them to 'dip into the sweet meaning', reserving the philosophical marrow for the more educated listener.

The *Philokainos* Orator: In Pursuit of Novelty

The second praiseworthy quality of Manuel as a 'speaker of words' is the novelty of his orations in formulation and content: there was not one of Manuel's orations, Eustathios argues, in which the emperor failed to include 'something novel for the ear' (*τι καινὸν εἰς ἀκοήν*).[37] He describes his experience of Manuel's orations as follows:

> Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἀνὴρ οὔτε ἀμφιλαφὴς τὴν γνῶσιν, καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν πολυβενθής, οὐ μὴν δὲ οὐδ' εἰσάγαν ἀβαθὴς καὶ ψιλὸς μαθήσεως, οὐκ ἂν αὐχήσαιμι παραβαλεῖν ποτε τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀκροάσει βασιλικῇ, ἐν ᾗ μή τι ξενίζον καὶ ἀρτιφανὲς ἔμοιγ' οὖν εἰς χρηστομάθειαν εἰσῳκισάμην κατὰ νοῦν.
>
> EUST. *Epitaphios* 30, p. 30.23–32.3

> I, for my part, not being a man great in knowledge, and, so to speak, very profound, though not altogether without depth and stripped of learning, would not claim to have ever lent my ear to an imperial speech in which I did not settle in my mind something surprising and new to me at least in terms of useful knowledge.[38]

Eustathios' conspicuous modesty underscores his own rhetorical expertise—as the most prominent intellectual and rhetorician of his time, he knows very well what he is talking about. His modesty lends weight to his praise of Manuel's oratorical skill and to the image of excellent oratory delineated in the *epitaphios*.[39] In what follows, he connects Manuel's striving for novelty with a

37 Eust. *Epitaphios* 30, p. 30.23.

38 In the Homeric commentaries, Eustathios uses the term χρηστομάθεια when speaking of passages that contain much useful information to expand the reader's knowledge. See e.g. *in Il.* 590.12–13, where Eustathios argues that the passage in question is rich in useful information in the form of historical facts on foreign peoples, and *in Il.* 858.51, where he argues that Homer provides useful information in similes.

39 Bourbouhakis (2007) 154. Magdalino (1993: 468) wonders in how far Eustathios' praise

similar striving on the part of 'Attic men' (Ἀττικοί), whose oratory is characterized by a 'love of novelty' (φιλόκαινον).[40] These Attic men, i.e. the ancient Athenians with their notorious penchant for new things,[41] 'were experts in eloquence, who wished to add new things to the old, in their eager search for audiences'.[42] Eustathios' words seem to reflect the competitive intellectual milieu of his own time, in which *literati*, competing for the patronage of the Komnenian elite, were compelled to distinguish themselves from their competitors.[43]

In the *Commentary on the Iliad*, Eustathios repeatedly draws attention to novelty in Homeric poetry, specifying in more concrete terms how an orator can achieve this quality of excellent oratory.[44] He identifies many techniques through which the poet creates novelty in the content and arrangement of his poem as well as its verbal expression. Homer's striving for novelty is clear from the very beginning of the *Iliad*, as Eustathios explains in his comments on *Iliad* 1:

> Ὅτι δέκα ἐτῶν περιπλομένων τοῖς Ἕλλησι περὶ τὸν Τρωϊκὸν πόλεμον Ὅμηρος τὴν Ἰλιάδα ἐκ τῶν τελευταίων ἤγουν ἐκ τοῦ δεκάτου ἔτους ἐποίησεν καὶ οὐδὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἐκ μέρους τινός, τουτέστι τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ συμπεσούσης μήνιδος τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως. ἐμεθώδευσε δὲ ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦτο ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὸ καινοπρεπὲς καὶ τῷ ἀνελπίστῳ ξενίζον, τὸ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἄρξασθαι οὔτε καινόν τι ἔχει καὶ ὁ ἀκροατὴς δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ οὕτως ἐλπίζει γενέσθαι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ δεινότερον, τουτέστιν οἰκονομικώτερον.
>
> EUST. *in Il.* 7.5–10

of Manuel's intellectual achievements, that is to say his achievements in a field in which Eustathios and his fellow intellectuals were supposed to excel, can be trusted.

40 Eust. *Epitaphios* 30, p. 32.3–4.

41 See e.g. Th. 3.38.5, D. 4.10, *Act. Ap.* 17.21.

42 Eust. *Epitaphios* 30, p. 32.4–5: διεξεσμένοις εἰς κάλλος λογιότητος, οἳ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, προσεπιζητοῦσι καὶ τὰ καινότερα, λιχνευόμενοι τὴν ἀκρόασιν.

43 On patronage in twelfth-century Byzantium, see Mullett (1984). The competitive systems of patronage that emerged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries prompted a stronger self-assertiveness on the part of authors (Lauxtermann [2003] 34–39), with the result that 'the self-confidence of 12th century orators is notorious among byzantinists' (Pizzone [2014] 6).

44 In ancient rhetorical theory, novelty is often connected with verbal expression. See e.g. D.H. *Comp.* 22.299, where 'novelty of figures' (ἡ τῶν σχημάτων καινότης) is mentioned as a characteristic of the unadorned and austere style; Hermogenes considers novel figures to be productive of a beautiful style (Hermog. *Id.* 1.12.37 ed. Patillon [2012b]).

> While ten years passed for the Greeks in the Trojan War, Homer created the *Iliad* from the last events, that is to say from the tenth year and not from this year in its entirety but from a part, i.e. from the wrath of Achilles that happened during this year. And the poet used this method both because it is novel and surprises by means of the unexpected—for to naturally start from the first events has nothing novel and the listener expects it to happen in this way in general—and because it is more skilful, i.e. better arranged.

By not narrating the Trojan War from its beginning, as the listener would expect, but starting *in medias res*, Homer surprises his audience. The poet produces a similar surprising effect by the arrangement of the events in *Iliad* 6: when Hector returns to Troy, he does not find his wife Andromache at home, as one would expect.[45] Eustathios explains that Homer deliberately did not choose the expected scenario, since this would fail to attract the listener's attention; instead, he purposefully develops the course of events 'in a more novel way' (καινότερον) and 'catches the listener's attention' (ἐπιστρέφει τὸν ἀκροατήν). In general, Eustathios claims, it is Homer's habit to write contrary to expectation and steer his narrative in unexpected directions, in order to evoke in the audience the desired effects of surprise and attention.[46]

In Eustathios' view, Homer at times also surprises his audience with novelty in the verbal expression of his poem. In his commentary on *Iliad* 10, for instance, he draws attention to the unusual syntax of line 10.437. Dolon tells Diomedes and Odysseus about the remarkable horses of king Rhesus, saying: 'His are surely the fairest horses that ever I saw, and the greatest [accusative], whiter than snow [nominative] and in speed like the winds [nominative].'[47] Eustathios explains:

> Σημείωσαι δὲ καί, ὅτι τῷ θαυμασίῳ τῆς ξυνωρίδος καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς φράσεως συνεξήλλακται. εἰπεῖν γὰρ δυνάμενος ὁμοιοπτώτως καλλίστους ἵππους καὶ μεγίστους λευκοτέρους χιόνος, θείειν δ' ἀνέμοισιν ὁμοίους, καὶ τοῦ μέτρου ἐπιδεχομένου τὴν τοιαύτην σύνταξιν, ὅμως ὁ ποιητὴς κατὰ πτῶσιν εὐθεῖαν καινῶς ἐσχημάτισεν, ἐξομοιώσας τὸ ξενίζον τοῦ λόγου σχῆμα τῇ καινοπρεπείᾳ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ θαυμαστικῶς τῇ μεταβάσει τοῦ σχήματος ἰδίᾳ τὸν τοῦ ζεύγους ἐκφωνήσας ἔπαινον καὶ συμμεταμορφώσας τὸν λόγον τῷ πράγματι καὶ καλῶς

45 *Il.* 6.369–373.

46 Eust. *in Il.* 662.55–57. On novelty in Eustathios' commentary, see also Van den Berg (2016) 110–113.

47 *Il.* 10.436–437: τοῦ δὴ καλλίστους ἵππους ἴδον ἠδὲ μεγίστους· / λευκότεροι χιόνος, θείειν δ' ἀνέμοισιν ὁμοῖοι·

> εἰπὼν τὸ καλὸν καὶ σχήματι καινοπρεπεῖ ἐξαγγείλας καινότητα πράγματος, ὡς ἂν ὁ ἀκροατὴς ἐπιστραφείη τῷ λόγῳ, καθάπερ ὁ Διομήδης τῷ πράγματι.
>
> EUST. *in Il.* 816.58–65

> Notice also that the form of the phrase has been altered to match the wonderful nature of the pair of horses. For while he could say in the same grammatical case 'the fairest horses, and the greatest [accusative], whiter than snow [accusative], and in speed like the winds [accusative]', and while the metre also allowed such a syntax, the poet yet formed it in a novel way in the nominative case, by assimilating the surprising form of the expression to the novelty of the matter; in a wonderful way with a peculiar change of the form, he utters the praise of the pair, transforms the expression together with the matter, and in a beautiful way speaks of what is beautiful and in a novel form reports a novel matter, in order that the listener's attention is attracted by the expression, like Diomedes' [attention is attracted] by the matter.

Eustathios underscores that it was not a mistake but a conscious decision on the part of the poet to depart from usual syntax.[48] In his view, Homer aims to create a symmetrical relationship between form and content: beautiful matters ought to be articulated in a beautiful style, novel matters in a novel manner.

Eustathios' attentiveness to novelty can be connected with a broader penchant for artistic innovation in twelfth-century Byzantium, which is apparent in the many literary experiments from this period and which 'elevated the transgression of boundaries and mixture of genres to an important characteristic of literary production in Komnenian society'.[49] Eustathios' own literary output provides examples of such a novel mixture of genres. At the outset of his *epitaphios* for patriarch Nicholas Hagiotheodorites, for instance, he specifies the different genres that he has mixed in composing this oration, thus using 'his own method' (μέθοδος ἰδία) and 'taking the utmost pleasure in this form' (χαίροντος τῇ ἰδέᾳ ταύτῃ ὡς τὰ πολλά).[50] Eustathios, then, practices what

48 Eustathios makes a similar point in e.g. *in Il.* 236.18–28: Homer did not include a solecism or grammatical mistake but something that *appears* to be a solecism. The poet consciously employs this unusual or novel syntax to create a surprising effect.

49 Agapitos (2003) 15. On originality in Byzantium, see also the papers collected in Littlewood (1995).

50 Eust. *Op. min.* 1, 3.10–11 ed. Wirth. On this oration, see Agapitos (1998).

he preaches, praising the emperor for the novelty in his oratory, teaching prose authors how to produce novelty in his *Commentary on the Iliad*, and displaying novelty in his own rhetorical writings.

Words like Snowflakes: Density and Clarity

The third oratorical quality that Eustathios ascribes to Manuel in the *epitaphios* again concerns both the style and the content of the emperor's orations. With an allusion to the *Iliad*, Eustathios compares Manuel's words to snowflakes on a winter's day:

> Τὸ δὲ πυκνὸν ἐν διαλέξεσι καὶ πλουτοῦν ἐπιχειρηματικῶς, τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ποιητικὴ σεμνυνεῖ Καλλιόπη, παρομοιοῦσα ἐς νιφάδων πύκνωσιν, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅτε καταφοράν τινα τοπικὴν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως βαρέως ἐκτραχυνομένην, ἡ τοῦ λόγου προκαλεῖται ὕλη. Τότε γὰρ τὸ τῆς νιφάδος εἰκόνισμα καὶ μάλιστα καιριώτατον. Πυκνὸς γὰρ τηνικάδε καιροῦ ὁ καταφορικὸς λόγος ὅσα καὶ νιφάδες τινές· ἔτι μὴν καὶ φρικαλέος καὶ οἷα τις ῥιγεδανός· καὶ τῷ τῆς σαφηνείας μὲν λευκῷ διαλάμπων, ὡς ἐξ ὕψους δὲ κατασκήπτων τῷ μεγαλείῳ τοῦ μεγέθους ἐξάρματι.
>
> EUST. *Epitaphios* 31, p. 32.15–23
>
> Density in discussions and wealth of proofs, that is what the poetical Calliope will exalt, likening them to a dense snowfall,[51] especially when the subject of the speech calls forth a tirade of *topoi* or [a tirade] that is bitingly made rough in another way. For then is the image of snow most appropriate. For at that point his vehement speech is dense, just like certain snowdrifts; you might even say dreadful, and like something causing one to shudder; and, on the one hand, it shines with the brightness of its clarity, while, on the other hand, it rushes down as from a height with the majestic swelling of its greatness.

The poetic allusion is to the famous description of Odysseus' oratorical style in *Iliad* 3.221–223, a Homeric passage in which ancient critics recognized an early precursor of their tripartite theory of styles: as mentioned above, Menelaus, Nestor, and Odysseus were commonly interpreted as models of the simple,

51 Cf. *Il.* 3.222.

middle, and grand style respectively.[52] The quoted passage, moreover, displays affinities with Hermogenes' more elaborate taxonomy of styles as found in *On Types of Style*. In line with Hermogenes, who defines τραχύτης ('roughness') as a subtype of μέγεθος ('greatness'),[53] Eustathios connects Manuel's inclination to make his discourse rough with its majestic greatness. The description of Manuel's discourse as καταφορικός ('vehement') may betray further influence of Hermogenes' rhetorical theory, which speaks of 'violent and vehement discourse' (σφοδρὸς καὶ καταφορικὸς λόγος).[54]

With the allusion to *Iliad* 3, Eustathios likens Manuel's oratorical style to the grand style of Odysseus, whom Homer, in Eustathios' view, presents as the most powerful orator.[55] His explanation of Homer's comparison of Odysseus' words with snowflakes sheds further light on the parallels between the oratorical styles of Manuel and Odysseus. Following ancient critics, Eustathios describes this style of oratory as 'sublime and striking and full of arguments that are mentioned close together, a style that Demosthenes emulates, too'.[56] Discussing the comparison in more detail, he explains:

> Τὸ δὲ 'ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα' εἴρηται διὰ τὸ τάχος τῶν νοημάτων, διὰ τὸ πυκνόν, διὰ τὸ τῆς σαφηνείας διάλευκον, ναὶ μὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ φρίκης γέμον. ἔοικε γὰρ καὶ καταφορικῶς προάγειν τὸν λόγον ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ νόμῳ

52 See Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 72–73 with commentary in Hillgruber (1994) 884–890. On the three styles in the *scholia vetera*, see Nünlist (2009) 219–221. For ancient ideas about rhetoric in Homer, see also Kennedy (1957).

53 On τραχύτης, see Hermog. *Id.* 1.7 ed. Patillon (2012b); on τραχύτης in Hermogenes and Eustathios, see Lindberg (1977) 211–221. In the *Commentary on the Iliad*, Eustathios repeatedly argues that Homer made the verbal expression of his poem rough in order to mirror the sounds evoked by the content. See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 203.33–34, 491.37–39, 1233.65–1234.1. Moreover, in the *Commentary on the Iliad*, Eustathios consistently uses the adverb βαρέως in contexts of indignation and sarcasm or irony, a usage that is connected with Hermogenean βαρύτης ('indignation'), on which see Hermog. *Id.* 2.8 ed. Patillon (2012b); on βαρύτης in Hermogenes and Eustathios, see Lindberg (1977) 254–262.

54 Hermog. *Id.* 1.1.33 ed. Patillon (2012b). In his commentary on Hermogenes' treatise, John Sikeliotes paraphrases Hermogenes' words as 'insolent and impetuous: for *kataphora* is the attack in accusations against the enemy and intensity' (Ὑβριστικὸν καὶ ἐπιφορικόν· καταφορὰ γὰρ ἡ ἐν κατηγορίαις ἐπιδρομὴ κατὰ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ καὶ τάσις, *in Hermog. Id.* 140.6–8 ed. Walz). Eustathios makes the same connection between σφοδρός and καταφορικός in *in Il.* 591.10.

55 See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 199.41–42.

56 Eust. *in Il.* 406.41–43: ὑψηλὸς καὶ καταπληκτικὸς καὶ μεστὸς ἐνθυμημάτων ἀθρόως λεγομένων, ὃν καὶ Δημοσθένης ζηλοῖ. Eustathios here follows the ancient scholia almost verbatim. See schol. A bT *Il.* 3.212.

> κοινοῦ τόπου τὴν πρεσβείαν μεθοδεύειν, παραμιγνὺς τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπειλάς, καὶ ὡς οἷον εἰπεῖν, θατέρᾳ μὲν δόρυ, θατέρᾳ δὲ κηρύκειον προϊσχόμενος.
>
> EUST. *in Il.* 408.1–5

> 'Words like snowflakes' is said because of the swiftness of the thoughts, because of the density, because of the 'whiteness' of the clarity, yes even because the words are full of shivering.[57] For it seems that Odysseus gave his oration at Troy in a vehement way and dealt with the embassy by a commonplace method, mixing threats into his oration as well, and, so to speak, holding in one hand a spear, in the other hand a herald's wand.[58]

There are clear correspondences between Eustathios' characterization of Manuel as orator and his description of Odysseus' oratorical style: while Manuel's oratory is 'dreadful' (φρικαλέος), Odysseus' words are 'full of shivering' (τὸ φρίκης γέμον); Manuel's oratory is a 'tirade of *topoi*' (καταφορὰ τοπική), while Odysseus' words are uttered 'in a vehement manner' (καταφορικῶς) and are full of rhetorical 'commonplaces' (κοινοὶ τόποι).[59] With their wealth of arguments,[60] both oratorical styles are characterized by 'density' (τὸ πυκνόν), that is to say, the various elements of the rich content are knitted close together.[61] Both orators express this dense content in a style that is bright and clear like the whiteness of snowflakes.[62]

While the *epitaphios* places much emphasis on the density of Manuel's oratory through the repetition of the word πυκνός, Eustathios had celebrated the clarity (σαφήνεια) of Manuel's style on an earlier occasion, too. Through the

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57 The Homeric scholia give the same interpretation of the comparison of Odysseus' words with snowflakes. See schol. bT *Il.* 3.222.

58 'A spear and a herald's wand' is a proverb mentioned in various lexica (e.g. Paus. Gr. δ 23, Phot. δ 723, Hsch. δ 2232, Suid. δ 1395), referring to those who make an entreaty and utter threats at the same time.

59 On κοινὸς τόπος ('commonplace'), see e.g. Hermog. *Prog.* 6 ed. Patillon (2008), Aphth. *Prog.* 7 ed. Patillon (2008).

60 Eust. *Epitaphios* 31, p. 32.15–16: πλουτοῦν ἐπιχειρηματικῶς; Eust. *in Il.* 406.42: μεστὸς ἐνθυμημάτων. On ἐπιχείρημα, see e.g. Hermog. *Inv.* 3.5 ed. Patillon (2012a); on ἐνθύμημα, see e.g. Hermog. *Inv.* 3.8 ed. Patillon (2012a).

61 On πυκνότης ('density'), see e.g. *in Il.* 200.30–33 where Eustathios points to the density of Odysseus' thoughts: every line expresses a new thought. Dionysius of Halicarnarssus discusses 'density' as a characteristic of Thucydides' style in *Th.* 24.59–62.

62 Eust. *Epitaphios* 31, p. 32.21–22: τῷ τῆς σαφηνείας μὲν λευκῷ διαλάμπων; *in Il.* 408.1: τὸ τῆς σαφηνείας διάλευκον.

remarkable brightness of his expression, Eustathios argued, the emperor illuminates the darkness of even the deepest thoughts.[63] Thus, an excellent orator is capable of presenting the most intricate content with clarity, a characteristic that Eustathios also ascribes to Homer. Numerous times throughout the Homeric commentaries, he points to the various methods by means of which the poet enhances the clarity of his account—we have already encountered the simile as one of such techniques.[64] I give two examples from the *Commentary on the Iliad* to illustrate two key principles underlying Eustathios’ discussion of Homer’s clarity of expression: on the one hand, he presumes a tendency on the part of the poet to explain himself for stylistic as well as didactical reasons; on the other hand, he starts from the assumption that every word of the *Iliad* has been consciously chosen by the poet and, therefore, fulfils a particular function, for instance enhancing the clarity of the account.

Eustathios observes an instance of Homer’s habit of explaining his own words in *Iliad* 22:[65]

> Ἕκτορα δ’, ὡς ἐνόησεν, ἕλε τρόμος· οὐδ’ ἄρ’ ἔτ’ ἔτλη
> αὖθι μένειν, ὀπίσω δὲ πύλας λίπε, βῆ δὲ φοβηθείς·
> *Il.* 22.136–137

> But trembling seized Hector when he caught sight of him, and he dared no longer remain where he was, but left the gates behind him, and turned to flight.

Eustathios explains:

> Τὸ δὲ ‘ἕλε τρόμος’ ἑρμηνεύων ὁ ποιητής φησιν ‘οὐδ’ ἄρ ἔτλη αὐτόθι μένειν’, ὅπερ σαφηνίζων πάλιν λέγει ‘ὀπίσω δὲ πύλας λίπε’. μεθὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν ὀλιγίστῳ διασαφῶν φησιν ‘ἔβη δὲ φοβηθείς’, καὶ προϊὼν δὲ δι’ ὀλίγου ὡσαύτως ἑρμηνεύει τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦ τρόμου, εἰπὼν ‘τρέσε δ’ Ἕκτωρ τεῖχος ὑπὸ Τρώων’.
> EUST. *in Il.* 1262.53–55

> Explaining the words ‘trembling seized him’ [*Il.* 22.136] the poet says ‘he dared no longer remain where he was’ [22.136–137]; clarifying this in turn, he says ‘left the gates behind him’ [22.137]. After this, further clarifying

63 Eust. *Op. min.* 13, 226.79–80 ed. Wirth with discussion in Karla (2007) 91.

64 See p. 224 above.

65 This phenomenon is frequently discussed by ancient scholiasts, too. For scholia on Homer’s ‘epexegetical’ style, see Nünlist (2009) 202–205.

> it very briefly, he says 'he turned to flight' [22.137], and a little further on he explains in the same way from which verb τρόμος is derived, by saying 'Hector fled in terror [τρέσε] beneath the wall of the Trojans' [22.143–144].

With all these explanations by Homer himself, the meaning of the phrase in question could not be clearer.[66] In Eustathios' view, such explanations are driven by the poet's desire to teach his audience—in the quoted passage, for instance, he teaches a lesson on the word τρόμος—as well as his wish to be understood correctly. A similar idea underlies passages in which Eustathios argues that Homer added a word or phrase to take away potential ambiguities.[67]

Eustathios assumes that Homer, as an excellent orator, composed his poem with the utmost precision and avoided speaking too much or repeating himself unnecessarily.[68] Accordingly, he looks for the motivations behind every word so as to demonstrate that none are idle or redundant. Ancient scholiasts, too, started from the assumption that every word in Homeric poetry is functional and athetized redundant words in their pursuit of the authentic Homeric text. Eustathios' mission, however, is to uphold the superiority and exemplarity of Homer as poet and orator and, more importantly, to elucidate the principles underlying Homer's composition. Frequently, he explains the function of a word or repetition that might seem redundant in terms of clarity, as may be illustrated by Eustathios' explanation of *Iliad* 18, lines 129 and 134, containing Thetis' words to Achilles:

> ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε, τέκνον, ἐτήτυμον οὐ κακόν ἐστι,
> τειρομένοις ἑτάροισιν ἀμυνέμεν αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον.
> […]
> ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν μή πω καταδύσεο μῶλον Ἄρηος,
> πρίν γ' ἐμὲ δεῦρ' ἐλθοῦσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδηαι·
> *Il.* 18.128–135

> Yes indeed, what you say, my child, is true: it is no ill thing to protect your friends who are hard pressed from utter destruction. […] But do not yet enter into the turmoil of Ares until your eyes shall look on me again coming here.

66 Many similar passages can be listed. See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 749.16–17 and 935.4–9.

67 Eustathios makes this point in e.g. *in Il.* 129.42–45, 146.13–17, and 1115.20–22.

68 See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 564.4–5.

Eustathios comments that the word 'turmoil' (μῶλος) would have sufficed, without the addition of 'Ares', as Homer uses it elsewhere.[69] With the addition of Ares' name, however, the poet expresses himself 'more accurately and completely' (ἀκριβέστερόν τε καὶ ἐντελέστερον).[70] Similarly, Eustathios goes on to explain that the addition 'from utter destruction' (αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον) after 'to protect' (ἀμυνέμεν) in line 134 is strictly speaking unnecessary, yet Homer added it all the same 'for the sake of more clarity, as is his habit' (διὰ πλείω συνήθη σαφήνειαν).[71] In this way, Eustathios' commentary offers practical clues on how to imbue the verbal expression of one's writings with the highly appreciated quality of clarity.

Conclusion

In tune with the spirit of the time, in the 'Age of Rhetoric' the good ruler is a good orator or an excellent 'speaker of words', praised as such by a widely celebrated orator and teacher of rhetoric. Even if it is questionable to what extent Eustathios' image of Manuel as an orator can be taken at face value, and even if, at times, Eustathios seems to lapse into praising his own profession rather than Manuel's oratorical skill, his image of excellent oratory nevertheless gives us valuable clues about the principles underlying the rhetorical writings of this period. The ideal orator is one who weighs every word, a word artist capable of creating the desired effects by consciously arranging the words in a certain way, and who, moreover, has something meaningful to say. Eustathios is always attentive to the combination of style and content: style is not an empty shell, but a means for the orator to enhance his content.

Eustathios recognizes the same qualities of excellent oratory in Homeric poetry and fleshes out the characteristics of the excellent orator in his Homeric commentaries. In this way, he presents his reader with a model to follow and provides him with practical help on how to write excellent rhetorical prose. He examines how Homer appeals to educated and uneducated audiences alike, for instance by means of myths; how he surprises his audience with novelties by starting *in medias res* and stretching the rules of syntax; how he makes Odysseus a model for the powerful orator, especially in density of thought and clarity of style; and how he purposefully chooses every word and himself

69 E.g. in *Il.* 17.397 and 18.188.

70 Eust. *in Il.* 1135.10.

71 Eust. *in Il.* 1135.12. Many similar passages can be listed. See e.g. Eust. *in Il.* 770.4–5, 887.19–21, and 1272.44–45.

produces clarity of style, for instance by explaining his own words and taking away ambiguities. Thus, Eustathios' Homeric commentaries shed light not only on the excellent oratory of Manuel as a good ruler, but also that of Homer and, ultimately, that of Eustathios himself.

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On the Good King according to Homer: A Sixteenth-Century Treatise by Christophoros Kondoleon

Filippomaria Pontani

To the best of our knowledge, two ancient authors devoted specific monographs to Homer's view of kingship and to his implicit ethical recommendations for princes and rulers: while we know nothing of Porphyry's ten books *On Homer's Usefulness for Kings* beyond the title recorded by the lexicon of Suidas,[1] Philodemus' much earlier treatise *On the Good King According to Homer* has come down to us in substantial fragments and has been edited by Tiziano Dorandi and more recently investigated by Jeffrey Fish.[2]

However, the only work in Greek on this topic to have been preserved in its entirety has so far escaped scholars' attention: it lies in manuscript form, under the title ἐκλογὴ παρὰ τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν ἐπῶν περὶ ἀρίστου στρατηγοῦ καὶ στρατιώτου ('Anthology of Homeric Passages Concerning the Best General and Soldier'), in ff. 29ʳ–74ʳ of ms. *Vaticanus Graecus* 1352, and it is an autograph of the little-known Monemvasian humanist Christophoros Kondoleon. Kondoleon lived in Western Europe, chiefly in Italy and France, during the first six decades of the sixteenth century, producing a remarkable body of works devoted to philosophical and theological issues, as well as to the moral (and partly allegorical) exegesis of Homer: none of these writings ever reached a published form during the author's lifetime.[3]

Little is known about Kondoleon's biography beyond his close relationship with the outstanding Cretan editor and scholar Arsenios/Aristoboulos Apostolis,[4] and his contact with important members of the Roman curia, from the learned cardinal Niccolò Ridolfi, the owner of the most remarkable private library in sixteenth-century Rome,[5] to pope Paul III, to whom he addressed a

1 Suid. π 2098: Περὶ τῆς ἐξ Ὁμήρου ὠφελείας τῶν βασιλέων.

2 Dorandi (1982); Fish (this volume).

3 Meschini (1973) and (1977), A. Pontani (1988), Piasentin & Pontani (forthcoming).

4 On Apostolis, see Geanakoplos (1962) 167–200, Pagliaroli (2004), Speranzi (2013), and Ferreri (2014) *ad indicem*. On Kondoleon's link with Apostolis as a copyist, see Cataldi Palau (1986a) and F. Pontani (2005) 495–496.

5 Muratore (2009) 70–71.

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letter sketching the ambitious project of a college for Greek and Italian pupils.[6] Kondoleon also spent some time in the entourage of Francis I, probably in an attempt to acquire French citizenship.[7] The uncertainties surrounding Kondoleon's biography impair an exact dating of his works, which are largely preserved in autograph manuscripts and range from theology to philosophy, from poetical exegesis to political theory and beyond.[8]

His six Homeric writings all occur in ms. *Vaticanus Graecus* 1352, for which watermarks suggest a date well into the sixth or even seventh decade of the sixteenth century.[9] Given that Kondoleon's first dated manuscript (*Monacensis Graecus* 400) bears the date 1517, this may imply that this collection of exegetical writings was copied and put together by the author in his old age. The forthcoming critical edition of these works by Marta Piasentin and myself will discuss their transmission and context in more detail;[10] for my current purpose, it will suffice to present and contextualize the aforementioned *Ekloge*, as well as another, shorter treatise concerning Homeric kingship, to which we shall turn first.[11]

The *Tractatio moralis*

Ms. *Vaticanus Graecus* 1352 opens (ff. 3^r–13^v) with a short, untitled dissertation, known under the modern name of *Tractatio moralis ex Homeri locis*. This text starts (§§1–2) with some very conventional claims about the nature of ἀρετή ('virtue') and its relevance for the highest of human activities, namely ἄρχειν ('government'), which is also the only way to acquire true εὐδαιμονία ('happiness'). In keeping with Kondoleon's overall philosophical preferences, which are marked by a mixture of Peripatetic and Neoplatonic elements, this introductory section bears an unmistakably Aristotelian flavour.[12] The essay then goes on to discuss a very particular aspect of Homeric kingship, namely the

6 Meschini (1973) 47–49 and 75–80.

7 This information emerges from Guillaume Pellicier's letter to Jean du Bellay of August 7th, 1536: see Dorez (1894) 232–240, Cataldi Palau (1986b) and (1986c).

8 Meschini (1973) 20–49.

9 See esp. *croissant* type 5377 Briquet (f. 13; Naples 1568), *fleur de lys* type 7104 Briquet (f. 23; Rome 1560), and *agneau* type 86809 Piccard (f. 76; Rome 1556).

10 Piasentin & Pontani (forthcoming).

11 All references by paragraph are to our forthcoming edition.

12 See e.g. §1: Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τὸ μετ' ἀρετῆς βιῶσαι καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ καλῶς κεχορηγημένον εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡρίσαντο ('Most philosophers have defined hap-

autourgia of rulers, princes, and noblewomen, i.e. their habit of performing humble everyday activities themselves, without the help of servants or assistants (§1):

> Εὐδαιμονία γὰρ ἑκάστῳ, κατὰ τὸ ἀνῆκον αὐτῷ, ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἕξις αἵ τε μετ' ὀρθοῦ λόγου πράξεις· διὸ οἱ πάλαι βασιλεῖς τε καὶ ἥρωες, ὁμοῦ ταῖς ἡρωΐσι, τὸ αὐτουργεῖν αἰσχρὸν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἧγον, τὸ ἀργὸν καὶ τὴν ῥαστώνην ὡς τὸν γενναῖον δουλοῦντα καὶ θῆλυν διατιθέντα προσηκόντως φεύγοντες.
>
> Happiness means for everyone to possess virtue according to his faculties, and to act according to right reason; this is why the kings and heroes of old, as well as the heroines, did not regard manual work as shameful for them: they thus appropriately avoided inactivity and laziness, which enslave the nobleman and lead him to effeminacy.

The rest of the essay consists of a series of examples:

- §3—*Odyssey* 18.365–379: Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, invites Eurymachus to a contest of ploughing and harvesting. Had this activity been unfitting for noblemen, he would never have mentioned it;
- §4—*Odyssey* 23.183–204: Odysseus proves his identity to Penelope by recalling in detail how he had built their bed by his own hands;
- §5—*Odyssey* 5.241–257: Odysseus builds the raft by which he will leave Ogygia;
- §§6–7—*Odyssey* 1.345–358, 17.88–91 and 96–97: Penelope works at her loom;
- §8—*Iliad* 24.265–285: Priam's sons prepare his cart;
- §9—*Iliad* 6.488–492: Andromache works at her loom;
- §10—*Iliad* 6.254–258: Hecuba is about to go and fetch some wine for Hector, who is coming back from the battlefield;
- §11—*Odyssey* 6.56–65: Nausicaa does the laundry;
- §§14–15, 17, and 20—*Iliad* 2.41–44, 9.9–12, 10.131–134; *Odyssey* 4.306–309: Agamemnon, Nestor, and Menelaus all get dressed on their own, unaided by servants; Agamemnon gives orders directly to the heralds, not through servants or envoys;

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piness as "living in a virtuous way and being well provided with external advantages in a complete life"'): cf. Arist. *MM* 1204a25–1206b35, *EE* 1219a33 etc.

§§16 and 18—*Iliad* 9.206–217, 24.120–125: Achilles barbecues during a sacrifice; his comrades prepare dinner, and specifically humble lamb, not poultry or other delicacies;

§19—*Iliad* 3.121–125 and 128; *Odyssey* 4.120–135: Helen works at her loom.

At the heart of his essay (§§12–13), Kondoleon refutes a powerful objection to his positive view of the simplicity of Homeric heroes: to those who may argue that this simplicity depends less on the characters' ethical choice than on their primitive and underdeveloped civilisation, Kondoleon replies by referring to the description of Alcinous' palace in *Odyssey* 8.81–103, a building that displays a remarkably refined artistry, in spite of the fact that the Phaeacian princess who lived there did the laundry herself (§13):

> Ὁ μὲν οὖν τοιούτους ἔχων οἴκους οὐ νομαδικὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ βασιλικώτερον ζῆν γε δοκεῖ· ἡ θυγάτηρ δ' ὅμως αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν αὐτῆς παιδίσκων ἐς πλυνοὺς ἀφίκεται· οὐ δορυφόροι προπέμπουσιν, οὐχ ἱππεῖς συνέπονται, ἀλλ' ὡς σπουδαία καὶ κοσμία μετὰ τῶν θεραπαινῶν αὐτῆς τὰ χρηστὰ ἔργα καὶ ἐπωφελῆ πράττειν οὐκ ἀναίνεται.
>
> Having such a palace, he [sc. Alcinous] does not seem to lead a shepherd's life, but a regal one; and yet his daughter heads for the washing tanks together with her maidens: no bodyguards precede, no horsemen follow her, but she keeps being serious and honorable and does not refrain from performing necessary and useful tasks together with her servants.

The rationale for the entire essay lies in Kondoleon's view of Homer's epics as the ethical manifesto of the good old times, when leaders and kings did not disdain manual work: heroic *autourgia* is for him but an aspect of the *paideia* Homer designed for ancient and modern rulers—the faith in Homer's educative value being of course a very ancient and powerful *topos* of Greek culture,[13] and one that was relatively easy to reconcile with the new, Christian horizon.[14]

The idea of singling out this specific topic is in itself far from original:[15] the observation that Homeric heroes are πάντες ἔμπειροι καὶ αὐτουργοί ('all experts

13 See e.g. Morgan (1998) 67–73 and 105–115, Cribiore (2001) *ad indicem*, Marrou (1948) 226–235. See also De Jong in this volume.

14 See e.g. Buffière (1956), Rahner (1957), Pépin (1976), von Haehling (2005).

15 The fullest treatment of the ancient debate is still Schmidt (1976) 159–173.

and *autourgoi*') goes back at least to Aristarchus of Samothrace, who appended it as a comment to the *Iliad* passage in which Priam drives his carriage without the help of any charioteer.[16] In the so-called 'exegetical' (or bT-) scholia to the *Iliad*, we find an impressive list of Odysseus' manual skills.[17] As concerns Achilles barbecuing and the heroes' humble meals (§§16, 18), this issue and its moral implications occupy an important section of Athenaeus' book 1 (8e–19a), part of which has been attributed by some scholars (though not by others) to the shadowy figure of Dioscurides, the author of a lost treatise *On Homer's Customs* (Περὶ τῶν παρ' Ὁμήρῳ νόμων);[18] be that as it may, this obviously looks like a Stoic concept.[19]

However, if ancient exegetes agreed on the constatation of *autourgia* in Homer, their interpretations of it differed widely, and it is precisely this background of ancient exegetical debates that serves to illuminate Kondoleon's observation in §§12–13.[20] While the Stoics and Athenaeus (or his source), as well as several of the 'exegetical' scholia on Homer, argued that Homer had deliberately designed the heroes' *autourgia* in view of his overall didactic purpose, Aristarchus of Samothrace believed that the heroic customs actually went back to a primitive stage of human history. In a sense, he thus followed in the footsteps of Thucydides' disparaging judgment of the customs of Homer's times as essentially 'barbarian' in his *archaiologia* (1.3–6). By referring to Alcinous' gardens,[21] Kondoleon overtly sided with the Stoics, and more directly with the likely source of many of his critical observations on Greek epic, namely the bulky commentaries to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by the twelfth-century archbishop Eustathios of Thessalonike,[22] in whose famous *editio princeps* (Rome 1542–1550) Kondoleon may have been directly involved.[23]

16 See schol. A *Il.* 3.261–262a, schol. bT *Il.* 3.261–262b, schol. T *Il.* 24.148 and 326. On Priam's carriage, see §8 of Kondoleon's treatise.

17 See schol. A bT *Il.* 8.93a and Eust. *in Il.* 701.25. See §§3–5 of the *Tractatio moralis*.

18 See Schmidt (1976) 16–19 and 163–164, and for a different view Heath (2000), who also collects and discusses all the evidence.

19 See Chrysippus, *SVF* III.708: ἐπετήδευον γὰρ τὴν αὐτοδιακονίαν ('they practiced self-service'), quoted in Ath. 1.18b; Schmidt (1976) 163–164.

20 See Roemer (1924) 194–199, Schmidt (1976) 161.

21 Unsurprisingly, the *ekphrasis* of these gardens was to become a *pièce de résistance* of the philo-Homerists during the *Querelle des anciens et des modernes*: see F. Pontani (2017) esp. 208.

22 See Eust. *in Il.* 413.14–16, with the *apparatus comparandorum* provided by Marchinus van der Valk (1971); F. Pontani (2017).

23 On Eustathios' *editio princeps*, see Liverani (2002). See also F. Pontani (2005) 495–498 on

Much like his Byzantine predecessor (who was *inter alia* particularly fond of Athenaeus), Kondoleon occasionally resorts to Biblical parallels for his analysis. For instance, when commenting on Achilles' self-made sacrifice, he observes (§ 18):

> Πάντες γὰρ ἐκ γῆς ἐπλάσθημεν καὶ ὁ Πρωτοπάτωρ ἡμῶν γεωργῶν ἐν ἱδρότητι τὸν ἄρτον ἐσιτεῖτο· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αἰσχύνη τὸ ζῆν ἰδίῳ πόνῳ καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸν πλησίον βλάπτειν καὶ τὰ τοῦ νόμου παραβαίνειν·
>
> For we have all been created from the earth, and our Forefather ate his bread after working the land by the sweat of his brow [cf. LXX, *Ge.* 3.18–19]: for there is no shame in living of one's own toil and work, but rather in damaging one's neighbour and in trespassing the law.

This allusion to the Bible is part of the powerful connection between classical and Christian *paideia* implicitly attempted by Kondoleon in several other writings throughout his career. That he conceived of Homer's teachings as still valuable in his own day, is made clear by § 15 of the *Tractatio*, which reveals most clearly the deeper nature of Kondoleon's essay as a sort of *j'accuse* against the moral decay of sixteenth-century elites, who indulged in a comfortable and luxurious way of life:

> Ἰδοῦ δὴ ὁ τῆς Πελοποννήσου καὶ πολλῶν νήσων ἄρχων καὶ τοσούτου στρατοῦ καθεστὼς αὐτοκράτωρ οὐκ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἐνδῦσαι καὶ ὑποδῆσαι προσίεται, οὔτε θεράποντας ἢ στρατιώτας πέμπει ὅπως πρὸς αὐτὸν τοὺς κήρυκας καλέσαιεν ἢ τὸ προσταχθὲν αὐτοῖς ἀπαγγείλειε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐνδύεται ὑποδέεταί τε καὶ αὐτάγγελος εἰς τοὺς κήρυκας παραγίνεται. Νῦν δὲ κάπηλοι καὶ καπήλων παῖδες ὑπὸ τῶν θεραπόντων ἐνδύεσθαι καὶ ὑποδεῖσθαι θρυπτόμενοι βούλονται, καὶ τὸ καπηλεύειν καὶ μαστρωπεύειν καὶ τοκεύειν τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν ἢ τεκταίνεσθαι ἢ γεωργεῖν τιμιώτερον ἄγουσι.
>
> Here is the ruler of the Peloponnese and of many islands, the leader of such a large army [sc. Agamemnon]: he does not wish someone else to help him wear clothes and shoes, nor does he send out servants or soldiers to summon the heralds or to tell them the orders, but he himself puts on his clothes and shoes, and serves as a messenger for the heralds.

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a manuscript of (chiefly Eustathian) scholia to the *Odyssey* (*Taurinensis* B.I.19) copied by Kondoleon and annotated by Apostolis.

Nowadays, on the other hand, merchants and their families live in luxury and want to be dressed and put on shoes by their servants: they value trading, pandering, and money lending more highly than building houses, working wood or cultivating land.

The *Ekloge*

The treatise contained in ff. 29r–74v of *Vaticanus Graecus* 1352 shares some features with the aforementioned *Tractatio moralis*, most notably autography, a moralistic thrust, and the focus on Homer. However, it is definitely more ambitious than the *Tractatio* in both length and scope. It appears to have been left unfinished, as it peters out in the middle of a sentence (although it seems as if not much were to follow in the author's line of thought).[24] Moreover, it is replete, much more so than Kondoleon's other extant writings,[25] with linguistic improprieties and stylistic faults—precisely these features point to the lack of a proper final revision. Let us first of all follow the line of Kondoleon's argument.

The work starts from the constatation of the inevitable decay of things human (§§1–3), as attested by the physical decline of mankind since the mythical age of the Giants, and by passages of Homer (*Iliad* 5.302–304, and more explicitly *Odyssey* 2.276–277), Herodotus (1.68.2–3, on Orestes' body in Tegea), and the Old Testament (LXX, *Nu.* 13.1–23). As a reaction—the author suggests—the whole of mankind, and military and political leaders in particular,[26] should at least endeavour to find in the Homeric poems a source of inspiration for their behaviour (§§4–6, here 5):

> Ὁποῖον δ' εἶναι δεῖ κατὰ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα τὸν ἄριστον στρατηγὸν καὶ στρατιώτην ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἀκριβῶς καὶ σοφῶς κατεσπούδασται· ἐξ ὧν ξυλλέξαντες τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἄριστον στρατηγὸν καὶ στρατιώτην ξυντείνοντα, λόγῳ τὰ διεσπαρμένα ὁμοῦ ξυντετάχαμεν, μηδὲν ἡμέτερον προστιθέμενοι εἰ μή που ἡμᾶς

24 §110: Ὁ δὲ φιλονεικίας ἢ κακίας ἄλλης ἕνεκα πολλοὺς τῶν δημοτῶν καὶ ξυμμάχων ἀποκτείνας ἢ θρασέως ὑβρίσας καὶ ἀσεβῶς εἰς τὰ θεῖα βλασφημήσας … ('The one who kills or violently attacks many of his fellow countrymen and allies because of ambition or of some other evil, and impiously insults the gods …')

25 Cf. the linguistic analysis of other writings in Meschini (1977) 32–34 and A. Pontani (1988) 146–149. For more details, see the introduction to Piasentin & Pontani (forthcoming).

26 The undeclared and sudden shift between military and political leadership is ubiquitous in the treatise and not very surprising in view of both the Homeric and the Renaissance patterns of kingship.

ἀναπτύξεως ἀνάγκη τοῖς φιλολόγοις χάριν ἐνῆγεν, ἡγούμενοι τοῖς τὰ πολεμικὰ μετερχομένοις γενησομένην ἐκ τούτων μιμουμένοις οὐ μικρὰν τὴν ὠφέλειαν, καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἰρηνικὰ καὶ ἀκίνδυνα πράττουσιν.

Homer explains seriously and wisely in his epics what the best general and soldier should look like in both soul and body: by collecting the lines that outline the best general and soldier, we have assembled together in an orderly way what was previously scattered, without adding anything of our own save where the need for an explanation directed to scholars prompted us to do so; for we believe that specialists of warfare will draw no small advantage from these passages by way of imitation, and so will those who are keen on peaceful and safe activities.

The epics provide us with paradigms in each of the three fields of human nature singled out by Aristotle,[27] namely bodily gifts, moral qualities, and outer, 'accidental' characteristics. Being the most philosophical of poets, Homer has set up a stern opposition between Agamemnon and Odysseus on one side (the successful leaders) and Achilles and Thersites on the other (the losers, the simple soldiers: §§ 7–10, here 7).

Βουλόμενος ὁ τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων φιλοσοφώτατος Ὅμηρος—ὡς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις εἰρήκαμεν—τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡμᾶς ἄριστον διδάξαι βίον, ὃς πράξει καὶ θεωρίᾳ κατορθοῦται γιγνόμενος, τὸν μὲν θεωρητικὸν ὡς βαθέως δεόμενον κολυμβητοῦ πρὸς κατάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι μυθικώτερον τοῦτον παρέδωκε, τὸν δὲ πρακτικὸν ὡς παχύτερον σαφέστερον ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀπεικόνισεν ἔργοις.

Homer, the most philosophical of poets and philosophers, wanted (as we have made clear elsewhere) to teach us mankind's best way of life, which is achieved by means of action and speculation: in his poems, he presented speculative life, in a more 'fabulous' way [*mythikoteron*], as needing a deep dive to be grasped, whereas he depicted more clearly practical life, which is grosser and thicker, in war scenes.[28]

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27 See Arist. *EN* 1098b13, *Pol.* 1323a25 etc.

28 This passage resonates with the traditional distinction between the 'ethical' and 'mythical' character of the *Odyssey* and the more 'concrete' and 'historical' one of the *Iliad*, which is well attested in ancient criticism (e.g. Longin. 9.15, Heraclit. *All.* 60, Eust. *in Od.* 1379.40, but already Arist. *Po.* 1459b15), and assumed by Kondoleon himself throughout his treatise *On the Proem of the Odyssey* (Matranga [1850] 504–510; see Piasentin & Pontani [forthcom-

That Achilles, the best of the Achaeans, should be almost on a par with Thersites, and anyway on the losing side with respect to Agamemnon, is by no means an obvious or traditional choice in the frame of the exegetical tradition on Homer, all the more so as this has nothing to do with the typical reproach made to Achilles, namely his irascible character.[29] Kondoleon's approach relies on his firm intention to emphasize Agamemnon's supreme authority, and thereby to highlight the *Iliad* (and partly the *Odyssey*, where Odysseus is the only legitimate king) as positive paradigms of autocratic power put into practice.

Now to the physical features: the perfect general must have a very developed eyesight, sense of smell, and sense of touch, a rounded head with flowing black hair (§19):

> Περὶ μὲν χρώματος, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ὑπογράφων εἴρηκε τὸν βασιλέα, μελαινοκόμαν δ' ὅμως ὑποφαίνει· οὕτω γὰρ ὁ Ζεύς, ᾧπερ αὐτὸν ἀπείκασεν, ὑπὸ τῶν ζωγράφων φαίνεται τὴν κόμην ἔχων γραφόμενος. Διὸ καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα μελαινοκόμαν εἰσήγαγε λέγων· [X 395–403] Ἐξ ὧν ἔστι συμβάλλεσθαι ὅτι τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ βασιλεῖ ἡ ὑπομελανίζουσα προσήκει κόμη· μετέχειν γὰρ δηλοῖ τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς σύννουν αὐτὸν ποιοῦσα καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰ τυχόντα ἀξυλλογίστως κινούμενόν τε καὶ ὀργιζόμενον.
>
> As for the colour of the hair, even if the poet did not say anything when outlining the king, still he indicates that he has black hair: for this is the way in which Zeus—to whom he compares him—appears to be represented by the painters. This is why Homer presents Hector as black-haired: [*Iliad* 22.395–403]. Hence one can understand that blackish hair is appropriate for a general and king, for it shows that he partakes of black bile, making him thoughtful and not prone to irrational emotion and rage in the face of the events.

Incidentally, that Hector should have black hair is in keeping with Byzantine physiognomic tradition, but that black hair should bear a positive connotation is at odds with ancient doctrine on the issue.[30] At any rate, the head is

ing]). However, theoretical and speculative elements can in fact also be found through a close reading of the *Iliad*, from which most of the passages in the *Ekloge* are drawn.

29 See e.g. Heraclit. *All.* 17–20, Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 129, schol. bT *Il.* 1.193 etc.

30 On Hector's hair, see Isaac Porphyrogenitus, *Physiogn.* p. 87.16 Hinck; on black hair as announcing 'cowardice and great craftiness', see Adamant. Soph. *Physiogn.* 2.37, p. 393.4 Foerster (see Swain [2007] 537).

man's most important *Merkmal*, as in the pivotal line describing Agamemnon, namely *Iliad* 2.478 κεφαλὴν ἴκελος Διὶ τερπικεραύνῳ, 'and similar in his head to Zeus delighting-in-thunder' (§ 14):

> Διὸ τῇ τοῦ παντοκράτορος Διός—ταὐτὸν δ' εἰπεῖν Χριστοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν—εὐσχηματίστῳ καὶ εὐδιαθέτῳ τὴν τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος κεφαλὴν παρείκασεν.
>
> This is why he compared the ruler's head to the well-shaped and well-built one of almighty Zeus—i.e. of Christ our saviour.

Blond hair, a muscled body, a slim waist, a strong voice, and a speedy pace all befit simple soldiers (not necessarily always inspired by *logos*), such as Menelaus and Achilles, who are characteristically presented here (§§ 20–23), for the sake of the argument, as mere ὑπηρέται ('servants') to their lord Agamemnon.[31] The importance of Zeus as a paradigm for the good ruler, beyond its peculiar resonance with Jesus Christ (this reading is not applied more widely in Kondoleon's allegorical strategy, although it belongs to a well-attested medieval practice),[32] stresses the pivotal role of the top part of the body, where rationality and *logos* are located, as opposed to the lower part below the waist (§§ 17–18), and it turns the exegesis of *Iliad* 2.478–479 into a full-fledged *imitatio Iovis* on the moral level.[33] In §§ 24–26 the virtues of wisdom, self-restraint, patience, justice, courage, loyalty, sincerity, and magnanimity are praised as essential. In §§ 27–35 a series of *loci*, especially from *Iliad* 1–6, are adduced to prove that a victorious general (be it Agamemnon, Menelaus or Diomedes, but even the Trojans Helenus and Chryses) should be pious and confident in his invocations to the gods,[34] who will reward him as they did—yet another allusion to Judeo-Christian history—with the Biblical leaders of the Jewish people (§ 32):

> Ὅτι δὲ οὐ μάτην αἱ εὐχαὶ καὶ ἡ εὐσέβεια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεόθεν ἐπινενόηται, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς πανταχοῦ βοηθείας καὶ νίκης αἴτιαι γίγνονται, παρεὶς τοὺς τῶν Ἑβραίων στρατηγούς, ὧν οἱ εὐσεβεῖς καὶ δίκαιοι μετ' ὀλίγων ἀεὶ ἀναριθμήτους ἐνίκησαν καὶ μεγίστας δυνάμεις καὶ βασιλείας κατεπολέμησαν, τοὺς ἥρωας ἐκτίθημι.

31 Blond hair as a sign of irascibility is already found in schol. A *Il.* 1.197 and Eust. *in Il.* 82.25.
32 See e.g. Dante, *Purgatorio* 6.118–119: 'o sommo Giove / che fosti in terra per noi crocifisso'.
33 See schol. A bT *Il.* 2.478–479b and especially Eust. *in Il.* 258.16–23.
34 On Homeric piety, see Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 116–118.

> Prayers and piety have not been invented in vain for the mortals by the gods, but they clearly become sources of aid and victory in all circumstances: leaving aside the generals of the Jews, amongst whom the pious and righteous ones always won, even when confronted with fewer troops against innumerable and impressive armies, and thus conquered kingdoms, I shall concentrate here on the heroes.

After all, according to *Iliad* 2.197 it is the gods who award honours to leaders (§§ 39–40), and yield some of them even a prophetic faculty (§ 36–39 deal with Hector's and Agamemnon's early knowledge of Troy's fall, and with Achilles' dialogue with his horses in *Iliad* 20).

Now, the good ruler must keep clear from a series of dangers: first and foremost greed, the worst of evils, which mars the Jewish race (§ 41; this is, alas, not the only anti-Semitic stance in Kondoleon's writings, although others are more strictly theological):[35]

> Οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἔπαινον πωλοῦσι χρημάτων ἕνεκα· τοὔνεκα ὡς αἰσχροτάτη κακία καὶ φθοροποιὸς τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις θείᾳ προνοίᾳ μάλιστα δέδωται [*sic*], ἵνα παρὰ πάντων τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος εἴη κατάπτυστον.

> Such men [sc. the greedy] are ready to sell for money their friends, their fatherland, and their fame: therefore this corruption and this basest of evils has been assigned by divine providence to the Jews, so that their race might be despised by all.

There ensues a discussion of vices that typically threaten the general: excessive ambition (§§ 42–45 on *anaideia* vs. justified *philotimia*, and the importance of *aidos* and honour, especially with respect to courage: see Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1.346–356), falsehood and deceitfulness (§§ 46–51), injustice, laziness, and irresponsibility (§§ 57–60), cruelty, cowardice, and drunkenness (the latter all exemplified by *Iliad* 1.225 and by the Thersites episode in *Iliad* 2.224–242: §§ 52–56, here 52):[36]

35 See A. Pontani (1988) 158 (l. 274 of the *de unitate ecclesiarum*) and 163 (l. 112 of the *in Lutheranos*). Nonetheless, we have seen in the preceding quote that for the sake of his argument Kondoleon does not hesitate to praise the generals of the Jews as they are described in the Old Testament.

36 See on this topic schol. bT *Il.* 1.225b and Eust. *in Il.* 89.43, particularly on the political purport of the line. On firmness and temper in reacting to insults (with special reference

> Φησὶ δὲ καὶ 'οἰνοβαρῆ' τὸν στρατηγὸν λοιδορῶν· νήφοντα τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἵνα πρὸς πάντα τὰ τῷ πολέμῳ ξυμπίπτοντα παραυτίκα νοοῖτο καὶ κρίνειν ἀκωλύτως καὶ ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ ἐξίκοιτο. Ὑπὲρ μέτρον γάρ ποτε πιὼν ὁ τοῦ Φιλίππου Ἀλέξανδρος τὸν αὐτοῦ φίλον ἀπέκτεινε, καὶ νήψας τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ τοῦ ἔργου μετάμελος γέγονεν ὥστε μονονουχὶ ἑαυτὸν διεχρήσατο. Ὁ γὰρ μεθύων καὶ τὰ δέοντα παρορᾷ, ἀνακαλύπτει τε τὰ μυστήρια καὶ ὑβριστὴς καὶ λοίδορος γίνεται, ἔν τε φυλακῇ τῷ ὕπνῳ κατέχεται, ὃ τῷ στρατῷ ξυμβαίνει κινδυνωδέστατον.
>
> He [sc. Achilles] insults the general by calling him 'heavy with wine' [*Iliad* 1.225]: it would be necessary for him to be sober in order to arrange immediately for all occurrences of the war, and to be able to judge without hindrance through deeds and words. Alexander the son of Philip once drank beyond the limit and killed one of his friends: once he got sober he felt such a violent repentance for this crime that he almost committed suicide [cf. Plutarch, *Life of Alexander* 51–52]. For the drunken man overlooks even his duties, reveals secrets, becomes violent and offensive, and is seized by sleep while on guard, which happens to be most dangerous for the army.

It should be stressed that the remarks about *Iliad* 1.225 do not imply that Achilles' insults to Agamemnon are in fact justified: Kondoleon takes them as mere authoritative indicators of the kinds of reproach that can possibly be addressed to a general.

Furthermore, the good ruler must be a good orator, as is shown by Agamemnon in the *peira* (*Iliad* 2.110–141), a masterpiece of *captatio benevolentiae* and rhetorical skill, which is commented extensively in §§61–70;[37] he must also be well versed in philosophy, history, and other disciplines—this is the rationale of Diomedes' long *rheseis* in *Iliad* 4.370–400 and 6.119–211, but also of the geographical data scattered in the *Catalogue of ships* (§§71–74, here 73):

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to *Iliad* 4.223–225), see Plu. *Praecepta* 815D. On the interpretation of Achilles' insults of Agamemnon in the *scholia vetera*, see Bouchard in this volume (esp. 112–114).

37 Some observations are already found in the scholia to these lines (see also Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 166), and of course the *peira* is a *locus classicus* of rhetorical criticism (see e.g. Dentice di Accadia [2010], F. Pontani [2012] 84–85 with further bibliography); but the combination is genuinely Kondoleon's. For the good ruler as orator, see also the papers by Klooster and Van den Berg in this volume.

Πολλοὶ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἀστραπὰς τὸν νοῦν ἀμβλυώττοντες ἐν ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἱστορίαις ὁμηρομάστιγες ἀφρόνως γεγόνασι· φασὶ γὰρ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ βίου κινδυνεύοντας ἤδη πολυστίχους διηγήσεις τοῖς ἔργοις παρεντιθέναι πάνυ ἄτοπον, οὐκ εἰδότες ὡς οὐ {πρὸς} τὸ κλαύσειν ἢ γελάσειν τὸν ἀκροατήν, ὥσπερ οἱ δραματοποιοὶ ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζονται, ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ πραγματείᾳ σκοπὸν προτίθεται, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄριστον πολίτην κατὰ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἡμᾶς διδάξειν ἀφορῶν, ἐν τοῖς παρεμπίπτουσι τῶν προσώπων τὰς ἑκάστῳ προσηκούσας ἱστορίας συνείρει, ὅπως τοῖς ἔργοις ἑκάστου καὶ οἱ λόγοι ξυνᾴδοιεν. Δεῖ οὖν τὸν ἄριστον στρατηγὸν καὶ πολίτην πάσης ἀρετῆς θεωρικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς μεμυημένον εἶναι καὶ ἔμπειρον, ἵνα καὶ τὰ τῶν πράξεων τέλη καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ξυντείνοντα προγινώσκειε.

Many people, dazzled in their minds by the poet's thunderbolts in his stories, have stupidly become 'whippers of Homer': they say that it is very unnatural that characters who are risking their lives should still insert long digressions in their actions, but they ignore that in this work the poet does not set himself the goal of making listeners laugh or weep (as dramatists are forced to do), but rather aims at teaching us what the best citizen should look like in moral and physical terms, and thus attributes to the intervening characters the stories appropriate to each of them, so that the words of each might correspond to his deeds. The best general and citizen should thus be initiated to and experienced in every theoretical and practical virtue, in order to foresee the outcome of the actions and what can lead to the wished result.

The perfect ruler should be temperate (like Alexander the Great resisting the temptation to rape Darius' daughters in Plutarch's account, *Alex. fort.* 333A11), respected and authoritative (*Iliad* 2.204 'let there be one lord, one king' is an absolute political *memento*), an expert in military science,[38] decisionist, unafraid of toil, friendly and persuasive rather than arrogant (§§ 75–82).

Finally, the 'outer' features of the general are numerous: he must belong to nobility (Pindaric lines such as *Olympian* 2.86 and 9.100 are invoked for this purpose, together with Agamemnon's divine genealogy in *Iliad* 2.100–108), he must be rich (as Agamemnon is described in *Iliad* 9) and have friends among his peers, for friendship is an important ingredient of the ruler's habit (§§ 83–86). A long *excursus* is devoted to the quality of the ruler's garments, which should

38 Kondoleon refers to *Iliad* 4.297–300, a reference which also occurs, in a similar context, in Ps.-Plu. *Vit. Hom.* 192.

be appropriate to his status (in §§ 87–93 examples are given from various descriptions in the *Iliad*, chiefly from book 10;[39] here § 90):

> Ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ἥρωας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐνδύει ὁ ποιητὴς ὡς ἔτυχεν ἕκαστος ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, διὰ τῆς ἐσθῆτος τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἑκάστου δηλῶν· διό, τὴν ἀνδρείαν δηλῶν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ταῦτά φησιν ἐν ἄλλοις· ὀρθωθεὶς δ' ἔνδυνε περὶ στήθεσσι χιτῶνα, | ποσσὶ δ' ὑπαὶ λιπαροῖσιν ἐδήσατο καλὰ πέδιλα, | ἀμφὶ δ' ἔπειτα δαφοινὸν ἑέσσατο δέρμα λέοντος | αἴθωνος μεγάλοιο ποδηνεκές, εἵλετο δ' ἔγχος.
>
> The poet then clothes each of the heroes and of the other characters according to his virtue or wickedness, showing through the garments his ethos and nature: this is why, indicating Agamemnon's courage, he says amongst other things: 'He stood upright, and slipped the tunic upon his body and beneath his shining feet bound his fair sandals, and thereafter slung across him the tawny hide of a lion glowing and huge, that swung to his feet, and took up a spear' [*Iliad* 10.21–24].

The same is said about the ruler's weapons in §§ 94–95, where an *excursus* refers to the allegory of Agamemnon's panoply in *Iliad* 11 as the various parts of man's rational soul (its development along the years, its practical virtues), an interpretation which Kondoleon had developed more fully in a special treatise.[40]

After a short hint to the moral qualities of simple soldiers, among which obedience and loyalty have the lion's share (§§ 97–100, again with a reference to Thersites), Kondoleon rounds off his work by suggesting a comparison between the ethical features of the Homeric heroes and those of his own contemporaries: the latter are totally oblivious of religion and fall prey to impiety, irrationality, and impulse—they are thus ready to be defeated even by a boy or a woman, like Goliath and Holophernes in the Old Testament (§§ 101–104). They are greedy, cowardly, and disrespectful to merits and honours, deceitful, prone to drunkenness, hypersensitive, and unaware of generosity (§§ 105–109):

> Περὶ δὲ ἐλευθεριότητος λέγειν οὐ δύναμαι, ὧν οἱ πλείους οὐχ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ δόξης, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ κλέπτειν καὶ ληστεύειν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καὶ

39 See already Eust. *in Il.* 794.38–45.

40 Also to be edited in Piasentin & Pontani (forthcoming), and to be read in the meantime in Matranga (1850) 510–520.

> τοῖς δημόταις στρατεύονται. [...] Τί δ' ἂν εἴποιμι περὶ τῆς αἰδοῦς, ὧν οἱ μᾶλλον ἀσελγοῦντες καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντες στρατιωτικότεροι λέγονται; Διὸ καὶ λειποτάκται, μὴ αἰσχυνόμενοι, καὶ ῥιψάσπιδες γίνονται. [...] Ἰταλοὶ καὶ Ἰσπάνοι μὲν νήφουσιν, αἰσχρὸν τὴν μέθην νομίζοντες· τἄλλα δὲ τῶν γενῶν, ἀνδρείαν τὴν μέθην ἡγούμενοι, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ πταίουσιν ἐν λόγοις τε καὶ ἔργοις, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.
>
> I cannot speak of liberality, since most of them do not fight for their fatherland or for their reputation, but in order to steal and loot, even from their allies and fellow-citizens. [...] What should I say about the *aidos* of those who are considered all the more warlike the more unreliable and coarse they appear? This is why they shamelessly become deserters and abandon their shield. [...] Italians and Spaniards are sober, for they regard drunkenness as something shameful: but the other populations, considering alcoholism to be a sign of manliness, often make false steps in words and deeds, which is regrettable.

Concluding Remarks

The *Ekloge* is an unfinished work, and one may wonder if a further revision would have improved its style and perhaps broadened the network of references to the *Iliad*—in its present form, the majority of the passages quoted in the treatise belong to Books 1–6 of the poem, although other books are also represented. Nevertheless, this essay stands out for a number of reasons.

First of all, it shares several features with Philodemus' *On the Good King*, as it has been reconstructed by scholars:

- Both works are structured around a critical collection of Homeric *loci*, even if Philodemus displays a greater degree of reworking;[41] it should be noted that the degree of overlap between the two selections is very limited (though of course we only have fragments of Philodemus' essay).
- Both works serve a positive moralistic goal, i.e. by taking their cue from Homer's lines they function as an exhortation for rulers to moderation in sex and wine,[42] to rational behaviour,[43] to justice and balance in deci-

41 Cairns (1989) 10.

42 On the sympotic topic in Philodemus, see De Sanctis (2007) 55–58 (esp. on Phld. *bon. reg.* cols. xvi–xxiv).

43 Achilles is frequently the villain in Kondoleon's works, just as anger plays an important

sions,[44] to nobility of offspring and clemence,[45] to hostility towards strife and useless warfare,[46] to the imitation of the gods.[47]

– Both works show a consistent debt to earlier exegesis (more controversial for Philodemus, due to the loss of many ancient exegetical works,[48] more evident for Kondoleon), but their originality is beyond doubt, especially as far as the selection of relevant lines is concerned: even if Kondoleon—here as in the *Tractatio*—clearly draws some ideas and hints from Eustathios' commentaries, the way in which he shapes his discourse is definitely original and proceeds from an intimate knowledge of the Homeric poems as well as from a personal persuasion about their paideutic excellence, in the well-known perspective that the poet deliberately chose to represent his characters, their deeds, and their speeches with a didactic goal in mind.
– Both works do not state explicitly their ultimate goal: since it appears unlikely that either of them should be intended as a mere rhetorical show-off, as an exercise of erudition, one may assume that both were written as a sort of paraenesis to the authors' patrons (Piso in the case of Philodemus; no named addressee in the case of Kondoleon), but even more compellingly as a wider reflection on the archaeology and premises of power—εἰς ἐπανόρθωσιν δυναστειῶν, 'for the correction of empires', as Philodemus puts it.[49] If this is so, one may wonder why the authors insisted on writing in Greek rather than Latin—perhaps a more understandable choice for Philodemus in Republican Rome,[50] less so for Kondoleon in the largely monolingual Latin culture of Renaissance Italy, where the knowledge of Greek was entering a slow decline.

Politically speaking, Philodemus was definitely a supporter of (enlightened) monarchy, as opposed to tyranny.[51] Kondoleon's case is more complex, but

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role in Philodemus' *On the Good King*: see Fish (2004). See also the disparaging words on Thersites (with quotation of *Il.* 2.215–220) in Phld. *bon. reg.* col. xxi.31–37 and Kondoleon's *Ekloge* § 11.

44 See Murray (1965).

45 Phld. *bon. reg.* cols. xxiv–xxv.

46 Phld. *bon. reg.* cols. xxvii–xxxi (the good δυνάστης, 'leader', must be φιλόνικος, 'lover of victory', not φιλοπόλεμος or φιλόμαχος, 'lover of war or battle').

47 Phld. *bon. reg.* cols. xxxvii–xxxviii; *Il.* 2.483 is evoked both in col. xxxviii.3–4 and in Kondoleon's *Ekloge* § 10.

48 See Murray (1965) 173–176 and especially the discussion in Dorandi (1982) 33–39.

49 Col. xxv.15. See Dorandi (1982) 47 and Schulte (2001) 170–172.

50 See e.g. Rochette (2010) 281–290.

51 Dorandi (1982) 22–32.

in order to understand it the *Ekloge* (whose discreet and implicit praise of autocratic rule we have hinted at above) should not be considered on its own, since it finds its place in a wider network of essays on political issues. The dialogue Περὶ ἀρχῆς ('On Government')[52] is a rather conventional essay devoted to an examination of the science of good government, and of the features pertaining to the ideal *archon* (justice, activity, foresight, *aidos*). The essay Περὶ νόμων ('On Laws')[53] deals with the rise of human law and describes the *polis* as a body whose various parts must cooperate with each other towards the common good, running each its own business (the ideal example is Florence, to whose duke Alessandro de' Medici [1531–1537] the work is dedicated). The Ἀριστοκρατία ('Aristocracy')[54] takes its cue from the Περὶ νόμων, and from its conclusion in favour of aristocracy as the best regime, tackling the thorny issue of how to identify the *aristoi* and assigning this delicate task to a court of *pateres*, through a sophisticated system created on a meritocratic basis.

More interestingly, Kondoleon's dialogue Περὶ αἱρέσεως ἀρίστης πολιτείας ('On the Choice of the Best Constitution')[55] examines the advantages and disadvantages of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, whereby all three interlocutors occasionally resort to Homeric examples:

– Joannes supports monarchy by extolling the lapidary *gnome* of *Iliad* 2.204, which also appears in *Ekloge* § 76 (*Vat. Gr.* 1352, f. 195^{v}).
– Philippos argues for aristocracy by referring to *Iliad* 2.371–372, where Agamemnon wishes he had at his disposal ten counsellors as wise as Nestor (*Vat. Gr.* 1352, f. 199^{r-v}), and to *Iliad* 15.203 and 9.497,[56] which imply that even monarchs can be wrong and change their mind (ibid., f. 201^{r}).
– Finally, Nikolaos, the champion of aristocracy and *de facto* spokesman of the author, resorts to *Odyssey* 2.276[57] in order to question the idea that if a king is good, his descendants will be good too; a few words later, he adds an

52 Ed. Meschini (1977).

53 Still unpublished; preserved in ff. 145^{r}–164^{v} of *Vaticanus Graecus* 1352: see Meschini (1973) 30–31.

54 Still unpublished; preserved in ff. 210^{r}–217^{v} of *Vaticanus Graecus* 1352 and ff. 817–858 of *Vaticanus Graecus* 2141: see Meschini (1973) 17 and 31.

55 Still unpublished; preserved in ff. 194^{r}–208^{r} of *Vaticanus Graecus* 1352.

56 The line rings as a hybrid of the two: στρεπτοὶ γὰρ θεῶν φρένες [*sic*] ('for the mind of the gods can bend').

57 In the form παῦροι γάρ τοι πατρὶ παῖδες ὁμοῖοι τελέθουσι ('few children are equal to their father'), once again an inaccurate quotation.

allusion to the following line (*Odyssey* 2.277: οἱ πλείους κακίους, 'most of them are worse') in order to argue that democracy, the rule of the many, cannot bring any good (*Vat. Gr.* 1352, ff. 205^r and 206^r).

More studies (and above all more editions) will be necessary in order to appreciate more fully the originality of Kondoleon's contribution to Renaissance political theory and to the history of Homeric criticism: neither will probably appear as substantial, despite the efforts of this Peloponnesian intellectual as a writer and a scholar. However, the *Ekloge*—and, to a lesser extent, the *Tractatio*—represent perhaps the most evident intersections of these two *Richtlinien* of his thought—intersections which takes their cue from the gigantic exegetical work of Eustathios of Thessalonike, and will still resonate in the paradigmatic moral value assigned to Homer by commentators of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Madame Dacier down to Alexander Pope.[58] Kondoleon's essays probably had no impact on such a complicated political situation as that of post-Reformation Italy (the 1527 sack of Rome; the constant threat of the Ottoman empire; the opening of the Council of Trento in 1545), nor is there any evidence that their author was familiar with such masterpieces of political theory as were being produced during his lifetime (I am thinking particularly of Niccolò Machiavelli's *Prince* [1513], of Thomas More's *Utopia* [1516], and of Francesco Guicciardini's *Ricordi* [1525–1530]). Still, while distancing themselves from the meagre philological results of earlier humanists (the so-called 'early humanist failure with Homer'),[59] Kondoleon's works will be among the last monographs on Homer not intended as mere scholarly products, but rather as genuine cultural attempts to keep alive—in Greek—the teachings of Classical antiquity in contemporary Europe.

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58 See Simonsuuri (1979) and F. Pontani (2017).
59 See Sowerby (1997) and F. Pontani (2007), and—for later developments—Ferreri (2007) and Ford (2007).

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'Royal Blood Will Stain My Spear': Satire, Trauma, and Semi-barbarous Princelings in Robert Graves' *The Anger of Achilles*

Laura McKenzie

> See whether [...] valure in *Achilles* [...] even to an ignorant man, carr[ies] not an apparent shining.
>
> – SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, *The Defence of Poesy* (1595)

•••

> Swordsman of the narrow lips,
> Narrow hips and murderous mind,
> [...]
> You who, capped with lunar gold
> Like an old and savage dunce,
> Let the central hearth go cold,
> Grinned, and left us here your sword
> Warden of sick fields that once
> Sprouted of their own accord.
>
> – ROBERT GRAVES, 'The Destroyer' (1948)

In the introduction to his 1959 translation of Homer's *Iliad*, *The Anger of Achilles*, Robert Graves charges that for centuries the poem has been grossly misunderstood. He proposes that, unlike other ancient court epics written specifically to exalt their author's rulers (Graves cites as examples the Hittite *Song of Ullikummi* and the Ugaritic *Baal*), the *Iliad* attacked rather than praised those mythical figures whom the current Mycaenaean ruling class appropriated as their ancestors.[1] Homer's intention, he asserts, was to subversively satirize—under the names of Agamemnon, Achilles, and others—the 'semi-barbarous

1 Graves (1959) 13. All further quotations are taken from this edition.

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Dorian princelings' (16) for whom he performed his court epic. Thus, in *The Anger of Achilles*, Agamemnon emerges as a weak, deceitful busybody, while Achilles is 'the real villain of the piece' (23): the archetypal warrior-figure who lies behind the biting satire of Graves' earlier poem 'The Destroyer', he is portrayed as a 'murderous', 'savage dunce', charged with sacrificing the men under his command to his own outrageous self-interest.

Perhaps understandably, therefore, Graves' translation has been widely dismissed by Classical scholars. And yet, as with much of his oeuvre, this text is significantly shaped by Graves' own traumatic experiences, points of pressure which inflect his notions surrounding kingship and military command. While Homer's satire, he argues, was motivated by a deeply felt resentment against the iron-age descendants of the 'Dorian invaders who drove his own ancestors overseas' (16)—a historical justification which is not elaborated on in his introduction—for Graves the *Iliad* reflects the emotional and psychological toll of a far more immediate history: that of his experience as an officer in the Royal Welch Fusiliers during the First World War; the horrors of trench warfare; and the attendant shell shock from which he suffered, in varying degrees, for the rest of his life.

When resituated in this context, 'kingship' takes on a particular meaning. For Graves, a king's role was not simply determined by the traditional concepts of ruling or leading—it was also, paradoxically, a state of being that was made credible only through subservience. Graves' monomyth of the White Goddess, the matriarchal deity whose significance he asserts in his 1948 prose work of the same name, demonstrates his commitment to the idea of the pagan ritual god-king, a man who represented an agricultural fertility god who either killed his predecessor, reigning until killed at the close of his own annual term, or who was sacrificed outright as his yearly kingship came to an end. For Graves, the significance of these divine kings was dependent upon their relationship with the White Goddess who took them as ritual husbands: they still destroyed each other annually, but did so in order to win her favour, a dutiful sacrifice executed in service of the Goddess. Indeed, when preparing his *Greek Myths* (1955) for publication Graves wrote to James Reeves about the discovery of some textual 'evidence' that 'clinche[d] an argument about how the Kings of Sparta were sacrificed at the end of their reign'.[2]

Actual as well as emblematic kings, then, were understood by Graves to undergo this dedicatory relationship with the Goddess. Although the Goddess

2 Robert Graves to James Reeves, n.d. Robert Graves Coll., folder 4.6. Harry Ransom Center, The University of Texas at Austin.

myth does not bear directly on the reading that follows, the inevitable death of the king and dedication of his kingship to a higher power relates profoundly to both Graves' wartime experience and his reading of the *Iliad*.[3] By re-deploying the king's sacrificial fate in terms of duty and service, Graves sets out his conditions for an ideal ruler—one that draws implicitly on the figure of the soldier. For Graves, kingship was best bestowed on men who were prepared to sacrifice themselves in service of another. In the Goddess myth, this 'other' was the Goddess herself; in the grim reality of the trenches, it was the men who were 'bound to one another by a suicidal sacrament'.[4] The selfish, self-serving kings of the *Iliad*, whether Agamemnon or Achilles (in his role as Lord of the Myrmidons),[5] failed dramatically to correspond with this notion of kingship, a failing that is borne out in Graves' translation. Homer's epic thus places a refracting lens on Graves' relationship with the men of 1914–1918, both those he served and those he commanded. Ultimately, *The Anger of Achilles* emerges as both an exorcism and an invocation of the *Iliad* as Princes' Mirror, one in which Sidney's notion of Achilles as a model of military 'valure' is undermined and the heroic qualities of many other characters are called into question.

The discourse surrounding the *Iliad* as Princes' Mirror will no doubt be familiar to the reader by now and requires little adumbration here. This chapter broadens this discussion by focusing on Graves' deployment of the epic as a 'negative' Princes' Mirror, in which the figures of Agamemnon and Achilles are based on military commanders in his own wartime experience. Although Graves does not refer directly to the concept of the Princes' Mirror in his introduction, whenever one encounters satire one is obliged to recognize its corrective function. Graves' poetic sense of responsibility is a legacy of two world wars, and while he ostensibly said *Goodbye to All That* with his war memoir of 1929 he told a 1970 interviewer that, when it comes to denouncing the injustices perpetrated by those who hold positions of moral responsibility in a conflict situation,

3 There is definitely work to be done here, however. In a note to his *Greek Myths* (1955: 312), Graves credits the *Iliad* and Homer with an abasement of the Olympian religion born of the epic poet's matriarchal bias: 'One would dismiss him as an irreligious wretch, were he not clearly a secret worshipper of the Great Goddess of Asia (whom the Greeks had humiliated in this war)'.

4 Graves (1967) 108.

5 Cf. e.g. *Il.* 16.211: 'as [the Myrmidons] listened to their king'. Translations of the *Iliad* are from Lattimore (1951).

> It's no good waving flags, fifty abreast and shouting 'We don't like war'. That's not practical. One must show who's been cheating, who's been lying, who's been making the money in what unjust business. And the poet must pin-point it. [...] If everybody acted poetically there wouldn't be any more nonsense. Sometimes a poet can take action.[6]

It is therefore not unreasonable to presume that, although he avers that he is simply reconstituting the *Iliad* as entertainment, Graves also seizes the opportunity to translate Homer's epic in order to 'take action': to warn future generations of military men against the mistakes made by their predecessors and, in short, to do his part in warding off future 'nonsense'.

In his 'negative' approach to the *Iliad*'s heroes Graves is not breaking entirely new ground: in Books 2 and 3 of the *Republic* Achilles is contrasted with Plato's configuration of the ideal soldier, as well as being positioned as distinctly problematic for the Philosopher-Ruler.[7] The issue for Plato's Socrates, of course, is that Achilles is the antithesis of the bound, determined civil defence-force that he envisions. He is doubtlessly courageous and skilled in martial combat, but he has also proved himself to be uncontrollable, bloodthirsty, and disrespectful of command, portrayed in the *Iliad* as a proponent of the *lex talionis* who comes dangerously close to thwarting his own army's victory over the Trojans. This critical heritage may not have sat too well with Graves, who in a 1951 letter to the classicist William Arrowsmith stated that '[p]ersonally myself, I think Plato stinks; but then I'm an eccentric'.[8] Nonetheless the fact remains that in Plato (and elsewhere) we find a precedent for Graves' conceptualization of Achilles as 'heartless' (11).[9]

Despite the fact that Graves is not the first to interrogate Iliadic notions of heroism, we are able to draw certain bio-critical conclusions from his idiosyncratic treatment of both Achilles and Agamemnon. These conclusions are supported by the fact that, following the Great War, Graves suffered from a profound form of shell shock, or combat-related PTSD. The story of trau-

6 Newman (1989) 121.

7 Cf. Pl. *R.* 3.389d–e, where Achilles' insult to Agamemnon at *Il.* 1.225 ('You're groggy with wine, you have the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer') is criticized: '[A]ren't the most important aspects of self-discipline, at least for the general rank and file, obedience to those in authority [...]?'; and *R.* 3.391c, which discusses Homer's depiction of Achilles' 'mean-spirited avarice and disdain for gods and men'. Translations are from Waterfield (1993). For the interpretation of Achilles' insults in the *scholia vetera*, see Bouchard in this volume (esp. 112–114).

8 Graves (1951).

9 Cf. Virgil's *Aeneid*, in which he is described as a *saevus* (savage) and *immitis* (merciless) butcher of men (2.29, 1.30, 3.87).

matic experience is one of reintegration: the trauma subject repeatedly and uncontrollably experiences the traumatic moment in the form of flashbacks and visions, symptoms which persist because the individual is unable to reintegrate traumatic memory—which resists, as Anne Whitehead (2004: 31) puts it, both 'narrative structure and linear temporalities'—into narrative memory.[10] An argument can be made for the notion that whenever Graves writes about the war he is attempting to facilitate this cathartic shift by reintegrating traumatic memory into narrative *on the page*, and—if this is the case—in *The Anger of Achilles* the satirical figures of Agamemnon and Achilles both carry the freight of experiences Graves underwent during his time on the Front Line. I would thus argue that Graves' reading of the *Iliad* is less firmly rooted in the classical past than his own traumatic history and that, finally, the psychological trauma inflicted on Graves during the Great War is the single most significant factor influencing his interpretative approach to the *Iliad* as Princes' Mirror.

'Describing the Threat of Evil': Narrating Trauma through Satire

As discussed above, in his introduction to *The Anger of Achilles* Graves proposes that the *Iliad* should be read as a satire rather than a 'literary work [...] of almost superhuman eloquence' (13). Once again, his general theoretical approach is not without precedent. Various scholars have read Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1532) as a satiric Princes' Mirror, with Garrett Mattingly (1958: 489) proposing that its author was 'goaded by anger, hatred and savage indignation'. Graves' hermeneutic is similarly shaped by a deeply felt anger and sense of betrayal: within his worldview, the *Iliad* is a satiric attack on incompetent military commanders—the aforementioned 'semi-barbarous princelings'—commensurate with the savagely ironic war poetry cultivated by the trauma of the Great War. Indeed, Graves charges that 'an inveterate hatred of war appears throughout the *Iliad* [as well as] a bitter comment on the monstrous slavery it entails' (24). Where Graves departs from Mattingly's approach to Machiavelli, however, is in his assessment of his source text's comedic qualities. The *Iliad* is, he claims, a 'tragedy salted with humour' (13) designed to inspire mirth, not reverence. Homer's

> pictures of the king-gods of his day were all caricatures. [...] What has been missed is that Homer's jokes were all deadpan. He delighted in

10 On traumatic experience and narrative memory, see Caruth (1995) and (1996).

> guying terrible old bores. [...] He had to keep a straight face and conceal his dirty cracks to avoid libel. He was like Cervantes, no more serious and as serious, cynical but a man of deep human sympathy.[11]

Nonetheless, despite its introduction's emphasis on humour, *The Anger of Achilles*' satire strikes a dark, distinctly ambivalent note which implicitly engages Graves' Princes' Mirror with what Michael Longley (2013: 2) describes as the 'psychic quagmire of the trenches'.

In the discussion that follows, I will be using the term 'satire' with the understanding that its objective is to deride or denounce, and that it distinguishes itself from straightforward didactic invective by encompassing black humour and both the characteristic and intention of irony (for what is satire, as Northrop Frye [1957: 223] contends, but 'militant irony'?). Satire performs a very specific censuring function for Graves, one that he outlines in a 1970 interview:

> One can describe, in a highly personal way, how outside events are affecting one. But there must be a differentiation made in poetry between the right hand—the truly creative one—and the left, which is the satiric, destructive one. You must differentiate between satire and real poetry. Satires are needed: otherwise, one can't keep the balance between real poems and topical comment. In satire, you can say what you like; you can break all the rules of euphony in describing the threat of evil.[12]

This notion of satire as an inherently destructive, disharmonious genre, fundamentally poised to describe the 'threat of evil', is pertinent to many of the critical discussions that revolve around the relationship between satire, irony, and trauma. This being the case, it is extremely relevant to Graves' objective of moulding *The Anger of Achilles* into a negative Princes' Mirror.

On initial inspection, satire and trauma appear irreconcilable. Satire, argues Ewald Mengel (2012: 167), demands 'distance, control, aloofness, and annihilating laughter'. Trauma entails uncontrollable immediacy belied by occlusion, and the 'suffering from an alienation of self'.[13] However, when satire points out the flaws—or 'evils'—of a political or social reality, it assumes a remedial function. Traumatic shock is denuded of its power by satirical laughter—when we

11 Allsop (1989) 70.
12 McKinley (1989) 162.
13 Mengel (2012) 167.

ironize something, we distance and protect ourselves from it. In Freudian (1960: 285) terms, such laughter enables 'the triumph of narcissism—the victorious assertion of the ego's invulnerability'. The ego, faced with forces (such as the traumatic flashbacks of the Somme which plagued the shell-shocked Graves) that threaten to destroy it, utilizes satire to both acknowledge and resist the suffering that these forces would elicit. Responding to a traumatic event with humour, as Robert M. Polhemus (1980: 19) puts it, 'asserts the power of the mind and body over the universe of death'.

When Graves was completing his translation of the *Iliad* in the late 1950s, the accepted socio-political reality was maintained by the ideologies of the 'warmongering' patriarchy he despised. Still plagued by the continuing effects of shell shock, combating feelings of 'alienation of self' must have been a significant unconscious drive for Graves. In 1958 he published the poetic self-portrait 'The Face in the Mirror', in which he described his

> Grey haunted eyes, absent-mindedly glaring
> From wide, uneven orbits; one brow drooping
> Somewhat over the eye
> Because of a missile fragment still inhering,
> Skin deep, as a foolish record of old-world fighting.[14]

Just as the contours of his face bear the scars of combat, so his '[g]rey haunted eyes' register the continuing psychological impact of his wartime experience, wrought far more profoundly than merely '[s]kin deep'. There is nothing redemptive about this description; one perceives a man as caught within his traumatic history as his reflection is caught in the mirror. By reconstituting Homer's voice as 'satirical', Graves utilizes the West's archetypical war poem to satirize the destructive forces—and the figures which embodied them—that shaped his past and present, thus striving towards an assertion of the 'ego's invulnerability' over the reality of the traumatic experience that still plagued him. In doing so, he engages directly with the literature of war, and thus his *wartime self*, for the first time since his 'suppress[ion]'—his word—of the vast majority of his war poems from 1927 onwards.[15] Satire thus offers the traumatized Graves the opportunity for catharsis, of translating traumatic memory into narrative memory within the protective framework of irony. And yet, when we look closely at Graves' *Anger of Achilles* we find that irony's

14 Graves (2003) 470.

15 Hibberd (2010) 290–291.

protective, 'triumphant' effect is far from stable, and that satire paradoxically resists as well as enables the representation of traumatic experience.

Variant theories of irony help explain this tension. Wayne C. Booth describes irony not as protective, nor assertive, but 'as something that undermines clarities, opens up vistas of chaos, and either liberates by destroying all dogma or destroys by revealing the inescapable canker of negation at the heart of every affirmation'.[16] In doing so, he draws on Paul de Man's 1969 essay 'The Rhetoric of Temporality', in which de Man describes irony as

> unrelieved *vertige*, dizziness to the point of madness. [...] [A]bsolute irony is a consciousness of madness, itself the end of all consciousness; it is a consciousness of non-consciousness; a reflection on madness from the inside of madness itself.[17]

Thus, while Freud and others credit irony for the triumph of the self over threatening forces, for Booth and de Man it constitutes a threat in itself, experienced as an epistemological breakdown. Taken to an absolute extreme, ironic insight undermines the empirical self by implying that we cannot really know anything, least of all ourselves. This negation of referentiality is commensurate with the trauma subject's experience: the originary psychic wound is displaced when it is inflicted, occurring only belatedly through traumatic symptoms; the subject does not 'know' what has happened to them, suggesting the 'possibility of a history that is no longer straightforwardly referential'.[18] If irony 'destroys by revealing the inescapable canker of negation at the heart of every affirmation', it therefore stands to reason that it cannot function successfully as a vehicle for catharsis, a process that depends on the uncompromised affirmation of the self over the 'vistas of chaos' at the centre of trauma.

Adhering simultaneously to both of these theoretical frameworks, Graves' translation of the *Iliad* presents us with a satiric, negative Princes' Mirror in which the notion of the protective function of satire and the concept of ironic nihilism enter into a conflicting process of repetition. As readers, there is an unceasing, acute pressure upon us as we move back and forth between Graves' sincere but traumatized voice describing the reality of combat and the strained, 'comedic', 'rational' voice translating the 'satire' as Homer 'intended' it to be understood. Graves is impelled, it seems, to re-form Homer's Princes' Mirror in

16 Booth (1974) ix.
17 De Man (1969) 198.
18 Caruth (1996) 11.

the hope of translating his own traumatic experience into narrative. To do so he constructs a satirical 'safety net' which must, by its own destructive nature, inevitably and inexorably fail him.

'The Best and Bravest of All Greeks!': *The Anger of Achilles* as Negative Princes' Mirror

Let us begin with Graves' assessment of Homer's 'comedy'. In his introduction, Graves points to several sections of the *Iliad* in which he reads the poet's voice as overtly comic—but this is a strain of comedy, given the theoretical discourses delineated above, which we must necessarily view with distrust. When Nestor offers to drive the mortally wounded Machaon out of danger, 'Homer's humour', apparently, 'is at its dryest [sic]' (22). Instead of helping the wounded soldier ('though after fifty years of warfare he can hardly have avoided picking up a little surgery') Nestor embarks instead on 'a long story of his own youthful adventures' and 'is still droning on when the Trojans swarm over the rampart' (22). This criticism recalls the ironic bitterness with which Graves refers to ineffectual, callous commanders in *Goodbye to All That*. One such passage reflects on the disinterest the upper ranks had in the troops' welfare that, for Graves, Nestor embodies. He recounts an incident involving some fellow officers who survived a battle at Bethuné in which one company incurred 'five hundred and fifty casualties, including eleven officers killed'.[19] On reporting to headquarters, Graves writes, the officers were greeted by a colonel 'sitting down to a meat pie' who 'looked up dully' and said:

> 'So you've survived, have you? [...] Well, all the rest are dead. I suppose Mr Choate had better command what's left of the 'A' Company; the bombing officer will command what's left of the 'B'; Mr Henry goes to 'C' Company. Mr Hill to 'D'. The Royal Welch are holding the front line. We are here in support. Let me know where to find you if you're needed. Good night.'
>
> Not having been offered a piece of meat pie or a drink of whisky, they saluted and went miserably out.
>
> *Goodbye to All That*, p. 143

The colonel's lack of interest in the survivors' welfare aligns him with Graves' configuration of Nestor: just as the latter does not attempt to aid the wounded

19 Graves (1981) 143. All further quotations are taken from this edition.

soldier, so the colonel offers the officers no sustenance nor enquires as to their welfare (nor the welfare of their men). It is enough that they are alive and can therefore return to their posts; the human cost of the operation is summarily ignored. By the end of the war Graves no longer felt that this cost had been justifiable, believing that patriarchal warmongers determined to make a profit out of the death of a generation had perpetuated the war beyond need. This rancour is evinced elsewhere in his introduction to *The Anger of Achilles*, where he voices his distaste for the warmongering which permeates the Iliadic narrative. In Book 13, he contends, Homer 'jokingly makes [Menelaus] rage against the Trojans as insatiable in their love of war—as though he had not been attacking them for the past ten years—and then plunge back into battle' (23).

Although it would be reductive to claim that, in Graves' translation, Nestor simply stands for the inept military figures he encountered in the British Army, or that Menelaus represents the callous generals or profiteering politicians and warmongers he despised, it is difficult to deny that, upon reading *The Anger of Achilles*, certain patterns emerge. Agamemnon, in keeping with the source text, does not come off well.[20] The *Iliad* sets the tone of his depiction in *The Anger of Achilles* by operating on the premise that he is a problematic leader. He quite obviously makes a catastrophic mistake by taking Briseis from Achilles, admitting as much in Book 19 when he confesses that he wronged him while in the grip of *atē*, thus causing the death of many of the Achaeans (*Iliad* 19.61–62). Another blunder is the false dream episode of Book 2: Agamemnon, misled by a dream sent by Zeus, decides to test the loyalty and fighting spirit of the Greek army by pretending to grant them permission to lay down their arms and return home; weary of nine years of fighting, the Greeks enthusiastically agree to leave. This clumsy attempt at reverse psychology and his underestimation of Achilles suggest that Agamemnon's credentials as a Princes' Mirror for the ideal ruler are questionable at best.[21] Nonetheless, the *Iliad* never presents him as a satirical figure; it is only in *The Anger of Achilles* that his characterization is taken to laughable extremes.

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20 On the reception of the figure of Agamemnon in ancient criticism, see Bouchard in this volume.

21 This contention is supported by Thucydides' implicit use of him, in Book 7 of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, as an ambiguous foil to Nicias. Several parallels can be drawn between Nicias' speech at 7.11–15 and Agamemnon's 'false dream' speech at *Il.* 2.110–141 which imply that the former was assimilated to the latter. Cf. Zadorojnyi (1998) 302: 'Nicias must lose because he only knows how to behave like Agamemnon.' For Agamemnon's test in ancient criticism, see Bouchard (this volume) esp. 110; for the test as an example of excellent rhetoric in Christophoros Kondoleon, see Pontani (this volume) 250.

In order to demonstrate how the dynamics of characterization, satire, and trauma are articulated at a textual level, throughout the following I will be comparing Graves’ translation to Richmond Lattimore’s *The Iliad of Homer* (1951). Lattimore’s is an appropriate ‘control’ text because it is widely received as a relatively literal translation of the *Iliad*, as well as being one that Graves consulted (as ‘a competent crib’) when preparing his own edition. We will take Agamemnon as our first point of comparison. Throughout *The Anger of Achilles* he is persistently presented as an officious, self-regarding half-wit, with little consideration for the lives of his men. In the Proem he is ‘Proud Agamemnon’ (1) rather than ‘Atreus’ son the lord of men’ (1.7), firmly delineating Graves’ assessment of his character. Indeed, Agamemnon’s self-importance becomes a point of ridicule in Graves’ translation of Book 2’s advance of the Achaean host. Lattimore has the following:

> and among them [was] powerful Agamemnon,
> with eyes and head like Zeus who delights in thunder,
> like Ares for girth, and with the chest of Poseidon;
> like some ox of the herd pre-eminent among the others,
> a bull, who stands conspicuous in the huddling cattle;
> such was the son of Atreus as Zeus made him that day,
> conspicuous among men, and foremost among the fighters.
> *Il.* 2.477–483

Graves’ Agamemnon, however, is reduced to a caricature:

> In the centre [of the advance] rode Agamemnon: he had a frown worthy of Zeus, a waist worthy of Ares, a breast worthy of Poseidon! He reminded everyone of a bull, standing nobly prepared to defend his herd; so heroic and grand, by the grace of heaven, was his appearance.
> *The Anger of Achilles*, p. 66

Although Graves maintains the comparative relationship between Agamemnon’s features and those of the gods, his sincerity is undermined by an observation included in *The Anger of Achilles*’ introduction. Homer, apparently, ‘is utterly cynical about the Olympian gods’: Zeus ‘rules them by fear and cunning, not love’; Ares is ‘foolish and brutal’; while Poseidon is clearly ‘despised’ by the poet for ‘not standing up to Zeus, and for being so touchy about his reputation as a master-mason’ (18–19). The impressive verbal portrait we find in Lattimore’s translation positions Agamemnon as eminently warlike and masterful; in Graves, these qualities are rendered ambiguous because he has effec-

tively undermined the *tertium comparationis*. In the *Iliad*'s original form, an alignment with Zeus is a positive asset for a military leader. The same does not apply to *The Anger of Achilles*, because from the outset Zeus' leadership skills have been called into question. Agamemnon, Graves implies, is motivated not by 'love' for his men and concern for their welfare but is simply concerned with maintaining a grip on his position, whatever the human cost. This too, of course, draws on Graves' own experience of the trenches: in *Goodbye to All That* he recounts an obviously doomed attack at Loos in 1915, before which his Company Sergeant Major protested that the orders given to them by military command amount to 'murder'; 'Of course it's murder, you bloody fool', Graves agreed, 'But there's nothing else for it, is there?'[22] To military command, soldiers' unnecessary deaths were a reasonable sacrifice to ensure the ascendancy of the British cause. Likewise Agamemnon's comparisons to Ares and Poseidon implicate him in (what Graves considers to be) the gods' defining characteristics: brutal, petulant, and weak. The searing irony of the phrase 'so heroic and grand […] was his appearance' is difficult to ignore.

This caricaturization of a leadership figure is familiar to us from Graves' memoir, where the upper ranks are frequently lampooned for being so caught up in the grandeur of their positions that they have lost touch with the realities of war. This is typified by the account Graves gives of a reprimand he and fellow officers received from their Colonel, 'Scatter' Ford, while posted at Montagne:

> 'As I [the Colonel] left my orderly room this morning I came upon a group of soldiers […]. One of these soldiers was in conversation with a lance-corporal. You may not believe me, but it is a fact that he addressed the corporal by his Christian name: *he called him Jack*! And the corporal made no protest! […] Naturally, I put the corporal under arrest, and he appeared before me at once on the charge of 'conduct unbecoming of an N.C.O.' […] But I warn you, if any further case of this sort comes to my notice […] I expect you officers to report the slightest instance to me […].'
>
> […] This is one of the caricature scenes that now seem to sum up the various stages of my life.
>
> *Goodbye to All That*, p. 160

So close to the front line and on the eve of battle, these trivialities are clearly ridiculous and inconsequential. As a rule, this is exactly how Graves portrays

22 Graves (1981) 147.

Agamemnon in *The Anger of Achilles*: a ridiculous and inconsequential figure cast as a mocking parody of British military command. Book 9 of the *Iliad* includes the so-called 'catalogue of gifts' (ll. 121–132) that Agamemnon offers to Achilles in recompense for seizing Briseis. This episode reflects the unchanged nature of Agamemnon's character: despite his professed apologetic stance he engages in competitive gift-giving, reeling off an excessive list of possessions (including his own daughters) in a move designed to accentuate and assert his own superiority.[23] In Lattimore's translation Agamemnon's folly and arrogance is captured by the lines 'let [Achilles] yield place to me, inasmuch as I am the kinglier | and inasmuch as I can call myself born the elder' (*Iliad* 9.160–161). In Graves, however, Agamemnon's diction accentuates his pomposity: 'I expect Achilles, in fact, to be ruled by me; since I am far higher in rank and, what is more, considerably his senior' (162). The officious 'in fact' and 'what is more' recall the aforementioned colonel, with his interjections of 'you may not believe me' and 'naturally', whose preoccupation with rank Graves criticizes in the excerpt above. As Princes' Mirror, Agamemnon thus functions as a model of exactly how *not* to behave when in a position of power. And yet, for the most part, he does not seem to tap into the vein of Graves' traumatic experience. One could argue, however, that he provides a 'way in' for Graves in terms of his satiric reconstitution of Achilles, who proves to be an altogether more challenging, mutable figure. Resisting any singular, coherent framework of representation, Graves' Achilles can arguably be read as an embodiment of the central paradox of the poet's traumatic experience.

Despite the fact that Achilles is sometimes seen as a problematic figure in reception,[24] within Western culture he nonetheless traditionally serves as the archetype of the military hero. Unmatched in his military prowess and sense of personal honour, his courage, intuition, and attacking force are consistently held up as model virtues for the ideal soldier. Despite his flaws (those virtues are, in the *Iliad*, employed for self-serving means), the figure of Achilles functioned as Princes' Mirror for Roman emperors, Alexander the Great, Medieval knights, and modern revolutionaries. Graves therefore flies in the face of convention when he states in his introduction that

23 Cf. Donlan (1989) 2 and 6.

24 Cf. King (1987), which discusses (among other examples) Catullus' 'brutal portrait' of Achilles in Poem 64, in which 'the sharp irony produced by the application of the terms *virtutes, felix, pietas*, and *castus* to the perpetration of suffering and brutality ensures that [our] judgement [of Achilles and the Age of Heroes which he represents] will be a severe one' (116–118).

> Homer treats Achilles with irony rather than humour. Though we are enlisted at the start as this ill-used hero's partisans, Achilles is soon discovered to be the real villain of the piece, who heartlessly watches the massacre of his comrades, just to spite Agamemnon.
>
> *The Anger of Achilles*, p. 23

Achilles' 'villainy' takes the form of withdrawing from the battlefield in retribution for Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis, an unforgivable slur against his own *timē* ('prestige'). To mark his withdrawal from the social structure of the Achaean army, he swears an oath on a sceptre which is carried by those Greeks who would 'administer | the justice of Zeus' (*Iliad* 1.238–239). This is a pivotal moment in the *Iliad*, one that sets the poem's tragic chain of events in motion. Lattimore's translation of the oath is pitch-perfect:

> And this shall be a great oath before you:
> some day longing for Achilleus will come to the sons of the Achaians,
> all of them. Then stricken at heart though you be, you will be able
> to do nothing, when in their numbers before man-slaughtering Hektor
> they drop and die. And then you will eat out the heart within you
> in sorrow, that you did no honour to the best of the Achaians.
>
> *Il.* 1.239–244

In Graves' version of the oath, however, Achilles simply seems to be sulking. His translation appears to lack the depth of feeling, of wrath and oblivion, which Lattimore's conveys:

> I vow
> That all you Greeks assembled now
> Before me—mark my words!—one day
> Shall miss Achilles in the fray
> And long for him, finding your chief
> Incapable (despite all grief)
> To save from Hector's murdering sword
> Whole regiments; then at last, my lord,
> Your anger inwards you shall turn,
> cursing that folly that dared spurn
> Him who indignantly here speaks:
> The best and bravest of all Greeks!
>
> *The Anger of Achilles*, p. 45

Graves, it seems, maintains his habitual ironic stance; and yet, crucially, he translates this section into verse. These poetic interruptions occur regularly throughout *The Anger of Achilles*, increasing in frequency as the narrative reaches its climax in the later books. Comparing the *Iliad* to the epics of the 'ancient Irish bards' in a 1960 interview, Graves contends that the latter

> made a practice of keeping the story in prose and whenever they came to some point of real interest, some dialogue between lovers or some complaint of a dying hero [...] then they took up their harps and wrote it as poetry, and that kept the prose story fresh and also preserved the actual lyrics, which were really the excuse for the story.

In Graves' opinion, Homer similarly 'contain[s] a number of individual poems wherever the action livens up; but great patches of it could just as well be in prose'.[25] That this stanza is deployed as a poetic interlude thus indicates, as he outlines in his introduction, that its significance is such that he must 'take [...] up his harp and sing' because 'prose will not suffice' (35). But where exactly is this significance situated? Are these lines simply a prime example of Homer's satirical 'voice', or does the passage speak to Graves in other ways?

Graves' translation certainly positions Achilles as the object of satire. His speech (like Agamemnon's) is pompous ('fray', 'folly') and—in his own words—'indignant' (the solemnity of '[a]nd this shall be a great oath before you' is reduced to the blustering 'mark my words!'). And yet the oath's intention could not be more serious, nor its scope more explicit. With these words he effectively condemns his former comrades to death: only Achilles, it is understood, can match Hector on the battlefield, and only an army in which Achilles is included can therefore hope to defeat the Trojan host. In his absence, the remaining Achaeans will undoubtedly be slain—a narrative eventuation that Graves was of course aware of. Therefore, unlike the portrait of Agamemnon in Book 2 which merely positions him as an object of ridicule, in this passage Graves seems to be delving further into his own traumatic history, a thesis supported by the exegesis of some crucial differences between the two translations.

In Lattimore's translation, Achilles' oath is addressed to Agamemnon—it is he who has sacrificed Achilles' *biē* ('force'), and when the time comes to face Hector he will literally be able 'to do nothing', locked in a state of ambivalent stasis. In Graves' translation, however, Achilles speaks to the Achaean host *about* Agamemnon. It is the men who he is abandoning, and the result of

25 Graves (1960).

this action will be that Agamemnon is explicitly 'incapable' of saving them. Although Achilles singles out the Achaean 'chief' as responsible for their imminent deaths, Graves makes clear that this is only the case because the petulant, 'spiteful' Achilles has abandoned his innocent comrades to the whims of an incompetent General. He is punishing them not by withdrawing his skill as a warrior, but by withdrawing his skill as a protector. This detail is particularly significant for our reading of *The Anger of Achilles*, but the question of intentionality is a contentious one. In regards to my discussion of the book as a whole, I do not believe that the 'trauma knowledge' Graves brought to his translation was inert. His role as 'knower' is contributive—but this includes the practice of unconscious knowing; and while it is straightforward enough to say that Graves was consciously attempting to write his own history onto the framework of the *Iliad*—surely a natural, prevalent drive to one who was still undergoing the effects of PTSD—the struggle that we find in its pages between narration and occlusion is one that was undoubtedly being fought at a subconscious level. I believe that Graves, in satirizing Agamemnon and Achilles, was consciously taking pot-shots at the military leaders he served under in the First World War. In his deployment of Agamemnon, at least, I believe he was successful. In terms of intentionality, however, the instability of satire as a vehicle for catharsis enabled the figure of Achilles to 'fight back': while Graves' explicit project is to ridicule military command, where Achilles is concerned this project slips from his control into the 'unrelieved *vertige*' of epistemic breakdown. Although Graves may have intended Achilles to operate as a negative Princes' Mirror for those ranking officers he found so contemptable, his unconscious intervenes and an entirely different figuration emerges.

The key to this lies in Graves' evaluation of an officer's—and therefore his own—role in the military command structure. In a 1971 interview he says:

> I hated coming back to England. [...] Our world was the trenches, and what really kept us there—and when I say us I mean young officers—was the sense of duty to our men. We were not fighting the Germans, we were seeing that our men weren't being mucked about by somebody else.[26]

Although he down-plays it here, Graves firmly believed that an officer's job was to ensure the survival of the men in his command; there could be no greater affront to military (or gentlemanly) honour than to renege on this moral responsibility. In his biography of his uncle's early life, *The Assault Heroic*

26 Graves (1971) 74.

(1986), R.P. Graves recalls the horror Graves experienced when he learnt that a disastrous offensive he was involved in at Cambrin on 25 September 1915, in which 'the "B" and "C" Companies of the Royal Welch Fusiliers had been more or less destroyed [and] most of [his] fellow officers had been killed', had never been expected to succeed.[27] 'Their job', R.P. Graves writes,

> had been to provide a diversion from the main attack at Loos some miles to the south. [...] To realize that so many men had been deliberately sacrificed simply 'to provide a diversion', and that he himself had come very close to death as a result, was a profound shock for Robert. [...] [When he heard that another diversionary attack had been planned] he found that his nerves were near breaking point: 'It was difficult for me to keep up appearances with the men; I felt like screaming.'[28]

The lack of value placed on Graves' own life, and the lives of his men, by British military command is reminiscent of Agamemnon's transgressive attitude towards the value of the individual which Achilles criticizes in his oath (note the anachronistic 'whole regiments' to describe the volume of losses). In *The Anger of Achilles*, however, although Agamemnon is the object of Achilles' condemnation, the translation's satirical framework ensures that it is the selfish figure of Achilles who truly fails his former comrades by willingly relinquishing his responsibility towards their protection.

This draws on the discourse of what Jonathan Shay (1994: 20) describes as Moral Injury, an essential part of combat-related PTSD that happens when 'there is a betrayal of what's right by someone who holds legitimate authority in a high-stakes situation'. Graves must have understood the literary depth and import of this passage, but it also, surely, must have struck a personal chord with him. As he wrote to Spike Milligan in December 1968, 'an officer's main task was to *save life* [emphasis mine]'.[29] Although Graves did not abandon his post on the front line, he did lead his men into a situation which, for many, meant certain death. I find in this passage not comedy or ridicule, but the guilt and shame that are at the centre of moral injury. These are the very emotions that Graves writes about in the 1920 poem 'Haunted', in which he describes seeing waking visions of the men who died under his command:

27 R.P. Graves (1986) 136–137.
28 R.P. Graves (1986) 137.
29 Scudamore (1991) 90.

> I meet you suddenly down the street,
> Strangers assume your phantom faces,
> You grin at me from daylight places,
> Dead, long dead, I'm ashamed to greet,
> Dead men down the morning street.[30]

In this context, then, the passage's blustering, comic tone, and words such as 'fray', create an ironic, trivializing distance not only between *The Anger of Achilles* and the *Iliad*, but between *The Anger of Achilles* and the reality of trench warfare which, in the context of Graves' own experience, included British poison gas which drifted back onto their own lines and men being literally cut in half by machine-gun fire. While the text draws on Graves' traumatic experience—as indicated by the words 'regiment', 'incapable', and 'murdering' (which has very specific modern connotations; soldiers are not, in the classical tradition, generally viewed as murderers)—it paradoxically distances itself from it through the vehicle of satire. Satirical laughter, which this passage doubtlessly intends to inspire, maintains its protective function in the face of the brutality and injustice of the trenches. The *animal ridens*, unlike the *animal rationale*, laughs instead of speaking his whole truth.

Thus, in a passage that speaks to an event in which Graves' own conduct—rather than that of his superiors—is the source of trauma, the cathartic project fails and we are left, not with resolution or clarity but the lurking remnants of his unnarratable experience. While drawing on Graves' experience of the Great War, this passage retains too much of what he perceives as Homer's 'humour' to truly recount a traumatic event in which he was not only failed by his own commanding officers, but in turn failed those who depended on him for survival.

Conclusion

The Anger of Achilles preserves, to a degree, the *Iliad*'s didacticism, if articulated in terms which fit Graves' worldview rather than Homer's. In his translation of 1.293–303, the climax of Achilles and Agamemnon's violent debate over the latter's appropriation of Briseis, Graves renders Achilles' final words thus:

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30 Graves (2003) ll. 6–10.

> Trample on whom you please, but not on Achilles, son of Peleus, for his engagement is at an end. And pay attention when I declare that [...] an attempt to impress me with your power by touching any other possession of mine would be dangerous! Visit my ship in that mood and royal blood will stain my spear!
>
> *The Anger of Achilles*, p. 46

Graves believed that Homer’s intention was to lampoon the ‘semi-barbarous princelings’ of his own time by satirizing them in the form of Agamemnon and Achilles; these same figures, then, necessarily function for Graves’ ‘Homer’ as a negative Princes’ Mirror—cautionary tales for rulers/leaders. This hermeneutic conflates with Graves’ own time and history at his most vulnerable point. In an attempt to assert what Polhemus called ‘the power of the mind and body over the universe of death’ he endeavours to draw royal blood by satirizing the military commanders of his own time, reconstituting the *Iliad* as a negative Princes’ Mirror in which the sins of those who drew up the ‘butcher’s bill’ of the Great War are reflected. Agamemnon is deployed (successfully, I would argue) as a negative mirror for military commanders, one which draws on the author’s encounters with the upper echelons of the British Army. This, admittedly, is partly due to the fact that the original text contains elements that encourage such a reading—Agamemnon is not an unproblematic figure to begin with. The same cannot be said, however, for the more tragic figure of Achilles. Ultimately, the irony which Booth labels a destructive, ‘inescapable canker of negation’ is proved to be just that. Although *The Anger of Achilles*’ satire is effective in its own right, Graves’ Achilles is not all he seems to be, and the irony Graves deploys never achieves its purgative potential. Despite Graves’ best efforts at striving towards catharsis by ‘writing out’ the destructive behaviour of his superiors, the reflection he sees staring back at him in the negative Princes’ Mirror of Achilles is more disturbing than that of Agamemnon, Nestor, and Menelaus combined: it is his own. In the final account, it is not ‘royal blood’ that Graves perceives on his hands, but the blood of the soldiers whose deaths he holds himself responsible for. There is perhaps as much of Graves in ‘The Destroyer’, *The Anger of Achilles* suggests, as there is in ‘The Face in the Mirror’: ‘old’, ‘savage’, and of ‘murderous mind’, Graves remains ‘warden’ of the ‘sick fields’ of the trenches from which, forty years on, he still cannot escape.

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